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Summary 
The realisation of socio-economic rights – often through the medium of administrative law 
– is a critical prerequisite for the transformation of South African society. Resources are integral 
to the fulfilment of socio-economic rights. However, resources are finite. Difficult allocative 
choices must thus be made since the fulfilment of different rights, and short-term and long-
term poverty alleviation programmes, all compete for resources. The primary research problem 
that this dissertation addresses is how Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach can contribute to the development of a theoretical paradigm for the judicial review of 
State resource allocation decisions that impact on socio-economic rights. This dissertation 
identifies key linkages that exist between the capabilities theory and the characteristics of 
South Africa’s project of transformative constitutionalism. Once these central tenets are 
identified, they should be observed throughout the adjudicatory process.  
In this dissertation the need for the development of a capabilities-based standard of review 
for the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions is assessed. Thereafter, a 
capabilities-based standard of review is designed. The weighting exercise required for the 
ranking of capabilities is carefully developed to cater for instances where diverse rights 
compete for prominence and resource allocation, or where long-term and short-term capability 
realisation vies for resources. However, it is cautioned that a capabilities-centred weighting 
exercise is only feasible where courts are willing to substantively interpret socio-economic 
rights. The interpretation of the content of the relevant right with reference to the capabilities it 
represents in a particular historical, social and factual context constitutes the first stage of the 
two-stage analysis. At the second stage of the rights-analysis, a capabilities-centred 
proportionality analysis can be applied to the impugned allocative decision. Finally, the 
contours of a capabilities approach to remedies are explored, whereby the efficacy of a remedy 
is measured by its potential to effect capability realisation.  
Thus, courts can extract accountability, responsiveness and openness from the State by 
requiring it to justify its allocative choices in the light of the normative content and purposes of 
socio-economic rights. Where reasonable resource allocation decisions are required, courts 
can help ensure that the State directs its resources to socio-economic capability realisation at 
a systemic level. Where resources are allocated to realise capability needs, it becomes 
possible for the socio-economically disadvantaged members of our society to unlock their 
potential and choose to live meaningful lives. In this way, a society characterised by freedom, 
dignity and equality for all becomes a realistic prospect. 
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Opsomming 
Die verwesenliking van sosio-ekonomiese regte, dikwels deur middel van administratiefreg, 
is ŉ voorvereiste van kritieke belang vir die transformasie van die Suid Afrikaanse samelewing. 
Hulpbronne is integraal tot die verwesenliking van sosio-ekonomiese regte. Hulpbronne is 
egter beperk. Moeilike toedelingsbesluite moet dus gemaak word aangesien die vervulling van 
verskillende regte, en die kort- en langtermyn programme vir verligting van armoede, almal 
meeding om hulpbronne. Die primêre navorsingsvraagstuk wat hierdie proefskrif aanspreek is 
hoe Amartya Sen en Martha Nussbaum se vermoënsbenadering kan bydra tot die ontwikkeling 
van ŉ teoretiese paradigma vir die regterlike hersiening van die Staat se toewysingsbesluite 
wat ŉ impak op sosio-ekonomiese regte het. Hierdie proefskrif identifiseer sleutel raakpunte 
wat bestaan tussen die vermoënsteorie en die eienskappe van Suid Afrika se projek van 
transformerende konstitusionalisme. Sodra hierdie kernbeginsels geïdentifiseer is, moet dit 
deurgaans in die beoordelingsproses nagekom word.  
In hierdie proefskrif word die noodsaak vir die ontwikkeling van ŉ vermoënsgebaseerde 
hersieningstandaard vir besluite oor die toewysing van Staatshulpbronne bepaal. 
Dienooreenkomstig word ŉ vermoënsgebaseerde standaard vir hersiening ontwerp. Die 
gewigstoekenningsoefening wat die gradering van vermoëns vereis, is deeglik ontwikkel om 
voorsiening te maak vir gevalle waar uiteenlopende regte meeding om voorrang en 
hulpbrontoewysing, of waar lang- en korttermyn vermoënsverwesenliking meeding om 
hulpbronne. Daar word nietemin gewaarsku dat ŉ vermoëns-gesentreerde 
gewigstoekenningsoefening slegs haalbaar is indien die howe bereid is om sosio-ekonomiese 
regte substantief te vertolk. Die vertolking van die inhoud van die ter sake reg met verwysing 
na die vermoëns wat dit verteenwoordig in ŉ bepaalde historiese, sosiale en feitelike konteks 
maak die eerste fase van die twee-stap analise uit. By die tweede fase van die regte-ontleding 
kan ŉ vermoëns-gesentreerde proporsionaliteitsontleding toegepas word op die 
bevraagtekende toewysingsbesluit. Laastens word die kontoere van ŉ vermoënsbenadering 
tot remedies ondersoek, waarvolgens die doelmatigheid van ŉ remedie gemeet word aan die 
potensiaal om vermoënsrealisering te bewerkstellig.  
Aldus kan die howe die Staat dwing tot verantwoordingspligtigheid, ŉ responsiewe 
ingesteldheid en openheid deur te vereis dat die Staat sy toewysingsbesluite verantwoord in 
die lig van die normatiewe konteks en doelwitte van sosio-ekonomiese regte. Indien redelike 
hulpbrontoewysingsbesluite vereis word, kan die howe help om te verseker dat die Staat sy 
hulpbronne aanwend vir sosio-ekonomiese vermoënsbewerkstelling op ŉ sistematiese vlak. 
Wanneer hulpbronne toegewys word om vermoënsbehoeftes te realiseer, word dit vir die 
sosio-ekonomies-benadeelde lede van ons samelewing moontlik om hul potensiaal te ontsluit 
en te kies om ŉ betekenisvolle lewe te leef. Sodoende word ŉ samelewing gekenmerk deur 
vryheid, menswaardigheid en gelykheid vir almal ŉ realistiese vooruitsig. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1 1 Background  
 
1 1 1 A transformative constitution 
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the “Constitution”) evinces 
a commitment to “[i]mprove the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of 
each person”.1 For this vision to become a reality, South African political, legal, social 
and economic institutions must be transformed to create a society in which the 
freedom, dignity and equal worth of all who live here are recognised and supported.2 
Large-scale reform is necessary to address the structural patterns of disadvantage 
caused by discriminatory laws and policies enacted under the apartheid regime.3 In 
addition to redressing the wrongs of the past, the positive construction of “a society 
based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights”4 is required. 
Our Constitution sets out the fundamental values that should guide the process of 
transformation.5 It also provides a constitutional framework in which this ambitious 
project can unfold.   
The law can be a powerful tool with which to effect social change.6 The law was 
used as a tool to oppress the majority of the South African population,7 and it can be 
used as a tool to attain social justice. Karl Klare’s well-known conceptualisation of 
“transformative constitutionalism” highlights the important role that law and legal 
                                            
1 Preamble to the Constitution.  
2 South Africa is founded on, inter alia, “[h]uman dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms”. S 1(a) of the Constitution.  
3 Preamble.  
4 Preamble.  
5 Besides the fundamental values of freedom, dignity and equality enumerated in s 1(a) of the 
Constitution, the other fundamental values on which our society is based are set out in s (1)(b)-
(d) of the Constitution. 
6 SA Scheingold The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political Change 2 ed 
(2004) 131.  
7 Legislation used to further racial oppression includes, but is not limited to, the Group Areas 
Act 41 of 1950; the Black Education Act 47 of 1953; the Reservation of Separate Amenities 
Act 49 of 1953 and the Group Areas Act 36 of 1966.  
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processes can play in the transformation of society through constitutional interpretation 
and enactment.8 
The shift from a system of parliamentary sovereignty to one of constitutional 
supremacy has fundamentally altered the foundations on which our legal system is 
based. The Constitutional Court is the ultimate guardian of the rights entrenched in the 
Bill of Rights. The judiciary in its entirety is subject only to the Constitution and the law.9 
Courts fulfil a significant function in a concerted effort to effect societal transformation 
by interpreting and enforcing constitutional rights. Of course, courts can by no means 
achieve this project in isolation. It is primarily the task of government to implement laws 
and policies aimed at far-reaching transformation.  
However, transformation must occur through on-going participatory processes that 
enable the public and civil society organisations to contribute to the formulation of 
government’s transformative agenda.10 Courts constitute one (amongst many) 
platforms where deliberation and participation can occur. Furthermore, courts can 
ensure that laws, policies and administrative action are constitutionally compliant. By 
engaging in substantive reasoning and requiring government to justify its actions, 
courts can support the transition from a culture of authority to a culture of justification, 
in terms of which all exercises of public power must be justified.11 In this way, the 
judiciary constitutes an institution that can promote the foundational values of 
accountability, responsiveness and openness.12 
 
1 1 2 Socio-economic and administrative justice 
 
1 1 2 1 Socio-economic rights 
 
The inclusion of justiciable socio-economic rights in the Constitution is significant for 
the achievement of societal transformation. Previously, apartheid policy systematically 
denied adequate access to socio-economic services to the majority of our country 
                                            
8 KE Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 150, 
quoted in chapter two part 2 4 below. 
9 S 165 of the Constitution.  
10 P Langa “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stell LR 351 354. 
11 E Mureinik “A Bridge to Where?: Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31 
32; M Pieterse “What do we Mean when we Talk About Transformative Constitutionalism?” 
(2005) 20 SAPL 155 156, 161, 165.  
12 S 1(d) of the Constitution.  
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based on race.13 The realisation of, inter alia, the rights to education;14 access to 
adequate housing;15 health care, sufficient food and water, and to social security,16 is 
necessary to address the structural socio-economic disadvantage caused by apartheid 
era laws and policies. In addition, it is necessary to realise socio-economic rights in 
order to facilitate the enjoyment of all other constitutional rights.17 Without the basic 
socio-economic means to live an autonomous and dignified life, meaningful 
participation in social, economic and political life is not possible. Nelson Mandela has 
made this point compellingly: 
 
“We must address the issues of poverty, want, deprivation and inequality in accordance 
with international standards which recognise the indivisibility of human rights. The right to 
vote, without food, shelter and health care will create the appearance of equality and justice, 
while actual inequality is entrenched. We do not want freedom without bread, nor do we 
want bread without freedom. We must provide for all the fundamental rights and freedoms 
associated with a democratic society.”18   
 
Furthermore, the realisation of socio-economic rights is crucial for the achievement 
of the constitutional objective to free the potential of each person. Without the 
enjoyment of basic socio-economic resources, the values of freedom, dignity and 
equality, on which our democracy is based, will never find meaningful expression in 
the lives of the socio-economically vulnerable members of our society.19  
 
1 1 2 2 Administrative justice  
 
In an effort to realise socio-economic rights and so attain social justice, the tenets 
of administrative justice must also be adhered to. Prior to the advent of constitutional 
democracy in South Africa, the State often denied socio-economic justice to the 
majority of its citizens through the mechanisms of administrative law. For example, 
                                            
13 K McLean Constitutional Deference, Courts and Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 
(2009) 9; CR Sunstein “Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa” (2001) 11 
Constitutional Forum 123 125. 
14 S 29 of the Constitution. 
15 S 26. 
16 S 27. 
17 Including “first generation” civil and political rights.  
18 N Mandela “Address of Nelson Mandela at his Investiture as Doctor of Laws” ANC 
<http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=4094> (accessed 25-09-2014). 
19 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 2. 
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access to housing and education was regulated through administrative law.20 In our 
current constitutional dispensation, administrative power continues to be vast. 
However, administrative action should now be directed at furthering the project of 
transformative constitutionalism, as opposed to denying social justice to the South 
African people.  
Socio-economic rights are often realised through the medium of administrative 
action. The realisation of socio-economic rights therefore forms part of administrative 
law’s potential to contribute to transformative constitutionalism. The fulfilment of socio-
economic rights is not enough – the means through which these rights are realised 
should reinforce the achievement of administrative justice.21 When implementing 
socio-economic policy and legislation, administrative action must thus be lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair.22 A constitutionally compliant allocation of resources 
towards, for example, social security will not lead to social justice if the grant system is 
unjustly administered. Social justice is therefore predicated on the realisation of socio-
economic rights in an administratively just manner. 
Furthermore, the manner in which legal claims are framed should not be allowed to 
prejudice the attainment of socio-economic justice. Thus, for example, a claim for the 
provision of social security might be framed as a socio-economic rights case or an 
administrative justice case, or both. It is imperative that administrative law be 
substantively developed to ensure that the interests sought to be asserted through 
such claims are sufficiently protected, regardless of how a claim is formulated. The 
substantive development of administrative law is thus necessary to ensure socio-
economic and administrative justice.  
 
1 1 3 A capabilities perspective   
 
The capabilities theory, as developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum,23 
resonates strongly with a project of transformative constitutionalism. Whereas one of 
                                            
20 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 11.  
21 The right to administrative justice is enshrined in s 33 of the Constitution. The Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”) aims to give legislative expression to the 
constitutional right.  
22 S 33(1) of the Constitution.  
23 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999); A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009); MC Nussbaum 
Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (2000); MC Nussbaum Creating 
Capabilities (2011). 
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our Constitution’s objectives is to realise the potential of each person, the capabilities 
theory asks to what extent we have the potential (or substantive freedom) to choose 
the lives we have reason to value.24 A capabilities perspective can therefore be 
adopted to evaluate the progress of the project of transformative constitutionalism and 
to assess the degree to which we have established a socially just democracy. 
Legislation, policy and administrative action can thus be judged by determining to what 
extent government measures expand the capabilities of all South Africans to choose 
the lives they have reason to value.  
Public reasoning is an essential component of Sen’s capabilities theory.25 Similarly, 
public reasoning conceptualised as participation constitutes a central tenet of 
transformative constitutionalism. The importance of public reasoning and participation 
holds several implications for the adjudication of socio-economic rights in general. 
First, it implies that in seeking to foster substantive capabilities, the State must 
simultaneously pay attention to procedural processes that allow for meaningful 
participation by a broad range of stakeholders. It further implies that government 
decisions and trade-offs between diverse priorities should be explicitly expounded to 
enable meaningful public scrutiny.26 Third, the requirement for public reasoning entails 
that opportunities should be created by the State and courts for the public to participate 
in evaluative exercises. In this way, all stakeholders can participate in value formation 
and policy design by identifying the objectives that government should pursue.27 
However, participation through public reasoning is not only instrumentally important, 
but is also of constitutive importance since the opportunity to participate in all spheres 
of life forms part of the lives we have reason to value.  
Certain fundamental tenets can be distilled from the central importance of public 
reasoning and agency within the capabilities theory. First, the entire capabilities 
approach depends on the informational base available to make evaluative judgments 
regarding the state of social justice in a particular context. This principle of 
informational broadening is congruent with the significance of participation under a 
transformative constitution.28 Second, it is imperative that decision-makers explicitly 
justify the socio-economic policy choices made. The principle of explicitness finds its 
                                            
24 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 74. 
25 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 44. 
26 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 75. 
27 110, 274, 287.  
28 See further chapter two part 2 4 3 below.  
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corollary in the requirement for substantive reasoning under a transformative 
constitution and in a culture of justification.29 These tenets must be observed by all 
stakeholders in order to ensure effective capability realisation in an effort to transform 
society.  
It is against this legal, political, social and theoretical background that this 
dissertation is situated.  
 
1 2 Rationale and motivation  
 
1 2 1 Using law to help combat poverty and socio-economic disadvantage 
 
Twenty one years after the advent of democracy in South Africa, it is estimated that 
nearly half of the South African population lives below the poverty line.30 Sen 
conceptualises poverty as the deprivation of “basic capabilities”, such as the 
capabilities to be adequately nourished or even minimally educated.31 Where people 
lack these elementary opportunities, the transformative objectives of the Constitution 
cannot be realised.32 The harsh reality acknowledged by our Constitutional Court over 
a decade ago accordingly persists, in that “the Constitution’s promise of dignity and 
equality for all remains for many a distant dream”.33 The underlying rationale for this 
dissertation is to contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of how the law 
can be utilised to combat poverty, homelessness and socio-economic disadvantage.   
                                            
29 See further chapter two part 2 4 4 below.  
30 Stats SA Poverty Trends in South Africa: An examination of absolute poverty between 2006 
and 2011 (2014) 12. For earlier data, see inter alia The Presidency Towards a Fifteen Year 
Review (2008) 18 <www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=89475> (accessed 02-06-
2011) (estimates that 47.99% of South Africa’s population lived below a poverty line of R322 
per month in 2005); see also JP Landman, H Bhorat, C van Aardt & S van der Berg Breaking 
the Grip of Poverty and Inequality in South Africa 2004 – 2014 (2003) 1 
<http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000649/index.php> (accessed 20-04-2011); S 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 
26.  
31 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 20.  
32 For example, the potential of those who lack basic capabilities is severely stunted, and the 
constitutional objective to “free the potential of each person” is hampered. Preamble to the 
Constitution.  
33 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 2. 
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1 2 2 Recognising the transformative potential of socio-economic rights and the right 
to administrative justice  
 
Poverty eradication requires a holistic and integrated strategy that includes the input 
of civil society organisations, grass roots activism, engagement among government 
and all stakeholders, and intergovernmental co-operation and planning. It also includes 
judicial enforcement of constitutional rights where laws and government conduct do 
not comply with the State’s constitutional obligations.34 The inclusion of justiciable 
socio-economic rights in the Constitution signals our society’s dedication to ensuring 
that government policy meets the basic needs of every person.35 The realisation of 
socio-economic rights can thus remedy basic capability deprivation, and in so doing 
alleviate poverty. Furthermore, the inclusion of the right to administrative justice 
acknowledges the importance of reaching constitutional goals through administrative 
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.  
The litigation and judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights can accordingly play 
a valuable role in an integrated strategy to combat poverty. If it were not for the litigation 
and adjudication of the right of access to housing36 in Government of the Republic of 
South Africa v Grootboom,37 government policy would not provide for those in urgent 
need who lacked the resources necessary to access housing in exigent 
circumstances.38 If it were not for the litigation and adjudication of the right of access 
                                            
34 G van Bueren “Alleviating Poverty through the Constitutional Court” (1999) 15 SAJHR 52 
53-54; see also J Seekings “Poverty and Inequality after Apartheid” (2007) Centre for Social 
Science Research, University of Cape Town 
<http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0003024/index.php> (accessed 26-04-2011) 27-28, 
where it is stated that meaningful poverty reduction likely requires further redistribution through 
the budget. Furthermore, Seekings opines that the government’s constitutional commitment to 
the provision of social security serves as a primary factor to motivate further expansion of a 
social welfare programme. The government has confirmed that its social security assistance 
programme constitutes its most important driver of the decline of poverty in South Africa. The 
Presidency Towards a Fifteen Year Review (2008) 19 
<www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=89475> (accessed 02-06-2011). 
35 D Bilchitz “Placing Basic Needs at the Centre of Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence” 
(2003) 4 ESR Review 2. 
36 S 26 of the Constitution.  
37 2001 1 SA 46 (CC).  
38 Alternatively, it may have taken some time for government to identify the lacuna in its housing 
policy had the Court not alerted it to this fact.   
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to health care services39 in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2),40 
government would not have expeditiously provided lifesaving treatment to indigent 
mothers who could not afford the medication necessary to prevent their infants from 
contracting HIV.  
Government may not always effectively respond to socio-economic rights litigation 
and the judicial enforcement of these rights. Nevertheless, socio-economic rights 
litigation may foster accountability and lead to social mobilisation and rights activism. 
The Constitutional Court recognised the potential of socio-economic rights litigation to 
promote accountability in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg:41 
 
“A reasonableness challenge requires government to explain the choices it has made. To 
do so, it must provide the information it has considered and the process it has followed to 
determine its policy… [T]he disclosure of such information points to the substantial 
importance of litigation concerning social and economic rights… In this way, the social and 
economic rights entrenched in our Constitution may contribute to the deepening of 
democracy. They enable citizens to hold government accountable not only through the 
ballot box but also, in a different way, through litigation.”42 
 
Even where government fails to fully comply with court orders,43 or to implement 
remedial plans without delay, socio-economic rights litigation can bring important basic 
capability needs into focus. For example, protracted litigation regarding the right to 
basic education has brought serious deficiencies in educational policies – and the 
government’s recalcitrance in realising this right – squarely into the public domain.44 A 
further rationale for this dissertation is thus the recognition of the transformative 
potential of socio-economic rights litigation and adjudication to help combat poverty 
and socio-economic vulnerability.  
                                            
39 S 27(1)(a) of the Constitution.  
40 2002 5 SA 721 (CC).  
41 2010 4 SA 1 (CC).  
42 Para 71.  
43 See, for example, F Veriava (Commissioned by Section 27) The 2012 Limpopo Textbook 
Crisis: A Study in Rights-bases Advocacy, the Raising of Rights Consciousness and 
Governance (2013) regarding government non-compliance with court orders related to the 
delivery of textbooks in the context of the right to basic education enshrined in s 29(1)(a) of the 
Constitution. 
44 F Veriava (Commissioned by Section 27) The 2012 Limpopo Textbook Crisis: A Study in 
Rights-bases Advocacy, the Raising of Rights Consciousness and Governance (2013) 37-39. 
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Administrative law serves as a critical conduit for the realisation of socio-economic 
rights. The implementation of socio-economic legislation and policy (as opposed to 
legislative or policy formulation)45 thus occurs through administrative processes and 
accordingly entails administrative action. The right to just administrative action implies 
that socio-economic goods should not merely be delivered to passive beneficiaries, 
but should occur through administrative processes that are lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair.46 These requirements thus constitute a segue through which Sen’s 
emphasis on agency and participation can find expression in the realisation of socio-
economic rights.47 Administrative justice serves the dual purpose of eliciting 
responsiveness, openness and accountability from the powerful administration, while 
fostering the dignity and agency of those affected by administrative action. As with 
socio-economic rights litigation, administrative justice litigation can also bring important 
basic capability needs into focus. For example, litigation about administrative 
processes regarding social grant payment systems has highlighted questionable 
practices of deductions from social grants and their impact on social welfare.48 An 
additional rationale for this dissertation is therefore the recognition of the important 
synergy that exists between socio-economic rights and the right to administrative 
justice, which can be developed as part of a comprehensive strategy to alleviate socio-
economic disadvantage.   
 
1 2 3 Recognising the persistent relevance of resources  
 
Resource allocation lies at the heart of the realisation of socio-economic rights. The 
judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights will accordingly often demand the 
evaluation of government expenditure decisions. Such expenditure decisions require 
                                            
45 Cf Permanent Secretary of the Department of Education of the Government of the Eastern 
Cape Province v Ed-U-College (PE) (Section21) Inc 2001 2 SA 1 (CC) para 17 where the 
Constitutional Court held that the political nature of a decision does not automatically result in 
action not constituting administrative action. Moreover, the political nature of an administrative 
decision does not affect the justiciability of such decision. 
46 S 33(1) of the Constitution.  
47 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 19, 53. 
48 See Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency 2015 6 BCLR 653 (CC) para 9. 
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priorities to be set.49 Courts should therefore be capable of assessing government 
priorities in the light of the socio-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution. 
Evaluative criteria can aid courts in doing so, and thereby fortify the ability of 
adjudication to contribute to the realisation of socio-economic rights by guiding 
government policy and facilitating democratic dialogue.50 The dissertation is thus 
further motivated by the recognition of the need for the formulation of concrete and 
justifiable criteria for the allocation of resources and for the subsequent judicial 
evaluation of such prioritising decisions.  
 
1 2 4 Recognising the importance of a capabilities perspective  
 
The capabilities theory, which places the substantive freedom to choose the lives 
we have reason to value at the centre of the evaluation of government laws, policies 
and conduct, resonates strongly with the objectives of a transformative constitution. 
The capabilities approach thus holds the potential to make a rich contribution to policy 
formation by the State, social evaluation of policy by the public and adjudication by the 
courts. This dissertation is motivated by the desire to identify further linkages that exist 
between a capabilities approach and our transformative Constitution, and to develop 
this theory specifically for the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions that 
impact on socio-economic rights.  
 
1 3 Scope of dissertation  
 
This dissertation investigates the suitability of adopting a capabilities approach for 
the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions impacting on socio-economic 
rights. Although a capabilities approach to adjudication may constitute a sound 
theoretical paradigm for constitutional review in general, that is not where the focus of 
this dissertation lies. Certain elements of the capabilities theory are evidently 
harmonious with our constitutional ethos, and alternative theories are thus not 
considered. In particular, capabilities theory resonates strongly with the rationale for 
including justiciable socio-economic rights in our Constitution. Without the fulfilment of 
                                            
49 G van Bueren “Alleviating Poverty through the Constitutional Court” (1999) 15 SAJHR 52 
61; C Scott & P Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A 
Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” (2000) 16 SAJHR 206.   
50 M Pieterse “Health Care Rights, Resources and Rationing” (2007) 127 SALJ 514 514. 
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basic socio-economic needs, real opportunities to live meaningful lives that give effect 
to the values of freedom, dignity and equality, do not exist. The realisation of socio-
economic rights thus creates the capabilities to choose the lives we have reason to 
value. Moreover, Sen’s theory aptly places the need for public expenditure aimed at 
capability realisation into perspective, and thus justifies the judicial review of State 
resource allocation decisions that impact on the crucial capabilities represented by 
socio-economic rights. In addition, Sen’s emphasis on observing the tenets of 
explicitness, informational broadening and agency through a process of public 
reasoning is wholly congruent with certain central features of adjudication under a 
transformative constitution.  
Furthermore, attention is primarily paid to adjudication in the context of sections 26, 
27 and 33 of the Constitution. The second subsection of sections 26 and 27 directs the 
State to “take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation” of the relevant rights.51 The 
availability of resources is thus always relevant in terms of these provisions, and 
arguments of resource constraints may often be proffered by the State to justify its 
failure to progressively realise these rights. The formulation of these rights has led the 
Constitutional Court to develop a model of reasonableness review. In terms of this 
model of review, a court does not ask whether the State has adopted the “best” or 
“correct” measures to realise the right in question, but merely whether the measures 
are reasonable.52  
Given the instrumental importance53 of administrative law for realising socio-
economic rights, administrative law review also falls within the scope of this 
dissertation. In particular, the Constitutional Court’s development of reasonableness 
review across the spheres of socio-economic rights and administrative justice 
jurisprudence is relevant for an analysis of the Court’s approach to the judicial review 
of resource allocation decisions that impact on socio-economic rights. Whereas the 
                                            
51 Ss 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution (emphasis added).  
52 This standard was developed especially in the early judgments of Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) and Minister of Health v Treatment 
Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). Given that the right to just administrative action 
requires “reasonable” administrative action, a test for substantive reasonableness has also 
developed in administrative law. Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). 
53 The right to administrative justice is also inherently important, but this falls outside the scope 
of this dissertation.  
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Court’s methodology is equally important in respect of other elements of administrative 
justice such as procedural fairness, these questions fall outside the scope of this 
dissertation.  
This dissertation focuses primarily on problems associated with adjudicating 
budgetary allocations. Although the allocation of, for example, human and technical 
resources will not be dealt with as distinct issues, it should be borne in mind that the 
allocation of any type of resources will ultimately result in a corresponding budgetary 
allocation.54  
 
1 4 Research problem  
 
1 4 1 The primary research question  
 
The primary research problem that this dissertation aims to solve is how the 
capabilities approach can contribute to the development of a theoretical paradigm for 
the judicial review of State resource allocation decisions that impact on socio-economic 
rights. In order to address this fundamental question, many ancillary questions are also 
investigated. 
 
1 4 2 Supplementary research questions  
 
1 4 2 1 A capabilities approach to adjudication  
 
The first ancillary question that must be answered is to what extent the capabilities 
approach can be developed for adjudication of complex, polycentric resource 
allocation decisions. This dissertation therefore identifies linkages that exist between 
the capabilities theory and the characteristics of transformative constitutionalism. Once 
such links are identified, a theoretical paradigm for adjudication that furthers the project 
of transformative constitutionalism can be designed.  
  
                                            
54 RE Robertson “Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the ‘Maximum 
Available Resources’ to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights” (1994) 15 HRQ 693.  
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1 4 2 2 The role of the judiciary 
 
However, the question arises as to whether the capabilities theory sufficiently 
recognises the role that courts can and should play in enforcing socio-economic rights. 
To the extent that Sen’s theory fails to accommodate the role of the judiciary,55 can it 
be developed to accommodate the significance of adjudication under a transformative 
constitution? Sen emphasises the role of public reasoning to make comparative 
judgments regarding the state of social justice, and to evaluate and rank capabilities. 
These two evaluative endeavours are related, in that the measure of justice or injustice 
prevalent in a society can be gauged by determining to what extent capabilities are 
allowed to flourish. For courts to function as one platform where evaluative public 
reasoning can meaningfully occur, what features of the capabilities theory and 
transformative constitutionalism should be assimilated by the judiciary? The research 
problem of how to adapt Sen’s theory for judicial utilisation, with reference to 
Nussbaum’s scholarship and the central tenets of transformative constitutionalism,56 is 
therefore explored.  
 
1 4 2 3 Defining “available resources”  
 
Another question that must be answered is how courts should conceptualise 
“available resources”.57 Where the State seeks to justify its non-realisation of a socio-
economic right on the basis of resource constraints, should a court merely examine 
the resources that have already been allocated to a particular socio-economic 
programme? Or should a court consider a wider pool of resources, for example, the 
relevant department’s overall allocation or even the national budget? Does a 
capabilities approach to evaluation support an even wider definition of “available 
resources” that involves the macro-economic choices available to the State? By 
answering these questions, the problem as to whether wide definitions of “available 
resources” should be recognised in order to prevent the State from limiting its socio-
                                            
55 Sen only gives fleeting recognition to the role that the judiciary can play in A Sen 
Development as Freedom (1999) 297.  
56 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 170. 
57 In terms of ss 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution.  
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economic obligations – by allocating minimal funds to relevant governmental 
departments or to particular socio-economic programmes – can be addressed.58  
 
1 4 2 4 Weighting rights and resource-based justifications  
  
A further research question relates to how courts can use the capabilities approach 
to assign weights to different rights, or short-term versus long-term socio-economic 
needs, that all vie for resource allocation. Once a valuational ordering of rights, values 
and other interests is established, resource-based justificatory arguments can then be 
assessed against the weight assigned to the importance of the rights and needs at 
issue. A critical question that will thus be addressed is how the capabilities approach 
can be utilised to design a capabilities-based standard of review for the adjudication of 
State resource allocation decisions.  
 
1 4 2 5 Using capabilities to imbue socio-economic rights with substantive content  
 
However, in seeking to address the question expounded immediately above, yet 
another important question arises: How can courts assign weight to oft-competing 
socio-economic rights without determining their content? Moreover, if socio-economic 
rights lack content, against what measure can courts assess the proportionality of the 
relevant resource allocation decisions? Many stakeholders develop the content of 
rights, including socio-economic rights. Thus government, the judiciary, civil society 
organisations and ordinary citizens all contribute to the meaning or content of rights. 
The capabilities approach constitutes a promising avenue for imbuing socio-economic 
rights with content. A crucial question that will be addressed is how the capabilities 
approach can be used to concretise the normative purposes and content of these 
rights. In this dissertation, focus is placed on the role of the courts, in particular, in 
elaborating the content of socio-economic rights in order to effectively adjudicate State 
resource allocation decisions.  
  
                                            
58 For the importance of interpreting “available resources” generously, see D Moellendorf 
“Reasoning about Resources: Soobramoney and the Future of Socio-Economic Rights Claims” 
(1998) 14 SAJHR 327.  
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1 4 2 6 The need for effective remedies 
 
Finally, the question must be addressed as to what a capabilities approach to 
remedies requires. Where socio-economic rights are infringed on a systemic level 
through unreasonable resource allocation, can a capabilities approach to remedies 
ensure effective relief? Which central features of a capabilities approach to 
adjudication under a transformative constitution should be observed to promote an 
effective remedy? The effectiveness of a remedy can be assessed by its ability to 
realise the capabilities that form the content of the infringed socio-economic right. 
Certain features of a capabilities approach to the design of a structural interdict will be 
scrutinised to determine its efficacy as measured against its potential to effect 
capability realisation. In order to answer these questions, Constitutional Court and High 
Court jurisprudence will be critically evaluated against the requirements of a 
capabilities approach to remedies. Furthermore, in answering the question of what a 
capabilities approach to remedies requires, yet another research question can be 
addressed: Can concerns that the judiciary lacks the constitutional and institutional 
competence59 necessary to adjudicate complex, polycentric State resource allocation 
decisions be accommodated at the remedial phase of adjudication?  
  
1 5 Research aims and hypotheses 
 
The primary research aim of this dissertation is to develop a theoretical paradigm 
for the judicial review of State resource allocation decisions that impact on socio-
economic rights. The central hypothesis of this dissertation is that a capabilities 
approach to adjudication under a transformative constitution can be developed to 
create a capabilities-based standard of review for the adjudication of State resource 
allocation decisions. Furthermore, a capabilities approach to adjudication can help 
ensure effective remedies where socio-economic rights have been infringed through 
unreasonable resource allocation decisions.  
In order to achieve the primary research aim, five subsidiary research aims are 
pursued in this dissertation. First, this dissertation aims to develop Sen’s and 
Nussbaum’s capabilities theory through a lens of transformative constitutionalism in 
                                            
59 Constitutional competence refers to the legitimacy of the judiciary as an unelected branch 
of government to review certain matters. Institutional competence refers to the capacity of the 
judiciary to review certain matters.  
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order to justify the role of the judiciary in adjudicating State resource allocation 
decisions. In order to achieve this aim, the role of public discussion and reasoning – 
and their relationship to the justiciability of resource allocation decisions – is evaluated. 
The hypothesis in this regard is that the capabilities theory, which places substantive 
freedoms and capabilities at the centre of evaluative judgments, can justify the 
prioritisation of expenditure on the realisation of socio-economic rights. Moreover, 
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capabilities theory can be developed to validate judicial 
involvement in questions of resource allocation and practically aid the adjudication of 
allocative decisions. The critical role of public dialogue and transparent reasoning 
within Sen’s theory of justice can further support the justiciability of resource allocation 
decisions. 
Second, the need for the development of a capabilities-based standard of review for 
the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions is assessed. The hypothesis in 
respect hereof is that the Constitutional Court’s insufficient focus on the content of 
socio-economic rights, narrow definition of “available resources”, undue resort to 
deference and rigid distinction between positive and negative duties illustrate the need 
for development of a capabilities-based standard of review. Furthermore, it is 
hypothesised that the courts do in fact possess the competence to adjudicate resource 
allocation decisions, as is evident from certain jurisprudence.  
Third, the aim is to develop a capabilities-based standard of review. The 
corresponding hypothesis posits that proportionality review closely resembles the 
weighting exercise required by a capabilities approach to adjudication. The weighting 
exercise required for the ranking of capabilities thus calls for careful development to 
cater for instances where diverse rights compete for prominence and resource 
allocation, or where long-term and short-term capability realisation vies for resources.  
Fourth, the extent to which a capabilities approach to remedies can be used to 
ensure systemic reasonable resource allocation is assessed. Simultaneously, a 
capabilities approach to remedies should be able to alleviate concerns that courts 
cannot legitimately or competently adjudicate polycentric resource allocation 
decisions. It is hypothesised that a structural interdict can be designed to incorporate 
certain capabilities tenets, so as to ensure systemic reasonable resource allocation 
while mitigating problems of legitimacy, institutional competence and polycentricity. 
Finally, a comparative perspective is provided by evaluating the strengths and 
weaknesses of the approach to the adjudication of resource allocation decisions 
followed in the United Kingdom and India, respectively. The corresponding hypothesis 
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is that comparative law can provide valuable insights regarding problems associated 
with adjudicating resource allocation decisions. A comparative perspective can also 
provide guidance as to how such problems may be addressed or avoided by domestic 
courts.  
 
1 6 Methodology 
 
1 6 1 Critically analysing the justiciability of State resource allocation decisions 
 
This dissertation will rely in the first instance on South African jurisprudence and 
academic literature to address the research questions formulated above. The 
Constitutional Court has articulated its stance on socio-economic rights in several 
cases to date, although a methodological approach to the review of resource allocation 
decisions has not been elucidated. Secondary literary sources provide valuable 
insights as to the degree of justiciability of resource allocation decisions and will be 
used to highlight key issues in the debate regarding the appropriateness of judicial 
intervention in this area. However, to date not much attention has been exclusively 
devoted to a comprehensive study of the issues raised. In addition, secondary 
literature with regard to the capabilities theory, proportionality and the Constitutional 
Court’s approach to the adjudication of socio-economic rights will be utilised.  
 
1 6 2 Developing capabilities theory to design a review paradigm  
 
In this dissertation, the capabilities theory as espoused by Sen and Nussbaum is 
developed for the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions. Reliance is 
primarily placed on the scholarship of Sen and, to a lesser degree, Nussbaum.60  
The capabilities theory resonates strongly with the ethos of our transformative 
Constitution, which serves as a legal-political framework for the achievement of 
equality, dignity and freedom for all. Given the close relationship between capabilities 
and the realisation of the socio-economic rights enshrined in our Constitution,61 the 
                                            
60 The main scholarship relied on is A Sen Development as Freedom (1999); A Sen The Idea 
of Justice (2009); and MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011). 
61 Capability theory evaluates laws, policies and conduct by asking to what extent such 
measures are aimed at enabling people to live the lives they have reason to value. Without the 
realisation of socio-economic rights, people will not possess the substantive freedom 
necessary to choose to lead meaningful lives. The rationale for the development of the 
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capabilities approach has been utilised by several legal scholars studying socio-
economic rights in the South African context.  
Sandra Fredman has utilised the capabilities approach to justify the imposition of 
positive duties by justiciable socio-economic rights. Her primary work in this regard is 
Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties.62 Several authors 
have subsequently used and elaborated upon Fredman’s capabilities-based paradigm 
for understanding the right to equality and socio-economic rights.63 David Bilchitz has 
also discussed and criticised the capabilities approach in the context of socio-
economic rights in Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and 
Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights.64 Sandra Liebenberg has drawn from the 
capabilities approach to illustrate how the fundamental values of freedom and dignity 
can aid the interpretation of socio-economic rights.65 Marius Pieterse has 
demonstrated the links between autonomy, the realisation of socio-economic rights 
and the right to health, which he regards as a critical (and fertile) capability.66 Erika 
George has argued for a closer interrelationship amongst development, human rights 
and capabilities, and has furthermore pointed out that capabilities can lend normative 
substance and content to abstract socio-economic rights.67 
South African post-graduate studies in law that have focused on socio-economic 
rights and have simultaneously explored the use of the capabilities approach are 
                                            
capabilities theory and for the constitutional enshrinement of justiciable socio-economic rights 
is to better the quality of life, agency and over-all well-being of all people suffering from the 
“unfreedoms” associated with poverty.  
62  S Fredman Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (2008). 
63 See, inter alia, B Goldblatt “The Right to Social Security – Addressing Women’s Poverty and 
Disadvantage” (2009) 25 SAJHR 442; L Chenwi & K McLean “‘A Woman’s Home is her 
Castle?’ – Poor Women and Housing Inadequacy in South Africa” (2009) 25 SAJHR 517. 
64 D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-
Economic Rights (2007). 
65 S Liebenberg “The Value of Freedom in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” (2008) Acta 
Juridica 149; S Liebenberg “The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic 
Rights” (2005) 21 SAJHR 1. 
66 M Pieterse “The Interdependence of rights to Health and Autonomy” (2008) 123 SALJ 553. 
See also in this regard JP Ruger “Toward a Theory of a Right to Health: Capability and 
Incompletely Theorized Agreements” (2006) 18 Yale J of Law & the Humanities 273. 
67 E George “Instructions in Inequality: Development, Human Rights, Capabilities, and Gender 
Violence in Schools” (2005) 26 Michigan J of Int L 1139 1179. 
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limited.68 One LLM dissertation that assesses the role that the right of access to health 
care services plays in reducing poverty, discusses the capabilities approach.69 
Rebecca Amollo’s LLD thesis, entitled Women’s Socio-Economic Rights in the Context 
of HIV and AIDS in South Africa: Thematic Focus on Health, Housing, Property and 
Freedom from Violence, uses the lenses of the capabilities approach and feminism to 
argue that gender-inequalities must be rectified in an effort to combat HIV/AIDS.70 
However, based on a literature survey and doctoral research, there appears to be 
no other project grounded in South African law that has focused on the ways in which 
the capabilities approach can be developed to design a review paradigm for the 
adjudication of State resource allocation decisions.71 The scholarship of Sen and 
Nussbaum is accordingly relied on, critically analysed and developed for the particular 
focus area of this dissertation, viz the judicial review of resource allocation decisions 
impacting on socio-economic rights.  
 
1 6 3 Constitutional Court jurisprudence  
 
As the highest court in South Africa, pronouncements by the Constitutional Court 
bind all other courts.72 Focus is therefore placed on Constitutional Court jurisprudence, 
since these judgments authoritatively establish constitutional principles that should be 
adhered to by lower courts. Selected judgments of the South African Constitutional 
Court are critically analysed in an attempt to illustrate the need for development of a 
capabilities-based standard of review for the adjudication of State resource allocation 
decisions. The focus is on judgments where qualified socio-economic rights or the right 
to just administrative action were at issue, and where a standard of reasonableness 
review was applied to impugned State laws, policy or conduct. High Court 
                                            
68 Post-graduate research in the field of economics and commerce has dealt more widely with 
the capabilities approach, but such studies are not strictly relevant to this dissertation.  
69 Z Strauss Die Rol wat die Reg op Toegang tot Gesondheidsorgdienste speel in 
Armoedevermindering in Suid-Afrika LLM dissertation North West (2010). 
70 R Amollo Women’s Socio-Economic Rights in the Context of HIV and AIDS in South Africa: 
Thematic Focus on Health, Housing, Property and Freedom from Violence LLD thesis Western 
Cape (2011). 
71 Writing from the perspective of political studies, S Hassim “Social Justice, Care and 
Developmental Welfare in South Africa: A Capabilities Perspective” (2008) 34 Social Dynamics 
104 uses the capabilities approach to argue that expenditure (or State spending), in itself, is 
not sufficient to achieve equality and social justice.   
72 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Seventeenth Amendment Act, 2012. 
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jurisprudence is critically evaluated where lacunae in the existing body of Constitutional 
Court jurisprudence exists, especially in the context of adopting a capabilities approach 
to remedies.  
 
1 6 4 A comparative perspective  
 
The Constitution expressly permits courts to consider foreign law when interpreting 
the Bill of Rights.73 This dissertation provides a comparative perspective by critically 
evaluating relevant jurisprudence and legal developments in the United Kingdom 
(excluding Scots law, and with an emphasis on English law) and India.  
It is trite that one’s choice of comparative jurisdictions is often limited by practical 
obstacles (such as the language in which the jurisdiction operates) as well as the need 
to understand a chosen jurisdiction in adequate depth to make its ultimate analysis 
meaningful.74 The selection of comparative jurisdictions in this dissertation is therefore 
limited by practical considerations of language and accessibility, as well as an 
awareness of the limited scope of this study. Although a comparative analysis of the 
legal approach in, for example, Columbia or Canada may have yielded relevant 
insights,75 this study focuses on two jurisdictions that illustrate the divergent forms that 
judicial review of resource allocation decisions in common-law jurisdictions, sharing a 
common legal heritage, can adopt. While being careful to avoid “shallow 
comparativism” and other risks inherent in comparative scholarship, the following 
exposition of the value of comparative analysis by O’Regan J is apt: 
 
“It would seem unduly parochial to consider that no guidance, whether positive or negative, 
could be drawn from other legal systems’ grappling with issues similar to those with which 
we are confronted. Consideration of the responses of other legal systems may enlighten us 
in analysing our own law, and assist us in developing it further. It is for this very reason that 
our Constitution contains an express provision authorising courts to consider the law of 
other countries when interpreting the Bill of Rights. It is clear that in looking to the 
jurisprudence of other countries, all the dangers of shallow comparativism must be avoided. 
                                            
73 S 39(1)(c) of the Constitution.  
74 C Saunders “The Use and Misuse of Comparative Constitutional Law” (2006) 13 Indiana J 
of Global Legal Studies 37 67; VC Jackson “Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies” 
in M Rosenfeld & A Sajo (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) 
54 64, 70. 
75 For a discussion of the relevance of these jurisdictions for future research, see chapter seven 
part 7 9 2 below.  
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To forbid any comparative review because of those risks, however, would be to deprive our 
legal system of the benefits of the learning and wisdom to be found in other jurisdictions…”76 
 
1 6 4 1 The United Kingdom  
 
In Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal),77 the only Constitutional 
Court judgment to date which has focused explicitly on scarce resources in the context 
of socio-economic rights, the Court relied on English jurisprudence to substantiate its 
unwillingness to scrutinise allocative decisions pertaining to medical resources and 
health budgets.78 Similarly, in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism,79 the Court relied on English authorities for guidance in 
interpreting certain provisions of PAJA that were drawn from English jurisprudence. 
Both these judgments are pivotal to this dissertation given their pertinence to two 
central themes addressed herein, namely (i) the judicial review of resource allocation 
decisions; and (ii) proportionality as potentially constituting a review paradigm that 
closely resembles the weighting exercise demanded by a capabilities approach to 
adjudication. The influence of English law on South African constitutional jurisprudence 
as it pertains to these two central themes therefore falls to be investigated.   
The judicial tendency to consider English law for guidance regarding the nature and 
scope of judicial review is understandable. England exerted colonial control over South 
Africa for over a century, and the influence of English law on South African 
constitutional and administrative law has been vast.80 Furthermore, in vesting colonial 
rule, Britain established an English system of public administration in South Africa.81 
Perhaps the greatest legacy of English influence on South African law was South 
Africa’s adherence to a Westminster system of parliament until the advent of a system 
                                            
76 K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 6 SA 419 (CC) para 35 (emphasis added).  
77 1998 1 SA 765 (CC). 
78 Para 30. 
79 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 44, interpreting s 6(2)(h) of PAJA, which was drawn from the 
English judgment Associated Provincial Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation 
[1948] 1 KB 223. 
80 On the significant historical and continuing influence of English law on South African 
constitutional, administrative and international law, see generally G Barrie “Decisions of the 
extinct Appellate Committee of the House of Lords will continue to resonate in South African 
Administrative, Constitutional and International Law” (2013) 28 SAPL 249.  
81 DW Freedman “Constitutional Law: Structures of Government” in WA Joubert & JA Faris 
LAWSA 5 2 ed (RS 2012) para 281. 
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of constitutional supremacy in 1994. Whereas the English judiciary still operates within 
a system of parliamentary sovereignty in terms of which judicial review of primary 
legislation is severely limited, South Africa’s transition to a system of constitutional 
supremacy theoretically vests our courts with far greater power to judicially review Acts 
of parliament. Ordinary courts in both jurisdictions continue to enjoy the power to 
review administrative action.  
The question arises whether the continued application of English doctrines and 
conventions remains appropriate for the adjudication of constitutionally enshrined 
rights in South Africa. Within the United Kingdom, debates regarding the nature of 
judicial review as a mere representation of the will of Parliament versus the merits of a 
rights-based approach, have gained impetus following the adoption of the Human 
Rights Act, 1998.82 An analysis of this debate is informative for illustrating the 
deficiencies in the current normative assumptions that underlie the justification for 
judicial review in the United Kingdom. These debates furthermore demonstrate the 
links between a rights-based approach to judicial review and the adoption of a 
substantive standard of review. South African courts should therefore feel fortified in 
adopting a substantive test for reasonableness across the fields of administrative law 
and socio-economic rights, since a contextual, rights-based approach is mandated by 
the Constitution itself.  
Furthermore, disagreement regarding the nature, importance and applicability of 
judicial deference persists in the United Kingdom after decades of academic and 
judicial debate on the subject.83 The issues of non-justiciability and deference become 
amplified where the judicial review of government resource allocation decisions is 
called for.84 The key difference that should inform debates regarding the applicability 
of these doctrines in South Africa again emerges as the difference between a system 
of parliamentary sovereignty and one of constitutional supremacy. In the former, the 
judiciary traditionally adopts a formalistic approach to reasoning and easily defers to 
the will of the legislature. In contrast, the interpretation and enforcement of 
constitutionally guaranteed rights must be determinative of the judicial approach in the 
latter.  
                                            
82 A Pillay “Courts, Variable Standards of Review and Resource Allocation: Developing a Model 
for the Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights” (2007) 6 EHRLR 616 626. 
83 Lord Steyn “Deference: A Tangled Story” (2005) PL 346.  
84 E Palmer Judicial Review, Socio-economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (2007) 162. 
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The seemingly irresolvable nature of these debates in the United Kingdom calls into 
question the appropriateness of a continued reliance on these aspects of English law 
by the South African judiciary. South African courts may benefit from taking cognisance 
of the pitfalls experienced by the English legal system in these respects, and may heed 
calls by English academics for judicial reform. The deficiencies identified in the English 
approach can therefore be instructive to South African courts in that our judiciary can 
avoid the same obstacles while incorporating academic proposals that will contribute 
to the realisation of our own constitutional project. In contrast to those aspects of 
English law that beg reform, a move in the United Kingdom towards recognising 
proportionality as a uniform head of review appears more promising for rights 
protection and enforcement.85 The advantages of adopting proportionality as a 
standard of review for the judicial review of State resource allocation decisions should 
therefore be acknowledged by South African scholars and the judiciary.  
 
1 6 4 2 India  
 
Like South Africa, India is a common-law jurisdiction that shares a history of 
colonisation by Britain. India gained independence from Britain in 1947, and adopted 
the Constitution of India, 1949 (“Indian Constitution”) shortly thereafter. India therefore 
underwent a transition from a system of parliamentary sovereignty to one of 
constitutional supremacy similar to that of South Africa in 1994. The Indian Supreme 
Court eventually adopted an unmistakably activist approach that is far removed from 
the restrained approach of judiciaries operating in Westminster systems.  
The Indian example is instructive for demonstrating how courts, although sharing an 
English legal heritage, can nevertheless adopt an approach distinct from one 
characterised by formal judicial review and deference in an effort to interpret, protect 
and enforce constitutional rights. The innovative approach of the Indian Supreme Court 
with regard to the creation and development of Public Interest Litigation86 will be 
scrutinised and Indian case law that impacted on resource allocation will be 
                                            
85 P Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 657. 
86 S Muralidhar “India: The Expectations and Challenges of Judicial Enforcement of Social 
Rights” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and 
Comparative Law (2008) 102 109.  
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discussed.87 It is not contended that the approach of any foreign jurisdiction should be 
uncritically adopted by the South African judiciary. Nevertheless, the strengths of the 
Indian Supreme Court’s approach in interpreting and enforcing constitutional rights in 
a manner that is congruent with certain central tenets of the capabilities approach 
should be recognised.  
Simultaneously, deficiencies in the Indian Supreme Court’s approach merit attention 
in order to ensure that South African courts can draw from the Indian Supreme Court’s 
strengths while avoiding similar difficulties in our own domestic jurisprudence.  
 
1 6 4 3 Methodological approach  
 
Comparative constitutional law methodologies can be categorised in various ways.88 
Relying on the categorisation espoused by Vicki Jackson89 and Sujit Choudhry,90 
respectively, the comparative methodology adopted in this dissertation can be 
described as an amalgamation of normative-dialogical and functional and, to a lesser 
extent, historical and classificatory. 
  
                                            
87 J Cassels “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the 
Impossible?” (1989) 37 Am J Comp L 495; S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication 
under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 122-123. Compare S Muralidhar “India: The 
Expectations and Challenges of Judicial Enforcement of Social Rights” in M Langford (ed) 
Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 
102 112, 113, 118-119 discussing the deferential stance of the Supreme Court towards the 
executive branch of government in Narmada Bachao Andolan v Union of India (2000) 10 SCC 
664 and S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative 
Constitution (2010) 125 who notes that observers are witnessing a trend moving away from 
such activism.  
88 Compare the categorisation of M Tushnet “The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional 
Law” (1999) 108 Yale LJ 1225 (“functionalism”; “expressivism” and “bricolage”) with that of S 
Choudhry “Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) 74 Indiana LJ 819 (“universalist”; “dialogical” and 
“genealogical”) and VC Jackson “Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies” in M 
Rosenfeld & A Sajo (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) 54 
(“classificatory”, “historical”, “normative”, “functional” and “contextual”). 
89 VC Jackson “Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies” in M Rosenfeld & A Sajo (eds) 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) 54. 
90 S Choudhry “Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) 74 Indiana LJ 819. 
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1 6 4 3 1 Normative-dialogical  
 
A normative approach (also termed a universalist approach) seeks to discover 
transcendental principles of justice through comparative analysis.91 This methodology 
can be applied at a very general level, or it can occur through comparative doctrinal 
analyses of, for example, divergent approaches to the interpretation and enforcement 
of socio-economic rights.92 Jackson describes normative doctrinal analyses as follows: 
 
“Scholars’ exploration of the varying assumptions, and interpretative approaches, of 
comparator countries may serve self-reflective normative purpose – at once trying to 
understand other systems and identify improvements of one’s own.”93 
 
Importantly, normative comparative scholarship can include the analysis of 
“aversive” examples found in foreign jurisdictions, ie the comparative study of negative 
models.94 Scheppele discusses the comparative analysis of negative models in the 
context of constitutional drafting, and seemingly limits this concept to morally 
repugnant societies, including totalitarian regimes and pre-democratic South Africa.95 
However, aversive precedent in more modest incarnations can also prove to be useful. 
Problematic aspects identified in the approach of the judiciary in the United Kingdom 
and India can therefore highlight issues that should be avoided by the South African 
judiciary. 
Choudhry distinguishes dialogical interpretation from normative interpretation on the 
basis that the former makes no normative assumptions.96 Normative disagreement is 
thus not an obstacle to dialogical comparative work, but instead compels the 
identification and justification of points of divergence.97 According to Choudhry, this 
                                            
91 VC Jackson “Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies” in M Rosenfeld & A Sajo (eds) 
The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) 54 60. 
92 61. 
93 61. 
94 KL Scheppele “Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-
constitutional Influence through Negative Models” (2003) 1 I Con 296; VC Jackson 
“Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies” in M Rosenfeld & A Sajo (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) 54 61-62.   
95 KL Scheppele “Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-
constitutional Influence through Negative Models” (2003) 1 I Con 296 305, 313.  
96 S Choudhry “Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation” (1999) 74 Indiana LJ 819 892.  
97 888. 
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self-reflective methodology encompasses the identification of factual and normative 
assumptions that underlie the approach of the comparative jurisdiction as well as the 
domestic jurisdiction under scrutiny.98 Once these normative assumptions are 
identified, it is necessary to question whether they are and should be shared by the 
relevant domestic jurisdiction. Writing in the context of comparative constitutional 
analyses executed by courts, the author elaborates: 
 
“Although the starting point of dialogical interpretation is constitutional difference, a court 
must also be open to the possibility that it will instead discover constitutional similarity. But 
nevertheless, even if the assumptions are similar, one can still ask why - that is, whether 
those assumptions ought to be shared. A similarity in constitutional assumptions should not 
be considered fixed and immutable… 
 
[T]he process of dialogic interpretation can lead the court to fundamentally re-assess its 
previous judgments, and to use comparative jurisprudence as a means to initiate radical 
legal change.”99 
 
In this dissertation, a normative methodology is thus followed by evaluating the 
judicial approach to the review of resource allocation decisions in the United Kingdom 
and India against the normative baseline posited by a capabilities approach to 
adjudication. Furthermore, a dialogical approach is adopted by explicitly 
acknowledging the inevitable differences amongst the judicial approach in each 
respective jurisdiction – and critically analysing the justifiability of the normative 
assumptions that underlie these differences as well as any similarities that may 
become apparent.  
 
1 6 4 3 2 Functional  
 
Functionalism constitutes the principal approach to comparative legal analysis.100 
According to this approach, similar institutions or doctrines across different jurisdictions 
are identified and their functions are compared, or similar functions performed by 
                                            
98 857. 
99 857-858 (emphasis added).  
100 VC Jackson “Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies” in M Rosenfeld & A Sajo 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) 54 62; O Brand 
“Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative Legal Studies” 
(2007) 32 Brook J Int’l L 405 409.  
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institutions across foreign jurisdictions are evaluated.101 Brand explains that 
functionalism entails identifying a similar legal problem which occurs across the 
comparator jurisdictions, analysing how each comparative jurisdiction resolves the 
problem, and finally evaluating the similarities and differences between the 
comparative approaches under scrutiny.102  
In this dissertation, the common problem identified is the judicial review of State 
resource allocation decisions that impact on socio-economic rights. The approach of 
the judiciary in the United Kingdom and India is then evaluated against the tenets 
posited by a capabilities approach to adjudication. This is done by comparing, inter 
alia, the common institution of judicial review, and the common doctrines of 
proportionality and deference, as they manifest in the selected jurisdictions. Whereas 
the United Kingdom may be regarded as constitutionally “most different” and India as 
“most similar” to South Africa,103 all three jurisdictions encounter the common problem 
identified. Furthermore, all three jurisdictions incorporate certain institutions and 
doctrines that may be utilised in divergent ways to respond to the shared problem. This 
forms the focus of the functionalist approach adopted in this dissertation.  
Functionalism has been subjected to criticism to the effect that, inter alia, it tends to 
be a reductionist approach that fails to adequately account for socio-economic and 
cultural heterogeneity.104 In this dissertation, these problems are sought to be mitigated 
by acknowledging the differences in constitutional design amongst the chosen 
comparator jurisdictions and South Africa from the outset. The differences between a 
system of parliamentary sovereignty as prevalent in the United Kingdom, and that of 
constitutional supremacy as is the norm in India and South Africa, should therefore 
lead to circumspection before unquestioningly accepting United Kingdom institutions 
and doctrines in the latter two jurisdictions. Only where these institutions or doctrines 
are capable of performing the function of promoting socio-economic capabilities 
through the adjudication of resource allocation decisions should their incorporation in 
jurisdictions committed to social transformation be considered. Conversely, the 
                                            
101 VC Jackson “Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies” in M Rosenfeld & A Sajo 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) 54 62.  
102 O Brand “Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative 
Legal Studies” (2007) 32 Brook J Int’l L 405 409. 
103 VC Jackson “Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies” in M Rosenfeld & A Sajo 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) 54 64. 
104 O Brand “Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative 
Legal Studies” (2007) 32 Brook J Int’l L 405 418. 
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similarity of the transformative vision encompassed by the Indian and South African 
Constitutions indicates that institutions that serve the function of transformation may 
be appropriately shared between these jurisdictions.  
The functional approach adopted in this dissertation is thus normative in the sense 
that the institution of judicial review, and the doctrines of proportionality and deference, 
are evaluated to determine whether they are capable of leading to consequences that 
are congruent with a capabilities approach to the adjudication of State resource 
allocation decisions.105  
 
1 6 4 3 3 Historical and classificatory  
 
The comparative methodological approach adopted in the dissertation can also be 
described as historical and classificatory. This is true, in the first place, because all 
three jurisdictions analysed in this dissertation are common-law jurisdictions that share 
a “genealogical connection” in that both South Africa and India were previously 
colonised by England.106 Moreover, the approach is classificatory in that “emerging 
trends in doctrine and interpretative methodology”107 are considered across the three 
jurisdictions under scrutiny. These doctrines include those of proportionality and 
deference, while the formalistic interpretative methodology preferred by United 
Kingdom courts stands in stark contrast to the broad interpretative approach favoured 
by the Indian Supreme Court. The role of public reasoning and participation among all 
stakeholders in the application of the institution of judicial review also constitutes an 
important common trend that merits further critical analysis.  
 
1 7 Overview of chapters  
 
In chapter two the capabilities approach to development and justice, as propounded 
by Sen and Nussbaum, is examined. This chapter seeks to justify the capabilities 
approach as an appropriate starting point for the development of a theoretical 
paradigm in which the judicial review of State resource allocation decisions can occur. 
                                            
105 VC Jackson “Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies” in M Rosenfeld & A Sajo 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) 54 62. The central 
tenets of a capabilities approach to adjudication under a transformative constitution are 
explored in chapter two part 2 4 below.  
106 VC Jackson “Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies” in M Rosenfeld & A Sajo 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (2012) 54 55, 58. 
107 57.  
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Furthermore, the linkages that exist between the capabilities theory and resource 
allocation are conceptualised. The question as to whether the capabilities theory 
supports a wide definition of “available resources” is discussed. Moreover, the role of 
the courts in the valuation and weighting of diverse capabilities and other factors is 
critically scrutinised. In particular, certain lacunae in Sen’s theory are highlighted and 
addressed in order to justify the role of the courts in adjudicating State resource 
allocation decisions. In this regard, the need to ascribe substantive content to socio-
economic rights with reference to the capabilities they seek to give rise to is 
emphasised. Finally, the implications of transformative constitutionalism for a 
capabilities approach to adjudication are highlighted.   
In chapter three the strengths and weaknesses of the judicial approach to the review 
of State resource allocation decisions in the United Kingdom and India, respectively, 
are analysed. First, the approach of the courts in the United Kingdom within a system 
of parliamentary sovereignty is evaluated. The efforts of certain leading academics to 
develop a rights-based justification for judicial review are elucidated. Thereafter, the 
need for adjudicative reform is espoused. Finally, a recent move towards a more 
capabilities-congruent approach is discussed. In particular, calls to adopt 
proportionality as a uniform head of review are evaluated.  
Thereafter, the focus of chapter three turns to the approach of the Indian Supreme 
Court. The Court has interpreted the justiciable rights contained in the Constitution of 
India, 1949, as including socio-economic capabilities, despite the fact that socio-
economic rights are not entrenched as directly justiciable fundamental rights. 
Furthermore, the innovation of Public Interest Litigation is analysed as a mechanism 
through which the Supreme Court has sought to generate increased information 
through facilitating broad government and stakeholder participation. However, 
weaknesses in the Supreme Court’s approach are also highlighted.  
Chapter four assesses the need for the development of a capabilities-based 
standard of review that can be applied where complex, polycentric State resource 
allocation decisions fall to be adjudicated. The need for such a standard of review is 
determined in the light of the judicial tendencies to collapse the interpretative and 
justificatory stages of adjudication; define “available resources” narrowly; unduly resort 
to deference and reinforce a rigid distinction between positive and negative duties 
imposed upon the State by qualified socio-economic rights. Thereafter, evidence of the 
judicial competence to review allocative decisions, as gleaned from existing 
Constitutional Court jurisprudence, is elucidated.  
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Chapter five investigates whether proportionality review, as a robust manifestation 
of reasonableness review, can be developed to constitute a capabilities-based 
standard of review for the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions. Elements 
of proportionality review apparent from Constitutional Court jurisprudence are 
expounded. Thereafter, the intricacies of adapting proportionality specifically for the 
review of allocative decisions are explored. Chapter five furthermore elucidates the 
overarching features of a capabilities-based standard of review. In addition, specific 
review criteria are identified.  
In chapter six a capabilities approach to remedies is expounded. Where a violation 
of a socio-economic right is found, the infringement of the right in question must be 
remedied. The need therefore arises to direct the State to re-allocate resources or 
procure additional resources. Chapter six explores the potential of the structural 
interdict to conform to a capabilities approach to remedies and to simultaneously 
accommodate the judiciary’s constitutional and institutional limitations. Where 
concerns regarding the constitutional and institutional competence of courts are simply 
ignored, ineffective remedies may be granted. Chapter six thus investigates whether 
the incorporation of certain central tenets of the capabilities approach into the design 
of structural interdicts can substantially address these important concerns while 
effectively vindicating vital capabilities and the socio-economic rights that protect them. 
Chapter seven concludes this dissertation. Recommendations are made for the 
future adjudication of State resource allocation decisions impacting on socio-economic 
rights. Related research areas that merit further analyses are highlighted.  
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Chapter 2: Adjudicating State resource allocation decisions: The capabilities 
approach  
 
2 1 Introduction 
 
The adjudication of State resource allocation decisions raises many concerns 
regarding the role and aptitude of the judiciary to make sound judgments in this 
complex context. The judiciary is often viewed as an illegitimate forum for adjudicating 
in an area that affects everyone.1 Moreover, attention must be paid to claims that courts 
are incompetent fora for the adjudication of polycentric issues that can result in a 
myriad unintended consequences.2 State resource allocation decisions are polycentric 
par excellence, and can impact on the national budget and even affect macro-
economic policy.3 A theoretical approach is accordingly needed that both justifies the 
role of the courts as a legitimate forum and practically aids the judiciary in competently 
adjudicating State resource allocation decisions in socio-economic rights cases.  
In this chapter it will be argued that the capabilities approach to development and 
justice, as developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, provides a theoretical 
approach that can meet these demands.4 This chapter lays the theoretical foundation 
for the evaluation of the approach of the judiciaries in the United Kingdom and India to 
the review of allocative decisions,5 the argument that aspects of the Constitutional 
Court’s application of a model of reasonableness review require reform,6 the 
development of a capabilities-based standard of review for the adjudication of State 
resource allocation decisions,7 and the design of a capabilities approach to remedies.8  
                                            
1 C Steinberg “Can Reasonableness Protect the Poor? A Review of South Africa’s Socio-
Economic Rights Jurisprudence” (2006) 123 SALJ 264 272. 
2 L Fuller “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harv LR 353 394 coined the term 
“polycentricity” to describe complex disputes in which a decision on one issue could potentially 
result in unknown ramifications for a myriad interrelated issues. 
3 JA King Judging Social Rights (2012) 38. 
4 This dissertation primarily focuses on two of Sen’s seminal works, A Sen Development as 
Freedom (1999) and more recently A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009). Furthermore, it is 
necessary to supplement Sen’s work at certain points and to this end reliance is placed on MC 
Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011).  
5 Chapter three.  
6 Chapter four.  
7 Chapter five. 
8 Chapter six.  
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The chapter commences by conceptualising the broad linkages that exist between 
the capabilities approach and resource allocation in the socio-economic sphere. 
Importantly, the implication of the capabilities approach for defining “available 
resources” widely or narrowly will be elucidated. Thereafter, Sen’s framework for the 
valuation of capabilities will be scrutinised, and the points of commonality between this 
valuational framework and the model of review adopt by the Constitutional Court in 
socio-economic rights and administrative justice cases will be highlighted. Significantly, 
the crucial importance of adopting a two-stage rights analysis for the review of 
allocative decisions will be emphasised. Similarly, the critical role that public reasoning 
and participation play in a process of valuation will be expounded. Furthermore, certain 
lacunae in Sen’s theory will be pointed out and supplemented with reference to 
Nussbaum’s scholarship.  
Finally, the congruence between a capabilities approach to adjudication and 
adjudication under a transformative constitution will be underscored with reference to 
certain tenets that are central to both the capabilities approach and a project of 
transformative constitutionalism.  
 
2 2 The capabilities approach 
 
2 2 1 Why capabilities? 
 
The capabilities approach constitutes a paradigm in terms of which a wide range of 
issues such as poverty, inequality, well-being, justice or government policies can be 
evaluated. This inter-disciplinary approach has been used as an evaluative tool in a 
variety of fields such as those related to development, welfare economics, political 
philosophy, and social policy.9 The capabilities approach stands apart from other 
evaluative approaches in that it does not focus exclusively on monetary income, 
resources, basic goods or utility.10  
Sen rejects utilitarian, welfarist approaches that focus on measuring the “utility” 
(defined as happiness, pleasure or preference) of alternative states of affairs. One 
reason for Sen’s rejection of these approaches is that non-utility related information 
such as conversion factors are excluded from an evaluative exercise. Thus, a welfarist 
                                            
9 I Robeyns “The Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey” (2005) Journal of Human 
Development 93 94.  
10 96-97.  
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approach would not take into account the additional needs of a disabled person, or the 
fact that a woman is satisfied with lower wages than her male counterparts due to a 
history of oppression and marginalisation.11 Instead, Sen places the substantive 
freedoms or capabilities to “choose a life one has reason to value”12 at the centre of 
his evaluative endeavours. This perspective recognises the importance of freedom to 
lead dignified lives. It is thus much more in tune with a constitutional democracy based 
on “[h]uman dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights 
and freedoms”13 than an approach whereby government policy is judged based on the 
real income per capita or Gross Domestic Product that it produces.  
Capabilities also resonate particularly strongly with the socio-economic rights 
enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the “Constitution”). 
Just as the freedom to choose meaningful lives cannot exist without the essential 
capabilities that render meaningful choices possible, the freedom to fully participate in 
social, political and economic life can only be exercised when at least basic material 
needs are met. The socio-economic rights enshrined in the Constitution can thus be 
conceptualised as being informed by the underlying capabilities they represent – 
capabilities worthy of legal and political recognition, protection and enforcement. 
Government may seek to justify its resource allocation for the realisation of socio-
economic rights with reference to its longer term development goals. For courts to be 
able to effectively adjudicate the reasonableness of such allocative decisions, the 
goals and means of development must be understood in a way that promotes the 
objectives of the Constitution. The following part will therefore expound some of the 
nuances of the capabilities approach in order to identify and conceptualise the linkages 
that exist between State expenditure on the fulfilment of socio-economic needs and 
economic development. 
  
                                            
11 97. 
12 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 74.  
13 S 1(a) of the Constitution.  
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2 2 2 The capabilities approach and resource allocation: Conceptualising the linkages  
 
2 2 2 1 Functionings and capabilities 
 
Sen equates substantive freedoms with capabilities in his design of an evaluative 
paradigm within which the progress of development as well as the justness of social 
arrangements can be assessed. Relying on Aristotle, Sen incorporates the concept of 
“functionings” into his approach; conceived as “the various things a person may value 
doing or being”.14 “Functionings” represent a supple concept, which can include basic 
states of being (such as being adequately nourished) as well as more complex states 
of being (such as being able to participate effectively in community life).  
This flexible conception of functionings that constitutes a spectrum ranging from 
simple to complex states of being complements the constitutional concept of 
progressive realisation in the context of the primary socio-economic rights provisions 
in the Constitution.15 A substantive conception of progressive realisation implies that 
the State should continually improve the quality and increase the range of beneficiaries 
of socio-economic goods.16 For example, twenty years ago the State might have 
fulfilled its obligations in respect of the right of access to sufficient water17 by supplying 
the minimum quantity of water necessary to survive. However, the State’s duty to 
progressively realise the right means that over the course of those twenty years a 
greater quantity of water should have been made available to a larger range of 
beneficiaries. Resource allocation decisions could thereby be assessed with 
increasing levels of scrutiny in order to determine whether government has 
progressively enabled more complex levels of functioning.  
Capabilities constitute the substantive freedom to choose “alternative functioning 
combinations”.18 A person for whom more functioning combinations are possible 
therefore possesses a greater “capability set” than a person who cannot achieve a 
functioning of being well-nourished, let alone a functioning combination of good health 
                                            
14 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 75. 
15 Ss 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution state that “[t]he state must take reasonable legislative 
and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation” of 
the rights of access to adequate housing, health care, sufficient food and water and social 
security. 
16 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 45. 
17 S 27(1) and (2) of the Constitution.  
18 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 75. 
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and education. Functionings thus represent actual achievements or what a person can 
actually do, whereas capability sets represent the substantive freedom to choose 
different functioning combinations.19 Capabilities therefore constitute the real 
opportunities that people have to realise various lifestyles, rather than the choices they 
actually make.  
 
2 2 2 1 1 Poverty and resource allocation  
 
Sen views poverty as a “deprivation of basic capabilities”.20 Where elementary 
capabilities such as those related to health care and education are lacking, mortality, 
undernourishment and widespread illiteracy may result.21 It follows that where material 
socio-economic needs are left unfulfilled, more complex functionings such as social 
and political participation cannot be realised.  
This approach as opposed to one that focuses on low levels of income recognises 
the intrinsic significance of socio-economic deprivations while simultaneously 
acknowledging influences other than income on poverty.22 Although connections can 
exist between income levels and capabilities,23 Sen argues that income should be 
viewed as merely instrumental to the attainment of greater capability sets and 
functionings. A focus on the deprivation of capabilities and the removal of 
“unfreedoms”24 in the struggle against poverty takes account of the personal 
characteristics and circumstances that can impede the conversion of income into 
capabilities.25 In the South African context, factors that may hamper the conversion of 
income into capabilities are closely related to lasting patterns of structural 
disadvantage caused by discriminatory apartheid-era laws, policies and resource 
distribution. 
                                            
19 75.  
20 20; for a discussion of why poverty should be viewed as capability deprivation rather than in 
terms of low income, see further 87-110.  
21 20. 
22 87-88.  
23 In that income can influence what people can choose, be or do (A Sen Development as 
Freedom (1999) 72) and capability enhancement through, for example, the provision of 
education and health care can increase the income levels of the recipient (19, 90). 
24 3, 15-17.  
25 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 254-257.  
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Room is thereby left for recognition of the relationships between structural and 
systemic disadvantage and socio-economic deprivation.26 Where government may 
seek to justify a particular allocation of resources to economic growth that will aid 
heightened income levels in the long term, such justification cannot be accepted at 
face value. Instead, resource allocation should be reviewed in light of other factors that 
result in capability deprivation. This view of poverty also accords with the philosophy 
underlying the inclusion of justiciable socio-economic rights in the Constitution. As 
Froneman notes, true freedom remains unattainable where the material means to 
enjoy such freedom are absent.27  
Courts should therefore take care to always place the vital interests that socio-
economic rights represent – and the gravity of a deprivation of basic capabilities – at 
the forefront of any evaluation of State resource allocation decisions. This 
conceptualisation could justify a State resource allocation decision aimed at the 
immediate alleviation of a deprivation of basic capabilities over a competing resource 
allocation decision aimed at promoting more complex functionings on a longer term 
basis.28  
 
2 2 2 1 2 Resource allocation beyond the minimum  
 
Nevertheless, resource allocation cannot solely be directed at realising basic 
capabilities and elementary functionings. As discussed below, Sen relies on the 
prioritisation and valuation of capabilities through public, reasoned discussion. 
Nussbaum, on the other hand, has identified a list of central capabilities that she 
regards as deserving of priority.29 She argues that a life of human dignity requires as 
                                            
26 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 25-29. 
27 J Froneman “Enforcing Socio-Economic Rights Under a Transformative Constitution: The 
Role of the Courts” (2007) 8 ESR Review 20 21. 
28 As the Constitutional Court stated in Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 44: 
“To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the degree and extent of the 
denial of the right they endeavour to realise. Those whose needs are the most urgent and 
whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is most in peril, must not be ignored by the 
measures aimed at achieving realisation of the right. It may not be sufficient to meet the test 
of reasonableness to show that the measures are capable of achieving a statistical advance 
in the realisation of the right.” 
29 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 33-34. 
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a minimum the provision of “ample” threshold levels for all the capabilities included in 
her list.30 A sharp distinction can therefore be drawn between Sen’s paradigm for the 
valuation of capabilities and Nussbaum’s list, which is accompanied by minimum 
thresholds. Whereas Sen’s approach resembles a balancing exercise that can easily 
be adapted for judicial use and is congruent with the model of reasonableness review 
adopted by the South African Constitutional Court,31 Nussbaum’s list raises some of 
the same problems associated with a “minimum core” approach to socio-economic 
rights adjudication.32  
Problematic aspects related to the minimum core approach include the questions of 
how to judicially determine the content of the core and how to set a fixed content 
without excluding participatory social processes that should contribute to the 
identification of dynamic socio-economic needs.33 Sen justifies his disinclination to 
                                            
30 32. 
31 The Constitutional Court’s development of a model of reasonableness review is explained in 
chapter one part 1 3 above.  
32 The minimum core entails that a State is obliged to provide certain minimum threshold levels 
of socio-economic goods required to meet essential needs and is elucidated in UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 3: The nature of State parties’ 
obligations (art 2(1) of the Covenant) UN Doc E/C 14/12/90 para 10:  
“In order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core 
obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate that every effort has been 
made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of 
priority, those minimum obligations.” (Para 10).  
In contrast, the UN Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 
14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health UN Doc E/C 12/2000/4 para 47 states 
that “a State party cannot, under any circumstances whatsoever, justify its non-compliance 
with the core obligations set out [in the General Comment] which are non-derogable”. The 
Court in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 33 
and Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 34 did 
not exclude the role of the minimum core approach in aiding in a determination of 
reasonableness, but ultimately developed a model of reasonableness review instead of 
adopting a minimum core approach for the adjudication of socio-economic rights. For a 
discussion of the problems related to the minimum core, especially those relating to the 
indeterminacy of the core and the potential of curtailing broader social dialogue regarding the 
content of socio-economic rights, see inter alia S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: 
Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 163-173 and KG Young “The 
Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content” (2008) 33 
Yale J Int’l L 113. 
33 KG Young “The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of 
Content” (2008) 33 Yale J Int’l L 113 137-140; S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: 
Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 165-170.  
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formulate a list of important capabilities by pointing out, firstly, the difficulty in 
formulating a list and prioritising capabilities without specifying the relevant context in 
which such capabilities will be exercised.34 This objection mirrors issues related to 
specifying a single content of a minimum core across various contexts. Secondly, Sen 
is averse to a list due to its potential to minimise or even ignore the role of public 
reasoning in establishing the nature and prioritisation of important capabilities.35 Again, 
Sen’s objection reflects the problem of setting a fixed minimum content without 
excluding social participatory processes that should help to formulate and adapt the 
content of socio-economic rights as socio-economic needs change.  
In addition to these general problems associated with the minimum core approach 
and, by extension, Nussbaum’s list, Nussbaum’s classification also potentially gives 
rise to instances of over-concentrated resource allocation. If all or most resources are 
allocated for the realisation of the thresholds that Nussbaum identifies, such resources 
may be rendered unavailable for the development of capabilities beyond these 
minimum thresholds. Bilchitz, who likewise devises a two-fold threshold for 
fundamental rights, astutely warns against diverting all resources to the fulfilment of 
basic needs:  
 
“Where the realization of such [minimal] interests entails that most of society’s resources 
are devoted to this purpose, the realization of such needs can lose its point for everyone. It 
is necessary for there to be resources available to retain a space beyond the basic in order 
for individuals to have the opportunity to realize their ends.”36 
                                            
34 A Sen “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights” (2004) 32 Philosophy & Public Affairs 
315 333 n 31; KG Young “The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in 
Search of Content” (2008) 33 Yale J Int’l L 113 137-138 who notes this important distinction 
between Sen’s and Nussbaum’s theories.  
35 A Sen “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights” (2004) 32 Philosophy & Public Affairs 
315 333 n 31.  
36 D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-
Economic Rights (2007) 210. See also D Bilchitz “Is the Constitutional Court Wasting Away 
the Rights of the Poor? Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality” (2010) 127 SALJ 
591 601-604 where Bilchitz discusses the difficulty of striking a balance between short-term 
relief from poverty and long-term fulfilment of adequate access to socio-economic goods and 
over-all development. Bilchitz proposes that short-term, interim services may be necessary to 
enable recipients to enjoy the benefits of long-term programmes. However, he points out that 
development will not be possible without tolerating a certain level of inequality of resources 
until the ultimate goal of progressive realisation (equal, adequate access to socio-economic 
goods) is reached: 
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As will be elaborated upon below, Sen’s approach to valuation can be developed so 
as to cater for resource allocation that adequately addresses the promotion of 
capabilities and functionings beyond the minimum.  
 
2 2 2 2 A focus on freedom  
 
According to Sen, development – and the success of any given society in general – 
should be assessed in terms of the substantive freedoms that members of that society 
enjoy.37 Development thus necessitates the removal of sources of unfreedom, be they 
poverty, inadequate economic opportunity or “systematic social deprivation”.38 
According to this approach, freedom is valuable both as an evaluative criterion and for 
the importance it places on the free agency of people. In turn, a particular type of 
agency in the context of development is both constitutive of the development process 
and instrumental to the promotion of agencies in other social and economic spheres.39 
 
2 2 2 2 1 Agency and participation  
 
Where socio-economic policy and concomitant State resource allocation decisions 
are concerned, Sen would therefore advocate agency and participation in State 
decision-making. Social programmes that are merely “delivered” to passive recipients 
of benefits are untenable within Sen’s theory.40 Resource allocation decisions cannot 
simply aim to deliver socio-economic goods to passive recipients. Instead, both the 
determination of the scope of a reasonable allocation and the subsequent utilisation of 
the allocation must include participatory elements.  
                                            
“It is crucial to understand that the Constitution sets a long-term goal of ‘equality of 
sufficiency’: it mandates that this be achieved through a process of progressive realisation 
which requires some level of inequality in the short-term.” (D Bilchitz “Is the Constitutional 
Court Wasting Away the Rights of the Poor? Nokotyana v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality” (2010) 127 SALJ 591 603). 
37 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 3, 18.  
38 3.  
39 4. Sen identifies five types of instrumental freedoms (namely political freedoms, economic 
facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security) that 
complement and supplement each other. Agency in one of the spheres related to these 
freedoms can therefore promote agencies of different types in other spheres. See further A 
Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 38-41.  
40 19, 53. 
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A significant interaction exists between the freedom to participate in public affairs 
and the expansion of capabilities. While public policy may enhance the capabilities that 
people enjoy, Sen highlights the fact that the exercise of participatory capabilities may 
influence the direction that public policy takes.41 The exercise of participatory freedoms 
by the public should likewise influence State resource allocation decisions that 
emanate from wider policy aims. Resource allocation decisions should thus expand 
capabilities, and the exercise of participatory capabilities should contribute to the 
formulation of reasonable resource allocation decisions.  
The reciprocal relationship between capability expansion and public policy is 
therefore central to a theory that focuses on substantive freedom.42 Since freedom to 
participate is a constitutive part of development and not merely a means to a different 
end, a State resource allocation decision that excludes this type of substantive freedom 
should not pass constitutional muster without weighty justification for the omission of 
participatory processes. Participation, as an intrinsic good, should thus be inherent in 
resource allocation decisions. At the same time, freedom may play “a constructive role 
in the formation of values and ethics”.43 Where State resource allocation decisions are 
concerned, participatory freedom can also be constructive in developing standards of 
review whereby similar decisions may be judicially assessed in the future.  
 
2 2 2 2 2 Constitutive and instrumental importance 
 
Freedom should be conceptualised as both the primary end and principal means of 
development and policy formation.44 Constitutive freedom concerns the substantive 
freedoms that enable people to live meaningful lives. These include basic capabilities 
and elementary functionings such as the ability to avoid starvation or 
undernourishment. Constitutive freedom also includes more complex freedoms such 
as those related to achieving literacy or exercising political participation.45 It follows 
that instead of asking how, for example, participatory processes contribute to overall 
development goals, the freedom to participate should instead be viewed as part of 
development itself.46 
                                            
41 18.  
42 18.  
43 292 (original emphasis).  
44 36-37.  
45 36.  
46 36. 
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Sen also identifies certain categories of freedoms that are instrumental in promoting 
overall social freedom to pursue the lives we have reason to value. Instrumental 
freedoms include, inter alia, political freedoms such as opportunities for public dialogue 
and dissent; social opportunities such as the provision of education and health care; 
and transparency guarantees, which should be aimed at preventing corruption and 
financial irresponsibility.47 An additional level of instrumental value of “social 
opportunities” is recognised in that social opportunities enable more effective economic 
and political activities.48  
State resource allocation decisions can thus be judged not only for their 
enhancement of overall freedoms and capabilities, but also for whether they are aimed 
at increasing important instrumental freedoms. Similarly, a reasonable allocative 
decision may be one that strikes a balance between the promotion of constitutive and 
instrumental freedoms and capabilities. Indeed, Sen highlights the importance of 
recognising the connection among instrumental freedoms inter se – as well as between 
instrumental freedoms and overall capability enhancement – for the analysis of public 
policy.49 
 
2 2 2 2 3 Opportunity and process  
 
In Development as Freedom, Sen distinguishes between an opportunity aspect and 
a process aspect of freedom. The opportunity aspect of freedom relates to the 
opportunities that people have to live the lives they have reason to value, given their 
social circumstances. In contrast, the process aspect of freedom concerns the nature 
of the processes through which choices are made. Significantly, attention should not 
exclusively be devoted to either aspect; rather sufficient weight should be accorded to 
both opportunity and process.50 Sen repeats this distinction in The Idea of Justice,51 
but goes on to circumscribe his argument: although both aspects are constituent of 
freedom, the capabilities approach relates only to the aspect of substantive 
opportunities. Sen argues that the capabilities approach “cannot pay adequate 
                                            
47 38-40.  
48 39.  
49 40.  
50 17, 291-292.  
51 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 228-230.  
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attention to fairness and equity involved in procedures”52 and that the procedural 
element is more appropriately dealt with by a theory of justice.  
Sen’s theory of justice as developed in The Idea of Justice thus makes room for 
procedural – and not just capability centred – justice.53 Nussbaum has interpreted 
Sen’s work as postulating that capabilities can relate to both procedure and substantive 
opportunity whereas according to Sen, human rights are confined to substantive 
opportunities only.54 It is submitted that the freedom to participate in fair procedures 
should form part of the capabilities approach in that fair procedures indubitably form 
part of the types of lives we have reason to value. When resources are devoted to the 
opportunity aspect of freedom, this may lead to the ability to meaningfully exercise the 
procedural aspect of freedom. In any event, Nussbaum is undoubtedly correct when 
she rejects Sen’s argument in the context of human rights, instead pointing out that 
procedural rights often constitute fundamental rights.55  
Moreover, the procedural and substantive elements of justice are sometimes 
inseparable.56 In the South African constitutional milieu, the development of 
administrative law57 to encompass substantive reasonableness review illustrates the 
futility of drawing rigid distinctions between procedure and substance.58 Likewise, 
socio-economic rights, such as the right of access to adequate housing, have been 
interpreted to inherently include elements of robust procedural fairness in the form of 
                                            
52 295. 
53 Sen makes the same argument in an earlier article: see A Sen “Elements of a Theory of 
Human Rights” (2004) 32 Philosophy & Public Affairs 315 336. 
54 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 67.  
55 67; see also MC Nussbaum “Capabilities, Entitlements, Rights: Supplementation and 
Critique” (2011) 12 Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 23 28.  
56 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 39.  
57 In the past, administrative law was characterised by the formalistic classification of 
administrative functions and an artificial distinction between procedural review and appeal on 
the merits. See further in this regard H Corder “Without Deference, With Respect: A Response 
to Justice O’Regan” (2004) 121 SALJ 438 443 and G Quinot “Substantive Reasoning in 
Administrative-law Adjudication” (2010) 3 CCR 111 115. 
58 H Corder “Without Deference, With Respect: A Response to Justice O’Regan” (2004) 121 
SALJ 438 443. Corder further points out that administrative law is informed by contextual 
values, including the constitutional founding values of accountability, responsiveness and 
openness (440). It is submitted that these values can serve to further infuse administrative law 
concepts with normative substance.  
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“meaningful engagement”,59 thus further blurring the distinction between substantive 
and procedural rights. Sen’s work should therefore be developed to recognise that 
capabilities – and the rights they infuse – may consist of an amalgamation of 
substantive and procedural elements.  
Whether conceptualised as part of freedom within the capabilities approach or 
freedom within a theory of justice, a focus on both the opportunity and process aspects 
is crucial for the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions in socio-economic 
rights cases. An instance of resource allocation, although possibly reasonable in terms 
of scope and purpose, may be found constitutionally wanting where it was taken 
without observing the procedural obligations of administrative justice. To hold 
otherwise would be to ignore the importance of agency and participation within State 
decision-making processes.  
Likewise, a resource allocation decision adopted in accordance with fair procedures 
may nevertheless be judged as substantively unreasonable because, for example, the 
scope of the allocation was under-inclusive in terms of amount or the class of persons 
to whom the allocation was directed. A resource allocation decision may also be found 
to be substantively unfair60 or unreasonable for failure to include participatory 
processes that are inherent in “reasonable” State conduct.  
When courts adjudicate State resource allocation decisions, both the opportunity 
and process aspects of any decision must be taken into account in order to ensure that 
reasonable and fair allocations are made. Moreover, by perceiving freedom as a 
synergy between substantive choice and the process of choice, courts can fruitfully 
develop the relationship that exists between socio-economic rights and the right to just 
administrative action.61  
  
                                            
59 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC). See further chapter six part 6 4 1 2.  
60 For the recognition that reasonableness as a ground for review in administrative law includes 
an element of substantive fairness, see the minority judgment in Bel Porto School Governing 
Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 153 and the discussion of this 
judgment in chapter five part 5 2 1.  
61 For a discussion of how the synergy between substance and procedure can be developed 
in the context of the State’s duty to meaningfully engage prior to and during socio-economic 
policy implementation, see S van der Berg “Meaningful Engagement: Proceduralising Socio-
economic Rights Further or Infusing Administrative Law with Substance?” (2013) 29 SAJHR 
376.   
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2 2 3 Interpreting “available resources” widely  
 
2 2 3 1 A capabilities-based justification for the adjudication of State expenditure  
 
The adjudication of State resource allocation decisions raises concerns that the 
judiciary lacks the constitutional competence to adjudicate issues that impact upon 
public finance and could affect matters of macro-economic policy.62 Jowell describes 
“constitutional competence” as follows: 
 
“The question of constitutional competence involves a normative assessment of the proper 
role of institutions in a democracy. It starts with the assertion that it is not the province of 
courts, when judging the administration, to make their own evaluation of the public good, or 
to substitute their personal assessment of the social and economic advantage of a decision. 
We should not expect judges therefore to decide whether the country should join a common 
currency, or to set the level of taxation. These are matters of policy and the preserve of 
other branches of government and courts are not constitutionally competent to engage in 
them.”63 
 
These concerns could prompt the judiciary to simply defer to the legislative and 
executive branches of government, instead of earnestly engaging with the issues at 
hand. Fortunately, Sen’s theory can serve to put the need for public expenditure into a 
capabilities-based perspective – and so help to justify the evaluation of State resource 
allocation decisions in socio-economic rights cases by allaying concerns related to 
constitutional competence.  
 
2 2 3 2 Adjudicating socio-economic expenditure  
 
Sen negates the assumption that only wealthy countries that enjoy ample resources 
can finance support-led processes,64 where programmes consisting of social support, 
                                            
62 Concerns regarding the polycentric effects of adjudicating State resource allocation also 
arise. See JA King Judging Social Rights (2012) 192-194. The critical importance of 
participation and informational broadening under a transformative constitution, and the 
potential of such an approach to at least partially overcome concerns of polycentricity, are 
canvassed in part 2 4 3 and chapter six part 6 3 2 below.  
63 J Jowell “Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review” (1999) PL 
448 451. The concept of constitutional competence corresponds to the issue of the legitimacy 
of the judicial branch of government to adjudicate certain matters.  
64 Sen distinguishes between “support-led processes” and “growth-mediated processes”. The 
latter depends on and utilises fast economic growth to expand social services. The former does 
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education and health care are instituted.65 Pointing to the economics of relative costs, 
Sen postulates that even poor countries can quickly expand education and health care. 
In this way, quality of life can be significantly elevated, while investment in education 
and health care can concurrently foster economic growth.66  
This perspective of social expenditure as both inherently important and 
instrumentally important to economic growth, can aid courts when evaluating resource 
allocation decisions in socio-economic rights cases. For example, although the State 
may argue that resources are scarce in South Africa, scarcity cannot excuse non-
allocation of resources for socio-economic purposes. Resources should therefore be 
made “available” even if government must borrow funds or take other macro-economic 
steps to do so.67  
A wide interpretation of “available resources” that looks beyond merely those 
resources that have already been allocated to particular socio-economic programmes 
is thus consistent with Sen’s theory. Furthermore, supported by an economic theory 
that is congruent with the transformative purposes of the Constitution, courts may feel 
more competent to venture into the terrain of State resource allocation decisions.  
 
2 2 3 3 Adjudicating macro-economic policy  
 
Importantly, Sen unequivocally values the realisation of capabilities above other, 
instrumental economic and macro-economic goals. Ultimately, then, the objectives of 
all levels of public policy must be the advancement and realisation of capabilities and 
functionings: 
 
“The role of public expenditure in generating and guaranteeing many basic capabilities calls 
for attention; it must be considered along with the instrumental need for macroeconomic 
                                            
not rely on fast economic growth to institute and expand social programmes. A Sen 
Development as Freedom (1999) 46.  
65 46-47.  
66 48-49.  
67 See D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-
Economic Rights (2007) 229 who argues that foreign loans and questions of macro-economic 
policy generally lie outside the expertise of the judiciary. The author goes on to state that courts 
could only “recommend” that government consider taking macro-economic steps. This 
dissertation emphasises that through adjudication and participation courts can and should 
require government to account for the steps it has taken to procure resources where the right 
in question demands such allocation. See further, for example, chapter five parts 5 3 3, 5 4 1 
1, 5 4 2 3, 5 4 2 5 and chapter six part 6 4 2 2.   
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 46 
 
stability. Indeed, the latter need must be assessed within a broad framework of social 
objectives.”68  
 
Sen’s work thus constitutes an economic, theoretical basis for valuing the promotion 
of inherently important capabilities along with instrumental concerns of macro-
economic stability. Although a court should by no means disregard the impact of its 
judgment on macro-economic policy, the perspective offered by Sen nevertheless 
highlights the fact that “macro-economic stability” is not a sacrosanct area where no 
court dare tread. Instead, within a transformative constitutional democracy, where law 
and the judiciary play a significant role in bringing about social change, no State 
resource allocation decision should be immune from judicial scrutiny.  
This conceptualisation of State expenditure is also congruent with a wide 
interpretation of “available resources” that does not merely focus on the resources that 
a State has already allocated to a particular programme or policy. Rather, “available 
resources” should be determined by focusing on the broader budget as well as the 
macro-economic options available to the State to procure additional resources where 
the socio-economic need at stake is great and the impact of non-realisation of the right 
grave. This can prevent the State from limiting its socio-economic obligations by 
allocating minimal funds to relevant governmental departments (at the appropriation 
stage of the national budget process) or to particular socio-economic programmes (at 
the administrative level of resource expenditure).  
Nevertheless, macro-economic instability would no doubt be detrimental to the 
realisation of capabilities. Where an order necessitating macro-economic action would 
therefore be imprudent, courts should nonetheless at least be prepared to require the 
State to thoroughly account for the efforts it has made to make resources available in 
the wide sense and the effect that any resource allocation may have on the economy.  
 
2 3 Valuation and the role of the courts 
 
2 3 1 A theory without content? 
 
Sen’s theory has been criticised for making little commitment to the content of 
valuable types of freedom, capabilities and functionings.69 Nussbaum states that Sen 
                                            
68 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 141 (original emphasis).  
69 See, for instance, Bilchitz, who criticises Sen’s approach for offering “little guidance in 
determining which functionings and capabilities can be said to be valuable”. D Bilchitz Poverty 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 47 
 
only attempts to provide an answer through “emphasis, choice of examples, and 
implication”, while giving due weight to the question of valuation of capabilities.70 While 
she finds this approach acceptable in the context of a mere comparative theory, she 
argues that it may well be inappropriate for developing a theory of democracy and 
justice: 
 
“Any use of the idea of capabilities for the purposes of normative law and public policy must 
ultimately take a stand on substance, saying that some capabilities are important and others 
less important, some good, and some (even) bad.”71 
 
Nussbaum further criticises Sen for conceptualising freedom as a “general, all-
purpose social good” of which important capabilities are merely examples.72 
Nussbaum proceeds to frame a substantive answer for this question of content by the 
compilation of her list of central capabilities. One of her primary grounds for doing so 
is to aid the formulation of political principles that can inform constitutional law.73 
Importantly, her development of the theory relies heavily on the notions of human 
dignity and agency.  
 
2 3 1 1 Recognising the role of the State in realising important capabilities  
 
According to Nussbaum, it is the task of government to enable people to pursue a 
life of dignity. This can be achieved by providing at least threshold levels of the 
capabilities she has identified as most important.74 Paradoxically, Sen – who aptly 
places the need for public expenditure within a capabilities perspective and also values 
agency – nonetheless seems reluctant to recognise enforceable, primary duties on the 
State to provide certain capabilities.75 Sen’s valuational theory can therefore be 
                                            
and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights (2007) 
11.  
70 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 27. 
71 27-28. 
72 70. 
73 70-73. 
74 32-33, see also 40, 168. 
75 See, for example, A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 269: 
“For efficient provision of public goods, not only do we have to consider the possibility of 
state action and social provisioning, we also have to examine the part played by the 
development of social values and a sense of responsibility that may reduce the need for 
forceful state action.” 
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supplemented with Nussbaum’s scholarship, without the need to adopt a rigid list of 
capabilities or a minimum core approach to adjudication.  
 
2 3 1 2 Recognising the role of the courts in articulating important capabilities 
 
Significantly, Nussbaum views courts as competent fora for the further specification 
of abstract capabilities and for the setting of progressively ambitious yet realistic 
thresholds.76 Nussbaum moreover recognises the responsibility of courts to enforce 
constitutions in a capability-enhancing manner.77 She highlights that a written 
constitution is a useful way of articulating fundamental entitlements.78 However, she 
goes on to state: 
 
“When a given capability has been recognized as a fundamental entitlement in a nation’s 
constitution... much more work needs to be done. The capability will need further 
elaboration or specification, and the threshold will have to be correctly set… [A central 
capability] abstractly specified at the outset, can be implemented through constitutional law 
over time, with a deepening and incrementally specific understanding of its requirements.”79  
 
2 3 1 3 Recognising the role of the South African Constitution in establishing content   
 
In the South African context, much of the concern regarding Sen’s lack of 
commitment to substance can be overcome with reference to our transformative 
Constitution.80 The inclusion of socio-economic rights and the purposes they seek to 
achieve can aid us in identifying what capabilities are worthy of special attention when 
evaluating State resource allocation decisions. Courts will often, however, be called 
upon to balance competing resource allocations, for example those aimed at the 
immediate realisation of basic capabilities versus those aimed at longer term 
                                            
While the development of social values and responsibility are no doubt important, the duty to 
provide socio-economic goods and capabilities in a country plagued by systemic disadvantage 
should in the first place lie with the State. To Sen, agency entails that the State plays an 
extensive but supporting role (53).  
76 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 40-42, 62. 
77 43. 
78 73. 
79 170, see for a discussion of judicial implementation 173-180 and part 2 3 3 3 below. 
80 See part 2 4 below, in particular part 2 4 1 where the normative values that underpin both 
the capabilities approach and the Constitution – and their ability to identify which capabilities 
constitute the substantive content of socio-economic rights – are discussed. 
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capabilities that can enhance other capabilities in turn.81 Nussbaum’s incremental 
specification of initially abstract capabilities can fruitfully take place within the 
valuational frameworks and mechanisms provided by Sen.  
 
2 3 2 Adjudicating State resource allocation decisions through the lens of capabilities 
 
Sen recognises that substantial debate can exist regarding the importance and 
prioritisation of diverse capabilities. This gives rise to the need to address the valuation 
of capabilities in an explicit manner.82 Capability sets can compete with each other, 
with functioning outcomes83 and with other considerations such as the implementation 
of fair procedures, for prominence – and for resource allocation. Where a court adopts 
a capabilities approach to adjudication, it may similarly be called upon to balance 
competing rights with each other and with other interests in relation to the allocation of 
limited resources. However, Sen does not perceive the possible diversity of valuational 
outcomes as a serious theoretical challenge. Instead, he relies on evaluative reasoning 
to overcome – at least partially – heterogeneity in valuation.84  
 
2 3 2 1 A constitutional focal space establishing a “partial ordering”    
 
Sen postulates that once a focal space for valuation is specified, judgments 
regarding prioritisation can result immediately. He elaborates thus:  
 
“When some functionings are selected as significant, such a focal space is specified, and 
the relation of dominance itself leads to a ‘partial ordering’ over the alternative states of 
affairs.”85 
 
For purposes of the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions in socio-
economic rights cases, the focal space has already been specified by the 
                                            
81 Pressing socio-economic needs that all require immediate allocation of resources can also 
vie for resource allocation, for example expenditure on health care versus expenditure on 
education.  
82 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 75.  
83 A “functioning outcome” is comprised of the alternative functionings and combinations of 
functionings that people achieve given their capability sets.  
84 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 77.  
85 78. 
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Constitution.86 The socio-economic rights87 and the right to just administrative action88 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights can provide the normative paradigm in which the further 
prioritisation and valuation of specific State resource allocation decisions can take 
place. This “partial ordering” may justify the prioritisation of spending on socio-
economic programmes over expenditure on luxury items or even areas such as 
national defence, where expenditure is disproportionate to the defence needs of the 
country.  
However, where more difficult questions of competing resource allocation decisions 
arise, there will be a need to refine the partial ordering by assigning weights to specific 
capabilities, different allocations and other important factors. For example, further 
refining of the partial ordering may be required in complex disputes where competing 
interests (for example short term versus long term spending on socio-economic rights 
or expenditure on education versus health) vie for resource allocation. 
 
2 3 2 2 Narrowing the range of weights 
 
The point of departure for adjudicating State resource allocation decisions is thus 
the identification of a partial ordering, in which rankings of an agreed-upon range of 
weights intersect. However, for complex resource allocation decisions to be effectively 
adjudicated, the permissible range of weights must be narrowed: 
 
“The partial ordering will get systematically extended as the range is made more and more 
narrow. Somewhere in the process of narrowing the range – possibly well before the 
weights are unique – the partial ordering will become complete.”89   
 
Courts can systematically assign weights to different factors, such as the content 
and normative purposes of socio-economic rights and the right to just administrative 
action contrasted with the justification proffered by the State for a particular resource 
allocation decision.   
                                            
86 Resort to Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities (MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 
33-34) is therefore unnecessary.  
87 Particularly for purposes of this dissertation, ss 26, 27 and, to a lesser extent, 29 of the 
Constitution.  
88 S 33 of the Constitution. 
89 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 78. 
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2 3 2 2 1 Using the assignment of weights to select an appropriate level of 
scrutiny  
 
Where the purpose of the right is particularly important, and the deprivation resulting 
from an inadequate allocation of resources is grave, the range of weights should be 
substantially narrowed. Where basic capabilities are at stake, the importance of the 
purpose of the right and the gravity of the capability deprivation will be established. 
The range should thus be correspondingly narrowed and the intensity of the scrutiny 
applied to the State’s justificatory arguments should be sharpened. Referring to the 
distinction drawn by John Rawls between rationality and reasonableness,90 Sen 
acknowledges the variability of levels of scrutiny: 
 
“The demands of scrutiny would have to be sharpened and tightened when we move from 
the idea of rationality to that of reasonableness, if we broadly follow John Rawls in 
interpreting that distinction.”91 
 
Where the State’s justification seems disproportionate vis-à-vis the normative 
content and purposes of the rights and gravity of any violation thereof, the partial 
ordering should become complete. In such a case, the impugned State resource 
allocation decision will not pass constitutional muster when subjected to the level of 
scrutiny required by the initial assignment of weights to the rights at stake. This will be 
the case where, for example, a social group lacks access to adequate levels of water 
necessary to lead dignified lives. In this scenario, the crucial functioning outcome of 
living a dignified life will be seriously imperilled, and the factual context of the litigants’ 
lived reality will illustrate the urgency with which the infringement should be treated. A 
strong level of scrutiny will consequently be adopted. The State will thus have to submit 
very strong justifications for not allocating additional resources so as to make adequate 
levels of water available. The range of weights will accordingly be narrowed to ascribe 
dominant weight to the litigants’ dignity and basic capability deprivation, whereas much 
less weight will be afforded to justificatory arguments proffered by the State. 
The assignment of varying weights serves the dual purpose of prescribing the level 
of intensity of scrutiny applied by the courts as well as indicating whether the resource 
allocation decision itself bears up to whatever level of scrutiny is appropriate. 
                                            
90 J Rawls Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001) 5-8.  
91 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 196.  
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Moreover, the variability of weights resonates with the open-ended standard of 
reasonableness review adopted by the Constitutional Court in adjudicating socio-
economic rights92 and administrative justice93 claims.  
 
2 3 2 2 2 Narrowing the range of weights in reasonableness review  
 
Quinot and Liebenberg advocate an approach to reasonableness review that utilises 
the benefits of this standard of review across the fields of socio-economic rights and 
administrative justice cases while simultaneously developing the substantive content 
of socio-economic rights.94 According to the authors, the normative and factual context 
of any given case should serve to “narrow the band” of options available to the State 
or administrator in acting “reasonably”.95 Where administrative action impacts on a 
socio-economic right, the normative content and purposes of the relevant right should 
thus narrow the range of options available to the administrator – or, in capabilities 
parlance, narrow the range of permissible weights.96  
Since the “narrowing of the band, and in particular the extent of the narrowing… 
depends on the substantive implications of the relevant right”97 it follows that an 
evaluative process of “understanding what the substantive implications of the relevant 
right are under the circumstances” must occur first – before the reasonableness of the 
administrator’s conduct is established.98 The same reasoning applies to cases where 
administrative action is not at issue,99 in that “[r]easonableness must be assessed in 
                                            
92 See in particular Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 
(CC); Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC); Khosa v 
Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 
(CC); Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC); and City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC). 
93 See in particular Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action 
Campaign as Amicus Curiae) 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) and Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister 
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). 
94 G Quinot & S Liebenberg “Narrowing the Band: Reasonableness Review in Administrative 
Justice and Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence in South Africa” (2011) 22 Stell LR 639 641. 
95 647. 
96 649.  
97 650. 
98 650. 
99 For example, where a legislative act is at issue in setting the budget or an executive act is 
at issue in formulating a socio-economic policy.  
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the light of the normative goals that the relevant socio-economic rights seek to 
advance”.100 
The substantive interpretation of the content and normative goals of the socio-
economic right at stake is therefore a crucial first stage in the process of valuation. 
Similarly, the gravity of the impact of the State’s actions or omissions must result in the 
application of a stronger standard of reasonableness review or a narrowing of the 
range of permissible weights.101  
 
2 3 2 2 3 The crucial importance of a two-stage analysis  
 
It is crucial to recognise that resource allocation decisions cannot be accurately 
weighted and adjudicated if weights have not already been assigned to the purposes, 
content of and impact on the rights concerned in the first stage of the rights analysis. 
As discussed above,102 this initial assignment of weights to the normative purposes 
and substantive content of the socio-economic rights at issue should serve to establish 
the level of scrutiny applied to State resource allocation decisions. Where the 
fundamental values of freedom, dignity and equality are seriously implicated, and the 
factual context of the litigants shows that even basic capabilities are being threatened 
or deprived, a strict level of scrutiny should be adopted.103  
For example, the overarching purpose of the right of access to adequate housing104 
may be to achieve the functioning outcome of living an autonomous, dignified life in a 
position of substantive equality with others. The social and historical context of the 
case may reveal that the claimant group has been disadvantaged by race-based 
patterns of discrimination. This would indicate that increased allocation may be 
necessary to enable the claimant group to realise the functioning of living a life in a 
position of substantive equality with others. The factual context may furthermore show 
that the claimant group requires more specific capabilities to be realised for the 
functioning outcome of living an autonomous and dignified life to be feasible. This may 
                                            
100 G Quinot & S Liebenberg “Narrowing the Band: Reasonableness Review in Administrative 
Justice and Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence in South Africa” (2011) 22 Stell LR 639 655.  
101 652.  
102 Part 2 3 2 2 1. 
103 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 
6 SA 505 (CC) para 49; S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a 
Transformative Constitution (2010) 183-186.  
104 S 26 of the Constitution.  
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include the capability to enjoy shelter from the elements, the capability to live in a safe 
environment, the capability to access infrastructure, the capability to access services 
such as water, electricity and sanitation, and so forth. Weight will therefore be assigned 
to the importance of realising these capabilities in order to achieve the significant 
overarching functioning outcome that constitutes the normative purpose of the right. 
The weight so assigned will highlight the appropriate level of scrutiny to which the State 
resource allocation decision should subsequently be subjected. Thereafter, it should 
be determined whether the resource allocation decision in question passes muster 
when subjected to the selected level of scrutiny.  
The first weighting step will be particularly important where different socio-economic 
rights compete for resource allocation or where short term and long term socio-
economic needs vie for resource allocation. Thus, for example, where one of the socio-
economic needs at issue represents a “fertile capability” that can generate 
improvements in other socio-economic areas, government can be expected to spend 
scarce resources on its realisation.105 All socio-economic rights represent fertile 
capabilities in that the realisation of these rights can catalyse the realisation of other 
socio-economic rights, foster dignity and enhance one’s ability to participate in the 
economic, political and social spheres. However, in certain contexts, some socio-
economic capabilities will prove to be more fertile than others. For example, education, 
which is considered an “empowerment right”,106 constitutes a fertile capability par 
excellence. Education promotes agency for the realisation of further basic capabilities 
and more complex capability sets.107 The fertile nature of education as a capability is 
recognised internationally108 as well as by its formulation as an “unqualified” right in 
the Constitution.109 In certain contexts where socio-economic rights compete for 
resource allocation, the exceptionally fertile nature of education might therefore justify 
the prioritisation of resource allocation for the realisation of the right to basic education. 
However, a thorough interpretation of the competing rights at stake must necessarily 
precede a decision regarding prioritisation.  
                                            
105 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 99.  
106 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No 13: The right 
to education (art 13) UN Doc E/C12/1999/10 para 1; Section 27 v Minister of Basic Education 
2013 2 SA 40 (GNP) para 4. 
107 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 98. 
108 Art 13(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). 
109 S 29 of the Constitution does not contain the qualifications relating to “available resources” 
and “progressive realisation” that appear in ss 26 and 27.  
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Resource availability or constraints are thus concomitant factors to which weights 
should be assigned, but cannot be allowed to subsume the assessment of other 
weight-worthy considerations. Rather, such decisions should be evaluated as part of a 
second, “justificatory” stage of the rights analysis once the content of the right has been 
allowed to refine the partial ordering already established by the inclusion of socio-
economic rights and the right to administrative justice in the Constitution. To conclude 
otherwise would be to eschew the valuation process and neglect to prioritise 
capabilities justly. Where resources are allocated inefficiently or unreasonably,110 
these factors should likewise increase the weights assigned to the capabilities 
represented by socio-economic rights in order to extend the ordering necessary to 
effectively adjudicate the State resource allocation decision concerned.  
 
2 3 2 3 Valuation and rights  
 
In congruence with Sen’s general capabilities approach, his conceptualisation of 
human rights, and particularly socio-economic rights, contains many points of 
connection with the Constitutional Court’s application of reasonableness review to 
adjudicate socio-economic rights.111 Although the implications of valuation through 
weight selection for socio-economic rights have been discussed above, Sen’s specific 
focus on human rights merits elaboration.  
 
2 3 2 3 1 The importance of public reasoning and participation  
 
Sen postulates that the underlying freedoms of human rights should be scrutinised 
so as to determine whether sufficient “thresholds” of importance and relevance exist 
                                            
110 G Quinot & S Liebenberg “Narrowing the Band: Reasonableness Review in Administrative 
Justice and Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence in South Africa” (2011) 22 Stell LR 639 651-
652.  
111 Much of Sen’s discussion regarding whether the ethical claims of human rights should be 
converted into legislated rights is not strictly relevant to this dissertation, which focuses on the 
justiciability of State resource allocation decisions within the framework of already 
constitutionally guaranteed, justiciable socio-economic rights. For further reading on the 
philosophical justification or lack thereof for human rights, see A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 
355-366. For a precursor of the arguments made regarding human rights in The Idea of Justice, 
see A Sen “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights” (2004) 32 Philosophy & Public Affairs 315. 
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to justify their recognition as “rights”.112 In order to assess compliance with threshold 
conditions and to determine whether “rights” warrant their status as such, the ethical 
claims underlying rights must “survive open and informed scrutiny”.113 Reasoning and 
participation thus become crucial, both for justifying the recognition of rights and for 
subsequently “weighting” or “ranking” rights within the context of the case at hand. 
Likewise, reasoning cannot but play a central role in determining whether State 
resource allocation decisions are reasonable for purposes of realising socio-economic 
rights.  
 
2 3 2 3 2 The imperfect obligation of reasonableness     
 
Sen’s exposition of the “institutionalization critique” and “feasibility critique” of socio-
economic rights similarly contains some important points of commonality with the 
model of reasonableness review that is applied in South Africa.  
The institutionalisation critique charges that for rights to be “real”, they must 
correspond exactly to “precisely formulated” obligations.114 Sen, however, refutes this 
line of critique by rightly pointing out that even traditional, first generation rights can 
correspond to imperfect obligations. That the qualified nature of the obligations 
imposed on the State does not detract from the justiciable nature of a socio-economic 
right is clearly reflected in South African case law:  
 
“[It] is an extremely difficult task for the state to meet these obligations in the conditions that 
prevail in our country. This is recognised by the Constitution which expressly provides that 
the state is not obliged to go beyond available resources or to realise these rights 
immediately. I stress however, that despite all these qualifications, these are rights, and the 
Constitution obliges the state to give effect to them. This is an obligation that courts can, 
and in appropriate circumstances, must enforce.”115 
 
The primary question, according to Sen, is “what one can reasonably do to help the 
realization of another person’s freedom”.116 The resemblance of this question to the 
reasonableness review standard applied in South Africa, whereby the court questions 
whether the measures adopted by the State to fulfil socio-economic rights are in fact 
                                            
112 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 366-367.  
113 385.  
114 382. 
115 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 94. 
116 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 372 (emphasis added).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 57 
 
“reasonable” as required by the Constitution, is apparent. Sen is surely correct in 
arguing that a “loosely specified” obligation117 – such as the duty to act reasonably – 
should not be confused with no obligation at all.118  
 
2 3 2 3 3 Progressive realisation within available resources   
 
What Sen terms the “feasibility critique” questions whether socio-economic rights 
should be recognised given that it may not be presently feasible to realise them for all. 
By acknowledging that “[d]emanding more from behaviour today than could be 
expected to be fulfilled would not be a good way of advancing the cause of justice”, 
Sen’s theory allows for the qualifications of “available resources” and “progressive 
realisation” as contained in sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution.119 Yet he goes on 
to point out that not even traditional, civil and political rights can immediately be 
realised for all. The fact that nations should aspire to realise socio-economic rights 
maximally cannot bar the scope for further social changes that may be needed before 
that point is reached.120  
The notion of progressive realisation within the Constitution recognises that all rights 
are not presently capable of being fulfilled for all, but that this cannot be allowed to 
detract from their status as enforceable rights. As Sen pertinently observes, “[n]on-
realization does not, in itself, make a claimed right a non-right”.121 Similarly, the non-
availability of resources does not detract from the status of the right. Where resources 
are not available presently, that does not relieve the government from allocating 
resources reasonably and efficiently towards the fulfilment of socio-economic rights as 
resources do become available. 
  
                                            
117 The obligation on the State to adopt “reasonable legislative and other measures” under ss 
26(2) and 27(2) or the requirement that all administrative action be reasonable under s 33(1) 
of the Constitution may both constitute “loosely specified” obligations. 
118 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 374.  
119 81.  
120 384.  
121 384.  
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2 3 2 3 4 Flexible contextualism  
 
Sen allows for the weighting of different rights.122 Whereas such weighting should 
in the first instance be the task of government in designing and implementing socio-
economic legislation and policies, courts have an important role to play in reviewing 
government decisions. Where government has paid insufficient attention to the 
normative import of any given right, it will be up to the courts to carry out a weighting 
exercise. As set out above, critical scrutiny and reasoning are indispensable tools for 
any weighting exercise involving capabilities. In congruence with a fluid conception of 
reasonableness review, Sen allows for the inclusion of various considerations including 
“intensities, circumstances and consequences”123 when conducting a weighting 
exercise. 
Courts should thus adopt a flexible approach to the interpretation of the content of 
rights, which takes account of varying contexts. Crucially, room should always be left 
for further dialogue and contestation through the process of critical, normative and 
participation-enhancing reasoning.124 The same flexibility inherent in the interpretation 
of the content of socio-economic rights in order to weight them, should be maintained 
when adjudicating specific State resource allocation decisions. Just as the content and 
ranking of rights may change with a change of circumstances, the reasonableness of 
an allocative decision or any justification the State may proffer for not making a 
particular allocation, must remain subject to reassessment and revision.  
 
2 3 2 4 The role of reasoning  
 
Public reasoning constitutes a crucial component of Sen’s valuational theory. 
Whether capabilities, rights, or an amalgamation of both are weighted, Sen proposes 
that weights can be selected through a process of reasoned evaluation. For purposes 
of social evaluation, of which it is submitted adjudication should be regarded a part of, 
Sen argues that a “reasoned ‘consensus’ on weights, or at least on a range of 
                                            
122 377, 386. 
123 377.  
124 386-387.  
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weights”125 must be arrived at. Importantly, this can only be achieved where public 
discussion and democratic understanding and acceptance are allowed to take place.126  
Sen goes on to elaborate the central significance of public reasoning in developing 
his theory of justice. Public reasoning is crucial for the valuation of capabilities and, 
closely related thereto, for the pursuit of social justice.127 The measure of justice or 
injustice prevalent in a society can be gauged by making comparative judgments 
regarding alternate states of affairs and by determining to what extent capabilities are 
allowed to flourish. In order to make a sound assessment, valuation of diverse 
capabilities is necessary, and these judgments and valuations are carried out through 
a process of reasoning.  
 
2 3 2 4 1 Participation  
 
Participation is a crucial element of valuation by public reasoning. Moreover, it 
should be a significant part of policy formation including the making of economic policy. 
Participation should also be of central import when courts adjudicate State resource 
allocation decisions. Where courts focus on the capabilities that socio-economic rights 
represent by interpreting these rights substantively, socio-economic rights can serve 
to catalyse policy formulation itself as well as social activism leading to policy 
change.128 Where polycentric issues call for scrutiny, participation will be critical for the 
assimilation of diverse informational inputs. Sen sums up the interaction between 
participation in policy making and participation in subsequent assessment:  
 
“The issue of public discussion and social participation is thus central to the making of policy 
in a democratic framework… In a freedom-oriented approach, the participatory freedoms 
cannot but be central to public policy analysis.”129  
  
                                            
125 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 78. 
126 78-79.  
127 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 44.  
128 D Brand “The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, or 
‘What are Socio-Economic Rights For?’” in H Botha, A van der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) 
Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 33 53-54.  
129 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 110 (emphasis added).  
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2 3 2 4 2 Using public reasoning to make comparative judgments  
 
Sen situates the mechanism of reasoning and the process of valuation within an 
adaptation of a mathematical social choice theory, which focuses on determining 
rankings of “alternative social realizations”.130 According to Sen, there are several 
factors that make social choice theory an appropriate paradigm for reasoning within a 
theory of justice – and, by extension, for the valuation of capabilities. For instance, 
social choice theory makes comparative assessments of different states of justice or 
injustice, rather than surmising about the features of a perfectly just society as a 
transcendental theory does. Thus, social choice theory and reasoned evaluation 
should focus on the actual, practical choices in existence and not on hypothetical 
postulations.131  
Where State resource allocation decisions are concerned, this theory can be utilised 
to justify the proposition that an ideal resource allocation to completely fulfil a socio-
economic right need not presently be required. Conversely, the absence of the 
requirement of such an ideal state of affairs should not deter courts from adjudicating 
specific State resource allocation decisions within the concrete factual and normative 
context in which socio-economic rights operate. To the extent that Sen’s comparative 
focus eschews the elaboration of the normative content of socio-economic rights, it 
stands to be developed. The content, purposes and normative goals of the socio-
economic rights at stake should be elucidated sufficiently. Yet an inability to achieve 
those purposes immediately does not render the purposive interpretation of rights 
superfluous. Rather, the fact that the full realisation of these rights may take time and 
increasing levels of resource allocation is accommodated by the notion of progressive 
realisation.  
 
2 3 2 4 3 Acknowledging a plurality of competing principles 
 
Another feature of social choice theory as a framework for reasoning is its 
recognition of a plurality of competing principles. Although it is acknowledged that an 
impasse may be reached on occasion, “the need to take note of the possibility of 
durable conflicts of non-eliminable principles” remains an important point for a theory 
                                            
130 94.  
131 106.  
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of justice and the reasoning that characterises it.132 During a process of reasoned 
evaluation, courts may at times validly decline to prioritise among competing rights and 
resource allocation decisions based on a lack of institutional competence or the 
informational base necessary to do so. However, given the vital, “non-eliminable” 
interests represented by socio-economic rights, this should be a justifiable course of 
action only in rare, highly complex cases.  
 
2 3 2 4 4 Re-examining polycentric decisions 
 
Room is also made for the re-examination of decisions within social choice theory. 
A State resource allocation decision that was found to be reasonable today may no 
longer be so in ten years’ time. Where the adjudication of a resource allocation decision 
triggers polycentric effects, social choice theory recognises that unintended 
consequences often arise and that further scrutiny and assessment are thus crucial: 
 
“[G]eneral principles about social decisions that initially look plausible could turn out to be 
quite problematic, since they may in fact conflict with other general principles which also 
look, at least initially, to be plausible… [O]nce the principles are formulated in unconstrained 
terms, covering inter alia a great many cases other than those that motivated our interest in 
those principles, we can run into difficulties that were not foreseen earlier…We then have 
to decide what has to give and why.”133  
 
Polycentric decisions can thus be re-examined, using the same process of public 
reasoning that was initially employed to ascribe weights to the capabilities at stake. 
Public reasoning therefore leaves room for a flexible judicial approach that takes 
cognisance of unforeseen consequences and changing circumstances. 
 
2 3 3 The role of the courts 
 
2 3 3 1 Sen’s failure to recognise the value of the judiciary  
 
The above exposition of selecting weights through the application of public 
reasoning begs the questions as to who should orchestrate the process of valuation. 
Courts seem an obvious choice for carrying out a process of reasoned evaluation 
where government policy has proved inadequate. After all, courts are designed to 
                                            
132 106 (emphasis added).  
133 107.  
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make decisions, analyse evidence, interpret rights, listen to all parties and contribute 
to a process of reasoning by providing reasons for their judgments.134 Significantly, the 
judiciary is familiar with the balancing exercise inherent in weighting capabilities.135  
Moreover, Sen relies on impartiality and objectivity as integral to the process of 
public reasoning in terms of which justice and injustice are to be measured. Sen refers 
to Rawls to highlight that a political precept is objective when “there are reasons… 
sufficient to convince all reasonable persons that it is reasonable”.136 Furthermore, he 
goes on to supplement this normative approach by asking to what extent political 
convictions can survive “informed public discussion”.137 Impartiality, objectivity and 
tests based on the notion of “reasonable persons” are fundamental traits of the judicial 
function. Yet Sen largely fails to recognise any role that courts might play and gives 
passing attention to institutional co-operation in Development as Freedom: 
 
“A variety of social institutions – related to the operation of markets… legislatures, political 
parties, nongovernmental organizations, the judiciary, the media and the community in 
general – contribute to the process of development precisely through their effects on 
enhancing and sustaining individual freedoms. Analysis of development calls for an 
integrated understanding of the respective roles of these different institutions and their 
interactions. The formation of values and the emergence and evolution of social ethics are 
also part of the process of development that needs attention…”138  
 
Within a structure of institutional dialogue and co-operation, courts are well-placed 
to enhance individual freedoms while fostering accountability for the State’s allocative 
priorities. Individual socio-economic capabilities can be promoted while values and 
“social ethics” are formed when the judiciary elaborates upon the normative, 
substantive content of socio-economic rights.139 As Liebenberg pertinently notes, this 
can, in turn, lead to meaningful accountability: 
                                            
134 D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-
Economic Rights (2007) 122. 
135 For example, in the context of the limitations analysis in terms of s 36 of the Constitution. 
See H Botha “Rights, Limitations and the (Im)Possibility of Self Government” in H Botha, A van 
der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 
13 22. 
136 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 42 quoting J Rawls Political Liberalism (1993) 119.  
137 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 43.  
138 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 297 (emphasis added).  
139 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 37, 40, 45-46, 51, 179-183. See also D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The 
Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights (2007) 143 who notes that 
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“Only once a focused and sustained effort to develop the values and purposes underpinning 
the socio-economic rights at stake in a particular case has occurred, can a proper 
assessment be made regarding whether the measures adopted by the State are reasonable 
given its obligations to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil’ the relevant rights.”140  
 
Liebenberg’s position can be developed by recognising that Sen’s valuational 
approach to the prioritisation of capabilities constitutes a theoretical paradigm which 
can be adopted by the judiciary to interpret the content and normative purposes of 
socio-economic rights. Once this interpretative step is completed, particular State 
resource allocation decisions can be adjudicated. The weighting process can thus be 
fruitfully directed by the judiciary, as long as a two-stage process of normative valuation 
followed by justification is adhered to.  
Substantive interpretation of rights, context, explicit reasoning and an effort to 
ensure maximum participation in judicial processes are all essential components of a 
fair weighting judgment. Botha echoes this point:  
 
“What distinguishes a good balancing judgment from a bad one is... less a function of the 
‘correct’ characterisation or the ‘accuracy’ of the weights attached to conflicting interests, 
than of the extent to which the judgment gives concrete meaning to constitutional norms, 
engages those affected by it, spells out the reasons for the decision, and articulates the 
moral and political reasoning that went into it.”141 
 
Of course, in order to recognise the importance of judicial enforcement of the 
second, justificatory stage of the weighting process, it is necessary to acknowledge the 
primary obligation that rests on the State to provide capabilities for its citizens. 
Nussbaum has developed this fundamental idea to a greater extent than Sen has.142   
                                            
“[d]eference is not owed to the government in defining the content of the right… but only in 
allowing it a ‘margin of appreciation’ to decide which measures it will adopt in fulfilling its 
obligations” (original emphasis).  
140 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 183.  
141 H Botha “Rights, Limitations and the (Im)Possibility of Self Government” in H Botha, A van 
der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 
13 22 (emphasis added). 
142 As discussed above in part 2 3 1 1. See MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 32-33, 
40, and in particular 168: 
“[A]ny government that fails to secure basic entitlements has failed in its most essential 
task.”  
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2 3 3 2 Institutional and structural justice 
 
Indeed, Sen has been criticised by Nussbaum and others for paying little heed to 
the place of law and institutional structures within democracy.143 Deneulin argues that 
by rejecting a transcendental approach to a theory of justice, which asks what the 
“basic structure”144 of a just society would look like, Sen fails to appreciate that many 
examples of injustice result from a failure of democratic structures.145 Furthermore, the 
author points out that by emphasising the role of public reasoning throughout his work, 
Sen “implicitly situates the subject of justice in the quality of the democratic 
structure”.146 Although Sen does acknowledge that institutions are important to any 
theory of justice, he advocates the selection of institutions that promote justice through 
their operation rather than equating the mere existence of those institutions with 
justice.147  
 
2 3 3 2 1 Examining the actual consequences of institutions  
 
Sen warns against an institutional approach that “prevents critical examination of 
the actual consequences of having the recommended institutions” and instead focuses 
on the mere existence of certain institutions.148 In the context of the judicial 
competence to adjudicate State resource allocation decisions, Liebenberg appositely 
argues that “courts should not simply take refuge in the theoretical institutional 
advantages [to prioritise and allocate resources] of the other branches of government”, 
but should rather closely scrutinise the actual decisions of government.149 The 
                                            
143 166, 178-180. 
144 J Rawls Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001) 10 who includes an independent 
judiciary in a “just basic structure [that] secures what we may call background justice”.  
145 S Deneulin “Development and the Limits of Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice” (2011) Third 
World Quarterly 787 793-794. For further criticism see DB Rasmussen & DJ Den Uyl “Why 
Justice? Which Justice? Impartiality or Objectivity?” (2013) 17 The Independent Review 
441 447, 450, 451.  
146 S Deneulin “Development and the Limits of Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice” (2011) Third 
World Quarterly 787 794. 
147 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 82.  
148 83.  
149 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 195.  
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presence of theoretically just institutions cannot therefore translate into automatic 
deference to actual government choices where resource allocation is concerned.  
 
2 3 3 2 2 Using institutions as platforms for public reasoning    
 
However, Sen acknowledges that institutions can promote reasoning and valuation 
processes: 
 
“Institutions can also be important in facilitating our ability to scrutinize the values and 
priorities that we can consider, especially through opportunities for public discussion…”150 
 
The institutional aptitude of courts to scrutinise “values and priorities” is obvious, 
and can be employed in the sphere of State resource allocation decisions. The ability 
of courts to promote “public discussion” and democracy is more controversial, and will 
be more fully canvassed below.151 Nevertheless, the potential of the institution of the 
judiciary to practise public reasoning and enhance democracy, and thereby to promote 
justice, should not be underrated.   
 
2 3 3 2 3 Acknowledging the importance of just institutional structures 
 
Sen goes on to emphasise the superiority of a comparative approach as opposed 
to a transcendental approach (that includes an institutional approach) throughout The 
Idea of Justice. However, within the South African context, the importance of 
institutional justice and the constitutional structure should not be underestimated. More 
particularly, the significant role that the Constitutional Court plays as the guardian of 
the rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights cannot be gainsaid. To the extent that Sen 
rejects the importance of a just “basic structure” too easily, his theory stands to be 
developed.  
Nussbaum has incorporated institutional concerns within her capabilities-based 
development of a theory of social justice.152 In addition, she offers insight into the 
practical role of the courts in a process of reasoned evaluation of capabilities. 
Nussbaum investigates how a political “basic structure” can secure minimum levels of 
                                            
150 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) xii.  
151 In part 2 4 3 below.  
152 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 166-180.  
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basic capabilities. In this regard, she convincingly argues that the provision of at least 
basic capabilities and the means to live a life with dignity constitute the raison d’etre of 
government.153 However, as noted above, once basic capabilities are guaranteed by a 
constitution, it becomes the task of the courts to further specify what they in fact require 
of government.154 Writing from the perspective of US constitutionalism, Nussbaum 
advocates a form of incrementalism whereby the conditions for implementation of 
capabilities as well as the parameters of the rights themselves are gradually and 
progressively expounded.155  
 
2 3 3 3 Judicial implementation of constitutionalised capabilities  
 
2 3 3 3 1 Separate or interdependent?  
 
Nussbaum highlights several characteristics of the judicial implementation of 
constitutionally guaranteed capabilities. First, she points to the separate existence, and 
interpretative history, of each capability. She adds that courts will only in rare instances 
require that protection be afforded to one right in order to protect a different right.156 
Although this may be true in certain cases, the interdependence of rights in general – 
and socio-economic rights in particular – should not be overlooked. Liebenberg 
regards the treatment of different rights as “protecting mutually discrete values and 
interests”157 as a characteristic of a formalist approach to rights that is inappropriate 
under a transformative constitution.158 The acknowledgement of the interdependent 
nature of rights will become relevant where different rights compete for the same 
resources. Courts will not be able to effectively assess the reasonableness of State 
prioritisation and allocation of limited resources where the different rights at stake and 
their interrelationship with one another cannot, as a first step, be elucidated. 
  
                                            
153 167-169.  
154 170.  
155 173.  
156 174. Nussbaum draws a distinction between trade-offs between capabilities and a mutually 
reinforcing relationship among capabilities (174-175).  
157 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 51.  
158 For a discussion of the implementation of capabilities under a transformative constitution, 
see part 2 4 below.  
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2 3 3 3 2 Cautious incrementalism?  
 
The second characteristic of judicial implementation that Nussbaum points to is that 
of “cautious incrementalism”, whereby the “contours of an abstractly specified right are 
exceedingly unclear at the outset”159 but are progressively and gradually clarified. 
Courts should therefore interpret the content and normative purposes of socio-
economic rights on a case-by-case basis, in terms of which the specific context of the 
case at hand will determine which capabilities are implicated. Only once the actual 
capabilities at stake are identified, can a particular State resource allocation decision 
be reviewed for reasonableness.  
However, in certain cases State resource allocation may be found to be structurally 
deficient, and to therefore require large-scale reform. In other cases, the 
consequences of the non-realisation of a socio-economic right may be drastic, and 
claimants could risk sustaining irreparable harm if a right-violation is not remedied 
immediately. In such instances, a departure from incrementalism may be called for. 
Such a departure from incrementalism can be justified with reference to the 
perspective provided by Sen, according to which even macro-economic impact should 
be assessed in terms of its instrumental value in promoting capabilities. Even where 
courts may lack the information necessary to overcome the dangers inherent in making 
polycentric decisions, they should still require the State to adequately justify its 
allocative choices. Where a right necessitates a particular allocation of resources, and 
such resources are in fact available to the State, the court should direct that the State 
act in accordance with its constitutional obligations. This is so even where the court’s 
decision may have far-reaching ramifications for the State’s allocative policy, or even 
the national budget.160 Where an unacceptable degree of poverty is prevalent within 
society, and government departments are often recalcitrant or corrupt, such a 
departure from incrementalism may be more easily justified.  
 
2 3 3 3 3 Contextualism  
 
A crucial characteristic of the judicial implementation of constitutionally recognised 
capabilities that Nussbaum highlights is that of contextualism. Nussbaum appositely 
                                            
159 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 175.  
160 Cf JA King Judging Social Rights (2012) 293 for a carefully reasoned but conservative 
endorsement of incrementalism, and the rejection of the proposition that courts should make 
decisions with a “nation-wide allocative impact”.  
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notes that abstract principles – such as constitutionally enshrined socio-economic 
rights – can only be realised within a concrete context. She goes on to state: 
 
“Judges cannot afford to remain at the level of generality or to take refuge in an approach 
that is merely formalistic, refusing to consider the content of each case: they need to dig 
into history and social reality in order to face the hard question of whether a given capability 
has really been secured to people.”161  
 
In order to face the “hard question” of whether a capability has in fact been secured, 
courts cannot but enquire as to the content of the right as informed by the factual and 
normative context at play. As discussed above, context must exercise an impact on 
the level of scrutiny that is applied to State resource allocation decisions.  
In the South African jurisprudential milieu, an excess concentration on the State’s 
justificatory arguments as opposed to the content of the right of access to “sufficient” 
water in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg162 may have been the result of minimising 
the factual context that persons with inadequate water had to endure. A better 
approach might have been one which first determined the water needs of the persons 
involved in their concrete lived reality. Thereafter, the needs thus identified could have 
been used to delineate the State’s obligation in respect of the right of access to 
sufficient water in the light of the facts of the particular case. Only then should the 
State’s justification for not providing such quantity of water have been assessed.  
However, the critical importance of context within the capabilities approach and the 
judicial implementation thereof should not be confused with an “ad hoc ‘situation 
ethics’” approach.163 Rather, in order to implement challenging principles on a 
universal basis, courts must be able to appreciate people’s lived socio-economic 
reality, where the capabilities to choose meaningful lives either exist or are absent.164 
Only once this is assessed can it be determined what resources are required to realise 
                                            
161 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 176 (emphasis added).  
162 2010 4 SA 1 (CC). In this case, the Constitutional Court reverted to a weak standard of 
review in holding that the provision of 25 litres of water per person per day to poor residents of 
Phiri, Johannesburg was reasonable and did not breach s 27(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
However, the Constitutional Court failed to interrogate the availability of resources for the 
provision of an increased amount of water. See chapter four part 4 2 1 4 and generally LA 
Williams “The Role of the Courts in the Quantitative Implementation of Social and Economic 
Rights: A Comparative Study” (2010) 3 CCR 141. 
163 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 176. 
164 176.  
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the relevant right. Thereafter, it can be determined whether the State’s resource 
allocation decisions were reasonable when viewed in the light of both the needs that 
the context revealed and the availability or scarcity of resources at the State’s disposal.  
 
2 3 4 The limits of reasoned valuation 
 
2 3 4 1 Incompleteness and partial agreement 
 
Public discussion and reasoning will not always succeed in establishing consensus 
on the ranking of different capabilities in a given context or the identification of the 
injustice of a given state of affairs. Sen recognises that valuational exercises will often 
be accompanied by debates.165 However, far from being deterred by the existence of 
disagreement where valuation and ranking are concerned, Sen values debates for 
generating political arguments and being “part of the process of democratic 
participation that characterizes development”.166 Sen goes on to argue that “adequate” 
public policies need not consist of perfectly ranked social possibilities. All that is 
required is that “partial agreements” delineate acceptable options:167  
 
“[A] theory of justice that makes systematic room for incompleteness can allow one to arrive 
at quite strong – and strongly relevant – judgements… without having to find highly 
differentiated assessments of every political and social arrangement in comparison with 
every other arrangement.”168 
 
The room Sen allows for incompleteness resonates with the leeway that 
reasonableness review affords to the State to adopt “reasonable” measures to realise 
socio-economic rights: 
 
“A court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether other more desirable or 
favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether public money could have been 
better spent. The question would be whether the measures that have been adopted are 
reasonable. It is necessary to recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be 
                                            
165 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 75.  
166 34. See further CR Sunstein “Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law” 
(2007) 74 Social Research 1 21 regarding the productive force that “incompletely theorized 
agreements” can exercise on adjudication. 
167 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 253.  
168 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 103.  
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adopted by the state to meet its obligations. Many of these would meet the requirement of 
reasonableness. Once it is shown that the measures do so, this requirement is met.”169 
 
Although precise agreement on what socio-economic rights demand need not be 
reached, courts can nevertheless determine whether a given instance of resource 
allocation is reasonable. Such determination can be based on the partial consensus 
that the capabilities that infuse socio-economic rights are important enough to merit 
their protection through constitutionally enshrined rights. 
 
2 3 4 2 The need for substantive guidance  
 
Yet the acceptance of lasting disagreements that arise due to, for example, 
“unbridgeable gaps in information, and judgemental unresolvability involving disparate 
considerations”170 provides no guidance regarding the role of the courts when such an 
impasse is reached.171 While Sen recognises that divergent principles can determine 
resource allocation,172 he offers little assistance173 in resolving disputes that courts 
may be legitimately called upon to decide in socio-economic rights cases. Where the 
interests at stake are important and the gravity of the non-realisation of socio-economic 
rights is real, courts cannot simply accept lasting disagreement in the context of a 
concrete case.  
The absence of guidance on how to resolve disagreement about just resource 
allocation decisions can lead to unprincipled resource allocation or exclusive 
expenditure on the “worst off” in society. In this respect, Pogge argues that the 
capability approach could result in “indefinite increases in expenditures” aimed at 
                                            
169 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 41.See 
further A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 103. 
170 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 103.  
171 See D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of 
Socio-Economic Rights (2007) 113-115 regarding the important role that courts can play in 
resolving disagreement.  
172 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 15.  
173 S Deneulin “Development and the Limits of Amartya Sen’s The Idea of Justice” (2011) Third 
World Quarterly 787 791. For criticism of Sen’s “unhelpful” avoidance of complete rankings, 
see T Pogge “A Critique of the Capability Approach” in H Brighouse & I Robeyns (eds) 
Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities (2010) 17 51.  
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alleviating the plight of those whose capability needs are the greatest.174 However, 
Anderson responds to Pogge’s critique by pointing out that the capabilities approach 
does not endorse futile expenditure of resources. Furthermore, she argues that 
capabilities-based criteria for the limitation of expenditure can be formulated, for 
example by limiting concentrated resource allocation that prejudices a different, larger 
group by rendering resources unavailable for the advancement of their capabilities.175 
However, since such criteria have not been established by Sen, his theory must be 
developed in order to mitigate incompleteness where competing resource allocation 
decisions call for adjudication in socio-economic rights cases.  
 
2 3 4 3 The need for content   
 
Another problematic area in the context of incompleteness and disagreement, is 
Sen’s insistence that only manifest instances of injustice – not precise allocations – 
need to be determined. To Sen, it is unnecessary to identify what exact allocation of, 
for example, food would be just – although, by contrast, it would be appropriate to 
recognise persistent famine as unjust.176  
Sen’s approach in this regard is inconsistent with the two-stage adjudicatory process 
advocated above, whereby courts should interpret the content of rights before 
adjudicating particular State resource allocation decisions. In certain contexts, this may 
involve the determination of a precise allocation for purposes of constituting “sufficient” 
or “adequate” levels of the relevant socio-economic right as required by the 
Constitution. This would be the case where, for example, the State provides indigent 
persons with an insufficient quantity of water, and thereby severely infringes their 
dignity interests. Here, a court might have to determine what quantity of water is 
“sufficient” to prevent capability deprivation and a concomitant impact on the freedom, 
dignity and equality of those affected by insufficient allocations. Once such a 
determination is made, the State’s justification for not providing full realisation of the 
right (albeit based on a policy of progressive realisation or limited resources) still falls 
                                            
174 T Pogge “A Critique of the Capability Approach” in H Brighouse & I Robeyns (eds) 
Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities (2010) 17 53.  
175 E Anderson “Justifying the Capabilities Approach to Justice” in H Brighouse & I Robeyns 
(eds) Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities (2010) 81 97. 
176 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 254.  
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to be assessed. Determining the content of the right does not therefore result in an 
immediate obligation on the State to fully realise such content presently.  
 
2 3 4 4 Rationing scarce resources  
 
The incompleteness of ranking that flows from Sen’s focus on reasoning holds 
serious implications for situations where “tragic choices” fall to be made. Nussbaum 
asserts that where two fundamental capabilities must be traded off against one 
another, for example due to scarce resources, an injustice of a distinct nature results. 
Nussbaum notes that Sen denies the possibility of ranking one alternative above 
another in such situations. However, she goes on to draw a distinction between the 
existence of a tragic choice and the impossibility of ranking alternatives at all, arguing 
that “one choice may be clearly better than another in a tragic situation, even though 
all available choices involve a violation of some sort”.177  
In South Africa, where poverty pervades society, tragic choices may arise often. 
Where people are denied the ability to live an autonomous life with human dignity, 
courts cannot simply decline “ranking” or adjudicating difficult choices. Scott and Alston 
persuasively argue this point:  
 
“When priorities are in essence cited as the problem, the very point of constitutional rights 
as priority setters for government would seem to have been missed. Positive rights and the 
notion of core guarantees do have a significant prioritising function. Trying to interpret the 
constitution to remove or neutralise this function thus misses the constitutional point.”178 
 
Where a constitutional violation is justified by the advancement of a different 
constitutional right in the context of limited resources, courts should acknowledge and 
articulate why a certain ranking is chosen. Government policy and subsequent 
adjudication thereof in difficult circumstances must always aim to eliminate similar 
dilemmas in the future.179 The fact that the State must often make “agonising 
choices”180 regarding the allocation of scarce resources should not render such 
                                            
177 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 37.  
178 C Scott & P Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A 
Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” (2000) 16 SAJHR 206 252 
(original emphasis).  
179 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 39.  
180 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 59.  
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allocative choices immune from scrutiny merely because difficult decisions are 
involved.181 Such decisions must be reasonable and aimed at promoting fundamental 
capabilities to the greatest extent possible in order to pass constitutional muster. To 
the extent that Sen’s theory fails to recognise the need for ranking and subsequent 
scrutiny in cases of scarcity, it should be developed by drawing from Nussbaum’s work 
in this regard.  
 
2 4 Implementing capabilities under a transformative constitution 
 
A unified and constitutionally informed approach to the valuation of capabilities 
promotes a vision of “transformative constitutionalism”. Karl Klare has defined 
“transformative constitutionalism” as follows: 
 
“By transformative constitutionalism I mean a long-term project of constitutional enactment, 
interpretation, and enforcement committed… to transforming a country’s political and social 
institutions and power relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction. 
Transformative constitutionalism connotes an enterprise of inducing large-scale social 
change through nonviolent political processes grounded in law.”182 
                                            
181 For an incisive criticism of the “tragic choice” discourse, see generally M Pieterse “Health 
Care Rights, Resources and Rationing” (2007) 127 SALJ 514 and particularly 519-520: 
“As in the case of other socio-economic rights, the constitutional entrenchment of justiciable 
rights to health care services thus demands a rethink of conventional judicial approaches 
to the various political processes and decisions that determine the distribution of resources 
within society… Courts, in turn, must decide whether challenged rationing decisions are 
constitutionally justifiable and can no longer shelter behind the ‘tragic reality’ and 
discretionary nature of the decisions.” 
182 KE Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 150. 
For the incorporation and development of Klare’s concept of transformative constitutionalism 
by other authors, see, inter alia, S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a 
Transformative Constitution (2010) 23-76; D Davis “Transformation: The Constitutional 
Promise and Reality” (2010) 26 SAJHR 85; C Hoexter “Judicial Policy Revisited: 
Transformative Adjudication in Administrative Law” (2008) 24 SAJHR 281; J Froneman 
“Enforcing Socio-Economic Rights Under a Transformative Constitution: The Role of the 
Courts” (2007) 8 ESR Review 20; P Langa “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stell 
LR 351; S Liebenberg “Needs, Rights and Transformation: Adjudicating Social Rights” (2006) 
17 Stell LR 5; M Pieterse “What do we Mean when we Talk About Transformative 
Constitutionalism?” (2005) 20 SAPL 155; D Moseneke “The Fourth Bram Fischer Memorial 
Lecture: Transformative Adjudication” (2002) 18 SAJHR 309; C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Facing 
the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the Development of an Indigenous 
Jurisprudence on Equality” (1998) 14 SAJHR 248. 
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From this description it is apparent that for transformative constitutionalism to 
become a reality, legal tools must be creatively harnessed to adjudicate government 
development policies. The same holds true for the adjudication of specific instances of 
State resource allocation decisions that impact on the realisation of socio-economic 
rights. 
Sen’s capabilities approach (as supplemented by the scholarship of Nussbaum) and 
theory of justice provide an evaluative framework that is largely consonant with a vision 
of transformative constitutionalism. Informed by the overarching values of freedom, 
dignity and equality, the capabilities approach seeks to promote social justice while 
enhancing agency. Similarly, transformative constitutionalism envisions social change 
through, inter alia, meaningful participation in the redistribution of resources necessary 
to achieve socio-economic justice.  
Sen’s focus on freedom allows participation to play a crucial role in evaluating 
capabilities. Courts can serve as one forum in which the State is compelled to engage 
with its citizens, thereby contributing to a comprehensive agenda of public discussion 
and reasoning. Nussbaum’s inclusion of context in her strategy of judicial 
implementation of capabilities adds value to Sen’s paradigm of reasoning by allowing 
the normative purposes of rights to be informed by the reality in which they operate. 
Public discussion as espoused by Sen and developed with reference to Nussbaum is 
thus congruent with an emphasis on deliberative democracy and dialogue that is 
necessitated by a transformative constitution.183 Furthermore, the instrumental value 
that Sen places on public expenditure is consonant with a wide interpretation of 
“available resources”, thereby leaving room for the normative purposes underpinning 
socio-economic rights to determine the pool of available resources to a degree.  
However, as discussed above, certain aspects of Sen’s theory merit development. 
For example, Sen fails to recognise the significant role that the judiciary can play in 
facilitating evaluative exercises while simultaneously fostering accountability. Sen’s 
reluctance to commit to the substance of important capabilities (or to acknowledge that 
justice may require a precise determination of what resources should be allocated) 
may likewise frustrate the transformative vision encapsulated by the Constitution.  
                                            
183 P Langa “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stell LR 351 354; S Liebenberg 
Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 29, 31-34, 
51, 64. 
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This lacuna in Sen’s theory can be addressed by drawing from the overarching 
values that underlie (and constitute the raison d’etre for) the capabilities approach, 
namely freedom, dignity and equality. Significantly, the values that inform the 
capabilities approach largely correspond to the foundational values of the 
Constitution.184 The purposes of transformative constitutionalism will only be achieved 
if these fundamental values are manifested in the lived reality of all who reside in South 
Africa. The similarity of these fundamental values can therefore allow courts to use 
capabilities to lend normative substance to socio-economic rights without straying from 
the constitutional ethos.  
 
2 4 1 The role of the fundamental constitutional values in a capabilities approach to 
adjudication   
 
A capabilities approach to adjudication will identify the normative purpose of socio-
economic rights as achieving the complex functioning outcome of living an 
autonomous, dignified life in a position of substantive equality with others. The values 
of freedom, dignity and equality therefore inform the overarching functioning outcome 
that socio-economic rights aim to achieve.  
By considering the social, historical and factual context of the case at hand, the court 
can ask which (more basic) capabilities need to be realised in order to achieve each 
aspect of this functioning outcome. The social and historical context may indicate that 
increased allocation is necessary to bring claimants who suffered from class- and race-
based patterns of disadvantage into a position of substantive equality with other 
groups. The factual context or lived reality of the claimants may indicate further basic 
capabilities that must be fulfilled in order for the achievement of the functioning 
outcome to become possible. For example, in the context of the right of access to 
health care services, specific capabilities may include access to safe and hygienic 
health care facilities, or access to essential medicines, in order to achieve the further 
capability of enjoying an adequate state of health. In this way, the content of socio-
economic rights can be determined with reference to the capabilities that the rights 
seek to foster in concrete contexts.  
Furthermore, these values are closely interrelated and interdependent both in terms 
of the capabilities approach and the Constitution. Although a certain case may highlight 
                                            
184 Ss 1 and 7(1) of the Constitution.  
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one value to a greater extent than the others, courts should remain cognisant of the 
fact that all three values may be implicated to some extent in all socio-economic rights 
claims. Nevertheless, where one fundamental value is most imperilled by a State 
resource allocation decision, its protection and enforcement can aid courts in ranking 
competing capabilities. For example, the value of dignity as manifested in the 
functioning of living a dignified life may lead to the conclusion that the State should 
marshal its resources to provide access to adequate water even where the affected 
litigants, while poor, are not the “worst off” in society.   
 
2 4 1 1 Substantive freedom 
 
The overarching value that informs the content of capabilities in terms of Sen’s 
approach is that of substantive freedom.185 However, Nussbaum cogently argues that 
not all types of freedom should serve as the basis of capabilities, since not all types of 
freedom are central to political projects such as transformative constitutionalism or to 
the attainment of basic socio-economic entitlements.186 Thus, freedom should not be 
conceived of in a negative sense as merely preventing obstacles that could hamper 
one’s liberty or freedom. Instead, freedom should be conceptualised as the positive 
creation of the capabilities necessary to make autonomous choices and to participate 
in political, social and economic life. Substantive freedom in terms of the capabilities 
approach must therefore include the provision of the material conditions required for 
possessing meaningful capability sets.187 In order to achieve the functioning of living 
an autonomous life, freedom-enabling material conditions must be aimed at realising 
the capabilities related to enjoying sufficient levels of health care, education, shelter, 
food and water, and social security. Where these capabilities are realised, participation 
in all spheres of life and the achievement of even more complex functionings become 
possible.  
State resource allocation decisions that impact on socio-economic rights should 
thus be carefully scrutinised to determine whether they enhance substantive freedom 
or limit it.188 While socio-economic capabilities are critical prerequisites for meaningful 
                                            
185 See part 2 2 2 2 above.  
186 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 70-72. 
187 S Liebenberg “The Value of Freedom in Interpreting Socio-economic Rights” (2008) Acta 
Juridica 149 159-160. 
188 167.  
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participation, participation and autonomy should at the same time play a part in the 
implementation of socio-economic rights.189 By substantively interpreting these rights 
as requiring freedom-enhancing resource allocation while devising innovative 
remedies to include participatory processes,190 courts can give expression to the 
fundamental value of freedom. For example, a social security grant must be sufficient 
to allow participation in social life. Simultaneously, the needs of the poor must be taken 
into account in determining what a sufficient grant entails and what resources should 
be allocated for purposes of social security payments.191   
 
2 4 1 2 Dignity  
 
Human dignity as a value features most prominently in Nussbaum’s development of 
the capabilities approach.192 While acknowledging that dignity can be a vague 
concept,193 Nussbaum argues that it can and should exert an influence on policy 
choices. Nussbaum illustrates how the prima facie abstract concept of dignity can 
acquire specification by means of the compilation of her list of central capabilities.194 
However, Nussbaum’s list need not be transplanted into South African jurisprudence. 
Instead, courts can infuse socio-economic rights with the normative substance of what 
dignity demands depending on the facts and context of the particular case at hand. For 
example, it would seem obvious that where people do not possess the capabilities to 
bathe, drink and tend to other necessities of life, the achievement of the functioning of 
living a dignified life would require a greater allocation of water. The specification of 
dignity with reference to relevant contextual circumstances was elucidated by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Mazibuko: 
 
                                            
189 168.  
190 See further chapter six part 6 4 1.  
191 For the recognition that basic socio-economic needs must be met for freedom to flourish, 
see for example Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) 
para 23; Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 
2004 6 SA 505 (CC) para 52. 
192 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 29. 
193 Nussbaum argues that debate can clarify what dignity requires in a certain instance. 
Moreover, “the quality of the debate, not the number of supporters, is crucial”. MC Nussbaum 
Creating Capabilities (2011) 32.  
194 33-35.  
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“A commitment to address a lack of access to clean water and to transform our society into 
one in which there will be human dignity and equality, lying at the heart of our Constitution, 
it follows that a right of access to sufficient water cannot be anything less than a right of 
access to that quantity of water that is required for dignified human existence... The quantity 
of water that is required for dignified human existence would depend on the circumstances 
of the individual concerned.”195 
 
Generally, resource allocation decisions that limit agency can be held to infringe 
upon the dignity of those affected. Furthermore, unfavourable social and economic 
conditions can stunt capability development, thus deeply violating the inherent dignity 
of all those concerned.196 When adjudicating State resource allocation decisions that 
impact on socio-economic rights, courts should thus ask which capabilities must be 
realised for the functioning of living a dignified life to be feasible. A resource allocation 
decision made after engagement with recipients can bolster the agency and dignity of 
those involved. Similarly, resource allocation decisions must aim to effectively realise 
socio-economic capabilities that can foster dignified lives. Where these capabilities are 
left unfulfilled, State conduct and resource allocation decisions must be subjected to 
strict scrutiny.197  
The value of dignity thus justifies demands for socio-economic resources while 
requiring a proportionate response from the State where material needs are not met.198 
If the State is not compelled to prove the reasonableness of its socio-economic 
resource allocation decisions, this may convey the message that the poor are not 
worthy of respect or the chance to live with dignity. However, care must be taken to 
promote a relational concept of dignity, which recognises the interdependence 
between individual and social welfare. This approach may at times necessitate the 
restriction of individual claims on resources.199 
  
                                            
195 City of Johannesburg v Mazibuko 2009 3 SA 592 (SCA) paras 17-18.  
196 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 30-31.  
197 See S Liebenberg “The Value of Human Dignity in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights” 
(2005) 21 SAJHR 1 17.  
198 18, 24-25.  
199 11-13.  
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2 4 1 3 Substantive equality 
 
The capabilities approach further advocates the equal worth and dignity of all 
persons.200 Transformative constitutionalism’s goal of substantive equality shares the 
same tenet by requiring a contextual analysis of structural disadvantage in order to 
facilitate the treatment of all as equals or as ends in themselves.201 Human dignity and 
equality are thus closely related, and need not degenerate into a liberal theory that 
focuses on “individual personality issues”202 as opposed to group-based patterns of 
disadvantage.  
A focus on equality of the capabilities we require to choose the type of lives we have 
reason to value moreover reconciles notions of absolute versus relative poverty while 
incorporating the notion of dignity. Absolute poverty holds that if certain minimum levels 
of sustenance are fulfilled, poverty is consequently eradicated regardless of remaining 
inequalities in society, whereas relative poverty holds that even where basic needs can 
be met, poverty exists where inequality is rife.203 The harmonisation of these ostensibly 
divergent concepts can aid courts in importing the value of equality into the normative 
content of socio-economic rights when adjudicating State resource allocation 
decisions. Whereas “[d]eprivation of capabilities is absolute... the resources needed to 
fulfil those capabilities are relative to society”.204 In other words, although resource 
allocation may not be strictly necessary to ensure survival, it may nevertheless remain 
crucial “for the avoidance of the shame that accompanies poverty” and the consequent 
enhancement of human dignity.205 
Other themes within Sen’s theory seemingly call out for application under a 
transformative constitution and can be easily adapted to enhance the adjudication of 
State resource allocation decisions. These include a reconceptualisation of just 
institutional relationships with a focus on the responsibilities incumbent on the judiciary 
                                            
200 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 31.   
201 As opposed to requiring equal treatment. See S Liebenberg “The Value of Human Dignity 
in Interpreting Socio-Economic Rights” (2005) 21 SAJHR 1 14.  
202 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence on Equality” (1998) 14 SAJHR 248 258.  
203 S Fredman “The Potential and Limits of an Equal Rights Paradigm in Addressing Poverty” 
(2011) 22 Stell LR 566 568-570. 
204 573.  
205 573.  
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under a transformative constitution, the demand for informational broadening as a 
means of facilitating meaningful participation and an insistence on explicit reasoning.  
 
2 4 2 The responsibility of the judiciary in terms of the separation of powers doctrine 
under a transformative constitution  
 
Where State resource allocation decisions fall to be adjudicated, separation of 
powers-related concerns inherent in the adjudication of socio-economic rights become 
magnified. It is therefore necessary to understand what role the judiciary plays in terms 
of the separation of powers under a transformative constitution. 
Sen’s aversion to a transcendental or institutional theory of justice has been 
evaluated above.206 However, Sen does not offer a comprehensive alternative vision 
of institutional justice that can be transplanted into a transformative approach to 
adjudication, other than by laying emphasis on the importance of reasoning and 
democracy by public discussion. Nussbaum acknowledges the resultant lacuna in the 
capabilities approach, stating that “[a] major challenge for the Capabilities Approach in 
the future, then, is to think more systematically about political structure”.207 The political 
structure in South Africa constitutes a crucial engine for the realisation of 
transformation through the implementation of capabilities.   
 
2 4 2 1 The need for institutional transformation 
 
Sen’s refusal to blindly accept the justness of a given institutional structure208 
accords with our constitutional vision in that transformation entails a “social and 
economic revolution”209 that demands constant change.210 Such change necessarily 
encompasses institutional reform. How we perceive the institutional structure of our 
democracy, and the separation of powers under a transformative constitution, will 
affect the roles and competencies we ascribe to different branches of government. This 
will, in turn, impact upon the question as to the justiciability of State resource allocation 
decisions in socio-economic rights adjudication. As Liebenberg appositely states: 
                                            
206 In part 2 3 3 2 above.  
207 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 180. 
208 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 82-84. 
209 P Langa “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stell LR 351 352. 
210 354. 
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“[The separation of powers doctrine] has the potential to frustrate transformation when it 
assumes an idealist form of strictly demarcated separate spheres, instead of a functional 
and pragmatic device to facilitate responsible, accountable governance. In its idealised, 
static form, the separation of powers doctrine may be ritually invoked by the courts as a way 
of avoiding their constitutional mandate to interpret and enforce constitutionally guaranteed 
rights.”211  
 
The separation of powers doctrine should thus be reconceptualised as a dynamic, 
collaborative relationship among the different branches of government. Certain matters 
will fall predominantly into the terrain of one branch or another.212 However, all 
branches must share the common purpose of transforming society and achieving the 
purposes of the Constitution. Thus, the legislative branch should draft constitutionally 
compliant legislation; the executive should formulate constitutional policies aimed at 
transformation; the administration should act in accordance with the constitutional 
precept of administrative justice and the judiciary should interpret rights and uphold the 
Constitution.  
 
2 4 2 2 The role of the judiciary  
 
Sen’s failure to accord due attention to the institution of the judiciary detracts from 
the capabilities approach’s transformative potential. The judiciary plays an important 
role in facilitating the transformation of society through its interpretation of socio-
economic rights.213 As guardians of the socio-economic rights enshrined in the Bill of 
Rights, South African courts have the ability and responsibility to facilitate deliberation 
and enforce accountability.214 The participation thus fostered is crucial for the 
realisation of fundamental capabilities. The realisation of fundamental, socio-economic 
capabilities is in turn crucial for the eventual actualisation of more complex functioning 
combinations. Moreover, the overarching project of fulfilling capabilities cannot be 
successful unless all stakeholders are dedicated thereto and held accountable for the 
measures they choose to implement.  
                                            
211 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 67.  
212 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 98. 
213 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 37.  
214 45.  
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Where State resource allocation decisions fall to be adjudicated, the judiciary should 
thus attempt to overcome problems of legitimacy and institutional competence by 
enhancing participation by various parties, rather than abdicating its constitutional duty 
by simply deferring to other branches of government.215 A State resource allocation 
decision should never be held to be completely non-justiciable based on concerns that 
could result in the invocation of deference.216 Rather, by drawing from the capabilities 
approach, the substantive content and normative purposes underpinning the socio-
economic right at issue should be elucidated. This weighting exercise should 
determine what level of scrutiny is applied to the resource allocation decision in 
question. Only then should the State’s justification, or the lack of availability of 
resources, enter into the weighting exercise. Where the introduction of these 
secondary factors highlights institutional or legitimacy concerns, courts should attempt 
to overcome such through various judicial strategies.217  
The refusal to seriously entertain claims that necessitate the adjudication of State 
resource allocation decisions is in conflict with both transformative constitutionalism 
and the capabilities approach. It amounts to a negation of the purposes for which socio-
economic rights were included in the Constitution as justiciable rights.   
 
2 4 3 Participation and informational broadening 
 
South Africa’s transformative Constitution requires that participation be fostered in 
all spheres of government and in all decisions that may impact on the rights and 
interests of the South African people.218 Langa eloquently describes transformation:  
 
“Transformation is a permanent ideal, a way of looking at the world that creates a space in 
which dialogue and contestation are truly possible, in which new ways of being are 
constantly explored and created, accepted and rejected.”219  
                                            
215 See further D Brand “Judicial Deference and Democracy in Socio-economic Rights Cases 
in South Africa” (2011) 22 Stell LR 614 622-625, 631-632.  
216 For a critical evaluation of the doctrines of non-justiciability and deference in the United 
Kingdom, see chapter three part 3 2 3 2 below. K McLean Constitutional Deference, Courts 
and Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2009) 25-26. 
217 Discussed further in chapter six part 6 3 below.  
218 KE Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 155; 
D Brand “Judicial Deference and Democracy in Socio-economic Rights Cases in South Africa” 
(2011) 22 Stell LR 614 622-623.  
219 P Langa “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stell LR 351 354.  
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Liebenberg echoes this understanding of transformation by emphasising the 
centrality of democratic deliberation to the transformation agenda.220 In particular, the 
processes through which deliberation occurs should accommodate a diversity of 
perspectives and interests.221 However, for this to become a reality, a redistribution of 
resources is required.222 Just State resource allocation decisions are therefore 
necessary to foster meaningful participation; such resource allocation decisions should 
themselves result from participatory decision-making and should subsequently fall to 
be adjudicated by a judicial process that promotes participation. Thus it emerges that 
participation is crucial for transformation and social justice generally, and for the 
adjudication of State resource allocation decisions in particular.  
Participation is likewise central to Sen’s capabilities approach and is manifested in 
the public reasoning required to evaluate and rank capabilities and varying levels of 
justice or injustice.223 Sen views debates regarding the ordering of capabilities as 
forming part of democratic participation.224 Furthermore, participation can result in the 
formation of social values over time: 
 
“[T]he freedom to participate in critical evaluation and in the process of value formation is 
among the most crucial freedoms of social existence. The choice of social values cannot 
be settled merely by the pronouncements of those in authority who control the levers of 
government.”225 
 
2 4 3 1 Promoting participation at all stages of the adjudicative process   
 
The realisation of socio-economic capabilities, combined with the optimisation of 
deliberative democracy and the enforcement of accountability can be achieved with 
                                            
220 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 29, 32.  
221 32.  
222 32.  
223 Sen notes the close relationship between democracy by public discussion and justice: 
“If the demands of justice can be assessed only with the help of public reasoning, and if 
public reasoning is constitutively related to the idea of democracy, then there is an intimate 
connection between justice and democracy, with shared discursive features.” A Sen The 
Idea of Justice (2009) 326.  
224 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 34.  
225 287.  
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reference to Rodríguez-Garavito’s model of dialogic activism.226 This model advocates 
the judicial implementation of strong (substantively interpreted) rights, moderate 
(participatory) remedies and strong monitoring.227 The first stage of this model allows 
for a capabilities-based weighting exercise during which the content of the socio-
economic right at stake dictates to what level of scrutiny a State resource allocation 
decision should be subjected. The remedial and supervisory stages of this model 
furthermore allow for an emphasis on participation and public discussion – two 
elements that are central to the capabilities theory.  
According to this approach, participation and accountability can be bolstered where 
courts substantively interpret rights and issue participatory remedies according to 
which the State is responsible for formulating just allocative decisions within the 
normative parameters set by the court. Crucially, to ensure both participation and 
accountability, moderate remedies must be accompanied by judicial supervision, 
where courts can assess the implementation of their orders and of socio-economic 
rights more broadly. It is during the supervisory process that the ambit of participating 
parties can be significantly widened to include non-governmental organisations, 
activists and others whose rights may be implicated but were not originally before the 
court.228 This results in the expansion of the information available to the court in order 
to effect meaningful socio-economic capability implementation while simultaneously 
leaving room for revision. Where polycentric concerns actualise or the broadening of 
available information leads to conclusions different from those arrived at in the original 
judgment, the supervisory process can help ensure that the implementation of the 
judgment can be revised if necessary.229  
  
                                            
226 C Rodríguez-Garavito “Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on 
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America” (2011) 89 Texas L Rev 1669 1688. 
227 1692. 
228 1691-1692.  
229 See generally chapter six regarding the use of the structural interdict to ensure effective 
capability realisation by incorporating the central capabilities theory tenets of explicitness and 
participation as informational broadening. The retention of supervision helps ensure the 
efficacy of the remedy.  
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2 4 3 2 Informational broadening    
 
As was alluded to above, the entire capabilities approach230 is predicated on the 
informational base used to make evaluative judgments.231 According to Sen, 
informational broadening can serve to establish coherent criteria for social and 
economic assessment.232 It follows that where courts orchestrate the ranking of 
capabilities in the context of an impugned State resource allocation decision, 
informational broadening can aid in the crystallisation of norms or benchmarks by 
which such allocative decisions can be judged in the future. 
As discussed above, Sen’s conception of reasoning holds that although judgments 
should be final, they should also be revisable.233 Consequently, as participation 
develops value formation – or criteria whereby the reasonableness of State resource 
allocation decisions can be judged – judgments can accommodate changing mores 
and varied contextual realities.234 Courts should thus be cognisant of the factual, lived 
socio-economic context of any case before it while simultaneously determining a 
response thereto with reference to the normative purposes underpinning our 
constitutional democracy.  
It is crucial that when adjudicating a State resource allocation decision, no relevant 
perspective should be excluded from the evaluative exercise. Sen argues that in 
addition to the interests of those parties directly involved in a dispute, the perspectives 
of other parties who can shed light on particular judgments should also be included.235 
Judgments should thus be arrived at after considering a diversity of perspectives.236 
This emphasis on participation and informational broadening is harmonious with a 
                                            
230 As opposed to an approach that focuses on liberty, utility, wellbeing or real income.  
231 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 56-57.  
232 253, 286.  
233 S Fredman Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (2008) 109; A 
Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 107.  
234 In the context of socio-economic rights, the need for a flexible response to changing 
circumstances is encapsulated by the concept of progressive realisation enshrined in ss 26(2) 
and 27(2) of the Constitution. As more resources become available and circumstances change 
over time, access to socio-economic rights should be made available to a broader range of 
people as obstacles to access are removed. Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 45.  
235 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 44.  
236 109. 
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conception of the judiciary and judicial process under a transformative constitution.237 
However, to truly foster participation and give voice to a diversity of perspectives, 
access to courts should be facilitated. Furthermore, the formal adherence to the 
adversarial process should give way to broader rules of standing and greater ease of 
intervention by, for example, amici curiae. Finally, innovative remedies and supervisory 
processes can likewise facilitate informational broadening while ensuring revisability 
as circumstances change during the implementation phase following a judgment.  
 
2 4 3 3 The limits of participation in the courtroom  
 
However, there are limitations to the degree that the judiciary can foster 
participation. Concerns regarding polycentricity arise in relation to the adjudication of 
State resource allocation decisions, since a judgment on a specific instance of 
resource allocation could result in unforeseen consequences for other budgetary 
allocations. Unforeseen consequences for budgetary allocations could result where 
groups in need of State resources are left unrepresented in litigation. Where such 
groups do not enjoy the opportunity to participate in litigation that leads to the 
adjudication of State resource allocation decisions, revised allocation policy may not 
take their needs into account. A participation deficit in the adjudication of State 
resource allocation decisions can therefore perpetuate under-inclusive allocative 
choices. However, concerns of polycentricity should not result in automatic non-
justiciability, but should lead a court to carefully scrutinise any justificatory arguments 
proffered by the State for inadequate resource allocation.238 Courts can further mitigate 
these concerns by issuing orders that require the participation of a broader range of 
parties than those originally involved in the litigation.  
Courts can also limit participation by declining to adjudicate certain issues.239 When 
this occurs, a court effectively removes itself from the role that it can play as 
constituting a forum for public discussion and reasoning. A strategy of deference thus 
defeats the participatory purposes inherent in the vision of transformative 
constitutionalism. Courts can promote just resource allocation decisions while 
                                            
237 S Fredman Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (2008) 105.  
238 See JA King Judging Social Rights (2012) 192-194.  
239 D Brand “The ‘Politics of Need Interpretation’ and the Adjudication of Socio-economic 
Rights Claims in South Africa” in AJ van der Walt (ed) Theories of Social and Economic Justice 
(2005) 17 25.  
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stimulating public debate by choosing to substantively interpret socio-economic rights 
instead of merely holding the State to account for “procedural good governance 
standards”.240 Where concerns regarding a lack of institutional competence of the 
judiciary or a significantly polycentric dispute arise, courts should still provide a 
substantive, normative interpretation of socio-economic rights while simultaneously 
devising remedies that can ensure stakeholder input.  
Ultimately, the transformative potential of the courts to enable greater participation 
through the enforcement of socio-economic rights – and to serve as a platform and 
catalyst for public reasoning – should trump the tensions inherent in rights and 
democracy. Without the realisation of basic socio-economic capabilities, the 
achievement of more complex functionings, including those related to political, social 
and economic participation, is not possible. Furthermore, authoritative 
pronouncements by the judiciary and its ability to hold the State to account for its socio-
economic obligations can serve as political currency whereby public debate and 
activism can be stimulated. Moreover, and especially where government recalcitrance 
mars any meaningful participation during policy formulation, courts can compel 
collaboration and participation through the crafting of innovative remedies and 
supervisory mechanisms. Means of facilitating deliberation and informational 
broadening in the courtroom and beyond in order to enable effective adjudication of 
State resource allocation decisions merit further elaboration and will be discussed in a 
later chapter.241  
 
2 4 4 Explicitness and substantive reasoning 
 
One of the central tenets of transformative constitutionalism is a shift from a culture 
of authority to a culture of justification, in terms of which all exercises of public power 
must be justified.242 This requires that State actors must account for the creation and 
implementation of socio-economic policy as well as for specific instances of resource 
allocation decisions. Hoexter notes that the culture of justification entailed by a 
                                            
240 D Brand “The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, or 
‘What are Socio-Economic Rights For?’” in H Botha, A van der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) 
Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 33 49, 53.  
241 Chapter six part 6 4 1.  
242 E Mureinik “A Bridge to Where?: Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31 
32; M Pieterse “What do we Mean when we Talk About Transformative Constitutionalism?” 
(2005) 20 SAPL 155 156, 161, 165.  
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transformative constitution is clearly exemplified by the right to administrative justice 
enshrined in section 33 of the Constitution.243 However, a culture of justification 
encompasses more than requiring justification from just the executive and legislative 
branches of government and the administration. Instead, as Quinot succinctly puts it, 
“[c]ourts are… required to both extract justification and reflect justification”.244  
The judiciary under a transformative constitution is thus bound to demand 
justification from other branches of government while simultaneously adhering to the 
requirements of a culture of justification through the manner in which it adjudicates 
disputes. This can be achieved through the use of a method of “transformative 
adjudication”, whereby substantive, purposive reasoning triumphs over the restrictive 
practise of formalistic reasoning that can allow courts to avoid their adjudicative 
responsibilities.245 By justifying judgments with reference to the substantive content 
and underlying norms and values of constitutional rights, courts can contribute to the 
project of transformative constitutionalism.246 Langa pertinently sums up 
transformative constitutionalism’s demand for substantive reasoning: 
 
“The Constitution demands that all decisions be capable of being substantively defended in 
terms of the rights and values that it enshrines. It is no longer sufficient for judges to rely on 
the say-so of parliament or technical readings of legislation as providing justifications for 
their decisions. Under a transformative Constitution, judges bear the ultimate responsibility 
to justify their decisions not only by reference to authority, but by reference to ideas and 
values.”247 
 
Embracing a commitment to substantive reasoning implies the articulation of the 
underlying considerations and values that lead to certain judicial outcomes. This can, 
in turn, allow the judiciary to come to terms with its constitutional obligation to promote 
social justice through its adjudicative practices.248 By bringing underlying 
                                            
243 C Hoexter “Judicial Policy Revisited: Transformative Adjudication in Administrative Law” 
(2008) 24 SAJHR 281 288.  
244 G Quinot “Substantive Reasoning in Administrative-law Adjudication” (2010) 3 CCR 
111 113.  
245 P Langa “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stell LR 351 357; C Hoexter “Judicial 
Policy Revisited: Transformative Adjudication in Administrative Law” (2008) 24 SAJHR 
281 287. 
246 G Quinot “Substantive Reasoning in Administrative-law Adjudication” (2010) 3 CCR 
111 113.  
247 P Langa “Transformative Constitutionalism” (2006) 17 Stell LR 351 353.  
248 KE Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 164.  
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considerations to light,249 judicial “candour” could promote public scrutiny of the “often 
hidden political and moral assumptions” that inform adjudication.250  
The demand for substantive reasoning is accommodated by the concept of 
“explicitness” in Sen’s capabilities approach and theory of justice. Sen argues that 
instead of obscuring reasoning during evaluative weighting processes in an “implicit 
framework”,251 explicitness in resolving judgmental questions is preferable. 
Explicitness furthermore allows for open public scrutiny of valuational judgments where 
prioritisation takes places in a context of diversity.252 Consequently, participation is 
allowed to flourish in the setting of social and economic priorities.  
Sen recognises that values and social reasoning often give way to complexities that 
do not allow for easily formulated axioms. Nevertheless, he advocates the balancing 
of the benefits of and need for explicitness against the difficulty of translating 
complexities into axiomatic terms.253 Furthermore, Sen is not oblivious to the 
vulnerability of public institutions to succumb to the practice of inarticulate and implicit 
reasoning: 
 
“The avoidance of reasoned justification often comes not from indignant protesters but from 
placid guardians of order and justice. Reticence has appealed throughout history to those 
with a governing role, endowed with public authority, who are unsure of the grounds for 
action, or unwilling to scrutinize the basis of their policies.”254  
 
Sen argues that an approach whereby explicitness and substantive reasoning are 
avoided can lead to a failure of justice, an absence of accountability and reduced 
opportunity for participation through public scrutiny.255  
Where State resource allocation decisions require adjudication in socio-economic 
rights cases, both the demands of transformative constitutionalism and Sen’s 
capabilities approach and related theory of justice require substantive reasoning. 
Where courts decline to review an allocative decision, they must clarify why institutional 
concerns must lead to a strategy of deference that favours the case made by the State 
                                            
249 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 51. 
250 KE Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 164.  
251 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 75.  
252 30. 
253 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 109-110.  
254 4.  
255 5.  
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at the expense of litigants whose socio-economic capabilities are at stake.256 
Furthermore, where a State resource allocation decision is held to be reasonable, or 
its scope is justified due to scarce resources, substantive reasoning similarly demands 
reference to the capabilities and purposes represented by socio-economic rights.  
 
2 5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has shown that the capabilities approach as developed by Sen and 
Nussbaum can be harnessed to constitute a theoretical justification for the judicial 
review of State resource allocation decisions that impact on socio-economic rights. On 
a general level, the focus that the capabilities approach places on the freedom that 
people actually enjoy to choose the lives they have reason to value resonates with the 
inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution. Furthermore, Sen’s theory 
places State resource allocation decisions into a capabilities perspective and justifies 
a wide interpretation of “available resources”.  
Significantly, Sen proposes a framework for the valuation and weighting of diverse 
and oft-competing capabilities. This valuational framework can be developed with 
reference to Nussbaum’s scholarship to constitute a review paradigm for the 
adjudication of State resource allocation decisions. According to this model, the 
Constitution establishes a partial ordering of important capabilities through its inclusion 
of socio-economic rights and the right to just administrative action. In order to review 
allocative decisions, courts must narrow the range of weights assigned to capabilities 
and other factors with reference to the historical, social and factual context of the case 
at hand. This evaluative exercise is largely congruent with the model of 
reasonableness review adopted by the Constitutional Court for the adjudication of 
socio-economic rights and the right to just administrative action. However, it is 
imperative that a two-stage analysis is adhered to, according to which the content of 
the relevant socio-economic right is established before a particular allocative decision 
or a justificatory argument proffered by the State is reviewed.  
The value of a capabilities approach to adjudication is that the content of socio-
economic rights can be determined with reference to the overarching functioning 
outcome that these rights aim to achieve. The normative purposes of socio-economic 
                                            
256 D Brand “Judicial Deference and Democracy in Socio-economic Rights Cases in South 
Africa” (2011) 22 Stell LR 614 221.  
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rights can be broadly defined as achieving the functioning outcome of living an 
autonomous, dignified life in a position of substantive equality with others. When 
considered along with the historical, social and factual context of the case at hand, 
specific capabilities that need to be realised in order for the functioning outcome to be 
achieved, will become apparent. The weighting of capabilities at this stage will indicate 
which level of scrutiny should be adopted to review a given allocative decision. 
Thereafter, the reasonableness or deficiency of allocative choices can be adjudicated. 
Importantly, the entire valuational process occurs through a process of public 
reasoning. The capabilities approach thus constitutes a theoretical justification for the 
review of allocative decisions, while simultaneously offering a practical method for 
applying a two-stage rights analysis to the adjudication of such decisions. The 
intricacies of a capabilities-based standard of review are elucidated in chapter five.  
A capabilities approach to the review of State resource allocation decisions can 
promote the purposes of transformative constitutionalism. Such an adjudicative 
approach must likewise take into account the fundamental tenets of transformative 
constitutionalism. Key linkages that exist between a capabilities approach to 
adjudication and adjudication under a transformative constitution have therefore been 
elucidated. First, the foundational constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality 
are central to both a project of transformative constitutionalism and a capabilities 
approach to adjudication. These values will consequently play an important 
interpretative role when courts weight capabilities and other factors in order to 
scrutinise State resource allocation decisions.  
Second, transformative constitutionalism requires a reconceptualisation of the 
separation of powers doctrine to recognise a more collaborative partnership between 
all branches of government. Similarly, Sen’s theory of justice implores us to evaluate 
the actual consequences of institutions, instead of merely assuming the justness of 
institutional structures. Whereas Sen accords insufficient weight to the role that the 
judiciary can play in prioritising capabilities and so promoting the ends of justice, 
Nussbaum illustrates that the values underlying the capabilities approach can be 
fleshed out through incorporation into a constitution and subsequent elaboration by the 
courts. The role of the judiciary as the ultimate guardian of constitutional rights under 
a thus reconceived notion of the separation of powers must be acknowledged. 
Third, participation is a crucial element of transformative constitutionalism. Public 
reasoning, participation and informational broadening occupy a similarly significant 
place in a capabilities approach to adjudication. Courts should thus scrutinise allocative 
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decisions in order to determine whether allocations were arrived at after engaging in 
participatory processes and whether the allocations are aimed at promoting 
participation in all spheres of life. Courts should simultaneously support participatory 
judicial processes by broadening the range of interests before it to the greatest extent 
possible. This challenge can be met at the remedial stage of adjudication by designing 
participatory remedies that involve a wide range of stakeholders during the supervisory 
phase of remedial action. This important implication of a capabilities approach to 
adjudication is fully explored in chapter six.  
Finally, when a State resource allocation is reviewed, the State should provide 
explicit evidence of how it arrived at and implemented its allocative decision. It is 
equally important for courts to engage in substantive, explicit reasoning when 
weighting capabilities and reviewing allocative decisions. Such substantive, explicit 
reasoning should extend to the remedial phase of adjudication. Paradoxically, 
formalistic reasoning stands at odds with the ethos of transformative constitutionalism 
and the capabilities theory.  
The following chapter will critically evaluate the approach of the judiciaries in the 
United Kingdom and India in respect of the judicial review of State resource allocation 
decisions that impact on socio-economic interests.    
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Chapter 3: Adjudicating resource allocation decisions in the United Kingdom 
and India: Strengths and weaknesses  
 
3 1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter expounded the suitability of the capabilities theory as a 
theoretical paradigm that justifies and aids the judicial review of State resource 
allocation decisions that impact on socio-economic rights. This chapter critically 
evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the judicial approach to the adjudication of 
resource allocation decisions in the United Kingdom (“UK”) and India against the 
measure of what a capabilities approach to adjudication requires.  
Both South Africa and India are common-law jurisdictions that share a genealogical 
connection with the United Kingdom given their history of colonisation by Britain.1 The 
United Kingdom’s influence on South African law has been extensive, and it is 
therefore understandable why our Constitutional Court has referred to English 
judgments in its own jurisprudence regarding resource allocation decisions impacting 
on socio-economic rights.2 Yet whereas the United Kingdom adheres to a system of 
parliamentary sovereignty, the South African and Indian judiciaries now operate under 
a system of constitutional supremacy.  
The transformative nature of India’s supreme constitution makes it apt for normative 
comparative analysis. In contrast, a normative-dialogical comparative methodology will 
be used to question whether doctrines applied by the UK judiciary to review resource 
allocation decisions can still be appropriately relied on by South African courts. This 
critical analysis is necessary given the material difference in constitutional design and 
the divergent normative assumptions that underlie the institution of judicial review in 
the United Kingdom, on the one hand, and South Africa and India, on the other.  
                                            
1 India attained independence from British colonial rule in 1947 and adopted the Constitution 
of India in 1949 (“Indian Constitution”). For an overview of the drafting process leading to the 
adoption of the Indian Constitution, see R Abeyratne “Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian 
Constitution: Toward a Broader Conception of Legitimacy” (2014) 38 Brook J Int’l L 1 25-32. 
For an explanation of why these two jurisdiction were selected for comparison, see chapter 
one part 1 6 4 above.  
2 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC). See further chapter 
one part 1 6 4 1 above.    
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Neither the United Kingdom nor India explicitly recognises socio-economic rights as 
justiciable.3 The method whereby each jurisdiction’s judiciary attempts to afford 
protection to critical socio-economic capabilities in the context of State resource 
allocation decisions is therefore instructive from the vantage point of South Africa’s 
relatively new constitutional democracy.  
The United Kingdom judiciary has traditionally displayed a conservative and 
formalistic approach to rights adjudication in general, and resource allocation decisions 
that impact on socio-economic capabilities in particular. The normative assumption that 
the will of the legislature is supreme, underlies the institution of judicial review and the 
application of the doctrine of deference. Academic debate regarding the justification 
for judicial review will be scrutinised for the light it sheds on the arguable deficiencies 
of the current underlying normative justification for this institution. Administrative law’s 
restricted formulation of reasonableness review, and a judicial tendency to reflexively 
defer to other branches of government, will be critically evaluated. The underlying 
constitutional tenet of parliamentary sovereignty furthermore supports a rigid 
distinction between civil and political rights, on the one hand, and socio-economic 
rights, on the other – since only rights recognised by the legislature as such are 
regarded as legitimate. This distinction will be critically analysed. Furthermore, 
academic proposals to utilise proportionality as a standard head of review will be 
examined, since proportionality resonates strongly with the weighting exercise inherent 
in a capabilities approach to adjudication.4  
The prevalent constitutional framework in India, as well as selected jurisprudence 
by the Indian Supreme Court,5 will be evaluated in order to determine whether the 
Indian adjudicative paradigm is congruent with a capabilities approach to the 
adjudication of resource allocation decisions. The normative assumption that underlies 
the institution of judicial review in India is that the Indian Constitution is supreme law 
that aims to facilitate the socio-economic transformation of society. The interpretative 
approach followed by the Supreme Court will be scrutinised in order to discern whether 
capabilities are allowed to determine the intensity of review to which resource 
                                            
3 The UK Human Rights Act, 1998 makes no provision for socio-economic rights. Art 37 of the 
Indian Constitution explicitly states that the Directive Principles of State Policy, which 
recognise socio-economic capabilities, “shall not be enforceable by any court”.  
4 See further chapter five part 5 3 below.  
5 This chapter only analyses the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, given the proliferation of 
High Court judgments coupled with easy access to the Supreme Court, resulting in a 
comprehensive body of jurisprudence. 
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allocation decisions are subjected. Furthermore, Indian jurisprudence will be critically 
analysed to establish whether it promotes capabilities-centred participation and 
explicit, substantive reasoning that can be fruitfully incorporated into South African law. 
However, weaknesses in the approach of the Indian judiciary will be evaluated in the 
light of the possible incoherence and unprincipled resort to deference displayed by the 
Court thus far. Moreover, the arguably fragmented nature of Indian administrative law 
will be investigated.  
Once the comparative evaluation is complete, conclusions will be drawn regarding 
the negative and positive guidance that South African courts and scholars can draw 
from the jurisdictions under scrutiny. The normative assumptions that underlie the 
operation of certain doctrines in both jurisdictions will thus be examined for their 
congruence with South Africa’s project of transformative constitutionalism and a 
capabilities approach to adjudication. 
 
3 2 The United Kingdom 
 
3 2 1 Introduction 
 
A system of parliamentary supremacy – and not constitutional supremacy – is 
prevalent in the United Kingdom.6 In the UK, government power is vast, and the role 
of the courts has traditionally been subsidiary to that of Parliament. As noted by Lord 
Steyn, the judiciary is merely charged with interpreting the law, and lacks the power to 
alter the law as determined by Parliament.7 Unrestrained parliamentary law-making 
power is controlled by a presumption that legislation is not intended to upset the rule 
of law or violate fundamental rights. Ultimately, however, Parliament retains the power 
to reverse any judicial decision of which it disapproves.8 Theoretically, therefore, the 
                                            
6 The principle of parliamentary sovereignty was first espoused by Dicey and held a superior 
constitutional status than the rule of law in his theory. J Jowell “Parliamentary Sovereignty 
under the New Constitutional Hypothesis” (2006) PL 562 562. However, it is important to bear 
in mind that “[i]n the absence of a constitutional text… the allocation of authority is assumed 
not by reference to any formal grant, or to the original intent of that grant, but on the basis of a 
moral claim to its exercise (or limitation)” (565). 
7 Lord Steyn “Deference: A Tangled Story” (2005) PL 346 347.  
8 This is also the position under the HRA. S 4(6) of the HRA states with regard to a declaration 
of incompatibility: 
“(6) A declaration under this section (“a declaration of incompatibility”) – 
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counter-majoritarian difficulty and associated concerns of judicial legitimacy should not 
arise.9 
Nevertheless, judicial review in the UK remains acutely restricted by a pervasive 
awareness of parliamentary sovereignty and a concomitant oversensitivity to issues of 
constitutional and institutional competence.10 However, there has been some 
movement, largely driven by academic debate, towards a more capabilities-congruent 
approach to adjudication. With the advent of the Human Rights Act, 1998 (“HRA”), the 
rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights11 (“European 
Convention” or “Convention”) have been incorporated into UK law.12 Although UK 
courts were tasked with upholding fundamental rights at common law to a more limited 
extent prior to the adoption of the HRA, the judicial responsibility to do so is now 
beyond doubt. This development will be analysed and its potential to posit a rights-
based justification for judicial review to replace the ultra vires doctrine will be 
investigated. 
Thereafter, the need for adjudicative reform will be evaluated in the light of the highly 
constraining test of Wednesbury unreasonableness and reflexive resort to deference 
in socio-economic matters. In addition, the rigid distinction between civil and political 
rights, on the one hand, and socio-economic rights, on the other, will be critically 
analysed in order to establish whether it prevents the courts from developing a truly 
capabilities-based approach to the adjudication of resource allocation decisions. The 
aversive example set by the UK judiciary may thus be regarded as illustrating the 
                                            
(a) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in 
respect of which it is given; and 
(b) is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made.” 
9 Lord Steyn “Deference: A Tangled Story” (2005) PL 346 348.  
10 “Constitutional competence” refers to the legitimate role of institutions such as the judiciary 
in a democracy. Jowell’s elaboration of this concept has been described in chapter two part 2 
2 3 1. The concept of “institutional competence” is explained by J Jowell “Of Vires and 
Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review” (1999) PL 448 451 thus:  
“The question of institutional competence involves a practical evaluation of the capacity of 
decision making bodies to make certain decisions. It starts with the recognition that some 
matters are not ideally justiciable. It thus focuses not upon the appropriate role of the judge, 
but upon the inherent limitations of the process of adjudication. This is because courts are 
limited in their capacity to decide matters which admit of no generalised or objective 
determination.” (Emphasis added).   
11 1950 ETS 5; 213 UNTS 221. 
12 Whereas judicial review has always been a remedy in the UK, judicial review under the HRA 
now constitutes an alternative to ordinary, common-law judicial review.  
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pitfalls that other common-law jurisdictions should avoid when grappling with the issue 
of how best to advance socio-economic capabilities without encroaching upon the 
traditional preserve of other branches of government.13  
Finally, calls for adopting proportionality as a uniform head of review will be 
evaluated in order to establish whether by employing a structured analysis, the 
intensity of which is determined by the capability at issue, government resource 
allocation decisions can be fairly and effectively adjudicated.  
 
3 2 2 The effort to develop rights-based review 
 
In the UK, no written constitution with a justiciable bill of rights exists to create a 
focal space or partial ordering in which capabilities, resource allocation decisions and 
other factors can be weighted. The absence of a written constitution has led to a 
protracted debate regarding the justification for judicial review. Such justification is 
important in terms of what it tells us about the nature of constitutional democracy in the 
UK. It therefore highlights the normative assumption that underlies the institution of 
judicial review in the UK, and the impact that this over-arching assumption has on the 
formulation of standards of judicial review, the application of deference and the 
distinction drawn between civil and political rights and socio-economic interests.  
 
3 2 2 1 The ultra vires doctrine  
 
On the one end of the spectrum of the debate regarding the justification for judicial 
review are those who believe that the ultra vires doctrine ultimately provides the most 
accurate and constitutionally stable justification for judicial review.14 The ultra vires 
doctrine casts no doubt on the supremacy of Parliament, and holds that it is Parliament 
that determines the principles of judicial review. When interpreting legislation or 
reviewing the conduct of public bodies, courts are therefore in fact merely enforcing 
legislative intent. According to this doctrine, the judiciary is unquestionably subordinate 
                                            
13 For a discussion of the comparative value of analysing “aversive” examples found in foreign 
jurisdictions in terms of a normative-dialogical methodology, see chapter one part 1 6 4 3 1. 
14 C Forsyth “Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of 
Parliament and Judicial Review” in C Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review and the Constitution (2000) 
29; M Elliot “The Ultra Vires Doctrine in a Constitutional Setting: Still the Central Principle of 
Administrative Law” in C Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review and the Constitution (2000) 83.  
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to Parliament and is merely an instrument for the implementation of the legislature’s 
will.15  
The modified ultra vires doctrine recognises the creative role of the judiciary in 
specifying principles of good administration, but nevertheless replaces the concept of 
“specific legislative intent” with that of “general legislative intent”. Specific legislative 
intent purportedly indicates in a particularised manner what principles of judicial review 
should be applied. Courts therefore sought to discover such specific parliamentary 
intent in concrete cases in order to justify judicial review.16 In contrast, general 
legislative intent is implied consent by Parliament for courts to develop the principles 
of judicial review, and thus specific consent need not be discovered in particular 
cases.17 According to the modified ultra vires doctrine, general legislative intent is said 
to govern the application and existence of the principles constituting the rule of law and 
justifies judicial review. Where general legislative intent is absent, judicial review flouts 
parliamentary sovereignty.18  
It emerges that a two-stage capabilities-based model of review, according to which 
the importance of the capabilities at stake and the severity of their infringement should 
determine the level of scrutiny to which an impugned resource allocation decision is 
subsequently subjected,19 will be difficult to justify under either of the ultra vires 
doctrine’s incarnations. An exclusive focus on the will of Parliament, coupled with the 
unequivocally subservient role of the judiciary, will likely result in the unprincipled resort 
to deference to the legislature. Moreover, this conceptualisation of the nature of judicial 
review pushes the content and normative purposes of rights to the margins, instead of 
using rights as a starting point for weighting competing factors. Where the intention of 
                                            
15 J Jowell “Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review” (1999) PL 
448 448; J Jowell “Parliamentary Sovereignty under the New Constitutional Hypothesis” (2006) 
PL 562 573; P Craig “Constitutional Foundations, the Rule of Law and Supremacy” (2003) PL 
92 93.  
16 P Craig “Constitutional Foundations, the Rule of Law and Supremacy” (2003) PL 92 93.  
17 Where the legislature is silent, “a presumption of continuing consent by Parliament to be 
bound by the rule of law as elaborated by the courts” is inferred by the courts. J Jowell 
“Parliamentary Sovereignty under the New Constitutional Hypothesis” (2006) PL 562 573. 
18 J Jowell “Parliamentary Sovereignty under the New Constitutional Hypothesis” (2006) PL 
562 574-575; P Craig “Constitutional Foundations, the Rule of Law and Supremacy” (2003) PL 
92 93; M Elliot “The Ultra Vires Doctrine in a Constitutional Setting: Still the Central Principle 
of Administrative Law” in C Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review and the Constitution (2000) 83 101, 
108-109.  
19 See chapter two part 2 3 2 2 1 above.  
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the legislature can be shown to support a resource allocation decision that impacts 
gravely on a socio-economic capability, such decision will nevertheless survive judicial 
scrutiny under the ultra vires doctrine.  
 
3 2 2 2 A common-law, rights-based model  
 
In response to the analytical and normative problems inherent in both manifestations 
of the ultra vires doctrine, scholars including Craig, Jowell and Oliver have posited a 
common-law justification for judicial review.20 According to the common-law model of 
justification, courts assume an independent role from that of the legislature. Balance is 
restored to the separation of powers through the acknowledgment that courts and the 
legislature share power. This approach thus perceives principles of judicial review as 
a common-law creation located in notions of the rule of law, justice, rights, legality and 
abuse of power. The common-law approach is therefore more realistic regarding the 
true source of review. Furthermore, it avoids the artificiality and indeterminacy that 
characterise the ultra vires doctrine.21  
The stark contrast between the two positions constituting the debate regarding the 
justification for judicial review (ie the ultra vires doctrine versus the common-law, rights-
based model) illustrates an underlying normative divergence regarding the foundations 
of constitutional law in the UK. Significantly, the common-law model provides a segue 
into rights-based review that is more congruent with a capabilities approach to 
adjudication than the ultra vires doctrine has allowed in the past. Furthermore, to the 
extent that rights are permitted to assume a central role in any weighting analysis, the 
potential for rigorous scrutiny of resource allocation decisions is increased. 
                                            
20 P Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 10-27; P Craig “Ultra vires and the Foundation of 
Judicial Review” in C Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review and the Constitution (2000) 47; P Craig 
“Competing Models of Judicial Review” in C Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review and the Constitution 
(2000) 373; J Jowell “Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review” 
(1999) PL 448; J Jowell “Parliamentary Sovereignty under the New Constitutional Hypothesis” 
(2006) PL 562; D Oliver “Is the Ultra Vires Rule the Basis of Judicial Review” in C Forsyth (ed) 
Judicial Review and the Constitution (2000) 3. See J Laws “Law and Democracy” (1995) PL 
72; Lord Woolf “Droit Public – English Style” (1995) PL 57.  
21 P Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 15; J Jowell “Of Vires and Vacuums: The 
Constitutional Context of Judicial Review” (1999) PL 448 449. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 100 
 
Simultaneously, a rights-based approach to judicial review may promote a culture of 
justification.22  
Craig has developed a rights-based approach according to which legislation and 
administrative action should be interpreted to conform to fundamental rights. A rights-
based approach demands heightened levels of scrutiny and more thorough 
justifications for legislation and conduct that may encroach on fundamental rights. 
Craig recognises that this approach will necessarily require judicial choices regarding 
the meaning to be attributed to fundamental rights, in particular the extent of protection 
that socio-economic interests should enjoy.23  
Significantly, Craig points out that the inherent limitations of the adversarial process 
do not render polycentric disputes, including those related to resource allocation, 
judicial “no go areas”.24 Although he concedes that differences exist between judicial 
review and political forums for debate, Craig nonetheless contends that the superiority 
of political processes should not be assumed.25 Value-driven judicial review can 
therefore be penetrating enough to contribute to the elucidation of capabilities. In 
addition, the role of the courts in facilitating the broadening of information through 
participatory processes and promoting explicit, substantive reasoning should be 
acknowledged.26 These considerations, related to “principles of good administration”, 
are accommodated by Craig’s approach.27 Craig argues that courts can both ensure 
that participation occurred in the initial decision by the administrative body and promote 
participation in the judicial process itself by construing rules relating to standing and 
intervention broadly.28  
Craig submits that a rights-focused, common-law basis for review need not 
challenge parliamentary sovereignty, even though reasons for the alteration of the 
model may exist.29 Craig further postulates that even if the necessity to mitigate 
parliamentary sovereignty is conceded, such can be accommodated through the 
adoption of heightened levels of scrutiny and rights-based canons of construction, and 
                                            
22 For the importance of a culture of justification under a transformative constitution, and the 
role of substantive legal reasoning in achieving it, see chapter two part 2 4 4 above.  
23 P Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 17.  
24 25. 
25 25.  
26 See chapter two part 2 4 above.  
27 P Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 17. 
28 24. 
29 P Craig “Constitutional Foundations, the Rule of Law and Supremacy” (2003) PL 92 107.  
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need not entail the judicial power to invalidate legislation.30 Craig regards the rule of 
law as substantive, in the sense that it gives rise to a spectrum of substantive rights.31 
All rights-based claims against government are thereby encompassed by the rule of 
law, although the substantive conception of the rule of law is not consistent with only 
one theory of justice.32  
Where clear legislative intent seriously threatens fundamental rights, and thereby 
jeopardises the rule of law itself, Lord Woolf’s statement is apposite: 
 
“[I]f Parliament did the unthinkable, then I would say that the courts would also be required 
to act in a manner which would be without precedent… [T]here [are] advantages in making 
it clear that ultimately there are even limits on the supremacy of Parliament which it is the 
courts’ inalienable responsibility to identify and uphold… They are no more than are 
necessary to enable the rule of law to be preserved.”33 
 
A “gradual re-ordering of… constitutional priorities to bring alive the nascent idea 
that a democratic legislature cannot be above the law”34 is therefore required to bring 
the common-law approach even more in line with an approach whereby capabilities 
are of central import for the exercise of judicial review. Only once fundamental rights 
are regarded as truly sovereign, will the importance of resource allocation decisions 
aimed at the realisation of socio-economic capabilities be put into perspective. Craig’s 
approach provides an excellent platform from which nuanced development towards a 
truly capability-centred approach to the adjudication of resource allocation decisions 
can be undertaken. However, this approach by no means obviates the need for wide-
spread adjudicative reform.  
  
                                            
30 107-111.  
31 P Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 19-20.  
32 P Craig “Constitutional Foundations, the Rule of Law and Supremacy” (2003) PL 92 96-98.  
33 Lord Woolf “Droit Public – English Style” (1995) PL 57 69. See also J Laws “Law and 
Democracy” (1995) PL 72 92.  
34 Lord Justice Laws “Illegality: The Problem of Jurisdiction” in C Forsyth (ed) Judicial Review 
and the Constitution (2000) 73 77. 
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3 2 3 The need for adjudicative reform  
 
3 2 3 1 A legacy of Wednesbury unreasonableness 
 
For decades, administrative law in the UK has struggled to emancipate itself from 
the shackles imposed by the Court of Appeal’s decision in Associated Provincial 
Picture Houses Limited v Wednesbury Corporation35 (“Wednesbury”). In that 
judgment, the court severely restricted reasonableness review of administrative action 
when it stated: 
 
“[I]f a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could 
ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere ... but that would require overwhelming 
proof... [A decision] must be proved to be unreasonable in the sense, not that it is what the 
court considers unreasonable, but that it is what the court considers is a decision that no 
reasonable body could have come to, which is a different thing altogether. The court may 
very well have different views from those of a local authority on matters of high public policy 
of this kind ... The effect of the legislation is not to set up the court as an arbiter of the 
correctness of one view over another... provided .... [that the administrative authorities] act 
... within the four corners of their jurisdiction, the court ... cannot interfere.”36 
 
The near impossible threshold for a determination of unreasonableness imposed by 
Wednesbury was later exacerbated when Lord Diplock held that an unreasonable 
decision is “a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral 
standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be 
decided could have arrived at it”.37  
Although a test for proportionality is applied in so far as rights-based claims under 
the HRA are at issue,38 borderline cases where the implication of a recognised right 
                                            
35 [1948] 1 KB 223.  
36 233-234 (emphasis added).  
37 Council for Civil Services Union v Minister of Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 951.  
38 Confirmed in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Daly [2001] UKHL 
26, see especially the judgment of Lord Steyn paras 24-28. Prior to the advent of the HRA, 
fundamental rights-based claims were subjected to “anxious scrutiny” as formulated in R v 
Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517. However, a review standard of “anxious 
scrutiny” did not require a deviation from Wednesbury reasonableness. See further E Palmer 
Judicial Review, Socio-economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (2007) 157-161; P Craig 
Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 622-623.  
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incorporated in terms of the HRA is debatable, remain cause for concern.39 Since the 
utilisation of resources is central to administrative decision-making,40 judicial review of 
resource allocation decisions that implicate non-recognised socio-economic 
capabilities may be rendered impotent.  
It is clear that Wednesbury sets a standard for unreasonableness that will rarely, if 
ever, be met.41 Craig notes in this regard that the consequences of any legal test must 
be evaluated in terms of real world circumstances, and that the Wednesbury test may 
be near-impossible for claimants to meet.42 Moreover, it reflects a highly deferential 
standard that places the burden of presenting “overwhelming proof” on the individual 
litigant while severely circumscribing the role of the courts in interfering with 
administrative action. Adhering to Wednesbury will hinder courts from aiding the 
realisation of crucial socio-economic capabilities when called upon to adjudicate a 
government resource allocation decision. Apart from setting an impractically high 
standard of unreasonableness, the test directs courts to focus on the conduct of 
government and its justificatory arguments to an almost exclusive degree. Little room 
is left to take account of the normative and factual context of a given case43 and to 
thereby substantively interpret the right at stake. 
A decisive move away from Wednesbury unreasonableness in favour of a more 
flexible proportionality standard of review is thus required if the UK is to progress to 
the point where rights, and the capabilities they should give rise to, form the core of 
judicial review.44   
                                            
39 P Craig “Proportionality, Rationality and Review” (2010) New Zealand L Rev 265 272-273.  
40 E Palmer Judicial Review, Socio-economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (2007) 162. 
41 J Jowell “In the Shadow of Wednesbury” (1997) JR 75 75; P Craig “Proportionality, 
Rationality and Review” (2010) New Zealand L Rev 265 274, 275; E Palmer Judicial Review, 
Socio-economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (2007) 158, 161; C Hoexter Administrative 
Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 346. 
42 P Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 665.  
43 See TRS Allan “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of Due Deference” (2006) 65 
Cambridge LJ 671 686. However, in arguing that a theory of deference has no place in a 
constitutional democracy, Allan appears to endorse Associated Provincial Picture Houses, 
Limited v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA) to the extent that it serves to 
appropriately delineate a separation of powers, thereby obviating the need to resort to 
deference. It is submitted that Allan is incorrect in this regard and that Wednesbury 
unreasonableness can amount to the same abdication of judicial responsibility as automatic 
resort to deference does.  
44 See parts 3 2 2 and 3 2 4.  
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3 2 3 2 From non-justiciability to deference  
 
3 2 3 2 1 The doctrine of non-justiciability 
 
Prior to the advent of the HRA, a “doctrine of non-justiciability” operated where an 
allocation of resources was challenged on the basis of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness.45 Courts thereby defined matters of public finance as “no go areas” 
which lay within the exclusive competence of the elected branches of government and 
administrators.46 As McLean observes, the judicial determination that a matter is non-
justiciable amounts to “extreme” or absolute deference.47 Troublingly, the doctrine of 
non-justiciability applied even where fundamental rights were implicated.48 It follows 
that where judges wholly refuse to engage with the normative and factual context at 
issue, they eschew a capabilities approach to adjudication. The relevant capabilities 
are left unacknowledged and rights remain uninterpreted.49 Moreover, the absence of 
reasoning in failing to adjudicate a particular resource allocation decision negates the 
role of the judiciary under the separation of powers,50 shuts down any possibility of 
meaningful participation,51 and eliminates a space for substantive, explicit discussion, 
debate and reasoning.52  
                                            
45 King distinguishes between “discretionary allocative decision-making”, which is non-
justiciable, and in which the cost of the allocation features as a consideration affecting the 
correctness of the decision; and “allocative impact”, where the decision imposes a burden on 
resources, but which is nonetheless justiciable. See generally JA King “The Justiciability of 
Resource Allocation” (2007) 70 MLR 197. 
46 E Palmer Judicial Review, Socio-economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (2007) 162. 
See further Nottinghamshire County Council v Secretary of State for the Environment and 
another appeal [1986] AC 240 (HL) and R v Secretary of State for the Environment, ex parte 
Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [1991] 1 AC 521 (HL), where local councils challenged 
expenditure targets established by the Secretary of State for the Environment. The House of 
Lords declined to review matters of economic policy in both instances.  
47 K McLean Constitutional Deference, Courts and Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa 
(2009) 26.  
48 E Palmer Judicial Review, Socio-economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (2007) 162-
163.  
49 See chapter two and especially part 2 4 above.  
50 See chapter two part 2 4 2 above. 
51 See chapter two part 2 4 3 above. 
52 See chapter two part 2 4 4 above.  
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Given the grave impact that a position of absolute deference can exert on 
capabilities, a doctrine of non-justiciability is not tenable within a democracy that values 
fundamental rights. This is perhaps most pertinently illustrated by the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment in R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex parte B53 (“Ex parte B”). In deciding 
the review of the health authority’s decision not to provide cancer treatment to a ten 
year old girl, Sir Thomas Bingham MR held: 
 
“Difficult and agonising judgments have to be made as to how a limited budget is best 
allocated to the maximum advantage of the maximum number of patients. That is not a 
judgment which the court can make. In my judgment, it is not something that a health 
authority such as this authority can be fairly criticised for not advancing before the court.”54 
 
The doctrine thus operated to rule out any engagement with the capabilities 
underlying a claim that a resource allocation decision was unfair. Even if the outcome 
of Ex Parte B was justified, the refusal to at least demand a cogent explanation for the 
health authority’s prioritisation and subsequent decision was not. Regrettably, the 
Court of Appeal took a regressive stance when it overruled the court of first instance, 
in which prior judgment Laws J had held that where a fundamental interest such as life 
is at stake, the decision-maker “must do more than toll the bell of tight resources... they 
must explain the priorities that have led them to decline to fund the treatment”.55 A 
culture of justification, which is desirable in any democracy, as well as a capabilities 
approach to adjudication were seriously impeded by the Court of Appeal’s subsequent 
decision.  
Even where courts ostensibly departed from Ex Parte B,56 the relevant judgments 
are characterised by an overwhelming awareness of parliamentary sovereignty, 
manifested in a statutory-based approach to review instead of an approach that is 
rights- or capabilities-based.57 Thus, in R v East Sussex County Council, ex parte 
                                            
53 [1995] 2 All ER 129 (CA).  
54 137. See also R v Gloucestershire County, ex parte Barry [1997] AC 584, [1997] 2 All ER 1, 
where mandatory duties were interpreted as mere powers in an effort to alleviate any burden 
on financial resources of local authorities providing residential care services to the elderly. 
55 R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex parte B [1995] 2 All ER 129 (CA) 137 (emphasis added).  
56 In line with the distinction drawn by JA King “The Justiciability of Resource Allocation” (2007) 
70 MLR 197. 
57 See further part 3 2 2 2 above regarding the common-law based justification for judicial 
review and the ability of a substantive conceptualisation of the rule of law to accommodate 
fundamental rights-based claims.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 106 
 
Tandy58 (“Tandy”), a departure from Ex parte B was effected through formalistic 
statutory interpretation59 and not through an open-ended and normative analysis of the 
rights and interests at play. In casu, the reduced provision of home education to sick 
children was at issue.60 Since only two other children were similarly affected by the 
policy under review in Tandy, the financial impact of the judgment was negligible. 
Therefore, the House of Lords was not compelled to weigh the importance of the 
underlying interest against any resource-based arguments raised by the local 
authority. In any event, no meaningful weighting exercise can occur where formalistic, 
artificial reasoning is routinely used as a shield against the demands that a normative, 
rights-based approach elicits from the judiciary. It follows that even when, in the wake 
of Tandy, lower courts felt empowered to produce rights-based outcomes,61 the 
catalytic effect that jurisprudence can have on issues of structural social injustice 
remains severely restricted.  
  
                                            
58 [1998] AC 714, [1998] 2 All ER 770.  
59 E Palmer “Resource Allocation, Welfare Rights – Mapping the Boundaries of Judicial Control 
in Public Administrative Law” (2000) 20 OJLS 63 83. In fact, the House of Lords in R v East 
Sussex County Council, ex parte Tandy [1998] AC 714, [1998] 2 All ER 770 777 endorsed R 
v Cambridge Health Authority, ex parte B [1995] 2 All ER 129 (CA) when it stated: 
“Once the reasonableness of the actions of a local authority depends upon its decision how 
to apply scarce financial resources, the local authority’s decision becomes extremely 
difficult to review. The court cannot second-guess the local authority in the way in which it 
spends its limited resources.” 
60 In terms of a capabilities approach to review, the fertile capability constituted by education 
would have justified the adjudication of the resource allocation decision within the normative 
and factual context of the case without the need to resort to artificial statutory construction to 
justify such a robust approach. See chapter two part 2 3 2 2 3 regarding the fertile nature of 
certain capabilities.  
61 See, for example, R v Birmingham City Council, ex parte Mohammed [1998] 3 All ER 788 
and Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, ex parte Kujtim [1999] 4 All ER 101. In her 
discussion of these and other judgments, Palmer notes that although these cases “fall squarely 
within the statutory paradigm of review, their outcomes are consistent with the protection of 
the rights of vulnerable individuals in welfare needs contexts”. E Palmer “Resource Allocation, 
Welfare Rights – Mapping the Boundaries of Judicial Control in Public Administrative Law” 
(2000) 20 OJLS 63 85. 
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3 2 3 2 2 Deference  
 
(a) The potential to collapse deference and non-justiciability  
 
Since the entry into force of the HRA, the doctrine of non-justiciability has been 
discarded in human rights cases and replaced (arguably haphazardly) with the concept 
of deference or the recognition of a “discretionary area of judgment” for decisions by 
government.62 In cases where the implication of a recognised right has called for a 
weighting exercise to be judicially conducted, courts have invoked concerns regarding 
their constitutional and institutional competence – as well as the potential polycentricity 
of resource allocation decisions – to justify resort to deference.63 Although the 
language of deference now at least partially recognises the underlying concerns for 
declining to adjudicate resource allocation decisions, it is possible that deference can 
lapse into a judicial attitude of non-justiciability. The obiter statement of the Court of 
Appeal in R (on the application of Anne Marie Rogers) v Swindon NHS Primary Care 
Trust, Secretary of State for Health64 illustrates this danger: 
 
“[T]his case would be very different if the [decision-maker] had decided that as a matter of 
policy it would adopt the Secretary of State’s guidance that applications should not be 
refused solely on the grounds of cost but that, as a hard-pressed authority with many 
competing demands on its budget, it could not disregard its financial restraints and that it 
would have regard both to those restraints and to the particular circumstances of the 
individual patient in deciding whether or not to fund ... treatment in a particular case. In such 
a case it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to say that such a policy was arbitrary or 
irrational.”65  
  
                                            
62 JA King “The Justiciability of Resource Allocation” (2007) 70 MLR 197 220-221; R v Director 
of Public Prosecutions, Ex Parte Kebeline [2000] 2 AC 326 380-381; Alconbury [2001] UKHL 
23; [2001] 2 All ER 929 paras 69-70; Brown v Stott [2001] 2 WLR 817 834-835. See also P 
Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 618-621. 
63 Donoghue v Poplar Housing & Regeneration Community Association Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 
595 para 69. 
64 [2006] EWCA Civ 392, [2006] 2 WLR 2649. 
65 Para 58 (emphasis added).  
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(b) Defining the boundaries of legitimate judicial intervention  
 
An overriding awareness of parliamentary sovereignty and the circumscribed role of 
the judiciary has often manifested itself in attempts to draw bright line divisions 
between law (on which courts may pronounce and to which the judiciary is itself subject 
to) and politics (which are best left to the “legitimate” branches of government). Thus, 
where difficult choices arise between individual rights and the interests of the larger 
community,66 courts have attempted to define such cases as “political” thereby 
requiring only political – and not legal – resolution.67 Courts have even gone so far as 
to suggest that the question of when to defer – as well as the illegitimacy of the judiciary 
to pronounce on matters of resource allocation – are themselves legal principles that 
must be upheld. Seeking to justify judicial abstention from adjudication, Lord Hoffman 
stated in R (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation:68  
 
“The principles upon which decision-making powers are allocated are principles of law. The 
courts are the independent branch of government and the legislature and executive are, 
directly and indirectly respectively, the elected branches of government... The allocation of 
these decision-making responsibilities is based upon recognised principles. The principle 
that the independence of the courts is necessary for a proper decision of disputed legal 
rights or claims of violation of human rights is a legal principle. It is reflected in article 6 of 
the Convention. On the other hand, the principle that majority approval is necessary for a 
proper decision on policy or allocation of resources is also a legal principle. Likewise, when 
a court decides that a decision is within the proper competence of the legislature or 
executive, it is not showing deference. It is deciding the law.”69 
                                            
66 The European Convention and the HRA make some allowance for these types of conflicts 
through the inclusion of generally qualified (Arts 8-11 of the European Convention) and 
specifically qualified (Arts 2 and 5 of the European Convention) rights. Where these rights are 
implicated, the application of a proportionality enquiry seeks to balance conflicting interests. 
The position in the UK in respect of unqualified rights (Arts 3, 4, 6, 7 and 14 of the European 
Convention) is more controversial, but it is likely that a proportionality enquiry or some form of 
deference will be allowed to limit these rights in certain circumstances despite their unqualified 
nature. See further in this regard A Kavanagh Constitutional Review under the UK Human 
Rights Act (2009) 257-267.  
67 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 para 29: 
“The more purely political (in a broad or narrow sense) a question is, the more appropriate 
it will be for political resolution and the less likely it is to be an appropriate matter for judicial 
decision.”   
See also para 38.  
68 [2003] UKHL 23. 
69 Para 76 (emphasis added).  
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The proposition that resource allocation decisions should not be subject to judicial 
review as a matter of law holds vast implications for the institution of judicial review in 
general, and for fundamental rights in particular. Lord Steyn, writing extra-judicially, 
rightly observes the “massive sweep” of Lord Hoffman’s statement.70 He goes on to 
argue that, at most, the implication of resource distribution or policy merely constitutes 
factors to be considered when a particular decision by government is reviewed. 
However, automatic judicial abstention in these areas cannot be treated as a legal 
principle.71 Lord Hoffman’s attempted classification thus falls to be rejected.  
A judicial approach whereby the legitimacy of Parliament is used to justify deference 
endorses a perception that the institution of judicial review is, in contrast, “profoundly 
undemocratic”.72 A superficially conceived of “democratic principle” should not be 
allowed to validate the apportionment of undue weight to secondary factors, such as 
the fact that resource allocation is the subject that falls to be adjudicated. This is 
especially so given that while courts may declare a particular legislative provision to 
be inconsistent with the HRA,73 they cannot invalidate any legislation. The judiciary’s 
role is thus already inherently limited to accord with the prevalent conception of 
democracy in the UK.  
Instead of allowing justificatory arguments to dominate the judicial enquiry in the 
name of “legitimacy”, the fundamental right at stake along with the factual context of 
the case must be allowed to dictate to what level of scrutiny a particular instance of 
resource allocation is subjected. Majority approval of resource allocation decisions 
must assume a secondary role where rights are imperilled. Jowell forcefully argues this 
point: 
 
                                            
70 Lord Steyn “Deference: A Tangled Story” (2005) PL 346 357.  
71 357. 
72 Alconbury [2001] UKHL 23; [2001] 2 All ER 929 para 60; see also S Fredman “From 
Deference to Democracy: the Role of Equality under the Human Rights Act 1998” (2006) LQR 
53 56. For the argument that the “democratic ideal” has little relevance where judges exercise 
their law-making function in resource allocation cases, see M Chamberlain “Democracy and 
Deference in Resource Allocation Cases: A Riposte to Lord Hoffman” (2003) JR 12 19. 
73 S 4 of the HRA. R Clayton “Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’: The Legitimacy 
of Judicial Intervention under the Human Rights Act 1998” (2004) PL 33 46 argues that where 
a court declares legislation to be incompatible with the HRA in terms of s 4 of the Act, an 
opportunity for dialogue between the courts and the legislature is created.  
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“No longer can we equate ‘democratic principle’ with ‘majority approval’. Nor can we any 
longer arrogate the monopoly of legitimacy to those decisions endorsed by the electorate. 
The new expectations have at their heart the protection of a limited but significant catalogue 
of rights even against overwhelming popular will ... The courts are charged by Parliament 
with delineating the boundaries of a rights-based democracy. In doing so, they ought not in 
any way to be influenced by the fact that Parliament may in the end disregard their 
pronouncements. Nor should they prefer the authority of Parliament or other bodies on the 
ground alone that they represent the popular will, or are directly or indirectly accountable to 
the electorate.”74 
 
Legitimacy-based concerns should therefore yield to the judicial responsibility to 
serve as catalyst for public discussion regarding the content and weighting of rights 
and the review of resource allocation decisions.75 This is especially apposite when 
government inaction in respect of resource allocation is taken into account.76 By 
reconceiving courts as a supplemental space in which deliberative democracy can be 
practised, substantive judgments can spur subsequent debate.77 Moreover, courts can 
ensure that the allocative decisions that enable the flourishing of capabilities are 
themselves reached through deliberative processes.78 In this way, courts can reinforce 
a dialogic conception of democracy instead of detracting therefrom.  
 
(c) Coming to terms with institutional limitations  
 
Concerns based on the institutional competence of courts to review complex and 
polycentric cases are better founded than those based on legitimacy. Thus, in 
Donoghue v Poplar Housing & Regeneration Community Association Ltd79 (“Poplar”) 
the court stated: 
 
                                            
74 J Jowell “Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity?” (2003) PL 592 597. 
75 For the responsibility of the judiciary to serve as a platform and catalyst for public reasoning 
in terms of a capabilities approach to adjudication under a transformative constitution, see 
further chapter two part 2 4 3 above.  
76 M Chamberlain “Democracy and Deference in Resource Allocation Cases: A Riposte to Lord 
Hoffman” (2003) JR 12 18-19.  
77 See further chapter two parts 2 4 3 and 2 4 4 above.  
78 S Fredman Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (2008) 105-
109; P Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 24-25.  
79 [2001] EWCA Civ 595. 
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“The economic and other implications of any policy in [the area of housing] are extremely 
complex and far-reaching. This is an area where, in our judgment, the courts must treat the 
decisions of Parliament as to what is in the public interest with particular deference...”80 
 
Whereas courts may rightly acknowledge their institutional limitations, automatic 
resort to deference as a legal principle where resource allocation decisions that impact 
on rights are at issue, is ill-advised. Deference is an exceedingly vague concept.81 
Ultimately, courts cannot shirk from the task of interpreting and enforcing rights, even 
where resource allocation decisions stand to be reviewed.82 In some instances, judicial 
review may result in better-reasoned evaluations that can pave the way for more 
meaningful debate regarding the content of rights and the resources necessary to 
realise them. Chamberlain argues thus: 
 
“In many if not most cases, the choice is between an allocation which is the outcome of a 
principled judicial decision and one which is justified by parliamentary inaction, itself the 
result of a filibuster, the sudden emergence of a more pressing issue or (most likely) a 
simple lack of interest on the part of Parliamentarians.”83 
 
Instead of relinquishing the inherently judicial function of interpreting rights through 
substantive review, courts should instead acknowledge the advantages of judicial 
review and seek to mitigate the disadvantages thereof. A court is able to focus on areas 
of government action that may be detrimental to the realisation of rights and 
burgeoning capabilities, while requiring the widest practicable spectrum of evidence to 
be placed before it. Moreover, courts are an excellent forum in which accountability 
can be fostered. By demanding explicit reasoning from government parties, a culture 
of justification can be facilitated. Importantly, whereas complex disputes are often 
proffered as justification for a deferential approach, “their very complexity might make 
it even more important to reinforce the duty of explanation” where fundamental 
capabilities are at stake.84  
Where the structure of UK courts and the procedural rules governing an adversarial 
process exacerbate concerns of institutional competence, it should be remembered 
                                            
80 Para 69 (emphasis added). See also Alconbury [2001] UKHL 23; [2001] 2 All ER 929 para 
60.  
81 J Jowell “Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity?” (2003) PL 592 599. 
82 598-599.  
83 M Chamberlain “Democracy and Deference in Resource Allocation Cases: A Riposte to Lord 
Hoffman” (2003) JR 12 19 (emphasis added).  
84 S Fredman Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (2008) 103.  
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that the prevalent institutional structure is capable of adaptation, as is evident from the 
analysis below of the Indian legal system.85 What should emerge clearly is that if a 
strategy of deference – a concept that is inscrutably vague86 – is succumbed to 
reflexively, unprincipled judgments will result while little will be done to develop 
mechanisms that can help mitigate institutional limitations.  
 
(d) Renouncing a theory of deference: a non-doctrinalist approach  
 
Given the stifling effect that reflexive resort to deference can exercise on 
capabilities-based jurisprudence, should the quest for a coherent theory of deference 
be abandoned? Allan forcefully argues that it should, perceiving deference as a (poor) 
substitute for searching, context-driven scrutiny of rights-based claims.87 For Allan, any 
degree of latitude that should be afforded to Parliament or the executive can only be 
discovered through context-sensitive judicial analysis, and is therefore internal to a 
balancing enquiry and the “ordinary principles of administrative law”.88  
Moreover, Allan rightly observes that no judgment where rights are implicated can 
be value neutral. To defer to the decision of a different branch of government based 
purely on the identity of the decision-maker is in no way a neutral judicial choice.89 
Instead, Allan advocates an approach whereby the justificatory arguments proffered 
by other branches of government – and not the unexamined expertise of those 
branches – are permitted to persuade the court.90 Thus, even in highly complex cases, 
a presumption of deference must be rejected in favour of coherent argument and 
explanation:91 
 
“The allocation of scarce resources is a matter for which primary responsibility must lie with 
the political branches of government; but any complaint of illegality must be examined on 
its own terms. If it is alleged that financial resources are so unevenly distributed between 
                                            
85 100.  
86 JA King “The Justiciability of Resource Allocation” (2007) 70 MLR 197 221-223. 
87 TRS Allan “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of Due Deference” (2006) 65 
Cambridge LJ 671.  
88 676; TRS Allan “Judicial Deference and Judicial Review: Legal Doctrine and Legal Theory” 
(2011) 127 LQR 96 112, 115.  
89 TRS Allan “Human Rights and Judicial Review: A Critique of Due Deference” (2006) 65 
Cambridge LJ 671 683.  
90 689.  
91 691.  
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competing claimants that the unfairness amounts to the breach of constitutional rights, the 
distribution must be judicially considered in the context of the rights at issue. It is likely that 
any unfairness would have to be grave in order to amount to a constitutional wrong; but the 
court would have to confront the relevant questions of law. To dismiss such claims as a 
matter of discretion, where the allegations were plausible, would be to render the rights in 
question non-justiciable – rights without any remedy for infringement.”92 
 
Furthermore, Allan’s non-doctrinalist approach circumvents the potential for double 
counting deference. As Young’s work demonstrates, deference is an inherently vague 
concept and is susceptible to a multitude of classifications.93 This plethora of 
conceptualisations can easily lead a court, relatively unfamiliar with rights-based 
review, to misapply or over-apply a doctrine of deference. This can happen when a 
court resorts to deference both in deciding to adopt a lighter level of scrutiny for 
reviewing government conduct and by subsequently resorting to deference in actually 
applying the selected level of scrutiny. Moreover, deference can be applied thrice if a 
court resorts thereto at remedial level. In the UK context, this could happen when a 
court decides whether to interpret a statute to comply with rights obligations or to 
declare the statute incompatible with the relevant right.94  
Instead of becoming lost in the confusing landscape of deference, it will be argued 
in later chapters that concerns related to institutional competence and polycentricity 
can thus rather be considered during the weighting exercise and accommodated at 
remedial level.95 Preferably, deference should be replaced with participatory remedies 
that recognise the aptitude of government bodies and involve government in the 
implementation of remedial programmes.96 Although the scope for designing 
innovative remedies is limited in the UK, a court can arguably facilitate dialogue by 
declaring legislation incompatible with Convention rights in terms of section 4 of the 
HRA, thereby catalysing legislative change without entering into the domain of law-
making itself.97 Furthermore, where administrative action infringes a recognised right 
                                            
92 693.  
93 AL Young “In Defence of Due Deference” (2009) 72 MLR 554.   
94 In terms of ss 3 and 4 of the HRA. See also AL Young “In Defence of Due Deference” (2009) 
72 MLR 554 577.  
95 Chapters five and six, respectively.  
96 See chapter six part 6 3 below.  
97 R Clayton “Judicial Deference and ‘Democratic Dialogue’: The Legitimacy of Judicial 
Intervention under the Human Rights Act 1998” (2004) PL 33 46; F Klug “Judicial Deference 
under the Human Rights Act 1998” (2003) LSE 1 7-8 
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/humanRights/articlesAndTranscripts/Judicial_deference_under_HRA1
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in terms of the HRA, courts retain remedial discretion to make an order it considers 
“just and appropriate”,98 which can arguably include participatory administrative 
remedies.99 In this way, weighting exercises that accord primary importance to the 
rights at stake can be conducted, thus moving the UK closer to a capabilities approach 
to adjudication.  
 
3 2 3 3 A rigid division of rights 
 
In the previous chapter, it was shown that the deprivation of basic socio-economic 
capabilities can undermine the achievement of more complex functionings, including 
those related to meaningful social, political and economic participation.100 Socio-
economic capabilities and civil and political capabilities interact on the level of resource 
allocation, since resources must be allocated to ensure basic capabilities, without 
which participation in other spheres of life is not possible. Equally, through political 
participation, adequate resources can be identified and allocated to socio-economic 
capabilities. Socio-economic and civil and political capabilities are therefore 
inextricably related to each other.  
Whereas the Indian Constitution explicitly recognises the importance of socio-
economic capabilities in its Directive Principles of State Policy,101 the UK maintains a 
rigid distinction between non-recognised socio-economic rights, on the one hand, and 
legislatively sanctioned civil and political rights, on the other. This distinction 
constitutes another consequence of the normative assumption that underlies the 
institution of judicial review in the UK, which calls for critical comparative assessment. 
In A v Secretary of State for the Home Department,102 the House of Lords reinforced 
                                            
998.pdf> (accessed 06-02-2014). But see A Kavanagh Constitutional Review under the UK 
Human Rights Act (2009) 128-132.  
98 S 8 of the HRA. 
99 For the controversy surrounding administrative remedial discretion even where an 
administrative act is held to be invalid and thus void ab initio, see C Forsyth “The Rock and the 
Sand: Jurisdiction and Remedial Discretion” (2013) Social Science Research Network 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2317277> (accessed 05-09-2014). 
100 See chapter two part 2 2 2 1 and parts 2 4 1 to 2 4 3 above. 
101 The Directive Principles of State Policy are used to interpret the rights enshrined in part III 
of the Indian Constitution. See further part 3 3 below.  
102 [2004] UKHL 56. 
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this distinction when it relegated “matters of economic or social policy” to the category 
of disputes which questionably call for a priori deference.103  
  
3 2 3 3 1 An implicit recognition of basic capabilities  
 
Despite this unsound distinction, UK courts have on occasion interpreted 
Convention rights to include the provision of minimum subsistence. In R (Adam and 
Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department104 (“Limbuela”) the House of 
Lords had to decide when the Secretary of State became obliged to provide support 
such as accommodation and welfare benefits to asylum seekers, even where a claim 
for asylum had not been made as soon as reasonably practicable after arrival in the 
UK as required by relevant legislation.105 In terms of the Nationality, Immigration and 
Asylum Act, 2002, the Secretary of State became obliged to provide support to late 
applicants for asylum where the provision of support would prevent the breach of the 
applicants’ Convention rights.106 In casu, the Secretary of State’s duty not to violate 
Article 3 of the Convention,107 which prohibits “inhuman or degrading treatment”, was 
therefore at issue.   
The Court implicitly recognised the basic capabilities at stake,108 and the suffering 
that would result if asylum seekers were deprived of such capabilities. Moreover, the 
Court acknowledged (without using capabilities terminology) the heterogeneity of 
circumstances that could aggravate capability deprivation or hamper the conversion of 
basic capabilities into the functioning of leading minimally dignified lives. In determining 
                                            
103 Para 108. This dichotomous approach led the court in Donoghue v Poplar Housing & 
Regeneration Community Association Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 595 to fail to examine the 
justifiability of possession orders that could arguably amount to arbitrary eviction in 
contravention of the right to have one’s home respected (in terms of Art 8 of the European 
Convention). As Fredman points out, the Court of Appeal in casu conflated the duty not to 
interfere with the exercise of the right (for example, by means of eviction) with the resource 
intensive duty to provide housing. S Fredman “From Deference to Democracy: the Role of 
Equality under the Human Rights Act 1998” (2006) LQR 53 58. 
104 [2005] UKHL 66, [2006] 1 AC 396. 
105 The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002.  
106 R (Adam and Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66, 
[2006] 1 AC 396 para 5.  
107 Art 3 states:  
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 
108 Although the Court did not use capabilities terminology.  
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whether the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment had been 
violated by denying subsistence support to asylum seekers, Lord Bingham stated: 
 
“When does the Secretary of State’s duty [to provide subsistence support to asylum 
seekers] under section 55(5)(a) [of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, 2002] 
arise? The answer must in my opinion be: when it appears on a fair and objective 
assessment of all relevant facts and circumstances that an individual applicant faces an 
imminent prospect of serious suffering caused or materially aggravated by denial of shelter, 
food or the most basic necessities of life. Many factors may affect that judgment, including 
age, gender, mental and physical health and condition, any facilities or sources of support 
available to the applicant, the weather and time of year and the period for which the 
applicant has already suffered or is likely to continue to suffer privation.”109 
 
The Court thus adopted a holistic and context-sensitive approach congruent with a 
capabilities-based method of review. Moreover, the Court noted that the duty on 
government not to subject anyone to inhuman or degrading treatment could amount to 
a positive duty to act, marshal resources and provide support to asylum seekers.110 
Importantly, in applying a test to determine whether the treatment in question was 
severe enough to constitute “inhuman or degrading” treatment, the Court dismissed 
the court a quo’s analysis according to which the test would be more exacting if the 
treatment resulted from “legitimate government policy”.111  
Nevertheless, the Court was careful to circumscribe the duty to apply only where 
the imposition of a statutory regime had itself led to the deprivation of means of 
generating subsistence.112 Thus, Article 3 of the Convention was interpreted as not 
imposing a duty to provide minimum support to all those who may be in socio-economic 
need: 
 
“It is not the function of article 3 to prescribe a minimum standard of social support for those 
in need ... That is a matter for the social legislation of each signatory state. If individuals find 
themselves destitute to a degree apt to be described as degrading the state’s failure to give 
them the minimum support necessary to avoid that degradation may well be a shameful 
reproach to the humanity of the state and its institutions but, in my opinion, does not without 
more engage article 3.”113 
                                            
109 R (Adam and Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66, 
[2006] 1 AC 396 para 8. See further paras 9, 59, 71 and 78.  
110 Para 47.  
111 Para 55.  
112 Paras 66-67. 
113 Para 66.  
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It follows that although the judgment in Limbuela is laudable, it has not gone far 
enough to ensure that the socio-economic capabilities and well-being of those residing 
in the UK can be ensured for all – even where resources must be allocated to do so. 
Furthermore, despite being progressive, Limbuela nevertheless again illustrates the 
judiciary’s tendency to draw rigid distinctions between political and legal issues.114  
 
3 2 3 3 2 Using the Equality Act to challenge resource allocation  
 
Government resource allocation decisions that impact deleteriously on socio-
economic capabilities have also been challenged through the mechanisms of the 
Equality Act, 2010.115 Relying on the duty on public entities to have “due regard” to 
                                            
114 Lord Hope drew this distinction forcefully: 
“The question whether, and if so in what circumstances, support should be given at the 
expense of the state to asylum-seekers is, of course, an intensely political issue. No-one 
can be in any doubt about the scale of the problem caused by the huge rise in the numbers 
of asylum-seekers that has occurred during the past decade due to the fact that more and 
more people are in need of international protection. There is a legitimate public concern that 
this country should not make its resources too readily available to such persons while their 
right to remain in this country remains undetermined. There are sound reasons of policy for 
wishing to take a firm line on the need for applications for asylum to be made promptly and 
for wishing to limit the level of support until the right to remain has been determined, if and 
when support has to be made available... It is important to stress at the outset, however, 
that engagement in this political debate forms no part of the judicial function. The function 
which your Lordships are being asked to perform is confined to that which has been given 
to the judges by Parliament.”  
R (Adam and Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66, [2006] 
1 AC 396 paras 13-14 (emphasis added). See further Baroness Hale’s statement that “we are 
respecting, rather than challenging, the will of Parliament” (para 75).  
115 S 1 of the Equality Act, which deals with public sector duties regarding socio-economic 
inequalities, has not been brought into force. Government Equalities Office “Equality Act 2010: 
Guidance” (2013) UK Government <https://www.gov.uk/equality-act-2010-guidance> 
(accessed 04-08-2015) indicates that “government has decided not to take forward… [the] 
public sector duty regarding socio-economic inequalities”. Reliance has thus been placed on 
s 149 of the Act, which reads, in part: 
“149 Public sector equality duty 
(1) A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to -  
(a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is 
prohibited by or under this Act; 
(b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected 
characteristic and persons who do not share it; 
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equality considerations, severe budget cuts falling under the umbrella of “austerity 
measures” have been brought under review.  
In R (on the application of Harjula) v London Councils,116 the Court stressed that the 
standard of “due regard” should be stringently applied where a large group of 
vulnerable persons was detrimentally impacted by a funding decision. Similarly, in R 
(on the application of Meany, Glynn and Sanders) v Harlow District Council,117 
although a significant budget cut for welfare services was not in itself held to be 
irrational, a failure to have “due regard” to criteria set out in discrimination legislation 
resulted in the Court quashing the said budgetary cuts. In R (on the application of W) 
v Birmingham City Council118 it was held that, prior to a funding cut, it was incumbent 
on the decision-making body to consider whether the impact of a budgetary cut on 
disabled persons would be so draconian so as to compel the decision-making body to 
find additional resources “even if they had to come from other budgets or from 
reserves”.119 
Although these cases therefore grappled with the lawfulness of allocative choices 
that impacted negatively on socio-economic capabilities, an approach whereby such 
engagement must be found in the weak requirements of the Equality Act is not ideal. 
Fredman pertinently observes the serious difficulties inherent in this approach: 
 
“The equality duties are... a fragile platform from which to launch these attacks. First, 
success is unpredictable, and when it comes, potentially unfulfilling... Provided the public 
body has given due consideration to the protected group, the duty is fulfilled. This might 
have the perverse effect of legitimizing cuts. Second, many of the cases have capitalized 
on the significant overlap between socio-economic disadvantage and gender, race or 
disability… The risk is that the duty gives priority to groups who can congregate under a 
‘status’ label to the detriment of those living in poverty more generally. Ultimately, the due 
regard standard cannot produce more funding: at most it can prompt a reconsideration of 
priorities among those competing for reduced resources. This means that the duty could 
well give rise to conflicts between status groups and other poor and disadvantaged groups, 
redistributing poverty without redistributing wealth.”120  
                                            
(c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and 
persons who do not share it.” 
116 [2011] EWHC 448. 
117 [2009] EWHC 559. 
118 [2011] EWHC 1147 (Admin). 
119 Para 180.  
120 S Fredman “Breaking the Mold: Equality as a Proactive Duty” (2012) 60 Am J Comp L 
265 282.  
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Thus, it is imperative that substantive review that recognises the critical importance 
of socio-economic capabilities in their own right – and engages with resource allocation 
decisions on this basis – is developed.  
 
3 2 3 3 3 The “manifestly without reasonable justification” test in welfare benefits 
cases  
 
Litigants have also attempted to challenge allocative decisions pertaining to welfare 
benefits by relying directly on the HRA. Usually, the proportionality test applied under 
the HRA in terms of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
demands strong justification for discrimination in respect of a Convention right.121 This 
would be the case where a policy aimed at the realisation of civil and political rights is 
at issue. However, a different justificatory standard is applied where general social and 
economic strategy is challenged.122  
In the recent judgment of R (on the application of SG and others (previously JS and 
others)) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,123 the introduction of a welfare 
benefits cap was challenged on the basis that it discriminated against women, since 
most single parent households affected by the cap were headed by women.124 The 
Convention right to which the discrimination allegedly pertained was Article 1 of the 
First Protocol to the Convention, which protects the right to property. Government 
sought to justify the introduction of the cap, and hence the discrimination, on the basis 
of its socio-economic policy aimed at limiting the public funding of welfare benefits, 
incentivising work and decreasing public expenditure.125  
                                            
121 In Stec v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 1017 the European Court of Human Rights 
explained that a difference in treatment will amount to discrimination if “it has no objective and 
reasonable justification; in other words, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if there is not 
a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought 
to be realised” (para 51). The Court went on to state that “very weighty reasons” would have 
to be proffered for discrimination based on sex (para 52), but that a different test applies in 
respect of matters of general social or economic policy (para 52).  
122 Stec v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 1017 para 52; Humphreys v Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners [2012] UKSC 18 para 16.  
123 [2015] UKSC 16. 
124 Paras 1-2; Art 14 of the European Convention.   
125 R (on the application of SG and others (previously JS and others)) v Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16 para 4.  
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The majority of the Supreme Court was quick to reaffirm the wide margin of 
appreciation granted by the European Court of Human Rights to national authorities in 
discrimination cases where general socio-economic strategy was concerned.126 Thus, 
it was held, that whereas discrimination based on sex would normally require weighty 
reasons of justification, discrimination would only breach a Convention right in welfare 
benefits cases where it was found to be “manifestly without reasonable justification”.127 
The majority of the Court applied a proportionality test as between the socio-economic 
policy aims of government and the means employed to achieve the aims,128 and 
concluded that the benefits cap did not amount to discrimination in contravention of 
Article 14 of the Convention.129  
Importantly, the majority per Lord Reed was at pains to emphasise that since the 
proportionality analysis involved issues of socio-economic policy and public 
expenditure, “due weight” was to be accorded to the decisions of the democratically 
elected institutions whose pre-eminent function was to make determinations on those 
issues.130 Deference based on constitutional and institutional competence concerns 
therefore again elided a capabilities approach to adjudication in terms of which the 
weighting of the capabilities of the litigants should determine the standard of scrutiny 
applied to the government’s justificatory arguments for introducing the welfare benefits 
cap.  
The factual context of the appellants was only considered in the dissenting judgment 
delivered by Lady Hale.131 Significantly, Lady Hale acknowledged that the benefits cap 
did not take into account varying family sizes of single parent families, and that a 
purported aim of the cap was not to limit family size or penalise large families.132 
                                            
126 Stec v United Kingdom (2006) 43 EHRR 1017, confirmed by the UK Supreme Court in 
Humphreys v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2012] UKSC 18. 
127 R (on the application of SG and others (previously JS and others)) v Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16 para 11; Humphreys v Revenue and Customs 
Commissioners [2012] UKSC 18 paras 16-21. The “manifestly without reasonable justification” 
test was formulated by the European Court of Human Rights for discrimination cases in the 
context of State parties’ general social and economic policy; see Stec v United Kingdom (2006) 
43 EHRR 1017 para 52.  
128 R (on the application of SG and others (previously JS and others)) v Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16 paras 67-77.  
129 Paras 96 (per Lord Reed), 133 (per Lord Carnwath), 134 (per Lord Hughes).  
130 Paras 92-93.  
131 Paras 169-177. 
132 Para 190.  
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Although accepting the applicability of the “manifestly without reasonable foundation” 
test, Lady Hale reiterated her sentiments in a previous judgment to the effect that the 
test did not obviate the need to carefully scrutinise the justificatory arguments proffered 
by government.133 Lady Hale concluded that the best interests of the affected children 
had not been sufficiently taken into account,134 and that depriving single mothers of 
basic subsistence through the discriminatory implementation of the cap was not a 
proportionate means of achieving the government’s socio-economic policy aims.135  
Lord Kerr reinforced Lady Hale’s opinion in a second dissenting judgment, regarding 
the effect of the cap (ie the deprivation of adequate food, clothing, housing and warmth) 
as antithetical to the best interests of children.136 The fact that a consideration of the 
appellants’ lived reality led to a conclusion that differed materially from that reached by 
the majority of the Court highlights the importance of adopting a capabilities approach 
to the adjudication of allocative decisions. In terms of such an adjudicative approach, 
the context of the case at hand should always play a significant role in courts’ 
decisions.  
An overarching presumption that Parliament and the executive intend to uphold the 
rule of law forms a cornerstone of the UK’s unwritten constitution.137 Where deference-
related distinctions between civil and political rights and socio-economic rights are 
allowed to erode the protection of fundamental values such as freedom and dignity, 
                                            
133 Para 210, referring to Humphreys v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2012] UKSC 
18 para 22.  
134 Lady Hale and Lord Kerr both found that the UK’s international obligations in terms of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child GA Res 44/25, 20 November 1989 should be taken 
into account in interpreting the rights enshrined in the European Convention and in order to 
determine whether discrimination in terms of those rights was justified (see especially R (on 
the application of SG and others (previously JS and others)) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2015] UKSC 16 paras 211-229 per Lady Hale and para 269 per Lord Kerr). Lord 
Carnwath found that the regulations pertaining to the benefits cap were not compatible with 
the duty to consider the best interests of the child (para 128) but that owing to the UK’s dualist 
system in respect of international law, this was an issue that had to be resolved by the political 
– and not the legal – system (para 133). Lord Hughes (para 155) found that the best interests 
of children had been taken into account, whereas Lord Reed held that the question was not 
relevant to an enquiry regarding discrimination against women (para 89).  
135 R (on the application of SG and others (previously JS and others)) v Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions [2015] UKSC 16 paras 227-229.  
136 Para 269.  
137 TRS Allan “Parliament’s Will and the Justice of the Common Law: The Human Rights Act 
in Constitutional Perspective” (2006) 59 Current Legal Problems 27 44, 45.  
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the rule of law is consequently threatened. Lamentably, a rigid distinction between 
socio-economic rights and “traditional” civil and political rights, exacerbated by the 
absence of a supreme Bill of Rights138 that explicitly guarantees both sets of rights, 
hampers the substantive review of resource allocation decisions and ultimately 
prevents the judiciary from a developing a truly capabilities-infused standard of review.  
 
3 2 4 Towards a capabilities approach to adjudication: Proportionality as weighting 
 
For the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions within a capabilities 
paradigm to evolve, substantive judicial review must be coherently developed. Since 
socio-economic capabilities are not enshrined as justiciable rights in the UK, the 
danger exists that these capabilities and concomitant resource allocation decisions will 
be reviewed in terms of Wednesbury unreasonableness.  
 
3 2 4 1 Recognising socio-economic rights at common law?  
 
UK courts have, fortunately, relaxed the Wednesbury test even in some cases not 
involving fundamental rights.139 Furthermore, if the law in the UK were to develop to 
recognise vital socio-economic capabilities as rights at common law – or as forming 
part of other recognised common-law rights and values,140 related resource allocation 
decisions could be reviewed in terms of a modified Wednesbury test of “anxious 
scrutiny”.141 According to this approach, a decision that impacts gravely on a human 
right will require significant justification to be held reasonable by the reviewing court. 
The more grave the interference with a right, the more substantial such justification 
would need to be. If a resource allocation decision therefore seriously imperilled a basic 
capability such as those related to health and life, government would have to proffer 
                                            
138 It is submitted that the Joint Committee on Human Rights A Bill of Rights for the UK? 29th 
Report of Session 2007–08 (2008) 6 does not go far enough in recognising the need for 
justiciable socio-economic rights.  
139 P Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 647.  
140 This development could possibly track developments in India where a variety of socio-
economic rights have been interpreted to form part of the justiciable right to life. See part 3 3 
2 below.  
141 In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Brind [1991] UKHL 4, decided 
prior to the HRA, a test of proportionality for rights cases was required; R v Ministry of Defence, 
ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517 developed the test for anxious scrutiny in rights cases.  
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considerable explanations by way of justification for its allocative choices to survive a 
test of anxious scrutiny. Although this form of review is more in tune with a test for 
substantive reasonableness than restrictive Wednesbury review, it would nonetheless 
demand substantial groundwork for socio-economic capabilities to qualify as “rights” 
for purposes of this modified standard of review. 
 
3 2 4 2 Using proportionality as a standard head of review   
 
A more theoretically coherent and capabilities-congruent approach would be to 
apply the test for proportionality currently used for review under the HRA, as a standard 
head of review. A test for proportionality will be applied to allocative decisions in socio-
economic cases where it is possible to read socio-economic interests into the rights 
protected by the European Convention.142 If proportionality were to be applied 
uniformly, this would allow for the gradual development of a judicial approach that 
recognises the importance of socio-economic capabilities where their deprivation 
results in the impingement of fundamental values such as freedom, dignity and 
equality.143 Once such development is allowed, allocative choices with a socio-
                                            
142 Socio-economic interests can be protected through the interpretation of, for example, Art 8 
of the European Convention (right to respect of one’s private family life, including one’s home) 
or Art 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention (protection of property). Thus, in 
Manchester City Council v Pinnock [2010] UKSC 45, the UK Supreme Court accepted that 
where a local authority seeks a possession order of a person’s home, Art 8 of the Convention 
requires that a court must assess the proportionality of granting such an order (para 49). In 
drawing this conclusion, the Court accepted the reasoning of the European Court of Human 
Rights regarding the proportionality enquiry required by Art 8 of the Convention in eviction 
cases. See, inter alia, Chapman v United Kingdom (2001) 33 EHRR 399; Connors v United 
Kingdom (2005) 40 EHRR 9; McCann v United Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 40; and Kay v United 
Kingdom [2010] ECHR 1322. 
143 See TRS Allan “Parliament’s Will and the Justice of the Common Law: The Human Rights 
Act in Constitutional Perspective” (2006) 59 Current Legal Problems 27 41 for a substantive 
conception of the rule of law that includes these values. The recognition of fundamental rights 
at common law is arguably derived from these values. R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Ex Parte Daly [2001] UKHL 26 para 30: 
“[S]ome rights are inherent and fundamental to democratic civilised society. Conventions, 
constitutions, bills of rights and the like respond by recognising rather than creating them.”  
In Osborn v The Parole Board [2013] 3 WLR 1020 para 68 the Supreme Court recognised that 
specific, common-law rights derive from fundamental values such as dignity. 
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economic component will no longer attract a reflexively deferential stance from the 
judiciary.  
 
3 2 4 2 1 Proportionality as weighting   
 
In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex Parte Daly144 (“Daly”), Lord 
Steyn held that proportionality review differs materially from Wednesbury review in that 
it entails a more searching level of scrutiny. Lord Steyn’s exposition of proportionality 
as a test resonates strongly with the weighting exercise inherent in a capabilities 
approach to adjudication: 
 
“First, the doctrine of proportionality may require the reviewing court to assess the balance 
which the decision maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or 
reasonable decisions. Secondly, the proportionality test may go further than the traditional 
grounds of review inasmuch as it may require attention to be directed to the relative weight 
accorded to interests and considerations. Thirdly, even the heightened scrutiny test 
developed in R v Ministry of Defence, Ex p Smith [1996] QB 517, 554 is not necessarily 
appropriate to the protection of human rights.”145 
 
Proportionality as a standard of review is thus strikingly similar to the weighting 
exercise that occurs under the capabilities approach to prioritise capabilities and other 
competing factors. First, the rights, interests or capabilities at issue should be 
identified. Once identified, a particular weight should be ascribed to them. According 
to a capabilities-based approach to adjudication, this would demand that the content 
of the right be interpreted with reference to the capabilities such right seeks to foster 
in the relevant historical, social and factual context. Moreover, it is this first stage of the 
rights analysis that should indicate with what intensity the proportionality test should 
be applied to the allocative decision under consideration. Once this stage is completed, 
the resource allocation at issue should be adjudicated to determine whether it was 
proportionate in the light of the first, interpretative stage of the analysis.  
Craig espouses the most common manifestation of the proportionality analysis as 
follows: 
 
“i. [W]hether the measure was suitable to achieve the desired objective; 
ii. whether the measure was necessary for achieving the desired objective; and 
                                            
144 [2001] UKHL 26. 
145 Para 27 (emphasis added).  
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iii. whether it none the less imposed excessive burdens on the individual. The last part of 
this inquiry is often termed proportionality stricto sensu.”146 
 
The UK possesses no written constitution which accords constitutionally significant 
weight to certain rights.147 In those instances where a socio-economic capability is not 
regarded as a fundamental right and cannot be read into the rights protected under the 
HRA, the reviewing court will need to assign weight to the capability at stake ab initio. 
This will necessarily require substantive review. However, this is no reason to shy away 
from an exercise of substantive weighting, since “[t]he reality is that the court is 
concerned with substance and procedure in HRA cases and ordinary judicial 
review”.148 
The UK jurisprudence shows a healthy development with regards to the application 
of proportionality in respect of the review of resource allocation decisions in certain 
cases decided under the HRA. As shown above, the socio-economic capabilities 
imperilled in Limbuela led the House of Lords to reject the lack of subsistence support 
provided to destitute asylum seekers as disproportionate while recognising the need 
to impose positive duties on government in certain circumstances. In Anufrijeva v 
Southwark London Borough Council,149 although not focusing on proportionality as 
head of review, the Court similarly held that where the welfare of children hung in the 
balance, a positive duty to provide support could be read into Article 8 of the European 
Convention.150 The balancing exercise inherent in these cases should therefore be 
extended to cover all situations where a socio-economic capability may be implicated.   
                                            
146 P Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 657. Pillay argues that this test combines factors 
suggested by the South African Constitutional Court in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister 
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). A Pillay “Courts, Variable 
Standards of Review and Resource Allocation: Developing a Model for the Enforcement of 
Social and Economic Rights” (2007) 6 EHRLR 616 632. The test for reasonableness set out 
in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 45 is unmistakably a substantive one. See chapter five part 5 2 2.  
147 See P Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 658 regarding the application of proportionality 
in rights cases. For the development of proportionality to apply to positive socio-economic 
rights, in general, and resource allocation decisions in particular, see chapter five parts 5 3 1 
4 and 5 3 3 2 below.  
148 P Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 660 (emphasis added). For the proposition that 
process and substance interact, see further P Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 20.  
149 [2003] EWCA Civ 1406. 
150 The right to respect of private and family life. Likewise, in R (on the application of Razgar) 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No.2) [2004] UKHL 27; [2004] 2 AC 368 the 
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3 2 4 2 2 The structured nature of the proportionality test  
 
The desirability of utilising proportionality as a standard head of review is further 
supported by the structured nature of the proportionality analysis. The test requires 
explicitness and substantive reasoning both in the justifications proffered by 
government for its allocative decisions as well as by the court in its reasoning and 
ultimate judgment regarding whether such allocation was proportionate or not.151 Such 
explicitness is commensurate with a capabilities approach to adjudication and 
furthermore promotes a culture of justification.152 Moreover, explicitness aids the 
difficult choices that courts must make in weighting and balancing competing rights or 
capabilities – with each other, as well as against the justifications raised by 
government.153 Difficult choices obscured in implicit reasoning do little for the 
development of a coherent jurisprudence or the facilitation of subsequent public 
scrutiny of evaluative judgments.  
By employing the test of proportionality uniformly to all instances of judicial review, 
substantive review can truly develop in UK law. Furthermore, such an approach will 
eliminate the danger that vulnerable claimants who narrowly fail to frame their claims 
in terms of recognised “rights” in borderline cases, will be left with no remedy – and 
thus no justice – should their claims be scrutinised within the confines of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness.  
 
3 2 5 Conclusion  
 
The system of parliamentary sovereignty that is prevalent in the UK renders the 
development of a capabilities approach to the adjudication of government resource 
allocation decisions difficult. Since socio-economic rights are not recognised as 
justiciable rights, resource allocation decisions that impact deleteriously on socio-
economic capabilities could potentially be subjected to very light rationality review as 
                                            
House of Lords held that an “extreme” threat to the health of a potential deportee could 
contravene Art 8 of the European Convention.  
151 P Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 668.  
152 For the importance of explicitness and substantive reasoning in terms of a capabilities 
approach to adjudication, see further chapter two part 2 4 4 above. For the importance of 
explicitness in applying a capabilities-based standard of review, see chapter five part 5 4 2 3 
below.  
153 P Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 671-672.  
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manifested in Wednesbury reasonableness. An overwhelming awareness of the 
supremacy of Parliament has resulted in an overconcentration by the judiciary on its 
own constitutional and institutional incompetence to review such matters. This has, in 
turn, led the judiciary to reflexively defer to other branches of government.  
However, a deferential approach is not necessarily mandated by a system of 
parliamentary supremacy. Instead, deference emerges as a judicial mechanism to deal 
with cases where courts feel ill-equipped to adjudicate polycentric or complex matters. 
In certain instances, courts justify deference on the basis of their purported illegitimacy 
as an unelected institution to make decisions that might have far-reaching, political 
impacts. Given the already limited role of the judiciary in the UK, coupled with the 
democratic nature of judicial review that aims to protect fundamental rights, the need 
for deference on grounds of constitutional competence is questionable.154  
Furthermore, determining the need for deference based on concerns regarding 
institutional competence is not unique to a system that adheres to parliamentary 
sovereignty. Instead, it is a problem that courts in jurisdictions that apply the common-
law method grapple with even under a system of constitutional supremacy.155 A move 
towards a rights-based justification for judicial review signals an opportunity for 
substantive review to develop. If this occurs, courts may feel more empowered to 
acknowledge and interpret important socio-economic capabilities. This will, in turn, 
provide a capabilities paradigm within which government resource allocation decisions 
can be effectively adjudicated.  
One potentially viable avenue for the introduction of a capabilities approach to 
adjudication is to apply proportionality as a uniform head of review. Given the many 
parallels between the proportionality test and the weighting exercise required by the 
capabilities approach, such application could allow the normative content of the rights 
at issue to determine to what level of scrutiny a particular resource allocation decision 
should be subjected.  
The approach of the judiciary in the United Kingdom therefore highlights the need 
for the development of substantive, rights-based judicial review, while illustrating the 
shortcomings of reflexive resort to deference where important socio-economic 
capabilities are at issue.   
                                            
154 See part 3 2 3 2 2 (b) above.  
155 For example, in India and South Africa.  
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3 3 India   
 
3 3 1 Introduction 
 
India boasts an ambitious, transformative constitution.156 Compared with the South 
African Constitution,157 the Indian Constitution may be said to encompass a similar 
vision of social transformation by its inclusion of Directive Principles of State Policy158 
(“DPSP”) that were intended to facilitate a “social and economic revolution” in India.159 
The socio-economic capabilities that the DPSP aim to advance include those related 
to education, public assistance or social security, nutrition, health and an improved 
standard of living.160 However, the explicitly non-justiciable nature of the DPSP 
suggests that the constitutional framers envisaged that primary responsibility for socio-
economic transformation in India would lie with the legislative and executive branches 
of government, and not with the judiciary.161 The Indian judiciary is instead empowered 
to adjudicate matters concerning the fundamental rights set out in part III of the Indian 
Constitution. The most prominent fundamental rights that have been interpreted as 
including socio-economic capabilities are the rights to equality;162 to life;163 and to 
education.164 
                                            
156 J Kothari “Social Rights Litigation in India: Developments of the Last Decade” in D Barak-
Erez & AM Gross (eds) Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (2007) 171 174; 
P O’Connell Vindicating Socio-economic Rights: International Standards and Comparative 
Experiences (2012) 84.  
157 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
158 Part IV of the Indian Constitution and discussed further below.  
159 MP Jain “The Supreme Court and Fundamental Rights” in SK Verma & Kusum (eds) Fifty 
Years of the Supreme Court of India: Its Grasp and Reach (2000) 1 65. For similar comments, 
see J Kothari “Social Rights Litigation in India: Developments of the Last Decade” in D Barak-
Erez & AM Gross (eds) Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (2007) 171 173-
174.  
160 See generally the DPSP set out in part IV of the Indian Constitution.  
161 Art 37 of the Indian Constitution; R Abeyratne “Socioeconomic Rights in the Indian 
Constitution: Toward a Broader Conception of Legitimacy” (2014) 38 Brook J Int’l L 1 30-32. 
162 Art 14 of the Indian Constitution. 
163 Art 21. 
164 Art 21A. 
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The separation of powers doctrine is not explicitly articulated in the Indian 
Constitution but has been recognised by the Supreme Court.165 Under the separation 
of powers prevalent in India, judicial review constitutes a critical facet of India’s 
constitutional democracy: Judicial review enjoys the status of a fundamental right along 
with the other fundamental, justiciable rights set out in part III of the Indian 
Constitution.166 An infringement of a fundamental constitutional right thus triggers the 
right to judicial review.  
Given that the Indian Constitution does not contain a general limitations clause 
analogous to section 36 of the South African Constitution,167 a judicial weighting 
exercise is essential for determining whether a fundamental right has been infringed, 
and for limiting rights where appropriate. However, the wide powers granted to the 
Supreme Court in respect of the infringement of fundamental rights168 have arguably 
led to a proliferation of claims being formulated as fundamental rights claims. Thus, for 
example, constitutional adjudication is sought by framing claims in terms of 
fundamental rights even where administrative law review would ordinarily be 
available.169 Consequently, certain facets of Indian administrative law have not 
developed substantively: the restrictive test for reasonableness in administrative law 
(as distinguished from the test that prevails where fundamental rights are concerned) 
is that of Wednesbury unreasonableness.170 The implications of this trend for the 
substantive development of administrative law therefore call for further investigation.  
                                            
165 See A Nolan Children’s Socio-economic Rights, Democracy and the Courts (2011) 137 n 
13 who notes that the separation of powers doctrine in the sense of checks and balances was 
endorsed by the Court in IR Coelho (Dead) v State of Tamil Nadu 2007 2 SCC 1. For a more 
rigid view of the separation of powers doctrine that emphasises the limits of judicial review 
rather than the creation of a collaborative inter-branch relationship, see MP Oil Extraction Pvt 
Ltd v State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1982 MP 1 para 41; Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar v Union 
of India 1981 2 SCR 52 71 and BALCO Employees Union v Union of India (2002) 2 SCC 333 
Indian Kanoon <http://www.indiankanoon.org/doc/1737583/> (accessed 12-12-2012). 
166 Art 32(1) of the Indian Constitution.  
167 Certain fundamental rights in the Indian Constitution contain specific limitations. See, for 
example, art 19 which sets out certain freedoms in subs (1) and continues to limit the right in 
the remainder of the article.  
168 Art 32(2) of the Indian Constitution.  
169 See further part 3 3 3 4 below.  
170 From the well-known English decision of Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v 
Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA) 233-234. For an analysis of the development 
of this doctrine in the UK, see part 3 2 3 1 above.  
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The following part evaluates the Indian Supreme Court’s attempts to bring critical 
socio-economic capabilities into the balance where State resource allocation decisions 
fall to be adjudicated. In particular, the Court’s innovation of Public Interest Litigation 
will be critically examined. Thereafter, potential pitfalls of the Court’s approach, 
including the need for a principled approach to deference and substantive development 
of administrative law, will be identified and critically analysed.  
 
3 3 2 A capabilities-infused framework and approach  
 
3 3 2 1 Bringing socio-economic capabilities into the balance 
 
Justiciable fundamental rights, including the right to equality171 and the right to life,172 
are contained in part III of the Indian Constitution, whereas non-justiciable DPSP are 
included in part IV thereof.173 Muralidhar states in this regard that the division between 
justiciable rights and DPSP was introduced as a “compromise” between those who felt 
that DPSP were not capable of enforcement as rights and those who emphasised the 
social agenda incorporated within the Indian Constitution.174 However, consensus 
seems to exist that whereas the inclusion of non-justiciable DPSP may have been 
aimed at limiting the courts’ power to pronounce on socio-economic justice,175 the 
DPSP were not intended to be of less importance than the fundamental rights. 
Although this divide could be explained by an admiration for a Westminster model of 
democracy that advocates minimal interference with the legislature,176 the DPSP were 
nonetheless directed at precipitating significant social transformation by way of State 
                                            
171 Art 14 of the Indian Constitution.  
172 Art 21.  
173 Art 37 states: 
“The provisions contained in this Part shall not be enforceable by any court, but the 
principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country 
and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.” 
174 S Muralidhar “India: The Expectations and Challenges of Judicial Enforcement of Social 
Rights” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and 
Comparative Law (2008) 102 103-104.  
175 P O’Connell Vindicating Socio-economic Rights: International Standards and Comparative 
Experiences (2012) 85. 
176 SP Sathe Judicial Activism in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits (2003) 3. 
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action.177 The Supreme Court initially displayed some ambivalence regarding the 
relationship between the fundamental rights and the DPSP. Legislative efforts at social 
reform were thwarted by the Court, which apparently regarded fundamental rights as 
superior to the DPSP.178 However, the Court gradually came to recognise the 
“complementary and supplementary”179 nature of fundamental rights and the DPSP.180  
The capabilities approach to adjudication that is advocated throughout this 
dissertation requires that the social goals at which the DPSP aim should infuse any 
enquiry regarding State resource allocation decisions that impact upon a fundamental 
right. If the fundamental rights are the means through which the ends embodied by the 
DPSP are attained,181 sufficient resources should be efficiently spent on facilitating the 
realisation of such ends. The DPSP similarly illuminate what capabilities were regarded 
as important enough to merit constitutional recognition, even if not susceptible to 
adjudication.  
The justiciable rights contained in part III of the Indian Constitution thus created the 
initial focal space and partial ordering in which a weighting exercise can take place to 
further prioritise competing capabilities and concomitant resource allocation.182 
                                            
177 See SP Singh “Constitutionalization and Realization of Human Rights in India” in CR Kumar 
& K Chockalingam (eds) Human Rights, Justice and Constitutional Empowerment 2 ed (2010) 
26 32-33 who argues that the judiciary, as opposed to the executive and legislature, is most 
often guilty of misunderstanding the redistributive spirit of the Constitution. Singh asserts that 
the various constitutional amendments seeking to harmonise the relationship between 
fundamental rights and DPSP so as not to subordinate the latter to the former, relay the 
message that “the positive obligations of the state cannot be taken less seriously than its 
negative obligations” and that in cases of conflict both types of obligations must be given equal 
effect (33).  
178 State of Madras v Champakam Dorairajan AIR 1951 SC 226. 
179 Chandra Bhavan Boarding & Lodging v The State of Mysore 1970 2 SCR 600 612.  
180 See further Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala AIR 1973 SC 1461 para 634. The Court 
in casu established that Parliament could pass constitutional amendments only when such did 
not purport to amend the “basic structure” of the Indian Constitution (the so-called “basic 
structure doctrine”). It later emerged that the basic structure included the courts’ power of 
judicial review. See also State of Kerala v NM Thomas 1976 1 SCR 906 993; Pathumma v 
State of Kerala 1978 2 SCR 537 545-547; Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India 1981 1 SCR 
206 255-256; Unni Krishnan JP v State of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 1 SCC 645.  
181 Minerva Mills Ltd v Union of India 1981 1 SCR 206 255.  
182 For an analysis of how the weighting exercise demanded by the capabilities approach can 
be incorporated into the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions, see chapter two 
part 2 3 2 above. See in particular chapter two part 2 3 2 1 for a discussion of the focal space 
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However, the DPSP import normative content into this space through the consensus it 
represents on what socio-economic capabilities are important. A court adjudicating a 
particular State resource allocation decision can thus draw from the socio-economic 
capabilities represented by the DPSP, along with the fundamental right implicated in a 
given case, in order to determine to what level of scrutiny the allocative decision should 
be subjected.  
 
3 3 2 2 Including socio-economic rights in the weighting exercise 
 
In 1978 the Supreme Court started interpreting the fundamental rights enshrined in 
the Indian Constitution widely.183 This paved the way for the development of the 
jurisprudence to recognise socio-economic rights within the fundamental rights 
enshrined in part III. The Court expanded this trend in Francis Coralie Mullin v The 
Administrator184 when it interpreted the right to life enshrined in article 21 of the Indian 
Constitution: 
 
“The fundamental right to life which is the most precious human right and which forms the 
ark of all other rights must therefore be interpreted in a broad and expansive spirit so as to 
invest it with significance and vitality which may endure for years to come and enhance the 
dignity of the individual and the worth of the human person.”185 
 
Such a broad and flexible interpretation of rights is to be welcomed. By interpreting 
a right expansively, a court does not necessarily require government to immediately 
allocate resources to achieve the complete fulfilment of the relevant right.186 The 
capabilities approach recognises that the inability to immediately realise a right does 
                                            
and partial ordering created by the inclusion of socio-economic rights and the right to just 
administrative action in the South African Constitution.  
183 Art 21 of the Indian Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or 
personal liberty except according to procedure established by law”. In Maneka Gandhi v Union 
of India 1978 2 SCR 621 626 (“Maneka Gandhi”) the Court held that such procedure must be 
“fair, just and reasonable”. 
184 1981 2 SCR 516.  
185 528. 
186 For an analysis of Sen’s response to the feasibility critique of socio-economic rights, see 
chapter two part 2 3 2 3 3 above.  
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not detract from the nature of such right.187 A right can therefore be broadly interpreted 
while flexibility is maintained to cater for changing circumstances and the concomitant 
evolution of what “reasonable” resource allocation requires.  
Importantly, the Court went on to enumerate a bundle of socio-economic interests 
(reminiscent of Nussbaum’s list of central human capabilities)188 inherent in the broadly 
construed right to life:  
 
“We think that the right to life includes the right to live with human dignity and all that goes 
along with it, namely, the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing and 
shelter and facilities for reading, writing and expressing one-self in diverse forms, freely 
moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings.”189 
 
As is apparent from the above statement by the Supreme Court, the right to human 
dignity implicates socio-economic capabilities.190 Dignity therefore informs the content 
of the right to life by identifying what socio-economic capabilities are required to live 
with dignity in a particular context. This interpretation thereby opened the door for a 
variety of socio-economic rights to be read into the right to life – or on an expansive 
reading, the right to live with dignity. The Court went on to take cognisance of the 
impact that varying degrees of national economic development would have on the right 
to live with dignity:  
 
“Of course, the magnitude and content of the components of this right would depend upon 
the extent of the economic development of the country, but it must, in any view of the matter, 
include the right to the basic necessities of life and also the right to carry on such functions 
and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the human-self. Every act which 
offends against or impairs human dignity would constitute deprivation pro tanto of this right 
to live and it would have to be in accordance with reasonable, fair and just procedure 
established by law which stands the test of other fundamental rights.”191 
                                            
187 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 384. For a discussion of how the capabilities approach 
accommodates the notion of progressive realisation, see further chapter two part 2 3 2 3 3 
above.  
188 See MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 33-34 and the discussion of the capabilities 
approach in chapter two.  
189 Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator 1981 2 SCR 516 529 (emphasis added). 
190 Similarly, the South African Constitutional Court has recognised that socio-economic rights 
will almost always implicate the right to human dignity. Government of the Republic of South 
Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 83; Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 
2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 21. 
191 Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator 1981 2 SCR 516 529 (emphasis added).  
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It transpires from the above statement that the Court envisages the level of 
economic development of a country as determining both the scope and content of the 
various socio-economic facets of the right to life. Pragmatically, economic development 
and financial constraints should be taken into account in establishing to what extent 
the right’s full realisation is presently feasible in the prevailing circumstances. However, 
slow development or inadequate resources should not determine the content of the 
right. Rather, in line with a capabilities approach to adjudication, the content of the right 
should determine what resources are made available.192 If the resources required to 
realise the content cannot reasonably be acquired and allocated, then inadequate 
resources could potentially constitute a justifiable limitation of the right – but does not 
diminish its content.  
The Court went on to hold that regardless of the level of economic development 
(and, it follows, resource constraints), the right to life “must … include the right to the 
basic necessities of life”. There is evidently a limit to the extent to which inadequate 
resources can justifiably limit a right.193 The Court’s statement is to be welcomed to the 
extent that it preserves the basic socio-economic content of the right notwithstanding 
constrained resources. However, instead of interpreting the Court’s statement as one 
that supports the minimum core approach to socio-economic rights, it should instead 
be read to require weighty justification where resource allocation does not provide for 
at least basic capability realisation.194  
By drawing from various specific DPSP as well as general principles that should 
inform State policy in terms of article 39,195 other specific socio-economic rights such 
                                            
192 See chapter two part 2 3 2 above. 
193 Even in cases where the prioritisation and ranking of capabilities are difficult, certain “non-
eliminable” principles remain. See further chapter two part 2 3 2 4 3 above.  
194 For a discussion of what the minimum core entails, and problematic aspects inherent in the 
minimum core approach and Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities, see chapter two part 2 2 
2 1 2 above.  
195 Art 39 directs that State policy should secure, inter alia, a means of livelihood for its citizens; 
the distribution of material resources so as to promote the common good; an economic system 
that does not result in the detrimental concentration of wealth; equal pay for equal work; health; 
and children’s interests. 
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as the right to shelter,196 the right to a livelihood,197 the right to health198 and the right 
to education199 have since been interpreted as forming part of the fundamental rights 
enshrined in part III.200 It follows that questions of resource allocation will often arise in 
cases where these socio-economic rights are implicated, given the fact that such rights 
require prioritisation.  
 
3 3 2 3 Promoting participation and informational broadening through Public Interest 
Litigation 
 
The right to approach the Supreme Court for a writ order where someone’s 
fundamental rights have been infringed is accorded the status of a fundamental right 
in the Indian Constitution.201 The importance of judicial review, socio-economic justice, 
and the need to ensure access to courts was evidently recognised by the drafters of 
                                            
196 As forming part of the right to life as enshrined in art 21 of the Indian Constitution: Shantistar 
Builders v Narayan Khimalal Totame AIR 1990 SC 630. In interpreting the right to life to include 
reasonable forms of shelter, the Court specifically referred to the DPSP contained in art 46, 
which directs the State to “promote with special care the educational and economic interests 
of the weaker sections of the people”. 
197 As forming part of the right to life as enshrined in art 21 of the Indian Constitution: Olga 
Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation 1985 2 SCR Supl 51. In interpreting the right to life to 
include the right to a livelihood, the Court specifically referred to the DPSP contained in arts 
39(a) (“[t]he State shall... direct its policy towards securing... that the citizens... have the right 
to an adequate means of livelihood”) and 41 (concerning the right to work, to education and to 
public assistance in certain cases). 
198 As forming part of the right to life as enshrined in art 21 of the Indian Constitution: Paschim 
Banga Khet Majoor Samity v State of West Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37. The Court did not refer 
to a particular DPSP but did allude to the duty of government in a welfare state to provide 
medical facilities. This duty is recognised in art 47 of the Indian Constitution, which directs the 
State to, inter alia, improve public health. 
199 As closely related to dignity and the right to life as enshrined in art 21 of the Indian 
Constitution: Miss Mohini Jain v State of Karnataka 1992 3 SCR 658; Unni Krishnan JP v State 
of Andhra Pradesh (1993) 1 SCC 645. The Court in both instances held that the DPSP in art 
45 amounted to a justiciable right since it contained a time limit for realisation. The Indian 
Constitution was subsequently amended to include the justiciable fundamental right to 
education in art 21A.   
200 For the need to develop the capabilities approach to recognise the interdependence of 
rights and capabilities, see chapter two part 2 3 3 3 1 above.  
201 Art 32(1) of the Indian Constitution.  
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the Indian Constitution.202 Although article 32 is widely formulated, access to justice 
remained barred for a significant portion of India’s society – the poor, vulnerable and 
indigent – for decades.203 The legacy of a colonial legal system that was individualistic 
and adversarial in nature, coupled with the poverty and lack of legal knowledge of large 
groups of the Indian population, resulted in an elitist system that largely excluded the 
poor. Moreover, the exclusionary nature of the legal system was exacerbated by 
narrow rules of standing that could not be utilised by those who were unaware of their 
constitutional rights in the first place and who in any event lacked the resources 
necessary to approach the Supreme Court for redress.204 
 
3 3 2 3 1 A novel form of litigation 
 
In order for the poor to meaningfully make use of the right to approach the Supreme 
Court where their fundamental rights had been infringed, the rules regarding locus 
standi and procedure had to be relaxed.205 In SP Gupta v President of India,206 it was 
held that anyone with a “sufficient interest” in the matter could approach the Supreme 
Court for relief.207 
                                            
202 MP Jain “The Supreme Court and Fundamental Rights” in SK Verma & Kusum (eds) Fifty 
Years of the Supreme Court of India: Its Grasp and Reach (2000) 1 3-4; V Iyer “The Supreme 
Court of India” in B Dickson (ed) Judicial Activism in Common Law Supreme Courts (2007) 1 
4; IP Massey Administrative Law 7 ed (2008) 437-438. One may also approach the Supreme 
Court in terms of art 32 where administrative action impinges upon a fundamental right. SP 
Sathe Administrative Law 5 ed (1991) 344.   
203 PN Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Colum J Transnat’l 
L 561 570. 
204 PN Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Colum J Transnat’l 
L 561 570-571; AH Desai & S Muralidhar “Public Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems” 
in BN Kirpal (ed) Supreme but not Infallible: Essays in Honour of the Supreme Court of India 
(2000) 159 161-162. 
205 PN Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Colum J Transnat’l 
L 561 570-571.  
206 1982 2 SCR 365.  
207 Para 22: 
“We would, therefore, hold that any member of the public having sufficient interest can 
maintain an action for judicial redress for public injury arising from breach of public duty [sic] 
or from violation of some provision of the Constitution or the law and seek enforcement of 
such public duty and observance of such constitutional or legal provision. This is absolutely 
essential for maintaining the rule of law, furthering the cause of justice and accelerating the 
pace of realisation of the constitutional objective.” 
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In People’s Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India208 the Supreme Court 
expounded the legally radical nature of Public Interest Litigation (“PIL”), a judge-led 
initiative that had been developed over some time:  
 
“[P]ublic interest litigation which is a strategic arm of the legal aid movement and which is 
intended to bring justice within the reach of the poor masses, who constitute the low visibility 
area of humanity, is a totally different kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional litigation 
which is essentially of an adversary character where there is a dispute between two litigating 
parties… Public interest litigation is brought before the court not for the purpose of enforcing 
the right of one individual against another as happens in the case of ordinary litigation, but 
it is intended to promote and vindicate public interest [sic] which demands that violations of 
constitutional or legal rights of large numbers of people who are poor, ignorant or in a 
socially or economically disadvantaged position should not go unnoticed and unredressed. 
That would be destructive of the Rule of Law which forms one of the essential elements of 
public interest in any democratic form of government...”209 
 
The Court justified its activism with reference to the “utter grinding poverty” that 
prevails in India.210  
Emphasising the wide language of article 32, the Supreme Court in Bandhua Mukti 
Morcha v Union of India211 held that any bona fide member of the public could now 
move the courts on behalf of another person or class of persons.212 In addition, courts 
could be moved to enforce a fundamental right by means of any “appropriate 
proceedings”: 
 
“[T]his requirement of appropriateness must be judged in the light of the purpose for which 
the proceeding is to be taken, namely, enforcement of a fundamental right.”213 
                                            
208 1983 1 SCR 456.  
209 467.  
210 468.  
211 1984 2 SCR 67. 
212 106-107. In State of Uttaranchal v Balwant Singh Chaufal JT 2010 1 SC 329 the Court 
attempted to provide guidelines regarding the use of PIL so as to try to curb abuse of the 
process. These guidelines included directions to the courts to encourage bona fide PIL 
applications while rejecting petitions filed for “extraneous considerations”. In addition, courts 
must ensure that “substantial public interest” is involved and must further prioritise petitions 
according to public interest, gravity and urgency. PIL should thus be launched in the public 
interest, and not in order to promote private interests or secure personal gain (para 198). 
213 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India 1984 2 SCR 67 107. The rules of standing had 
similarly been relaxed in the oft-coinciding field of administrative law. Standing was thus 
expanded from limiting locus standi to an “aggrieved person” to encompassing “notional injury 
standing”, “class standing” and, finally, “public concern standing”. IP Massey “Evolving 
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The right at stake should thus, initially, impact upon the procedure and litigation style 
adopted by the court. Thereafter, the right should continue to exert an influence on the 
level of scrutiny applied to the resource allocation decision in question.  
 
3 3 2 3 2 A collaborative partnership between the courts and other stakeholders  
 
The Supreme Court went even further in emphasising the important role of the 
courts, together with the petitioners and other branches of government, in securing 
critical socio-economic rights and interests: 
 
“[T]he task of restructuring the social and economic order so that the social and economic 
rights become a meaningful reality for the poor… is one which legitimately belongs to the 
legislature and the executive, but mere initiation of social and economic rescue programmes 
by the executive and the legislature would not be enough and it is only through 
multidimensional strategies including public interest litigation that these social and 
economic rescue programmes can be made effective. Public interest litigation… is 
essentially a co-operative or collaborative effort on the part of the petitioner, the State or 
public authority and the court to secure observance of the constitutional or legal rights, 
benefits and privileges conferred upon the vulnerable sections of the community and to 
reach social justice to them.”214 
 
This collaborative partnership between the legislature, executive, judiciary, and the 
petitioner as representative of vulnerable groups of society, as well as input provided 
by commissions and amici curiae, is particularly helpful in the context of the 
adjudication of State resource allocation decisions. Objections that courts are 
institutionally inept or illegitimate forums for adjudicating polycentric resource 
allocation decisions can be overcome when courts enter into a dialogue with other 
branches of government. Courts should furthermore facilitate dialogue between the 
government and vulnerable sectors of society.  
A “judicial conversation” decentres the role of the courts and facilitates an inclusive 
conversation that allows even marginalised voices to be heard.215 Through discussion 
                                            
Administrative Law Regime” in SK Verma & Kusum (eds) Fifty Years of the Supreme Court of 
India: Its Grasp and Reach (2000) 101 107-108. 
214 People’s Union for Democratic Rights v Union of India 1983 1 SCR 456 469 (emphasis 
added).  
215 S Fredman Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (2008) 133. 
See further IP Massey Administrative Law 7 ed (2008) 438 who describes PIL as a 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 139 
 
and multi-stakeholder participation, all parties can work together to arrive at a mutually 
agreed upon, reasonable resource allocation that best advances the capabilities of all 
people affected thereby. By engaging in meaningful collaboration, “the Court does not 
feel constrained to defer to government, and government does not challenge the figure 
arrived at” – instead, a capabilities-enhancing resource allocation decision can be 
formulated.216  
Participation is thus crucial for the prioritisation of capabilities and concomitant 
resource allocation. Furthermore, resources must be allocated to realise capabilities 
that enable meaningful social, economic and political participation.217 
 
3 3 2 3 3 Informational broadening through participatory mechanisms 
 
(a) Commissions and amici curiae  
 
PIL is characterised by an expansion of locus standi to facilitate access as well as 
the relaxation of procedural rules.218 Furthermore, the Court has often appointed 
commissioners or commissions where it lacked information. When adjudicating State 
resource allocation decisions, the involvement of a commission could help overcome 
concerns that courts are incompetent fora for evaluating matters of resource allocation. 
The commissions are tasked with gathering facts and submitting a quick, but detailed, 
report to the Court. Either party may dispute the content of the report by filing 
affidavits.219 Amici curiae have similarly aided the Court in verifying facts presented by 
all parties as well as in carrying the matter forward in legal terms. By making use of 
these innovative participatory mechanisms, informational broadening occurs. With a 
                                            
collaborative effort between the court, the petitioner and government with the purpose of 
making socio-economic programmes meaningful to the poor.  
216 S Fredman Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (2008) 134.  
217 For the importance of participation for a capabilities approach to adjudication under a 
transformative constitution, see chapter two part 2 4 3 above.  
218 Whereas a letter addressed to the court initially sufficed to invoke judicial review, the 
practice has become rare. Instead, after screening by the PIL cell of the court, amici curiae are 
appointed to draft petitions. SP Sathe Judicial Activism in India: Transgressing Borders and 
Enforcing Limits (2003) 206-207; AH Desai & S Muralidhar “Public Interest Litigation: Potential 
and Problems” in BN Kirpal (ed) Supreme but not Infallible: Essays in Honour of the Supreme 
Court of India (2000) 159 165.  
219 PN Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Colum J Transnat’l 
L 561 575. 
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broad informational base at its disposal, a court is able to rank and prioritise capabilities 
more effectively by incorporating a diversity of perspectives into its decisions.220  
 
(b) A non-adversarial, collaborative process  
 
An essential characteristic of PIL is its non-adversarial nature.221 Although India 
inherited an adversarial system from its British colonisers, the advent of constitutional 
supremacy paved the way for a departure from this system. This is of particular 
significance set against a backdrop of socio-economic capabilities. A collaborative 
process aimed at effectively realising these critical capabilities is more in line with a 
transformative constitution than an adversarial process where the litigant with deeper 
pockets often occupies an advantageous position. Moreover, by carving out a more 
inquisitorial role for the judiciary, it becomes better equipped to deal with polycentric 
matters. Although this may be undesirable from the perspective of those who advocate 
a rigid separation of powers, the reality of an overburdened legislature and corrupt 
executive, as well as the imperative to vindicate critical rights, justify a more activist 
approach.222  
 
(c) Monitoring agencies   
 
In line with the purpose-driven, proactive nature of PIL as opposed to an adversarial 
system, the Court has not shied away from issuing unconventional remedies. 
Commissions have also been directed to recommend appropriate remedies.223 Where 
the government has been recalcitrant in implementing them, the Court has responded 
by appointing monitoring agencies.224 The composition of the monitoring agencies is 
                                            
220 For the crucial importance of informational broadening for making social and economic 
assessments, see chapter two part 2 4 3 above.  
221 AH Desai & S Muralidhar “Public Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems” in BN Kirpal 
(ed) Supreme but not Infallible: Essays in Honour of the Supreme Court of India (2000) 
159 162-167.  
222 SP Sathe Judicial Activism in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits (2003) 
210-211.  
223 J Cassels “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the 
Impossible?” (1989) 37 Am J Comp L 495 500.  
224 PN Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Colum J Transnat’l 
L 561 575-577; J Cassels “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting 
the Impossible?” (1989) 37 Am J Comp L 495 506. For the role of monitoring or supervision in 
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flexible, and they can be comprised of judicial officers or even members of the 
executive. Importantly, the Supreme Court decided to appoint monitoring agencies in 
order to ensure effective justice to litigants and preserve the public’s trust in the 
judiciary.225 
 
3 3 2 4 Relying on crucial capabilities to justify robust adjudication of State resource 
allocation decisions 
 
The Supreme Court of India has often adopted a robust approach where State 
resource allocation decisions were at issue. This approach has encompassed the 
rejection of averred resource constraints and the issuing of resource-intensive 
orders.226 In the following part, selected judgments where important basic capabilities 
                                            
ensuring participation and accountability, see chapter six part 6 4 3 below, and, generally, C 
Rodríguez-Garavito “Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on 
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America” (2011) 89 Texas L Rev 1669.  
225 PN Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 23 Colum J Transnat’l 
L 561 577. 
226 The Supreme Court has issued monetary orders with, cumulatively, potentially far-reaching 
consequences for the public purse. Perhaps most well-known is the case of Mehta v State of 
Tamil Nadu 1996 6 SCC 756 in which the Court scrutinised the conditions of child labourers. 
The Court ordered that employers of child labourers should pay a set amount into the so-called 
“Child Labour Rehabilitation-cum-Welfare Fund”. Furthermore, the Court recognised that 
compelling the State to provide employment for as many adults as there were child labourers 
would unduly strain State resources. Therefore, the Court held that the State could make a 
contribution to the said Welfare Fund where it was unable to provide substitute adult 
employment (paras 27-30). Given the widespread nature of the problem of child labour in India, 
the Court cannot be faulted for attempting to spur employers and government into action so as 
to at least start the complex task of eradicating child labour. The Court observed that the 
financial implications of its judgment were aimed at building a “better India”. In addition, the 
Court noted that similar financial considerations had not prevented other developing countries 
from eradicating child labour (para 32). The judgment has not escaped criticism for constituting 
a breach of the separation of powers doctrine and for failing to acknowledge that projects of 
such complexity were purposefully left for the executive to deal with. (SP Sathe Judicial 
Activism in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits (2003) 250; V Iyer “The 
Supreme Court of India” in B Dickson (ed) Judicial Activism in Common Law Supreme Courts 
(2007) 24.) One must question whether to ask the Court to instead “shrug its shoulders and 
say that priorities are a matter of policy and so it is a matter for the policy-making authority” 
(Pandey v State of West Bengal 1987 2 SCR 223 242) would have been tenable where the 
rights of children were at stake. It is submitted that such a proposition cannot hold.  
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were implicated in the context of resource allocation, are analysed in order to illustrate 
the judicial approach’s congruence with a capabilities approach to adjudication. 
 
3 3 2 4 1 Health and life  
 
In Municipal Council, Ratlam v Shri Vardhichand227 the municipality had failed to 
provide adequate drainage and sanitation facilities for resident slum dwellers, thereby 
allowing a public nuisance to be created. Capabilities relating to health and life, 
necessary to achieve the functioning of living a dignified life, were therefore implicated. 
The municipality alleged that it had insufficient resources to remedy the situation. The 
Court, however, firmly rejected an attempted defence of resource constraints, holding 
that insufficient resources can never justify failure by an organ of State to perform its 
primary function: 
 
“A responsible municipal council constituted for the precise purpose of preserving public 
health and providing better finances cannot run away from its principal duty by pleading 
financial inability. Decency and dignity are non-negotiable facets of human rights and are a 
first charge on local self-governing bodies.”228 
 
The Court was fortified in its decision to issue positive directions and impose time 
limits by its observation that the municipality had chosen the route of litigation for seven 
years. During this period, the municipality could have employed the resources spent 
on the litigation to take action that would abate the public nuisance.229 Other than 
wasteful litigation and recalcitrance in fulfilling its primary duty, the implication of the 
slum dwellers’ dignity seems to have informed the Court’s robust approach.230  
The Court directed the municipality to “slim its budget on low priority items and elitist 
projects to use the savings on sanitation and public health”.231 A court should not be 
barred from perusing a budget and identifying distinctions between items with high 
priority and those with lower priority. By directing reprioritisation while leaving the 
details thereof to the government body concerned, a court can fulfil its constitutional 
                                            
227 1981 1 SCR 97.  
228 110.  
229 101; 110-112.  
230 For a discussion of the value of human dignity’s ability to identify important capabilities and 
trigger robust review of State resource allocation decisions, see further chapter two part 2 4 1 
above.  
231 Municipal Council, Ratlam v Shri Vardhichand 1981 1 SCR 97 114.  
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mandate to prevent and remedy rights violations while not itself entering into the arena 
of polycentric priority setting. A capabilities-based weighting exercise can therefore 
identify the need for the original decision-maker to revaluate its own weighting 
processes.  
 
3 3 2 4 2 Education  
 
The Court has similarly displayed a forceful approach towards the realisation of the 
fertile capability of education. In Miss Mohini Jain v State of Karnataka232 (“Mohini 
Jain”) the question at issue was whether the State could allow private educational 
institutions to charge a capitation fee for admission. A related question was whether 
the right to education constituted a fundamental right in terms of the Indian 
Constitution. At the time that judgment was given, the right to education was not prima 
facie a justiciable, fundamental right contained in part III of the Indian Constitution. It 
was, however, included in two non-justiciable DPSP in part IV of the Indian 
Constitution. The Court held that while the majority of the country remained illiterate, 
both the fundamental rights in part III and the overall objectives of the Indian 
Constitution as set out in the preamble, would remain meaningless. The fertile nature 
of education as a capability that can lead to a variety of more complex functionings 
was thus recognised.233  
The Court went on to emphasise the importance of human dignity as expressed 
through the fundamental right to life enshrined in article 21. Based on its conclusions 
regarding the critical role of education in the Indian Constitution’s vision of social 
justice, the Court held that the right to education formed part of human dignity and was 
thus concomitant to article 21.234 The Court further emphasised that government was 
constitutionally mandated “to provide educational institutions at all levels” to benefit 
Indian citizens.235  
                                            
232 1992 3 SCR 658. 
233 For the significance of “fertile” capabilities that can generate improvements in other socio-
economic areas, see chapter two part 2 3 2 2 3 above.  
234 Miss Mohini Jain v State of Karnataka 1992 3 SCR 658 667-670. 
235 670. One factor that seems to have encouraged the Court to take such a forceful stance 
was the fact that it was primarily the State’s obligation to provide education. To the extent that 
private institutions offered education, they constituted “agents” of the State, fulfilling the State’s 
obligations (672). A similar factor played a role in catalysing a robust judicial role in the South 
African High Court decisions of National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-
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Although the Court’s capabilities-infused interpretative approach can be wholly 
supported, the Court could have done more, as a second step, to determine the 
practicality of its judgment in the light of possibly strained resources. Jain states in this 
regard that “[t]he Mohini Jain ruling was hardly viable, feasible and tenable, for no state 
currently has the financial wherewithal to meet the public demand for professional 
colleges”.236  
In Unni Krishnan JP v State of Andhra Pradesh237 (“Unni Krishnan”), the Court had 
the opportunity to reassess its far-reaching decision in Mohini Jain. Unni Krishnan 
again dealt with the limit of capitation fees charged by professional colleges. The Court 
held that the ratio in Mohini Jain was correct to the extent that it held that the right to 
education was indeed implicit in article 21. However, the Court went on to limit the 
content of the right to education, thereby overruling Mohini Jain to the degree that that 
judgment had implied an unqualified right to education at all levels.238 Based on the 
text of the DPSP in articles 41 and 45,239 the Court held that the right to education was 
unqualified for citizens between the ages of seven and fourteen. Thereafter, the right 
                                            
Governmental Organisations v MEC for Social Development (1719/2010) [2010] ZAFSHC 73 
(5 August 2010); National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental 
Organisations v MEC for Social Development (1719/2010) [2011] ZAFSHC 84 (9 June 2011); 
National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v MEC 
for Social Development, Free State (1719/2010) [2013] ZAFSHC 49 (28 March 2013); National 
Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v Member of the 
Executive Council for Social Development, Free State (1719/2010) [2014] ZAFSHC 127 (28 
August 2014) and Assosiasie van Welsynsorganisasies en Organisasies Sonder 
Winsoogmerk v Die LUR vir Maatskaplike Ontwikkeling van die Provinsie Vrystaat 2003 JDR 
0112 (O). 
236 MP Jain “The Supreme Court and Fundamental Rights” in SK Verma & Kusum (eds) Fifty 
Years of the Supreme Court of India: Its Grasp and Reach (2000) 1 32. 
237 1993 1 SCR 594.  
238 654-655. 
239 Art 41 of the Indian Constitution states: 
“The State shall, within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make effective 
provision for securing the right to work, to education and to public assistance in cases of 
unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement, and in other cases of undeserved want.” 
(Emphasis added). 
Art 45 of the Indian Constitution states: 
“The State shall endeavour to provide, within a period of ten years from the commencement 
of this Constitution, for free and compulsory education for all children until they complete 
the age of fourteen years.” (Emphasis added).  
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was circumscribed by the economic capacity and development of the State.240 The 
Court noted that article 45 was the only DPSP that contained a time limit for its 
achievement – in casu, ten years, which had long since passed: 
 
“Does not the passage of 44 years, more than four times the period stipulated in Article 45 
convert the obligation created by the article into an enforceable right? In this context, we 
feel constrained to say that allocation of available funds to different sectors of education in 
India discloses an inversion of priorities indicated by the Constitution… What has actually 
happened is more money is spent and more attention is directed to higher education than 
to and at the cost of primary education.”241  
 
While adopting a more moderate approach than that apparent in Mohini Jain, the 
Court nevertheless did not shy away from adjudicating the State’s prioritisation of 
resource allocation.242 Again, it was the Court’s focus on the capability and the rights 
it imbues with content that allowed it to adopt a robust yet prudent approach to the 
adjudication of resource allocation decisions.  
 
3 3 2 4 3 Food   
 
Furthermore, the Court has issued in excess of 50 far-reaching orders in a series of 
right to food petitions initiated by the People’s Union for Civil Liberties.243 The PIL was 
launched following a protracted period of drought that resulted in wide-spread famine, 
malnutrition and starvation. The Court held that the right to food is encompassed by 
the right to life as enshrined in article 21 of the Indian Constitution, read with the DPSP 
in article 47, which directs the State to regard nutrition, standard of living and public 
health as constituting part of its primary duties.244 The Court thus expanded on the 
                                            
240 Unni Krishnan JP v State of Andhra Pradesh 1993 1 SCR 594 655. 
241 656 (emphasis added).  
242 Kothari argues that the issue of resource constraints was “ingeniously” dealt with when 
Reddy J pointed to the distinct wording in arts 41 and 45, respectively, in that economic 
capacity only qualified art 41: J Kothari “Social Rights Litigation in India: Developments of the 
Last Decade” in D Barak-Erez & AM Gross (eds) Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and 
Practice (2007) 171 189. 
243 PUCL v Union of India (Writ Petition [civil] No 196 of 2001). For a full index of all the interim 
orders issued to date, see Right to Food Campaign <www.righttofoodindia.org> (accessed 08-
10-2013).  
244 PUCL v Union of India (Writ Petition [civil] No 196 of 2001): Interim order dated 2 May 2003. 
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broad interpretative approach espoused in Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator, 
according to which the right to life entails the right to live with dignity.245 
Ample stockpiled food was available since the initiation of proceedings, but was not 
accessible to vulnerable and destitute segments of the population who faced the real 
risk of starvation. One of the original orders thus directed the State to distribute food in 
terms of the Targeted Public Distribution Scheme; to commence the effective 
implementation of its schemes directed at the most vulnerable segment of society as 
well as those related to old age pensions, maternity benefits and family benefits; to 
start the roll out of a Mid-Day Meal Scheme in terms of which cooked meals would be 
provided to school-attending children; and to fully implement its Integrated Child 
Development Scheme.246 Subsequent orders have attempted to enforce effective 
implementation, accountability and community participation. However, the 
inaccessibility of stockpiles remains a serious concern despite recent legislative 
intervention.247 
Significantly, the implication of nutrition and health-related capabilities, as informed 
by the value of human dignity, led to the Court adopting a robust approach to the 
protracted litigation. The Court has issued orders setting out the State’s obligations in 
terms of the nutritional requirements of children, adolescent girls and pregnant women, 
in detail.248 In doing so, the Court has ordered government to prioritise the needs of 
the most vulnerable members of society before attempting to implement programmes 
aimed at achieving universal food security.249 Moreover, the Court has not shied away 
from scrutinising the budgets and actual expenditure of recalcitrant States, and 
ordering re-allocation or expenditure where under-spending has occurred.250  
The severely deleterious effect that the deprivation of nutrition-related capabilities 
would have on a range of other basic capabilities such as those related to life and 
                                            
245 Francis Coralie Mullin v The Administrator 1981 2 SCR 516 529. 
246 PUCL v Union of India (Writ Petition [civil] No 196 of 2001): Interim order dated 28 
November 2001. 
247 The National Food Security Act 20 of 2013. For criticism of the Act, with regards to its cost 
and implementation implications in particular, see inter alia, D Sinha “Cost of Implementing the 
National Food Security Act” Economic & Political Weekly (28-09-2013) 31.  
248 PUCL v Union of India (Writ Petition [civil] No 196 of 2001): Interim order date 28 November 
2001. 
249 PUCL v Union of India (Writ Petition [civil] No 196 of 2001): Interim order dated 14 May 
2011. 
250 PUCL v Union of India (Writ Petition [civil] No 196 of 2001): Interim order dated 20 April 
2004; Interim order dated 13 December 2006. 
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health, together with the serious implication for the achievement of the functioning 
outcome of living an autonomous and dignified life, therefore justified the adoption of 
a robust standard of review to adjudicate State resource allocation decisions in this on-
going matter.  
 
3 3 3 Aspects in need of capabilities-infused development and reform  
 
Positive elements of the judicial approach in India have been discussed above. 
These characteristics of judicial review rest on the normative assumption that the 
Indian Constitution is aimed at the transformation of Indian society. Furthermore, the 
judiciary forms part of a collaborative partnership with other branches of government, 
the purpose of which is to attain the Indian Constitution’s transformative objectives. 
This fundamental normative assumption has led to judgments which are largely 
congruent with the capabilities approach to adjudication espoused in this dissertation.  
However, the Indian Supreme Court’s approach cannot be unreflectively 
transplanted into South African law. There are several aspects of the Indian judiciary’s 
approach which do not reflect the normative purposes of transformative 
constitutionalism. Instead, aspects in need of reform sometimes result from India’s 
history of colonisation by the British, and the incorporation of English law despite the 
fact that the latter rests on fundamentally different normative assumptions. The 
following part critically analyses those elements of Indian jurisprudence that are in 
need of capabilities-based reform.  
 
3 3 3 1 Thwarting participation and informational broadening  
 
As was noted above, a collaborative partnership between all three branches of 
government, litigants and other stakeholders can best serve to arrive at reasonable 
resource allocation decisions without triggering concerns that justify resort to judicial 
deference. Participation by all stakeholders is critical in such a co-operative 
conversation.  
Yet some of the very characteristics that make PIL such an innovative development 
in general and a good framework for the adjudication of State resource allocation 
decisions in particular, paradoxically shut down participation in certain respects. For 
example, the appointment of commissions can “create a parallel structure of decision-
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making deep within the area of executive competence”.251 When one additionally 
factors in the (empirically unverified) opinion that appointed commissions often 
discourage the executive from acting on its own initiative and thereby perpetuates 
recalcitrance,252 the possibility begins to emerge that commissions with parallel 
jurisdiction can stifle participation. This concern is strengthened where the reports of 
the commissioners are not subject to cross examination.253  
Furthermore, the expanded scope of PIL “runs the risk that those who already have 
political and economic power will drown or even silence the voices of the poor and 
marginalised”,254 thus further diminishing the scope for meaningful participation by all 
stakeholders. Where the needs of those affected by a resource allocation decision 
cannot be determined, it is unlikely that a reasonable resource allocation can be arrived 
at. The necessity of incorporating a broad range of perspectives in allocative design is 
underscored by the polycentric nature of socio-economic resource allocation 
decisions. Courts partial to PIL should thus be particularly careful to boost participation 
lest PIL’s innovative and well-intended mechanisms have the counterproductive effect 
of shutting out the voice of the executive and silencing the voice of the poor and 
vulnerable classes it was originally intended to protect.  
 
3 3 3 2 Lack of explicit reasoning and informational broadening  
 
Another pertinent criticism of PIL is the failure of government to implement the 
Court’s orders. Often, this is due to the fact that the Court makes an order with 
                                            
251 S Fredman Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (2008) 135. 
252 135; S Khurshid Judicial Activism in Indian Law (2012) address by Mr S Khurshid, Minister 
of Law and Justice and Minority Affairs, Government of India hosted by University of Oxford, 
Faculty of Law, 12-10-2012.  
253 S Fredman Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (2008) 136; V 
Iyer “The Supreme Court of India” in B Dickson (ed) Judicial Activism in Common Law 
Supreme Courts (2007) 1 23-24.  
254 S Fredman Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (2008) 137. 
See also V Gauri Public Interest Litigation in India: Overreaching or Underachieving? The 
World Bank Development Research Group Human Development and Public Services Team 
Policy Research Working Paper 5109 (2009) 16 Table 2a which shows the win rate of 
advantaged classes vis-à-vis disadvantaged classes in selected fundamental rights cases 
sharply increasing from 1961-1989 to 2000-2008. See further IP Massey Administrative Law 
7 ed (2008) 448, 449 who comments on the development of PIL into middle class interest 
litigation.  
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potentially vast resource implications in a show of judicial activism without according 
sufficient weight to real problems of resource constraints.255  
In Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samity v State of West Bengal256 (“Samity”) an 
agricultural labourer fell from a moving train and sustained serious head injuries. He 
was denied admission to several hospitals due to a purported shortage of available 
medical facilities. Interpreting the right to medical treatment as forming part of the right 
to life under article 21, the Court held that in casu there had indeed been a violation of 
a fundamental right. The Court ordered compensation for the injured petitioner. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court ordered the upgrade of medical facilities, increased 
specialist treatment facilities, and the provision of adequately equipped ambulances 
throughout the City.257 The Court recognised that financial resources would be required 
to comply with these far reaching directions but nevertheless held: 
 
“It is no doubt true that financial resources are needed for providing these facilities. But at 
the same time it cannot be ignored that it is the constitutional obligation of the State to 
provide adequate medical services to the people. Whatever is necessary for this purpose 
has to be done... In the matter of allocation of funds for medical services the said 
constitutional obligation of the State has to be kept in view.”258 
 
The robust nature of the above statement is commendable to the extent that it 
recognises the importance of the right at stake. It is similarly to be welcomed from a 
capabilities perspective to the extent that the content of the right should influence the 
level of resources made available for its realisation. Likewise, the importance of the 
capabilities that form the content of the right should influence the intensity of review to 
which such resource allocation decision is subjected.259 However, the Indian Supreme 
                                            
255 V Iyer “The Supreme Court of India” in B Dickson (ed) Judicial Activism in Common Law 
Supreme Courts (2007) 1 26. Baxi asserts in this regard that the Court’s failure to take steps 
to have its orders implemented by means of, for example, contempt proceedings, creates the 
impression that the Court acquiesces to unconstitutional government conduct. He goes on to 
forcefully argue that the future of constitutional democracy hangs in the balance. U Baxi 
“Taking Suffering Seriously: Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court of India” in U Baxi 
(ed) Law and Poverty: Critical Essays (1988) 387 413-414.   
256 (1996) 4 SCC 37. 
257 The South African Constitutional Court in Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-
Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC), discussed in chapter four part 4 2 2 below, failed to acknowledge 
this component of the Indian Supreme Court’s order.  
258 Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samity v State of West Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37 para 16. 
259 See further chapter two part 2 3 2 2 1 above. 
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Court did not probe what resources were in fact available or could be made available, 
and thus failed to recognise the reality of limited resources.  
Whereas the first interpretative stage of the two-stage analysis required by a 
capabilities approach to adjudication was therefore observed, no second, justificatory 
stage in the weighting process took place. The standard of scrutiny identified as 
appropriate given the content of the right at stake was not applied to evidence 
presented by the State regarding limited resources. As a result, the capabilities-based 
weighting exercise was not completed.260 This risks non-compliance with unrealistic 
court orders.  
The judgment could have been improved if closer scrutiny of available resources 
occurred, and some recognition had been given to the fact that compliance would entail 
the procurement of additional resources. The need to procure additional resources 
could have prompted the Court to establish what a reasonable resource allocation 
would be in the case at hand. Moreover, explicit, substantive reasoning and 
informational broadening in respect of possible resource constraints would have 
conformed to a capabilities-based approach to review. By explicitly considering 
whether resources were limited, and requesting information in this regard from 
government, the Court could have anticipated the potential ramifications of its order to 
some degree.  
 
3 3 3 3 A recent move to unprincipled deference  
 
A further line of criticism regularly levelled against the Court is that its far-reaching 
remedies breach the separation of powers doctrine by encroaching on the terrain of 
the legislature and administration.261 The adjudication of socio-economic rights will 
often entail orders with budgetary implications even when the adjudication of budgetary 
allocations is not directly called for. A strict adherence to the traditional separation of 
powers doctrine in this novel context is therefore neither practical nor desirable.262 
                                            
260 See further chapter two part 2 3 2 2 3 above.  
261 SP Sathe Judicial Activism in India: Transgressing Borders and Enforcing Limits (2003) 
250-251; J Cassels “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the 
Impossible?” (1989) 37 Am J Comp L 495 509; S Fredman Human Rights Transformed: 
Positive Rights and Positive Duties (2008) 134.  
262 For the need to reconceive the traditional separation of powers doctrine, see the incisive 
discussion in S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative 
Constitution (2010) 66-71. See further for a discussion of the arguably outdated nature of the 
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When a court is called upon to adjudicate a resource allocation decision in the context 
of socio-economic rights, the State’s economic policy will more often than not be 
implicated. It would therefore be desirable for courts to acknowledge that they are often 
called upon to adjudicate policy matters. Clearly articulated criteria as to how policies 
should be adjudicated in the light of the socio-economic capabilities at stake would be 
infinitely more useful than obfuscating resorts to deference.  
One would expect transparency in judicial reasoning from the Indian Supreme Court 
when it adjudicates policy matters given its activist record. Such transparency, through 
explicit reasoning, similarly constitutes a hallmark of capabilities-based adjudication. 
Incongruously, the Court has vacillated between prescribing policy and refusing to 
engage with State policy choices. Disappointingly, the inconsistency of the Court in the 
field of policy related matters makes it difficult to elucidate a coherent judicial 
framework for the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions affecting socio-
economic capabilities.  
 
3 3 3 3 1 An aversion to adjudicating economic policy 
 
In BALCO Employees Union v Union of India263 (“BALCO”) government had 
embarked on the implementation of a new economic policy to disinvest from several 
State-owned enterprises. Employees of one such disinvested company challenged the 
decision to make the disinvestment, contending that they should have been consulted 
throughout the process.264 The employees brought a writ petition for judicial review in 
terms of article 32 of the Indian Constitution, relying on their loss of protection by 
articles 14 (equality before the law) and 16 (equality of opportunity in matters of public 
employment) due to the disinvestment.265  
In addition, the State of Chhattisgarh alleged that whereas it was not challenging 
the policy itself, the implementation of the policy was constitutionally unsound for 
various reasons, including the failure to give due consideration to the workers’ 
                                            
doctrine as traditionally conceived of, PJH Maree Investigating an Alternative Administrative-
law System in South Africa LLD dissertation Stellenbosch (2013) 47-53 and in particular 51. 
The author argues that the doctrine, if conceptualised as normative, dynamic and flexible, 
remains useful (263, 264).   
263 (2002) 2 SCC 333 Indian Kanoon.  
264 8.  
265 8. 
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interests.266 Ultimately, the court held that the government had sufficiently informed 
and engaged with employees regarding the disinvestment process but that it would be 
impossible to provide everyone affected by policy decisions with a formal hearing each 
time such a decision was made.267  
Although the direct implication of workers’ socio-economic capabilities in this case 
may be open to debate,268 the Court in BALCO ostensibly supported some contentious 
positions that are worth scrutinising. For example, it cited with approval a judgment 
that held that in economic matters, the government was entitled to more leeway than 
in matters involving civil and political rights. Since economic policy will likely affect 
socio-economic capabilities, this statement reinforces a rigid distinction between socio-
economic rights and civil and political rights. The tenability of this distinction is 
questionable.269  
Furthermore, the Court appears to have endorsed a rigid conception of the 
separation of powers doctrine that focuses on the limited role of judicial review.270 For 
transformative constitutionalism to make a real impact in transforming society, the 
doctrine should be reconceptualised as a collaborative interaction among the various 
                                            
266 9. 
267 19. 
268 For reports of the deteriorating socio-economic conditions of workers following the 
disinvestment, see, for example S Kumar “BALCO after Privatisation” (26-09-2004) People’s 
Democracy <http://pd.cpim.org/2004/0926/09262004_balco.htm> (accessed 07-01-2014). 
269 For an insightful argument in favour of recognising the interdependence of all rights, see S 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 
51-54. See further 67 regarding the need for the judiciary to scrutinise and even order changes 
to economic policy in the context of adjudicating socio-economic rights. For the need to 
develop a capabilities approach to adjudication that recognises the interdependence of all 
rights and capabilities, see chapter two part 2 3 3 3 1 above.  
270 The Court referred to MP Oil Extraction Pvt Ltd v State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1982 MP 1 
para 41 in which it was stated: 
“The supremacy of each of three organs of the State i.e. legislature, executive and judiciary 
in their respective field of operation needs to be emphasised. The power of judicial review 
of the executive and legislative action must be kept within the bounds of constitutional 
schemes so that there may not be any occasion to entertain misgivings about the role of 
judiciary [sic] in outstepping its limit by unwarranted judicial activism being very often talked 
of in these days. The democratic set up to which the polity is so deeply committed cannot 
function properly unless each of the three organs appreciate [sic] the need for mutual 
respect and supremacy in their respective field.” 
The Court referred to a similar sentiment expressed in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar v Union 
of India 1981 2 SCR 52 71. 
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branches of government with the purpose of attaining common, constitutionally defined 
goals.271 Having emphasised that it was not for the Court to judge the wisdom of a 
policy or whether a better policy choice could have been made, the Court held: 
 
“The Courts have consistently refrained from interfering with economic decisions as it has 
been recognised that economic expediencies lack adjudicative disposition and unless the 
economic decision, based on economic expediencies, is demonstrated to be so violative of 
constitutional or legal limits on power or so abhorrent to reason, that the Courts would 
decline to interfere. In matters relating to economic issues, the Government has, while 
taking a decision, right to ‘trial and error’ as long as both trial and error are bona fide and 
within limits of authority. There is no case made out by the petitioner that the decision to 
disinvest in BALCO is in any way capricious, arbitrary, illegal or uninformed.”272 
 
The Court thus clearly envisaged a high threshold of unreasonableness, reminiscent 
of Wednesbury unreasonableness,273 for it to “interfere” with or adjudicate a 
government policy choice. The dictum in BALCO should not be followed without 
circumspection in cases where important capabilities may be more directly implicated, 
in so far as it allows for an overly broad margin of discretion to government based on 
the fact that questions of economic policy are involved. Such a broad discretionary 
margin might lead to the adoption of a “manifestly without reasonable justification” test 
as used by the European Court of Human Rights and the UK Supreme Court where 
matters of general socio-economic policy are at issue. This can lead to undesirable 
outcomes that seriously impinge upon important socio-economic capabilities.274 The 
capabilities at issue, and not the nature of the policy as economic or otherwise, should 
determine the level of scrutiny to which government conduct is subjected.275 Having 
had the option of simply determining what procedural fairness required in the 
                                            
271 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 66-71. For the normative nature of the separation of powers doctrine, see PJH Maree 
Investigating an Alternative Administrative-law System in South Africa LLD dissertation 
Stellenbosch (2013) 38. It follows that the nature of the doctrine should evolve as the normative 
landscape of a given jurisdiction changes.  
272 BALCO Employees Union v Union of India (2002) 2 SCC 333 Indian Kanoon 14 (emphasis 
added). 
273 See part 3 2 3 1 above.  
274 See further the case evaluation in part 3 2 3 3 3 above.  
275 See further Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) 
(discussed in chapter four part 4 2 2 below), in which the South Africa Constitutional Court 
applied a thin standard of rationality to a rationing policy and similarly merely required good 
faith on the part of government. 
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circumstances of the case, the need for the Court’s various pronouncements regarding 
the non-justiciability of economic policy is dubious.  
 
3 3 3 3 2 A refusal to become embroiled in developmental projects  
 
The Court has also unequivocally indicated that decisions to undertake 
infrastructure-related development projects constitute policy decisions that lie outside 
the domain of what can ordinarily be considered justiciable. In Narmada Bachao 
Andolan v Union of India276 (the “Narmada Dam case”) the Court held that where 
government has put a system in place which is not arbitrary, the Court’s circumscribed 
function is to ensure that the system operates in accordance with government’s vision 
thereof.277  
In casu, the petitioners relied on article 21 of the Indian Constitution as well as an 
international convention and sought comprehensive judicial review of a developmental 
project to build a large dam.278 It was alleged that the project should not be allowed to 
continue until the environmental impact assessment had been completed. Moreover, 
the project would result in the large-scale eviction and displacement of thousands of 
people. As a result, the capabilities related to shelter and to earning a livelihood as 
contained in the DPSP and read into the right to life were imperilled.279 Furthermore, it 
was argued that satisfactory rehabilitation of displaced inhabitants was not possible 
and that article 21 of the Indian Constitution would therefore be violated.280  
The Court responded by surmising that displaced persons would enjoy better 
amenities once relocated and that displacement was therefore not tantamount to a 
violation of fundamental rights. Adopting a paternalistic tone,281 the Court held that the 
“gradual assimilation in the main stream of the society will lead to betterment and 
                                            
276 (2000) 10 SCC 664 Indian Kanoon <http://indiankanoon.org/doc/1938608/> (accessed 26-
11-2012). 
277 69.  
278 In addition to art 21 of the Indian Constitution, the petitioners relied on ILO Convention 107 
(1957).  
279 Shantistar Builders v Narayan Khimalal Totame AIR 1990 SC 630, interpreting the right to 
life to include reasonable forms of shelter. Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation 1985 
2 SCR Supl 51, interpreting the right to life to include the right to a livelihood with reference to 
the DPSP in art 39(a).  
280 Narmada Bachao Andolan v Union of India (2000) 10 SCC 664 Indian Kanoon 13. 
281 P O’Connell Vindicating Socio-economic Rights: International Standards and Comparative 
Experiences (2012) 101 describes this passage as a “mix of paternalism and utilitarianism”.  
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progress”.282 The Court asserted that it was the petitioners – and not government as 
alleged – who were acting contrary to the public interest by challenging the policy 
decisions after an unreasonable lapse of time “during which period public money has 
been spent in the execution of the project”.283 Where rights are threatened or infringed 
this line of reasoning becomes indefensible, even more so in a jurisdiction where the 
judiciary has recognised that rigid procedure cannot be allowed to thwart the 
vindication of fundamental rights. The Court went on to severely restrict its own role 
where developmental projects involving policy decisions are concerned: 
 
“It is now well-settled that the courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction, will not transgress 
into the field of policy decision [sic]. Whether to have an infrastructural project or not and 
what is the type of project to be undertaken and how it has to be executed, are part of policy 
making process and the Courts are ill equipped to adjudicate on a policy decision so 
undertaken.”284  
 
In a passage that is difficult to fathom given the Court’s unprecedented activism in 
the past, the Court elevated compliance with civil procedure and the expenditure of 
costs in the execution of policy above the protection and vindication of fundamental 
rights:  
 
“The Court, no doubt, has a duty to see that in the undertaking of a decision, no law is 
violated and people’s fundamental rights are not transgressed upon except to the extent 
permissible under the Constitution. Even then any challenge to such a policy decision must 
be before the execution of the project is undertaken. Any delay in the execution of the 
project means over run in costs and the decision to undertake a project, if challenged after 
its execution has commenced, should be thrown out at the very threshold on the ground of 
latches285 [sic] if the petitioner had the knowledge of such a decision and could have 
approached the Court at that time. Just because a petition is termed as a PIL does not 
mean that ordinary principles applicable to litigation will not apply.”286 
 
PIL was evidently designed with the very purpose of rendering “ordinary principles” 
of litigation inapplicable where poverty and voicelessness threatened the realisation of 
                                            
282 Narmada Bachao Andolan v Union of India (2000) 10 SCC 664 Indian Kanoon 19.  
283 14. The Court went on to emphasise the critical importance of water and the important duty 
that thus rested on government to provide the same. Narmada Bachao Andolan v Union of 
India (2000) 10 SCC 664 Indian Kanoon 18, 68, 73.  
284 69.  
285 A defence of laches is available to a defendant where there has been an unreasonable 
delay by the party seeking to enforce her or his rights. 
286 69 (emphasis added).  
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fundamental rights. Moreover, to dismiss a tardy claim forthright without entertaining it 
even where fundamental rights are threatened is to elevate form above substance to 
an unacceptable degree.  
 
3 3 3 3 3 A thin conception of administrative law  
 
ND Jayal v Union of India287 similarly concerned the construction of a dam. The 
petition was brought in terms of article 32 of the Indian Constitution, given the 
implication of constitutional rights in the matter.288 In casu, the Court noted that the 
right to sustainable development formed part of the right to life guaranteed in article 21 
of the Indian Constitution. It was contended that by granting clearance for the project 
to continue, government had not properly applied its mind to the matter.289  
Although referring to Sen’s concept of development as freedom,290 the Court 
approved of and applied the dicta from the Narmada Dam case, thus limiting the 
Court’s power to interfere to cases where government had acted with “mala fides, 
arbitrariness or irrationality”.291 The Court underscored its own institutional 
incompetence to adjudicate matters that require scientific knowledge, instead leaving 
such matters to the judgment of government. Where judicial interference was called 
for, the Court held that “well-settled principles of administrative law” should guide any 
review.292 Regrettably, the Court appears to have envisaged a thin, procedural 
conception of administrative law – as opposed to a more robust, substance infused 
application thereof – so as to minimise any encroachment on the terrain of the 
executive.293  
                                            
287 (2004) 9 SCC 362. 
288 Art 32(1) states that “[t]he right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for 
the enforcement of the rights conferred by [the Indian Constitution] is guaranteed”. 
Administrative law claims are consequently often framed as rights issues in order to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, to escape the strictures of Wednesbury unreasonableness 
(see parts 3 2 3 1 above and 3 3 3 4 below) and, in certain instances, to take advantage of the 
relaxed procedures of PIL.  
289 ND Jayal v Union of India (2004) 9 SCC 362 para 7.  
290 Para 23. See chapter two part 2 2 for a comprehensive discussion of development as 
freedom in the context of adjudicating State resource allocation decisions.  
291 ND Jayal v Union of India (2004) 9 SCC 362 para 18. 
292 Para 19. 
293 Para 19:  
“The consideration in such cases is in the process of decision and not in its merits.”  
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In contrast to the majority judgment, the dissenting judgment of Dharmadhikari J 
displayed a greater sensitivity to the plight of displaced persons. The judge noted that 
the social costs of dam projects could be “too heavy” and that the economically weaker 
position of displaced persons was an important factor to be taken into consideration.294 
Importantly, Dharmadhikari J recognised that conflicts about natural resources often 
masked conflicts between the haves and have nots of society.295 It is submitted that 
an approach that takes cognisance of the needs of the vulnerable will always be 
preferable to an automatic retreat to deference where courts are called upon to 
adjudicate resource allocation decisions in cases where important capabilities are 
implicated.296  
 
3 3 3 4 Scope for greater development and integration of administrative law review  
 
Given administrative law’s reach and potential for the advancement of rights, the 
powerful judiciary in India is well situated to contribute to the rule of law by substantively 
developing administrative law. Through explicit, substantive reasoning, administrative 
law review can contribute to a capabilities-based approach to adjudication by 
stimulating further debate regarding the weighting of diverse capabilities.297 Massey 
commends the Indian judiciary for contributing to the establishment of the rule of law 
in India by developing principles of administrative law. The author goes on to opine 
that the courts’ application of administrative law has improved the quality of life of many 
citizens by furthering the attainment of social and economic justice. Moreover, Massey 
emphasises the crucial socio-economic function that administrative law fulfils in any 
society.298 Sathe likewise notes that administrative law plays a significant role in 
channelling State efforts to accomplish the “profound social transformation” envisaged 
                                            
For the importance of substantive reasoning in terms of a capabilities approach to adjudication, 
see further chapter two part 2 4 4 above.  
294 ND Jayal v Union of India (2004) 9 SCC 362 para 105. 
295 Para 106.  
296 For the importance of context in determining with what level of scrutiny State resource 
allocation decisions should be reviewed, see further chapter two part 2 3 3 3 3 above.  
297 Chapter two part 2 4 4 above.  
298 IP Massey “Evolving Administrative Law Regime” in SK Verma & Kusum (eds) Fifty Years 
of the Supreme Court of India: Its Grasp and Reach (2000) 101 104.  
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by the Indian Constitution.299 It follows that similar links to those found in South Africa 
exist between administrative law and socio-economic rights in India.  
 
3 3 3 4 1 A legacy of Wednesbury unreasonableness where fundamental rights 
are not clearly implicated  
 
However, divorced from the fundamental rights enshrined in the Indian Constitution, 
certain facets of Indian administrative law have not developed substantively to the 
extent perceivable in South Africa.300 This results in the application of varying 
standards of review based on whether or not an important capability can be read into 
a fundamental constitutional right in a given case.301 
In Indian administrative law, which inherits much from its English ancestry, “[t]he 
principle of reasonableness has become one of the most active and conspicuous 
among the doctrines which have vitalized administrative law in recent years”.302 Yet 
despite this “all-pervasive” presence of reasonableness in Indian administrative law,303 
the test for reasonableness in administrative law as distinguished from the test that 
prevails where fundamental rights are concerned, is that of Wednesbury 
unreasonableness.304 The Supreme Court elucidated the position in Union of India v 
G Ganayutham:305 
 
“[I]n administrative law, where no fundamental freedoms… are involved… the 
Courts/Tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary judgment as to 
reasonableness will remain with the executive or administrative authority. The secondary 
judgment of the Court is to be based on Wednesbury… principles…”306 
 
                                            
299 SP Sathe Administrative Law 5 ed (1991) 11. 
300 See, for example, the test for contextual reasonableness developed in Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). A substantively 
infused test for reasonableness can promote the adjudication of administrative resource 
allocation decisions that best contribute to the realisation of socio-economic rights in South 
Africa.  
301 For a discussion of the similarly problematic position in the United Kingdom, see part 3 2 4 
above.  
302 OC Reddy The Court and the Constitution of India: Summits and Shallows (2010) 238.  
303 CK Takwani & MC Thakker Lectures on Administrative Law 4 ed (2008) 320.  
304 See part 3 2 3 1 above.  
305 (1997) 7 SCC 463.  
306 Para 28.  
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This restrictive test, which sets the bar so high that unreasonableness will only rarely 
be found to exist, has been relaxed in South Africa in favour of a contextual test for 
reasonableness.307 As Hoexter aptly notes, “tests of this sort set such a low standard 
for administrative decision-making that they are quite worthless except as a ground of 
last resort”.308 The same problems associated with the Wednesbury standard in the 
United Kingdom309 therefore persist in Indian law where fundamental rights are not 
explicitly implicated. This results in the incoherent position, as is the case in the United 
Kingdom, that where a socio-economic capability cannot be read into a justiciable right 
in a certain instance, a much more restrictive standard of review will be applied to an 
impugned allocative decision.310   
 
3 3 3 4 2 Reading the requirement for reasonableness into articles 14 and 21  
 
This restricted approach to reasonableness can be distinguished from the 
administrative law principles that apply where fundamental rights are clearly 
implicated. The duty on administrators to act lawfully, reasonably and in a procedurally 
fair manner is often inextricably linked to articles 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution.311 
Article 14 has precipitated the principle that government action “must be informed by 
reason”.312 Moreover, owing to the close relationship between article 14 and article 21, 
the requirement for reasonableness can be said to extend to both these articles. In 
Maneka Gandhi the Court per Bhagwati J stated: 
 
“Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of 
treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an 
essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like a brooding 
                                            
307 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 44.  
308 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 346.  
309 See part 3 2 3 1 above.  
310 For a discussion of why a constitutionally more coherent approach requires the application 
of proportionality as a standard head of review, see the analysis of the position in the United 
Kingdom in part 3 2 4 above.  
311 Art 14 of the Indian Constitution states that “[t]he State shall not deny to any person equality 
before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India” whereas art 21 
states that the deprivation of life or liberty can only occur in terms of “procedure established by 
law”.  
312 MP Jain “The Supreme Court and Fundamental Rights” in SK Verma & Kusum (eds) Fifty 
Years of the Supreme Court of India: Its Grasp and Reach (2000) 1 40.  
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omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer the test of 
reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article 14.”313  
 
A decision regarding what resources to allocate, as well as the subsequent 
application of such allocative decision, should both be reasonable.  
 
3 3 3 4 3 The need to apply proportionality review as a standard head of review  
 
However, the circumstances in which reasonableness review in Indian 
administrative law will require a proportionality analysis remain obscured by rigid 
distinctions between constitutional review and administrative law review. In Om Kumar 
v Union of India314 the Supreme Court embarked on an analysis of various jurisdictions 
including the United Kingdom and India in an effort to establish what role the doctrine 
of proportionality played in administrative law. The Court elucidated its conception of 
proportionality: 
 
“By ‘proportionality’, we mean the question whether, while regulating exercise [sic] of 
fundamental rights, the appropriate or least restrictive choice of measures has been made 
by the legislature or the administrator so as to achieve the object of the legislation or the 
purpose of the administrative order, as the case may be. Under the principle, the Court will 
see that the legislature and the administrative authority ‘maintain a proper balance between 
the adverse effects which the legislation or the administrative order may have on the rights, 
liberties or interests of persons keeping in mind the purpose which they were intended to 
serve’. The legislature and the administrative authority are however given an area of 
discretion or a range of choices but as to whether the choice made infringes the rights 
excessively or not is for the Court. That is what is meant by proportionality.”315 
 
The administrator’s range of available choices is therefore circumscribed by the 
Court’s power to adjudicate any “excess” infringement of rights. Put differently, the 
impact of the administrative action and the importance of the right at stake demarcate 
the options available to the administrator. Having analysed the emergence of 
proportionality in UK law and its implied use in Indian case law, the Court concluded: 
 
                                            
313 Maneka Gandhi v Union of India 1978 2 SCR 621 674. SP Sathe Administrative Law 5 ed 
(1991) 103 states in this regard that “cases of unreasonableness have been covered under 
[article 14 of the Constitution] under which unreasonableness is arbitrary and therefore violates 
the right to equality …”.  
314 2000 Supp 4 SCR 693. 
315 Para 28.  
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“[I]n administrative action affecting fundamental freedoms, proportionality has always been 
applied in our country though the word ‘proportionality’ has not been specifically used.”316  
 
However, the Court was careful to limit the use of proportionality to cases where 
fundamental freedoms were implicated and, in the context of article 14, only where 
discriminatory conduct as opposed to arbitrary conduct was at issue.317 Massey 
observes that whereas the doctrine of proportionality is wholly applicable in 
constitutional adjudication where fundamental rights are concerned, it is still evolving 
in the general sphere of administrative law. The author argues: 
 
“For the present the doctrine is not available in administrative law in the sense that the court 
cannot go into the question of choice made and priority fixed by the administrator… In an 
action for review of an administrative action the court cannot act as a court of appeal. Even 
in cases where the validity of a restriction imposed on the fundamental right is involved the 
court must exercise self-restraint and allow [a] greater margin of appreciation to the 
administrator…”318 
 
Ajoy criticises this distinction as overly complicated and artificial, arguing instead for 
an approach whereby a flexible construction of proportionality can accommodate 
variable levels of scrutiny depending on the factual and normative context of the case 
at hand. He rightly notes that given the broad construction of the fundamental rights by 
the Supreme Court, much time spent on determining what type of right has been 
violated could instead be used for evaluating whether competing rights and interests 
were properly balanced by the administrator.319  
In the context of resource allocation decisions, competing goals and rights will often 
need to be balanced. A flexible application of the test for proportionality in the sense 
that various rights and interests should be appropriately balanced may be well suited 
to ensuring reasonable, administratively just and efficient resource allocation 
                                            
316 Para 55.  
317 Paras 66-67. 
318 IP Massey Administrative Law 7 ed (2008) 389. 
319 PB Ajoy “Administrative Action and the Doctrine of Proportionality in India” (2012) 1 Journal 
of Humanities and Social Science 16 21. See also A Chugh “Is the Supreme Court 
Disproportionately Applying the Principle of Proportionality?” (2004) 8 SCCJ 33 who similarly 
calls for the uniform application of proportionality and further charges the Court with conflating 
the doctrine of proportionality and “strict scrutiny” in its analysis of UK administrative law. 
Moreover, both authors argue that the doctrine of proportionality has not been developed in 
administrative law by the Supreme Court since the Court’s pronouncements in Om Kumar v 
Union of India 2000 Supp 4 SCR 693. 
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decisions. However, for such a flexible test to be available across a broad spectrum of 
cases where socio-economic capabilities may be affected through administrative 
action, administrative law stands to be developed to encompass proportionality review 
in all cases – and not only where specific fundamental rights are at issue. This would 
include cases where particular DPSP are at issue and have not yet been interpreted 
as forming part of justiciable, fundamental rights by the Indian courts.  
Ultimately, a more coherent development of administrative law will better promote a 
uniform, capabilities-based standard of review for the adjudication of government 
resource allocation decisions. By consolidating the currently fragmented approach to 
reasonableness review in India to encompass a single head of review, courts can 
engage in weighting exercises of variable intensity depending on the capabilities at 
stake in a given case. Proportionality review can therefore be adopted to unify review 
over different (artificially) demarcated areas of law. This will prevent unnecessary 
compartmentalisation of the law. Moreover, it will ensure that the development of 
administrative justice is not neglected by trying to frame administrative law claims in 
the guise of specific article 14 or 21 claims in order to trigger constitutional adjudication 
rather than administrative law review. In this way, the advantages of the Indian 
judiciary’s innovative approach to rights-based claims can be imported into the existent 
body of administrative law.  
 
3 3 3 5 A lack of coherence   
 
Rajagopol, Iyer and Dickson argue that the Court’s activist jurisprudence constitutes 
“substantive ad hocism”.320 Similarly, Khosla argues that the Court has not interpreted 
socio-economic guarantees as systematic rights, but has instead narrowly focused its 
substantive interpretation on the facts of the cases at hand.321 Iyer goes further in his 
scathing criticism of the PIL era of judicial activism: 
                                            
320 B Rajagopal “Pro-Human Rights but Anti-Poor? A Critical Evaluation of the Indian Supreme 
Court from a Social Movement Perspective” (2007) 18 Human Rights Review 157 160. The 
author goes on to state that the “Court’s record on economic, social, and cultural rights remains 
deeply unsatisfactory” (160). V Iyer “The Supreme Court of India” in B Dickson (ed) Judicial 
Activism in Common Law Supreme Courts (2007) 1 4; P O’Connell Vindicating Socio-
economic Rights: International Standards and Comparative Experiences (2012) 104, agreeing 
with Rajagopal. 
321 See, in general, the distinction made between conditional and systematic rights in M Khosla 
“Making Social Rights Conditional: Lessons from India” (2010) 8 I Con 739. It is submitted that 
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“[T]he jurisprudence generated by such activism suffered from a visible lack of doctrinal 
coherence, insufficiently rigorous reasoning, a disconcerting unpredictability of approach, 
and a reliance on unquestioning presumption and reiteration rather than empirical evidence 
for many of the highly controversial conclusions reached by the Court. Much of the activism 
has… been characterized by ad hoc-ism and cheap populism...”322 
 
The Court’s incoherent vacillation between a willingness to encroach on policy 
matters in the name of social justice and an aversion to adjudicating policy-related 
matters,323 is not an ideal setting for the adjudication of resource allocation decisions. 
Well-reasoned guidelines for such adjudication are necessary. Although such 
guidelines would need to be flexible and cater for differing circumstances in which 
resource allocation decisions are made, they must be capable of coherent application. 
The alternative would be arbitrary adjudication of resource allocation decisions that 
does nothing to aid policy-makers, administrators or prospective litigants.  
Moreover, arbitrary decision-making can alienate other branches of government 
instead of including them in a collaborative partnership. A lack of coherence thus flouts 
the explicit reasoning and participation espoused by a capabilities approach to 
adjudication.324 Courts should explicitly justify the judgments they arrive at, in order for 
their evaluative judgments regarding resource allocation to be susceptible to public 
scrutiny. Explicit, substantive reasoning thus makes subsequent participatory 
processes meaningful. Where courts eschew the tenet of explicit reasoning, important 
constitutional objectives such as accountability and participation are hampered.  
  
                                            
systematic socio-economic guarantees have indeed been recognised by the Supreme Court 
in certain judgments, for example in Miss Mohini Jain v State of Karnataka 1992 3 SCR 658; 
Unni Krishnan JP v State of Andhra Pradesh 1993 1 SCR 594; and Paschim Banga Khet 
Majoor Samity v State of West Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37.  
322 V Iyer “The Supreme Court of India” in B Dickson (ed) Judicial Activism in Common Law 
Supreme Courts (2007) 1 4.  
323 See part 3 3 3 3 above.  
324 For the importance of participation and explicit reasoning according to a capabilities 
approach to adjudication, see further chapter two parts 2 4 3 and 2 4 4 above.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 164 
 
3 3 4 Conclusion  
 
The constitutional framework prevalent in India brings a variety of socio-economic 
capabilities into focus. Although many of these are enshrined as DPSP and are thus 
non-justiciable, the Supreme Court has interpreted fundamental, justiciable rights to 
include socio-economic capabilities. Expansive interpretation holds the potential to 
accord content and weight to socio-economic rights. The Court’s interpretative 
approach can therefore support a capabilities approach to the adjudication of State 
resource allocation decisions if pursued in a coherent and consistent manner.  
The Supreme Court’s activist approach in introducing PIL to facilitate access for the 
poor constitutes a radical judicial innovation. PIL harbours the potential to promote true 
participation amongst the Court, government, vulnerable litigants and a wider pool of 
similarly placed persons who may be affected by a particular judgment. PIL can thereby 
serve to enhance the deliberative nature of litigation while broadening the information 
available to the Court. In this way, a capabilities-congruent approach to the 
adjudication of State resource allocation decisions can be allowed to flourish. 
In many instances, the Court’s approach to the adjudication of resource allocation 
decisions is equally commendable. The Court has used the vital socio-economic 
capabilities detrimentally affected by State resource allocation decisions to justify a 
robust approach when scrutinising resource-based justifications proffered by the State. 
In certain cases where the Court may have been too eager to enforce a capability, 
resulting in unrealistic orders, it has subsequently adopted a more moderate position 
that strikes a balance between the vital capability at stake and the reality of limited 
resources to achieve it.  
However, the Supreme Court jurisprudence suffers from a marked doctrinal 
incoherence. An unprincipled resort to deference fails to take the deprivation of socio-
economic capabilities seriously. In declining to review such matters for possible 
violation of fundamental rights, the Court has sought refuge in an overly procedural 
conception of administrative law. Furthermore, certain characteristics and 
developments in PIL potentially threaten true participation by shutting out the input of 
the executive and – more importantly – that of truly vulnerable prospective litigants.  
The Court’s robust approach to the adjudication of State resource allocation 
decisions has also at times failed to pay sufficient attention to the second, justificatory 
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stage in a proposed two-stage rights analysis. As discussed in the previous chapter,325 
this process entails the interpretation of the relevant right followed by the review of the 
resource allocation decision at issue.326 By not engaging with what resources are 
realistically available to realise the relevant capability, the Court undermines its own 
credibility, fails to broaden its informational base and hinders participation by 
government. Finally, reasonableness review in Indian administrative law remains 
underdeveloped and fragmented. Instead of distinguishing between rights-based 
claims and other administrative law cases where socio-economic capabilities may 
nevertheless be implicated, proportionality should be applied as a uniform head of 
review.  
The approach of the Indian Supreme Court is therefore instructive. Its strength in 
terms of a normative methodology lies in its activist interpretative approach in bringing 
socio-economic capabilities to the fore where resource allocation decisions are at issue 
and its innovations in respect of the participatory mechanism of Public Interest 
Litigation. The Court’s weaknesses are equally instructive from a comparative 
methodological perspective, in that it illustrates the judicial tendencies to be avoided 
by other common-law jurisdictions grappling with questions of how to sufficiently 
advance socio-economic capabilities in complex, polycentric cases of resource 
allocation.  
 
3 4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to critically analyse the adjudication of State resource 
allocation decisions that impact on socio-economic capabilities in the United Kingdom 
and India. The judicial review of allocative decisions constitutes the shared problem 
according to the functionalist aspect of the methodological approach adopted in this 
dissertation.327 By evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of the constitutional 
framework and judicial approach in these two jurisdictions, capabilities-enhancing 
aspects can be incorporated into South African law whereas capabilities-eschewing 
                                            
325 Chapter two part 2 3 2 2 3. 
326 For the critical importance of following a two-stage analysis when adjudicating State 
resource allocation decisions so as to promote and enhance capability realisation, see chapter 
two part 2 3 2 2 3 above.  
327 For an explanation of the methodological approach adopted in respect of the preceding 
comparative analysis, see chapter one part 1 6 4 3 above.  
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elements can be noted and avoided by the South African judiciary. This evaluative 
exercise, set against the standards implied by a capabilities approach to adjudication, 
thus contributes to the normative methodological project undertaken in this study.  
According to the normative-dialogical approach to comparative analysis, South 
African courts should consider the normative assumptions that underlie the judicial 
approach in the United Kingdom to determine whether the incorporation of certain UK 
doctrines in our own jurisprudence remains appropriate. The overarching normative 
assumption that underlies the institution of judicial review in the United Kingdom, as 
reflected in the ultra vires doctrine, is that the will of the legislature is supreme. This 
assumption has led to the application of restrictive standards of Wednesbury review 
and the application of the doctrine of non-justiciability. This assumption further 
supports the operation of the doctrine of deference in the United Kingdom, in that 
courts regard themselves as constitutionally and institutionally incompetent to 
adjudicate socio-economic matters, generally, and government’s allocative decisions, 
in particular. In addition, the overarching normative assumption reinforces the rigid 
distinction between socio-economic rights and civil and political rights, since courts 
only regard rights recognised by the legislature as such, as legitimate.  
A similar normative assumption is not plausible in the South African context, given 
our system of constitutional supremacy. A tendency by South African courts to defer 
can be explained with reference to our strong tradition of parliamentary sovereignty as 
inherited from Britain, but cannot be easily justified in the light of our judiciary’s 
constitutional obligation to promote the rights enshrined in our Bill of Rights. In South 
Africa, the normative assumption that should inform the judicial review of State 
resource allocation decisions that impact on socio-economic rights is that of a 
collaborative partnership between all branches of government and other stakeholders 
with a common purpose of advancing a project of transformative constitutionalism. 
Restrictive standards of review and overzealous resort to deference thus constitute 
pitfalls of the UK approach to review that should be acknowledged and avoided by our 
courts.  
A rights-based approach to judicial review has gained momentum since the 
enactment of the HRA. A rights-based justification for judicial review is much more 
congruent with the normative assumption that underlies our own project of 
transformative constitutionalism. It is to be hoped that this trend towards substantive 
review, which gained momentum with the introduction of the HRA and was previously 
espoused by academic scholarship, will continue. Wide-spread judicial reform can be 
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attempted within the promising framework posited by proportionality review, which 
provides an ideal structure for the weighting and prioritising exercise inherent in a 
capabilities approach to the adjudication of government resource allocation decisions. 
The South African legal system can benefit from considering the advantages of 
proportionality as a uniform head of review in its own reasonableness review 
jurisprudence – and thereby strengthen its own capabilities approach to adjudication.  
India’s transformative constitutional framework and activist judicial approach that 
seeks to protect fundamental capabilities, constitute positive guidance for South 
African courts. The normative assumption that supports the Indian Supreme Court’s 
approach reflects that which underlies our own constitutional design. The broad 
interpretation of rights has empowered the Supreme Court to adopt a robust approach 
to the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions. Moreover, the judge-created 
Public Interest Litigation movement demonstrates that the structure of courts and 
litigation need not remain fixed. Where capabilities are allowed to form the centre of 
the judicial function, innovative development that relaxes rigid procedural rules is 
possible. Explicit, transparent reasoning and meaningful participation are thereby 
allowed to triumph.  
Relaxation of procedure as well as adaptions to a strictly adversarial model can 
partially overcome objections that courts are illegitimate and institutionally incompetent 
fora to adjudicate State resource allocation decisions. Furthermore, the separation of 
powers doctrine is reconceived in India as a more collaborative partnership that sets 
the realisation of capabilities as its common goal. The crucial importance of capabilities 
as instrumental to the leading of autonomous, dignified lives justifies all such 
innovations, aspects of which could be fruitfully incorporated by the South African 
judiciary.  
It is therefore regrettable that the Supreme Court has recently succumbed to a 
posture of deference in policy matters – even at the expense of vital capabilities. The 
normative assumption that underlies the application of this doctrine in the UK is equally 
inappropriate in India, which also boasts a transformative, supreme constitution. South 
African law would also benefit from continuing to develop a unified standard of 
substantive reasonableness review in socio-economic and administrative law cases, 
whereas administrative law review in India remains fragmented and underdeveloped.  
The following chapter will critically evaluate the need for development of a 
capabilities-based standard of review with reference to relevant South African 
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Constitutional Court jurisprudence. Furthermore, judicial competence to adjudicate 
State resource allocation decisions as evinced from jurisprudence will be illustrated.  
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Chapter 4: The need for development of a capabilities-based standard of 
review  
 
4 1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter, the need for development of a capabilities-based standard of review 
for the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions will be elucidated through 
the critical analysis of relevant Constitutional Court jurisprudence. This chapter 
therefore lays the basis for the development of a capabilities-based standard of review 
in the following chapter. Attention will be devoted to jurisprudence where the rights 
enshrined in sections 26, 27 and 331 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
(the “Constitution”) were implicated. Although resources are necessary for the 
realisation of any right, the relevance of resources is magnified where the State’s 
obligations under sections 26(2) and 27(2) are concerned.2 Furthermore, given the 
importance of administrative law in realising socio-economic rights and the desirability 
of developing a unified standard of review across these two fields of law, developments 
with regard to the standard of reasonableness review applied in administrative justice 
cases are included in the following analysis.  
First, certain trends apparent in Constitutional Court jurisprudence that are in need 
of judicial reform will be evaluated. In this regard, the Constitutional Court’s insufficient 
focus on the content of socio-economic rights will be illustrated and critically analysed. 
Next, the Court’s adoption of a narrow definition of “available resources” will be 
discussed. The problems inherent in the undue resort to judicial deference will be 
expounded, and the rigid distinction drawn between the State’s positive and negative 
obligations in respect of socio-economic rights will be questioned.  
Thereafter, aspects of relevant Constitutional Court jurisprudence that evince the 
judicial competence to adjudicate State resource allocation decisions will be 
highlighted. These include the requirement for reasonable resource allocation, and the 
                                            
1 S 33(1) states that “[e]veryone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable 
and procedurally fair”.  
2 This is due to the fact that courts will always have to consider the availability of resources in 
assessing the reasonableness of the measures adopted by the State to fulfil the rights set out 
in the first subsection of ss 26 and 27. Ss 26 and 27 constitute qualified socio-economic rights 
in that the State “must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of [the rights enshrined in s 26(1) and 27(1)]” 
(emphasis added).  
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role of the judiciary in terms of the separation of powers doctrine under a transformative 
constitution. Moreover, the Court’s ability to adjudicate highly complex policy matters 
will be analysed for its potential to be analogously extended to the review of allocative 
decisions. Finally, the Court’s robust review of justificatory arguments based on 
resource constraints will be evaluated.  
 
4 2 Aspects in need of reform    
 
4 2 1 An insufficient focus on the content of rights  
 
As has been argued throughout this dissertation, a capabilities approach to the 
adjudication of State resource allocation decisions requires that a two-stage process 
be followed, according to which the normative content of the socio-economic rights at 
stake determines the standard of scrutiny applied to any justificatory arguments raised 
by the State.3 Where the interpretative and justificatory stages of this process are 
collapsed, an inappropriate intensity of review may be applied and disproportionate 
weight may be assigned to the State’s justificatory arguments based on resource 
constraints.4 Furthermore, by failing to engage in normative interpretation, a court 
eschews the explicitness and substantive reasoning demanded by the application of a 
capabilities approach to adjudication under a transformative constitution.5 Explicit, 
substantive reasoning promotes a culture of justification, elucidates the State’s 
constitutional obligations and makes meaningful public scrutiny of the evaluative 
judgments arrived at by courts possible.  
The Constitutional Court’s approach to the adjudication of socio-economic rights 
claims has largely been characterised by an overwhelming focus on the 
reasonableness of the State’s actions. This has led to a failure to adequately develop 
flexible interpretations of the normative content and purposes of the rights at stake. As 
pointed out by Liebenberg: 
 
“The reasonableness model of review offers no clear distinction between determining the 
scope of the right, whether it has been breached, and justifications for possible 
infringements. This allows the courts to elide an initial principled engagement with the 
purpose and underlying values of the relevant rights and the impact of the deprivations on 
                                            
3 See further chapter two part 2 3 2 2 above.  
4 See chapter two part 2 3 2 above.  
5 See chapter two part 2 4 4 above.  
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the claimant groups. The focus of the inquiry... is on the justifiability of the State’s policy 
choices without a sustained analysis of the substantive values and purposes which the 
relevant rights protect under South Africa’s transformative constitution.”6  
 
Liebenberg’s argument can be developed further by conceptualising the 
“substantive purposes” that socio-economic rights seek to protect as the capabilities 
necessary to achieve the overarching functioning outcome of living an autonomous 
and dignified life in a position of substantive equality with others.7 In this sense, the 
fundamental values of freedom, dignity and equality can identify which more basic 
capabilities must be realised for the functioning outcome to be achieved.8 The social, 
historical and factual context9 of the case at hand will further identify what capabilities 
form part of the content of the relevant socio-economic right. 
For example, the purpose of the right of access to adequate housing can be said to 
be the achievement of the functioning outcome described above. However, in order to 
attain this functioning outcome, many more basic capabilities must first be realised. 
Depending on the position of the claimant group in the historical and social context of 
South Africa, considered along with the factual context or “lived reality” of the litigants, 
these capabilities may include the capabilities to enjoy adequate shelter, access to 
infrastructure and access to basic services. These capabilities are in turn necessary to 
realise other capabilities such as being able to enjoy a sufficient state of nourishment 
or an adequate state of health. As will be demonstrated below, insufficient attention 
has been devoted to the recognition and expansion of the vital capabilities that socio-
economic rights represent and should foster.  
 
4 2 1 1 Soobramoney  
 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal)10 (“Soobramoney”) serves as an 
exemplar of the pitfalls that can occur when a court fails to engage with the normative 
                                            
6 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 175-176, see further 173-179.  
7 This overarching functioning outcome thus gives expression to the fundamental values of 
freedom, dignity and equality that inform the capabilities approach and our Constitution. See 
further chapter two part 2 4 1.  
8 See further chapter two part 2 4 1 above.  
9 See further chapter two parts 2 3 3 3 3 and 2 4 1 above.  
10 1998 1 SA 765 (CC).  
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substance of the right at stake. In Soobramoney – a case that centred on the allocation 
of scarce medical resources – the appellant was denied dialysis treatment for chronic 
renal failure owing to the scarcity of resources in the provincial Health Department and, 
by extension, the public hospital to which he turned.11 The appellant relied on the 
constitutional right to life (section 11 of the Constitution) and the right not to be refused 
emergency medical treatment (section 27(3)) to argue that the public hospital should 
continue to provide on-going renal dialysis treatment to him. The provision of on-going 
treatment would require the allocation of additional resources by the State to the 
provincial Health Department and hospital in question.12  
The Constitutional Court held that sections 11 and 27(3) were of no avail to the 
appellant in this case. In addition, the Court made several statements regarding 
resources in the context of section 27(1)(a)13 and (2). Relief was ultimately denied on 
the basis that the allocation of scarce resources was rational in this case and that the 
granting of relief would result in manifold detrimental impacts on wider areas of 
resource allocation.  
The thin standard of rationality14 review adopted by the Constitutional Court can be 
ascribed to a number of factors.15 However, the Court’s failure to engage in explicit 
reasoning or to elaborate on the normative purposes of the socio-economic right of 
access to health care16 indubitably contributed thereto. By first grappling with the 
                                            
11 Due to the scarcity of resources experienced by the public hospital, only patients with 
curable, acute renal failure gain automatic access to dialysis treatment. Patients with 
irreversible, chronic renal failure must meet certain criteria to access dialysis treatment. Owing 
to the appellant’s heart disease, he was ineligible for dialysis treatment in the public sector. He 
had sought treatment from the private sector but eventually depleted his finances. 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) paras 3-5.  
12 Para 12.  
13 “Everyone has the right to have access to health care services…”. 
14 Rationality review can connote a minimum, “catch-all” standard of review, as well as a thin, 
highly deferential standard of review. This dissertation adopts the latter meaning in referring to 
rationality review. A Price “The Content and Justification of Rationality Review” (2010) 25 
SAPL 346 350, 356-359.  
15 For instance, the polycentric effect that the reallocation and prioritisation of resources would 
entail (Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) paras 28, 31), 
the existence of rational rationing criteria (para 25), consistent overspending by the provincial 
Health Department (para 24), and the nature and identity of the decision-maker (para 29: the 
provincial authority charged with making “difficult decisions at the political level”, para 45: the 
health authority that enjoys expertise). 
16 S 27(1)(a) of the Constitution.  
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content of the right of access to adequate health care, a more intense level of scrutiny 
might have been appropriately applied to the State’s resource allocation decisions. An 
application of a more robust intensity of review might have yielded the same outcome, 
yet the importance of the capabilities at stake would have necessitated closer scrutiny 
of the resource allocation decisions at issue. Such an approach would have been more 
in harmony with adjudication under a transformative constitution that seeks to advance 
basic capabilities through their incorporation as socio-economic rights.  
The Court failed to embrace a commitment to explicit, substantive reasoning as is 
required in a culture of justification17 when it wholly subsumed the content of the right 
of access to health care services as set out in section 27(1) of the Constitution into its 
assessment of the State’s obligations set out in section 27(2). Section 27(1) was 
thereby consigned a “definitional function only”,18 in that it merely served to categorise 
those claims which are in fact protected and which therefore trigger the imposition of 
the State obligations set out in the second subsection of section 27.  
Instead of clearly articulating what it considered as worthy of protection under 
section 27 (for example, curative or preventative treatment) and then distinguishing the 
appellant’s claim from the important capabilities encompassed by the right of access 
to health care, the Court resorted to implicit reasoning that obfuscates the normative 
content of the right at issue. Indeed, “the only substantive references to the ends that 
government is required to pursue [in terms of section 27(1)] are oblique and indirect”19 
– thus highlighting the deficiency of the Court’s approach when assessed in terms of 
the requirements of a capabilities-based model of review. 
 
4 2 1 2 Grootboom  
 
Following the disappointing judgment in Soobramoney, the Court subsequently 
developed a more nuanced reasonableness review approach to socio-economic rights 
                                            
17 See further chapter two part 2 4 4 above; E Mureinik “A Bridge to Where?: Introducing the 
Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31 32; M Pieterse “What do we Mean when we Talk 
About Transformative Constitutionalism?” (2005) 20 SAPL 155 156, 161, 165.  
18 C Scott & P Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A 
Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” (2000) 16 SAJHR 206 239. 
19 D Brand “The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, or 
‘What are Socio-Economic Rights For?’” in H Botha, A van der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) 
Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 33 45.  
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cases in Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom20 (“Grootboom”). In 
terms of this approach, the State’s obligations under sections 26(2) and 27(2) are 
adjudicated by asking whether the measures adopted are capable of facilitating the 
realisation of the right in question and whether such measures are reasonable.  
The Court fared somewhat better in recognising that the right of access to adequate 
housing21 “entails more than bricks and mortar”.22 However, after enumerating a brief 
list of what the right additionally encompasses,23 the Court did little further by way of 
engaging with the normative purposes and substance of the right with reference to the 
capabilities that it signifies.24 Where the Court did invoke the fundamental values of 
freedom, dignity and equality that inform socio-economic rights, it did so during its 
assessment of the reasonableness of State measures.25 In contrast to the Court’s 
approach, normative considerations should, as a first step, extend the partial ordering 
of values set by the right at stake. Normative considerations should thus be used to 
help identify which capabilities are implicated, and determine what weights should be 
assigned to these capabilities. Once the importance and weights of the relevant 
capabilities are determined, proportionate weights can then be ascribed to resource 
availability or constraints and other competing factors at the second stage of the rights 
analysis.  
Significantly, the Court did demand a means-end analysis in that the measures 
adopted by the State “must be capable of facilitating the realisation of the right”.26 
                                            
20 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). 
21 S 26 of the Constitution.  
22 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 35.  
23 Para 35: 
“It requires available land, appropriate services such as the provision of water and the 
removal of sewage and the financing of all of these, including the building of the house itself. 
For a person to have access to adequate housing all of these conditions need to be met: 
there must be land, there must be services, there must be a dwelling. Access to land for the 
purpose of housing is therefore included in the right of access to adequate housing in 
section 26.” 
24 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 177; D Brand “The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic Rights 
Jurisprudence, or ‘What are Socio-Economic Rights For?’” in H Botha, A van der Walt & J van 
der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 33 45-46.  
25 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 44; S 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 
177.  
26 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 41.  
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However, in order to determine whether the means can achieve the constitutionally 
mandated ends, those ends must be substantively interpreted.27 The Court failed to do 
so. Instead it again focused almost exclusively on the obligations imposed upon the 
State by the second subsection of the right.28  
 
4 2 1 3 TAC 
 
Similarly, in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2)29 (“TAC”), the 
Constitutional Court did not explicitly engage with the normative content of the right of 
access to health care services. Although there is implicit recognition that the 
administration of Nevirapine to mothers and their children forms part of this right, the 
normative justification for this conclusion was left unexplored. The ability of such 
treatment to achieve the overarching functioning outcome of living an autonomous, 
dignified life in a position of substantive equality with others was therefore left 
unexamined.30 Consequently, the weighting exercise inherent in a capabilities 
approach to the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions was once again 
eschewed.  
 
4 2 1 4 Mazibuko 
 
The Constitutional Court came close to a complete abdication of its interpretative 
duties in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg31 (“Mazibuko”). The Court reverted to a 
standard of rationality review in holding that the provision of 25 litres of water per 
person per day to poor residents of Phiri, Johannesburg (the “applicants”) was 
reasonable and did not breach section 27(1)(b)32 of the Constitution.  
                                            
27 D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-
Economic Rights (2007) 143.  
28 D Brand “The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, or 
‘What are Socio-Economic Rights For?’” in H Botha, A van der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) 
Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 33 45-46; S Liebenberg Socio-
Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 177.  
29 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). 
30 D Bilchitz “Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations 
for Future Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence” (2003) 19 SAJHR 1 8-10; S Liebenberg 
Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 178.  
31 2010 4 SA 1 (CC). 
32 S 27(1)(b) states that “[e]veryone has the right to have access to… sufficient food and water”. 
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Whereas the Supreme Court of Appeal had previously held that the right of access 
to “sufficient” water33 could not constitute “anything less than a right of access to that 
quantity of water that is required for dignified human existence”,34 the Constitutional 
Court declined to examine the substantive implications of the value of dignity for the 
normative content of the right. By refusing to interpret the normative substance of the 
right at issue, the Court conflated a two-stage enquiry into one that focused exclusively 
on the obligations of the State set out in the second subsection of section 27. The 
Court justified its failure to accord any significance to the content of the right with 
reference to the textual exposition of the right, the suggestion that interpreting content 
could have the “rigid” effect of preventing contextual analysis, and the Court’s own 
institutional limitations.35  
In the Constitutional Court, the applicants argued that the Court should quantify the 
right of access to sufficient water in order to facilitate the leading of a dignified life. 
However, the Constitutional Court rejected the argument that it was obliged or 
empowered to give quantitative content to section 27(1)(b).36 The Court misconstrued 
the applicants’ argument as one for the minimum core approach,37 whereby the 
minimum content of the right is what the State works from to progressively realise the 
right in its entirety. The applicants in fact argued for the quantification of the right in the 
sense of what the State should be working towards. In the latter sense, the 
reasonableness of the State’s conduct could then be evaluated against such 
constitutional goalpost as opposed to being assessed in a normative void. By failing to 
earnestly consider this distinction, the Court in effect failed to evaluate the State’s 
evidence with a view towards establishing whether it was in fact reasonably possible 
to provide “sufficient water” necessary for the leading of dignified lives.38    
  
                                            
33 S 27(1) of the Constitution.  
34 City of Johannesburg v Mazibuko 2009 3 SA 592 (SCA) para 17 (emphasis added).  
35 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 57-61. 
36 Para 56. 
37 For a discussion of what the minimum core entails, and problematic aspects inherent in the 
minimum core approach and Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities (MC Nussbaum Creating 
Capabilities (2011) 33-34), see chapter two part 2 2 2 1 2 above. 
38 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 469 and see for further criticism 466-480. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 177 
 
4 2 1 4 1 A proceduralised conception of progressive realisation  
 
The Court a priori assumed that the provision of “sufficient” water, on the applicants’ 
account, was not “immediately” possible.39 Yet the Court failed to acknowledge that, at 
the time of judgment, fifteen years during which the right should have been 
“progressively” realised had elapsed. The Court eschewed a substantive 
conceptualisation of progressive realisation as requiring the State to progressively 
improve the quality of access to socio-economic rights.40 According to the Court’s 
approach, progressive realisation only requires flexibility in the sense that the State 
should continually review its policies and adapt them in the light of changing 
circumstances.41 Without a substantive conceptualisation of what the right ultimately 
requires, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to truly assess the reasonableness of 
the State’s progress.42  
 
4 2 1 4 2 Disregarding context  
 
Context – both normative and factual – is a key consideration within a capabilities 
approach to adjudication.43 Without taking heed of the normative purpose of the right 
at issue in the context of the lived reality of those who allege a right-infringement, the 
important capabilities at stake cannot be identified. Where content cannot be ascribed 
to the relevant right with reference to the capabilities it represents in a given case, an 
                                            
39 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 56-59. In misconstruing the 
applicants’ argument as one for the “minimum core” approach, the Court accepted, without 
much evidence, the impossibility of even achieving a minimum standard. The Court previously 
made similar statements in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 
721 (CC). For criticism of the vague, unsubstantiated statements previously made by the Court 
in this regard, see D Bilchitz “Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying 
the Foundations for Future Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence” (2003) 19 SAJHR 1 16-17. 
40 A capabilities approach supports a substantive conceptualisation of progressive realisation. 
Capability realisation can lead to the achievement of a spectrum of functioning outcomes, 
ranging from basic to complex functionings. See further chapter two parts 2 2 2 1 and 2 3 2 3 
3 above.  
41 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 40, 67.  
42 The Court adopted an inverse approach to content when it stated: 
“By adopting [reasonable measures], the rights set out in the Constitution acquire content, 
and that content is subject to the constitutional standard of reasonableness.” Mazibuko v 
City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) para 66.    
43 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 377; chapter two part 2 3 3 3 3 above. 
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appropriate intensity of scrutiny cannot be determined.44 The Court was therefore 
prima facie correct when it stated that “[t]he concept of reasonableness places context 
at the centre of the enquiry and permits an assessment of context to determine whether 
a government programme is indeed reasonable”.45  
Incongruously, by failing to recognise that the normative values of freedom, dignity 
and equality necessitated a certain quantity of water,46 the Court failed to take seriously 
the lived reality of the applicants who lacked such quantity of water.47 The applicants 
were therefore deprived of the basic capabilities necessary to choose to lead an 
autonomous, dignified life in a position of substantive equality with others. “Context” as 
it pertains to implicated capabilities and the circumstances of the applicants played 
little role in the Court’s assessment of the State’s conduct.48 Furthermore, the Court’s 
suggestion that “[f]ixing a quantified content might, in a rigid and counter-productive 
manner, prevent an analysis of context” cannot be supported. As previously argued, 
the capabilities approach leaves room for flexibility in defining the content of rights and 
for the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions.49 The content of rights may 
change in correspondence to changing contexts.  
Thus, in a certain factual context the normative values of freedom and dignity may 
identify the capability to realise an adequate state of health as forming part of the 
content of the right of access to sufficient water. “Sufficient water” would therefore 
constitute the quantity of water necessary to realise the capability of enjoying an 
adequate state of health. In a different social and historical context, the value of 
equality may indicate that the capability to enjoy a greater quantity of water constitutes 
the content of the same right. Where this capability is not realised, disparities in access 
to water may exacerbate entrenched class-based patterns of disadvantage. The more 
complex capability of enjoying the freedom to live life in a position of substantive 
                                            
44 See chapter two above, and in particular parts 2 3 2 2, 2 3 2 3 and 2 3 3 3 3.  
45 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) para 60.  
46 The normative context. 
47 The factual context. See in this regard Applicants’ Heads of Argument paras 323-331 in 
Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC).  
48 For further criticism of the Court’s general approach that fails to place sufficient focus on the 
interests, needs and lived reality of litigants, see D Bilchitz “Placing Basic Needs at the Centre 
of Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence” (2003) 4 ESR Review 2. See also S Wilson & J 
Dugard “Taking Poverty Seriously: The South African Constitutional Court and Socio-economic 
Rights” (2011) 22 Stell LR 664 673-678. 
49 See chapter two part 2 3 2 3 4 above. See also S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: 
Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 471.  
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equality with others will thus be negated. “Sufficient water” in this case would constitute 
the quantity of water necessary to bring the relevant group’s access to water roughly 
in line with the access enjoyed by groups who do not suffer from structural patterns of 
race- or class-based disadvantage. One right can accordingly represent varying 
capabilities depending on the normative and social, historical and factual context at 
hand.  
The Court in Mazibuko therefore eschewed at least two central tenets of the 
capabilities approach in that it failed to explicitly grapple with the normative and factual 
content of the right at issue. As was the case in Soobramoney, these factors 
contributed to the Court’s application of a thin, highly deferential standard of rationality 
review. This standard is incommensurate with the importance of basic capability 
fulfilment for the achievement of the functioning outcome of living a free, dignified life 
as a substantively equal member of society.   
 
4 2 1 5 Blue Moonlight  
 
Even in those judgments where State resource allocation decisions were subjected 
to a sufficiently robust standard of review given the capabilities at issue,50 the Court 
could still do more to explicitly grapple with the content of the rights at stake. In City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd51 
(“Blue Moonlight”), the Constitutional Court was called upon to decide whether local 
government (the “City”) was constitutionally obliged to provide temporary, emergency 
housing to occupiers who were evicted from their homes by private landlords and who 
would be rendered homeless as a result of such eviction.  
The Court’s willingness to closely interrogate the State’s insufficient resource 
allocation could be explained by its implicit recognition of the effects of homelessness 
on the capabilities necessary to live a life characterised by freedom, dignity and 
equality. However, the Court did not justify its selected standard of scrutiny by way of 
explicit elaboration of the capabilities that must be realised in order for the overarching 
functioning outcome to be achieved. Besides some general observations regarding the 
impact of homelessness on dignity52 and a factual survey of the occupiers’ 
                                            
50 See part 4 3 4 below. 
51 2012 2 SA 104 (CC). 
52 Para 2. 
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circumstances,53 the Court only gave fleeting recognition to the intersection of the 
normative and factual context of the case at hand.54  
 
4 2 1 6 Implications of the Constitutional Court’s approach  
 
An insufficient focus on the content of socio-economic rights can cause 
reasonableness review to collapse into a predominantly procedural model of review 
that merely enforces “good governance standards”.55 This has led to comparisons 
between reasonableness review in socio-economic jurisprudence and an 
administrative law model of reasonableness.56 However, the comparisons made 
generally conceive of reasonableness review in administrative law as an impoverished 
standard of review akin to rationality review – devoid of substance and marred by 
formalism and undue deference to administrators.  
Yet administrative law review has undergone significant development since the 
advent of constitutional democracy in South Africa. Prior to the adoption of a supreme 
constitution, administrative law laboured under the influence of English law’s restrictive 
                                            
53 Paras 6-7.  
54 N 88 (emphasis added): 
“[In Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 
2004 6 SA 505 (CC)] … this Court noted that when determining whether an exclusion is 
reasonable regard must be had to: the purpose of the right in question; the impact of the 
exclusion on those excluded; the relevance of the ground of exclusion to the purpose of the 
right in question; and the potential impact the exclusion has on other intersecting rights. 
From the foregoing, it is evident that the Occupiers are disproportionately impacted by the 
exclusion. The effect that this exclusion has on their rights to life and dignity is significant.” 
See also C McConnachie & C McConnachie “Concretising the Right to a Basic Education” 
(2012) 129 SALJ 554 579.  
55 D Brand “The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, or 
‘What are Socio-Economic Rights For?’” in H Botha, A van der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) 
Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 33 49, see also 44-48.  
56 CR Sunstein “Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa” (2001) 11 
Constitutional Forum 123 130-131; D Brand “The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-
Economic Rights Jurisprudence, or ‘What are Socio-Economic Rights For?’” in H Botha, A van 
der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 
33; D Davis “Adjudicating the Socio-Economic Rights in the South African Constitution: 
Towards ‘Deference Lite’?” (2006) 22 SAJHR 301 314, 317, 318, 323. Steinberg distinguishes 
socio-economic rights reasonableness review from an administrative law model: C Steinberg 
“Can Reasonableness Protect the Poor? A Review of South Africa’s Socio-Economic Rights 
Jurisprudence” (2006) 123 SALJ 264. 
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standards of scrutiny and undue resort to deference.57 Moving from a pre-constitutional 
position where reasonableness as a ground for review was severely restricted,58 
administrative law review has gradually evolved to encompass a flexible, substantive 
conception of reasonableness.59  
Disparaging comparisons between reasonableness across these two spheres of law 
should therefore instead be replaced by comprehensive development of this model of 
review in order to benefit both socio-economic rights and administrative justice 
jurisprudence. By reconceiving reasonableness review as a nuanced, substantive 
standard that focuses on capabilities, the symbiotic relationship between socio-
economic rights and the right to administrative justice can be further strengthened.  
A unified capabilities-based standard of review that can be applied to State resource 
allocation decisions holds the potential to benefit litigants and prospective litigants, the 
State, and jurisprudence as a whole. By interpreting the content of rights with reference 
to the capabilities they aim to foster in a given normative and factual context, litigants 
and those similarly placed can expect courts to focus on their needs. Without focusing 
on socio-economic capability realisation, the overarching functioning outcome of 
having the freedom to choose a life lived with dignity in a position of substantive 
equality with others will never be possible. The formulation of a unified capabilities-
based standard of review can also clarify the constitutional obligations of the State, 
thereby allowing the State to formulate and implement its socio-economic programmes 
accordingly. Finally, a coherent body of jurisprudence allows for meaningful public 
scrutiny of the evaluative judgments made by courts. Public scrutiny can in turn lead 
                                            
57 For a critical analysis of the position in the United Kingdom, see chapter three part 3 2 3 
above.  
58 Union Government (Minister of Mines and Industries) v Union Steel Corporation (South 
Africa) Ltd 1928 AD 220 236-237. 
59 Early development of substantive reasonableness review in judgments such as Carephone 
(Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO 1999 3 SA 304 (LAC) and Roman v Williams NO 1998 1 SA 270 (C) 
was initially thwarted by the Constitutional Court in Bel Porto School Governing Body v 
Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC). In casu, the majority reverted to rationality as 
standard of review whereas, in contrast, the minority advocated a substantive conception of 
reasonableness review similar to proportionality review. In Minister of Health v New Clicks 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign as Amicus Curiae) 2006 2 SA 311 (CC), 
the Constitutional Court confirmed that a higher level of scrutiny, namely reasonableness 
review, was necessitated by the Constitution. Despite a Wednesbury unreasonableness (see 
chapter three part 3 2 3 1 above) formulation in s 6(2)(h) of PAJA, the Constitutional Court 
further developed a test for substantive reasonableness in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC).  
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to the contestation of initial judgments, and the formation of new evaluative judgments 
in the light of evolving reality.   
 
4 2 2 A narrow definition of “available resources”  
 
Resources are central to the realisation of socio-economic rights and for the 
transformation of a society marred by a profoundly unequal distribution of 
capabilities.60 The State’s constitutional obligation to adopt reasonable measures 
“within available resources” to realise the socio-economic rights enshrined in sections 
26 and 27 of the Constitution can be interpreted narrowly or broadly.61 The question 
thus arises as to whether a court is bound to evaluate only the “resource envelope”62 
already allocated to the specific State department or socio-economic policy. Another 
interpretative possibility posits that the judiciary is under a constitutional obligation to 
assess a wider resource pool that is, or has the potential to be, at the State’s disposal. 
“Available resources” thus stands to be construed in a broad or a narrow sense.63  
The Constitutional Court has often displayed a distinct discomfort with the prioritising 
dimensions of socio-economic rights.64 The Court has therefore favoured a narrow 
interpretation of “available resources” in its attempt not to exacerbate institutional 
tensions between it and the legislative and executive branches of government.  
 
4 2 2 1 Allowing available resources to define the content of rights  
 
Thus, in Soobramoney, the Constitutional Court interpreted “available resources” 
narrowly when it was called upon to look beyond existing budgetary allocations. The 
Court noted at the outset that the obligations imposed on the State by both sections 
                                            
60 RE Robertson “Measuring State Compliance with the Obligation to Devote the ‘Maximum 
Available Resources’ to Realizing Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights” (1994) 15 HRQ 
693 694; C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence on Equality” (1998) 14 SAJHR 248 249.  
61 Ss 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution.  
62 C Barberton “Paper Tigers? Resources for Socio-Economic Rights” (1999) 2 ESR Review 6 
7.  
63 D Moellendorf “Reasoning about Resources: Soobramoney and the Future of Socio-
Economic Rights Claims” (1998) 14 SAJHR 327 330. 
64 See C Scott & P Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A 
Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” (2000) 16 SAJHR 206 252 
quoted and discussed in the context of rationing scarce resources in chapter two part 2 3 4 4.  
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26 and 27 are dependent on resources “available for such purposes”65 and that the 
rights themselves are limited and defined by reason of a lack of resources.66 In a 
separate judgment, Madala J likewise adopted a narrow construction of “available 
resources” when stating that constitutional rights could be limited for certain reasons, 
one such reason being the scarcity of resources.67  
The availability or scarcity of resources therefore defined the content of the right. 
Conversely, according to a capabilities approach to the adjudication of resource 
allocation decisions, the normative content of the right in question should determine 
what resources are made available for the fulfilment of the right and its corresponding 
obligations. Justificatory arguments regarding scarcity of resources should then only 
be evaluated in the light of the importance of the content and purposes of the right at 
stake.  
The Court also effectively limited the section 27(3) right not to be refused emergency 
medical treatment to the provision of resources that are existing and available when it 
stated: 
 
“A person who suffers a sudden catastrophe which calls for immediate medical attention… 
should not be refused… emergency services which are available and should not be turned 
away from a hospital which is able to provide the necessary treatment. What the section 
requires is that remedial treatment that is necessary and available be given immediately to 
avert that harm.”68 
 
This suggests that the State is not under a positive duty to procure additional 
resources to ensure that emergency treatment is in fact available to everyone.69   
                                            
65 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 11 (emphasis 
added).  
66 Para 11.  
67 Para 43.  
68 Para 20 (emphasis added). But compare the separate judgment of Sachs J where he states 
that s 27(3) “provides reassurance to all members of society that accident and emergency 
departments will be available”, thereby suggesting that the State is in fact obliged to take 
positive measures to ensure the availability of emergency medical resources. Para 51 
(emphasis added). 
69 Scott and Alston charge that the Court’s purely negative interpretation of the right amounts 
to a misinterpretation of the Indian jurisprudence referred to by the Court and that such a 
reading renders the right redundant (C Scott & P Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities 
in a Transnational Context: A Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” 
(2000) 16 SAJHR 206 247). The Court relied on Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samity v State 
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4 2 2 2 Leaving allocative decisions unquestioned  
 
Having not disputed the court a quo’s finding that the provincial Health Department 
had insufficient funds to treat patients in the appellant’s position, the appellant in 
Soobramoney argued that the State should allocate additional funds so as to make the 
treatment in question more widely available.70 The Court ultimately disagreed.  
The Court pointed out that the provincial Health Department had significantly 
overspent its budget in the past and was set to continue this trend in the future. If the 
facts of the case had been different and the national government had been joined as 
a party,71 the Court could have been expected to scrutinise allocations to the provincial 
Health Department from the overall budget in the light of the obligations placed on the 
State by section 27. However, rather than seeking to give content or relative weight to 
the right of access to health care and thereby assess the sufficiency of the health 
budget, the Court simply accepted that resources were significantly inadequate.  
The Court went on to focus on several manifestations of the polycentric impact that 
an order in favour of the appellant would have.72 If an increased allocation of resources 
for the treatment of patients with chronic renal failure were to be ordered, such an order 
would possibly need to be accommodated within existing budgetary allocations. This 
would necessitate a reprioritisation within the available provincial health budget. If such 
an order mandated an increase of the overall health budget, the national budget would 
be detrimentally affected in at least two ways: First, treatment would have to be 
extended to all similarly placed persons (ie all patients suffering from chronic renal 
failure), thereby impacting on the health budget and prejudicing other health care 
programmes. Second, other patients requiring expensive tertiary care would also have 
to be accommodated. Extending treatment to those similarly placed would necessitate 
                                            
of West Bengal (1996) 4 SCC 37 (discussed in chapter three part 3 3 3 2) but failed to account 
for the positive remedial measures (including the remedy’s impact on resource allocation) 
imposed by the Indian Supreme Court. 
70 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 23.  
71 For example, had tertiary health care not been at issue or, alternatively, had more compelling 
evidence been presented to justify the allocation of additional funds. S Liebenberg Socio-
Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 140-142. 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 24 states that 
the provincial Health Department “does not have sufficient funds to cover the cost of the 
services which are being provided to the public” and that the scarcity of dialysis resources “is 
a nation-wide problem and resources are stretched in all renal clinics throughout the land”. 
72 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) paras 28, 31. 
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a dramatic increase of the health budget, which would in turn affect the State’s 
obligations with regards to the provision of other socio-economic goods.73  
Having outlined the “hugely radical consequence of this one judgment”,74 the Court 
proceeded to make the following controversial statement:75 
 
“The provincial administration which is responsible for health services in KwaZulu-Natal has 
to make decisions about the funding that should be made available for health care and how 
such funds should be spent. These choices involve difficult decisions to be taken at the 
political level in fixing the health budget, and at the functional level in deciding upon the 
priorities to be met. A court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions taken in good 
faith by the political organs and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with 
such matters.”76 
 
The effect of the above quoted and preceding passages was thus to limit the section 
27(2) phrase “within available resources” to those resources already allocated to the 
particular right or socio-economic purpose. Political decisions aimed at fixing the health 
budget were left unexamined for compliance with the obligations imposed by the 
constitutional right of access to health care (and even, arguably, for compliance with 
the requirement of substantive rationality).77 The Court failed to require proof that the 
State had taken any steps to procure additional funding to ameliorate the obviously 
inadequate budget78 and lessen the need for significant over-expenditure.  
  
                                            
73 Paras 28, 31.  
74 C Scott & P Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A 
Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” (2000) 16 SAJHR 206 241.  
75 C Scott & P Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A 
Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” (2000) 16 SAJHR 206 241 
state that this passage “has been read by many to signal a deference bordering on abdication 
of a review role in assessing the constitutional adequacy of existing state resources”. 
76 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 29 (emphasis 
added). 
77 M Pieterse “Health Care Rights, Resources and Rationing” (2007) 127 SALJ 514 532. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the development and content of the requirement that, at a 
minimum, all instances of public power must be rational, see generally A Price “The Content 
and Justification of Rationality Review” (2010) 25 SAPL 346.  
78 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 23, where the 
Court noted that the court a quo had found that a lack of funds had been conclusively proven 
and was not disputed and para 24, where the Court set out the significant over-expenditure by 
the provincial Health Department, noting that stretched resources was a nation-wide problem. 
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4 2 2 3 Implications of the Constitutional Court’s approach 
 
According to Sen, health is of paramount importance in a capabilities approach79 
according to which government should strive to enable all persons to be or do that 
which they have reason to value. He notes in this regard that “some of the most 
important policy issues in the promotion of health care are deeply dependent on the 
overall allocation of resources to health, rather than only on distributive arrangements 
within health care”.80 The Court’s focus in Soobramoney on “distributive arrangements 
within health care” and the possible polycentric impact that an increase in the budget 
would have instead of first scrutinising how the content of the right at stake should 
influence budgetary allocations is therefore regrettable.81  
The Court unquestioningly accepted the wisdom of the myriad political choices that 
led to the current – admittedly insufficient82 – allocation of resources. Pieterse forcefully 
argues this point in the context of health care rationing: 
 
“[T]he ‘inevitability’ of financial constraints is a fallacy that has long frustrated legal 
responses to the social ‘realities’ of poverty and deprivation. Meaningful engagement with 
the dilemmas of health-related resource rationing requires an acknowledgment that budgets 
and the accompanying resource limitations that shape the context of rationing decisions are 
political, rather than natural, phenomena.”83 
 
Political decisions foreshadow budgetary allocations for all socio-economic rights. 
Liebenberg84 and Mbazira85 separately note that the Court’s approach to resource 
allocation in Soobramoney fails to promote a rights-conscious budgeting process on 
                                            
79 A Sen “Why Health Equity?” (2002) 11 Health Econ 659 659. Nussbaum similarly includes 
health in her list of central capabilities. MC Nussbaum Women and Human Development: The 
Capabilities Approach (2000) 78. 
80 A Sen “Why Health Equity?” (2002) 11 Health Econ 659 661.  
81 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 139, 141, 142.  
82 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) paras 23-24.  
83 M Pieterse “Health Care Rights, Resources and Rationing” (2007) 127 SALJ 514 526. 
Pieterse repeats this point with particular reference to Soobramoney v Minister of Health 
(KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) at 528.  
84 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 142.  
85 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 96. 
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the part of the State. Moellendorf’s warning that “[a] broader sense of ‘available 
resources’ must be employed if socio-economic rights are to guide policy rather than 
depend upon it” is thus apposite.86 Pieterse similarly argues that the content of the right 
at stake should influence the budgeting process,87 but that the Court in Soobramoney 
regarded resource scarcity as a “natural, rather than political fact”.88 By failing to 
interrogate these choices for compliance with a capabilities-centred budgeting 
process,89 courts in effect allow government to minimise its constitutional obligations 
by allocating minimal resources for the realisation of crucial socio-economic rights. 
This, in turn, potentially renders socio-economic rights devoid of meaning, substance 
or remedial force.90  
In order to prevent this, the content of the relevant socio-economic right must be 
defined independently of resource constraints.91 By substantively interpreting the 
socio-economic right, the importance of the capabilities forming the content of the right 
is allowed to determine what resources are allocated to socio-economic policies. For 
example, where people lack access to “sufficient” food,92 their capabilities to be 
adequately nourished and enjoy an adequate state of health are negated. The more 
complex capability set required to live an autonomous, dignified life as an equal 
member of society cannot be realised in such conditions. This type of scenario calls 
for effective, prioritised resource allocation. If that means declaring a current budgetary 
allocation to be constitutionally inadequate, it is a judgment that is mandated by the 
Constitution and the transformative, capabilities-enhancing purposes it seeks to 
achieve.  
However, a decade after Soobramoney, the Court in Mazibuko again displayed its 
unwillingness to let the normative purposes underpinning a socio-economic right 
dictate budgetary allocation, and not vice versa. In declining to determine the content 
                                            
86 D Moellendorf “Reasoning about Resources: Soobramoney and the Future of Socio-
Economic Rights Claims” (1998) 14 SAJHR 327 332.  
87 M Pieterse “Health Care Rights, Resources and Rationing” (2007) 127 SALJ 514 521.  
88 532. 
89 See chapter five part 5 4 2 3 below.  
90 M Pieterse “Health Care Rights, Resources and Rationing” (2007) 127 SALJ 514 528; C 
Barberton “Paper Tigers? Resources for Socio-Economic Rights” (1999) 2 ESR Review 6 7. 
91 D Bilchitz “Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations 
for Future Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence” (2003) 19 SAJHR 1 19-23. See part 4 2 1 
above.  
92 S 27(1)(b) of the Constitution.  
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of the right of access to sufficient water, the Court held that it is for the legislative and 
executive branches “to investigate social conditions in the light of available budgets 
and to determine what targets are achievable in relation to social and economic 
rights”.93 As argued above,94 social conditions and the normative content of socio-
economic rights must be permitted to inform what resources are allocated and made 
“available”. A narrow definition of “available resources” may wholly deprive socio-
economic rights of their normative force.95 
 
4 2 3 Undue deference to other branches of government  
 
The Constitutional Court has recognised the need for deference to other branches 
of government in the context of formulating a substantive test for reasonableness 
review in administrative law cases.96 The Court characterised deference as “respect” 
for the decisions of government based on the character of the decision and the 
expertise of the decision-maker.97 However, the Court explicitly held that the nature of 
the decision and the identity of the decision-maker do not absolve a court from 
                                            
93 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) para 61 (emphasis added). See S 
Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 
469 who criticises the Court for avoiding its special responsibilities “to interpret the normative 
standards underpinning socio-economic rights”.  
94 Part 4 2 1 above.  
95 D Moellendorf “Reasoning about Resources: Soobramoney and the Future of Socio-
Economic Rights Claims” (1998) 14 SAJHR 327 332. See also K Chetty “The Public Finance 
Implications of Recent Socio-Economic Rights Judgments” (2002) 6 LDD 231 250.  
96 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 45. Given the similarity of reasonableness review as developed across the fields of 
administrative law and socio-economic rights jurisprudence, the Court’s reasoning is also 
apposite for claims framed purely in terms of socio-economic rights. The Court’s 
conceptualisation of deference is thus relevant for administrative law and socio-economic 
rights reasonableness review. For a discussion of the contextual test for reasonableness 
developed by the Court, see chapter five part 5 2 2 below.  
97 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 48. In doing so, the Court referred to a dubious dictum by Lord Hoffman in the UK 
judgment of R (on the application of ProLife Alliance) v British Broadcasting Corporation [2003] 
UKHL 23 para 76. For criticism of Lord Hoffman’s conceptualisation of deference, see chapter 
three part 3 2 3 2 2 (b) above. For a conceptualisation of deference as respect, see further C 
Hoexter “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 SALJ 
484 501.  
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reviewing the decision.98 It therefore remains uncertain under which exact 
circumstances resort to deference will be appropriate. However, in this dissertation it 
is argued that concerns of constitutional and institutional competence should 
preferably be accommodated at the remedial – and not the review – stage of 
adjudication.   
 
4 2 3 1 Double counting deference  
 
The perceived need for deference should not be allowed to determine the level of 
scrutiny applied to a State resource allocation decision. As argued in the analysis of 
the position in the United Kingdom, if deference influences the level of scrutiny 
adopted, and deference is again shown when such scrutiny is applied to the State 
resource allocation decision, the potential to “double count” deference arises.99 
Nonetheless, it emerges that in certain judgments, deference was in fact allowed to 
influence the judicial choice to adopt a thin standard of rationality review.100 Whereas 
this tendency is somewhat understandable in the United Kingdom given that 
jurisdiction’s system of parliamentary sovereignty, it is inappropriate to resort to 
deference so easily in a system of constitutional supremacy.  
 
4 2 3 2 Impeding the development of substantive review in administrative law   
 
Given the vast influence of English law on our own system of administrative law, 
undue deference to administrators coupled with restrictive formalism have plagued 
administrative law for over a century. This tendency threatens the continued 
                                            
98 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 48 (emphasis added).  
99 See chapter three part 3 2 3 2 2 (d) above.  
100 For example, in Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC); 
arguably in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) and in the majority judgment 
of Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC). Rationality 
review is not appropriate in cases where important capabilities are at stake. The importance 
of the capabilities (that form the content of the socio-economic right) for the achievement of 
the functioning outcome of living a life characterised by freedom, dignity and equality justifies 
the adoption of a more intense level of scrutiny. M du Plessis & S Scott “The Variable Standard 
of Rationality Review: Suggestions for Improved Legality Jurisprudence” (2013) 130 SALJ 
597 616. 
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development of a substantive test for reasonableness in administrative law.101 The 
formalistic, restrictive legacy left by English law renders swift reform particularly 
welcome.102 Where a State resource allocation decision implicates a capability that 
underlies both the right to administrative justice and a socio-economic right, cases may 
arise where claims are framed exclusively in terms of administrative law. Since just 
administrative action is often essential for the realisation of socio-economic rights, it is 
therefore important to ensure that reasonableness review develops substantively 
across both spheres of law.  
It is thus to be hoped that the judiciary will not revert to the formalistic, unduly 
deferential approach apparent from the majority judgment in Bel Porto School 
Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape103 (“Bel Porto”). The Court applied a thin 
standard of rationality in reviewing the failure by the Western Cape Education 
Department (“WCED”) to employ general assistants working at certain applicant 
schools, which had been previously advantaged under the apartheid regime’s 
educational system. These schools received a subsidy from the Department of 
Education, which could be spent at the schools’ discretion. Citing financial pressure 
and near-bankruptcy, the schools urged the WCED to employ their general assistants 
and accordingly to carry the cost of retrenchment should that become necessary. 
When the WCED refused to do so, the schools claimed that this decision infringed, 
inter alia, their right to equality enshrined in section 9 of the Constitution and their right 
to just administrative action as set out in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Act 200 of 1993 (“interim Constitution”).104 
The majority of the Court drew a rigid distinction between procedural and 
substantive fairness, and denied that substantive fairness formed part of the right to 
just administrative action. The Court therefore rejected the approach previously 
                                            
101 For a discussion of the formulation of a substantive test for reasonableness, see chapter 
five parts 5 2 1 and 5 2 2 below. 
102 C Hoexter “Judicial Policy Revisited: Transformative Adjudication in Administrative Law” 
(2008) 24 SAJHR 281 293. For the traditionally close relationship between deference and 
administrative law, see further D Davis “Adjudicating the Socio-Economic Rights in the South 
African Constitution: Towards ‘Deference Lite’?” (2006) 22 SAJHR 301 319-320. 
103 2002 3 SA 265 (CC).  
104 Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 84. 
This judgment was decided on the basis of item 23(2)(b) of Sch 6 of the Constitution, according 
to which s 24 of the interim Constitution was retained until the enactment of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”). 
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espoused by the Labour Appeal Court in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO105 
(“Carephone”) regarding the change brought about to the common-law position by the 
constitutional provision that administrative action must be “justifiable” in relation to the 
reasons given for it. In Carephone, Froneman DJP had held that the constitutional 
provision required rationality of outcome or merit of the administrative action under 
review and not rationality as merely indicative of procedural impropriety.106 Such 
substantive rationality107 was informed by the normative values of accountability, 
responsiveness and openness.108  
Opting instead for an interpretation of the right to just administrative action which 
continued to severely restrict administrative law review for reasonableness, the 
majority in Bel Porto stated that to recognise the requirement for substantive fairness 
“would drag courts into matters which according to the separation of powers should be 
dealt with at a political or administrative level and not at a judicial level”.109 Instead, the 
Court held that for a decision to be justifiable, it merely needed to be rational and 
lawful.110  
The Court took note of the variable levels of intensity with which reasonableness 
review was applied in the United Kingdom depending on the implication of a human 
right.111 Distinguishing the present case as involving an important policy that did not 
infringe constitutional or other rights,112 the Court declined to express an opinion on 
the justifiability of varying levels of intensity of review.113 A substantive approach to 
review that recognises that the capabilities at stake may justify variability of scrutiny114 
is commensurate with adjudication under a transformative constitution.115  
                                            
105 1999 3 SA 304 (LAC). 
106 Para 31. 
107 Para 37. 
108 Para 35. 
109 Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 88.  
110 Para 89. 
111 See chapter three part 3 2 4 above.  
112 Cf the discussion of the minority judgment in chapter five part 5 2 1 below, in which Mokgoro 
and Sachs JJ found that the right to just administrative action had in fact been infringed. Bel 
Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 150.  
113 Para 127.  
114 C Hoexter “The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law” (2000) 117 
SALJ 484 504. 
115 G Quinot “Substantive Reasoning in Administrative-law Adjudication” (2010) 3 CCR 
111 113.  
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Moreover, substantive review cannot be said to breach the separation of powers 
since all exercises of public power should be consistent with the Constitution “and it is 
the duty of courts”116 to ensure that such power is exercised in harmony with the tenets 
of the Constitution. It is this crucial difference between our constitutional system, and 
the system of parliamentary sovereignty prevalent in the United Kingdom, that merits 
a decisive break from a tradition of judicial deference still apparent in UK jurisprudence 
and academic debates.117  
 
4 2 3 3 Depriving socio-economic rights of their normative force  
 
Turning to socio-economic rights claims, in Soobramoney the identity of the 
decision-maker and the polycentricity of the rationing decisions at issue led directly to 
the adoption of a standard of rationality review.118 The Court rightly acknowledged the 
identity and expertise of the medical authority responsible for devising the rationing 
criteria for admission to kidney dialysis treatment. However, the same cannot be said 
with regard to the identity of the political authorities responsible for setting the budget 
that resulted in the need for rationing. If the political identity of those responsible for 
setting budgets calls for automatic deference, then socio-economic rights will be 
rendered meaningless as all such rights centre upon the allocation of resources.119  
Similarly, since most resource allocation decisions are complex and polycentric, the 
nature of the decision cannot justify reflexive resort to a deferential level of scrutiny. 
Instead, a level of scrutiny that is congruent with the capabilities at issue can be 
applied. When applying such level of scrutiny and evaluating the cogency of any 
justificatory resource-based arguments proffered by the State, the reviewing court may 
find that the technicality and persuasive force of the evidence warrants deference as 
respect. However, where the reviewing court carefully considers such evidence and 
still finds the State’s resource allocation decisions constitutionally wanting, such issues 
may be best resolved at the remedial stage.120   
                                            
116 Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign as 
Amicus Curiae) 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) para 313 (emphasis added); see further part 4 3 3 below. 
117 See chapter three part 3 2 3 2 above.  
118 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) paras 29, 45.  
119 M Pieterse “Health Care Rights, Resources and Rationing” (2007) 127 SALJ 514 528, 531.  
120 See generally chapter six.  
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Mazibuko serves as a sobering example of the dangers that hiding behind a shield 
of deference can pose for the exercise of capabilities-enhancing adjudication. The 
Court’s rigid conceptualisation of the separation of powers doctrine in effect absolved 
it of any meaningful judicial responsibility to take capabilities seriously, or to hold the 
State to account for its socio-economic policy choices. As Williams appositely explains, 
the separation of powers doctrine is too abstract and vague to provide any useful 
guidelines regarding a reviewing court’s role in the quantitative implementation of 
socio-economic rights.121 It therefore falls to a court to decide what the separation of 
powers doctrine, viewed in the context of a transformative constitution, demands in a 
given case. Given the fact that, on the evidence presented,122 the applicants’ ability to 
achieve the functioning outcome of living an autonomous, dignified life as equal 
members of society was clearly threatened by their inability to access sufficient water, 
the Court displayed undue deference.  
Furthermore, the Court purported to espouse a conception of reasonableness 
review that fosters accountability. However, it proceeded to accord “presumptive 
validity”123 to the State’s evidence. This evinces an approach that elevates deference 
above the need to apply robust scrutiny to State actions that have the potential to cause 
basic capability deprivation. Finally, the Court failed to acknowledge that separation of 
powers concerns could be accommodated by innovative, dialogic remedial 
approaches.124 
 
4 2 4 A rigid distinction between positive and negative duties   
 
In Grootboom, the Constitutional Court recognised that section 26 of the 
Constitution encompasses a negative obligation “placed upon the state and all other 
entities and persons to desist from preventing or impairing the right of access to 
adequate housing”.125 In TAC, it was stated that section 27 contains a similar negative 
                                            
121 LA Williams “The Role of the Courts in the Quantitative Implementation of Social and 
Economic Rights: A Comparative Study” (2010) 3 CCR 141 141-143. 
122 See in this regard Applicants’ Heads of Argument paras 323-331 in Mazibuko v City of 
Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC). 
123 LA Williams “The Role of the Courts in the Quantitative Implementation of Social and 
Economic Rights: A Comparative Study” (2010) 3 CCR 141 189.  
124 195-196; see further chapter six especially part 6 3 below.  
125 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 34.  
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duty.126 Whereas the positive obligations incumbent upon the State in terms of sections 
26(2) and 27(2) are defined and limited by considerations of reasonableness, 
progressive realisation and available resources, these qualifications do not pertain to 
negative obligations.  
 
4 2 4 1 A more robust standard of review 
 
The widened scope of these negative obligations as well as a traditional aversion to 
the enforcement of positive duties, have triggered a notably different mode of review 
in cases where negative obligations to refrain from impairing access to socio-economic 
rights are at issue. Instead of the State’s obligations being circumscribed by resource 
constraints as is the case where positive duties are concerned, a presumptive 
infringement of a negative right triggers the application of the stringent proportionality 
analysis required by the section 36 general limitations clause.127  
Although the State’s latitude to rely on resource constraints is reduced where 
negative obligations are adjudicated, judgments in such cases have nevertheless 
resulted in orders with manifest implications for State resource allocation. For example, 
in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz128 (“Jaftha”), the Constitutional Court 
closely examined certain provisions of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 32 of 1944 that 
allowed for the sale in execution of people’s homes in order to satisfy even trifling 
debts. Having established that this procedure prima facie infringed the applicants’ 
negative right not to be deprived of their existing access to adequate housing,129 the 
Court subjected the Act to stringent review under the general limitations clause.130 The 
Court held that the violation of the negative obligation could not be justified, and 
proceeded to issue a remedy of judicial oversight of future sales in execution under the 
Act.131 This remedy clearly necessitates additional (time-, human- and ultimately 
                                            
126 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 46. 
127 S Liebenberg “Grootboom and the Seduction of the Negative/Positive Duties Dichotomy” 
(2011) 26 SAPL 37 41. For a discussion of the proportionality analysis required by s 36 of the 
Constitution, including the text of the provision, see chapter five part 5 3 1 2 1 below.  
128 2005 2 SA 140 (CC).  
129 Para 34. 
130 Paras 35-49.  
131 Paras 54-55.  
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budgetary) resources;132 yet this result was seemingly not considered in the light of the 
negative duty at stake. 
 
4 2 4 2 A false premise regarding resource allocation 
 
One of the reasons why courts regard themselves as more institutionally competent 
to adjudicate negative rights and duties is that negative rights are traditionally regarded 
as entailing less far-reaching resource implications.133 As observed by Young, 
“negative obligations are easier for a court to deal with”134 and the prioritising 
dimensions of socio-economic rights can purportedly be avoided.135  
However, as Liebenberg persuasively argues, all human rights obligations demand 
significant positive action and concomitant resource allocation by the State.136 As the 
author points out, the crucial difference in the scope of resource allocation for the 
realisation of socio-economic rights and traditionally recognised civil and political rights 
is that the State has already invested vast resources in the infrastructure necessary to 
realise the latter category of rights:137 
 
“The fact that socio-economic rights require a greater commitment to institutional reforms 
and are thus more resource intensive in many contexts than civil and political rights is due 
to historical and political choices rather than any intrinsic feature of the rights 
themselves.”138 
 
It is consequently unsound to allow a false dichotomy between positive and negative 
duties to influence the level of scrutiny adopted for the adjudication of State resource 
allocation decisions. Instead of resorting to typologies that focus on the nature of rights 
or the duties they give rise to,139 it should be borne in mind that “the ideological lens 
                                            
132 S Liebenberg “Grootboom and the Seduction of the Negative/Positive Duties Dichotomy” 
(2011) 26 SAPL 37 51.  
133 48.  
134 KG Young Constituting Economic and Social Rights (2012) 177.  
135 See part 4 2 2 above regarding the Court’s aversion to the prioritising aspects of socio-
economic rights in relation to the need to define “available resources” broadly.  
136 S Liebenberg “Grootboom and the Seduction of the Negative/Positive Duties Dichotomy” 
(2011) 26 SAPL 37 49.  
137 51.  
138 51-52.  
139 As originally devised by H Shue Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and US Foreign 
Policy (1980). 
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through which a right is viewed determines which kind of duties are in focus”.140 Where 
resource allocation decisions fall to be adjudicated, the vital capabilities at issue should 
dictate what level of scrutiny is appropriate. Capabilities thus constitute the “ideological 
lens” through which the State’s obligations should subsequently be assessed.  
 
4 2 4 3 The implication of identical capabilities 
 
Identical capabilities may be implicated in a case which can be framed in terms of 
the positive duties of the State under section 26(2), or its negative duties under section 
26(1) or 26(3).141 For example, where occupiers are evicted from a privately owned 
building and no provision for temporary accommodation is made, the capabilities 
imperilled will include those related to enjoying shelter from the elements, access to 
infrastructure, proximity to places of work, and access to services such as water, 
electricity and sanitation. The deprivation of these elementary capabilities may negate 
the capability to live itself, in other words it could result in absolute capability 
deprivation.  
By framing a claim in terms of section 26(1) or 26(3), the duty of the State in this 
type of situation could be characterised as “negative”. This may lead to the application 
of the stringent section 36 limitations analysis to determine whether the State has failed 
to discharge its negative obligation by failing to prevent interference with existing 
access to the socio-economic right.142 This claim could also be framed so as to require 
the state to adopt “positive” reasonable measures to make provision in its housing 
                                            
140 S Fredman Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (2008) 67.  
141 S 26 states: 
“Housing 
26. (1) Everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. 
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right. 
(3) No one may be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished, without an 
order of court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. No legislation may 
permit arbitrary evictions.” 
142 The “existing access test” was developed in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 
2 SA 140 (CC) para 34. M Dafel “The Negative Obligation of the Housing Right: An Analysis 
of the Duties to Respect and Protect” (2013) 29 SAJHR 591 600 states in this regard:  
“[T]he existing access test entails that a claimant must institute his socio-economic rights 
claim as a negative obligation if he already has access to the socio-economic resources 
and there is a measure or the threat of a measure that seeks to erode the current enjoyment 
of the resource.” (Original emphasis).  
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policy for temporary accommodation. In the latter case, a limitations analysis will not 
follow and the State’s omission may be judged against a much lighter level of scrutiny. 
Dafel states in this regard: 
 
“A claimant that can characterise his case as one where the state has breached the negative 
obligation will in all likelihood have a stronger case for the vindication of his socio-economic 
right than a claimant that only invokes the state’s positive obligations to act.”143 
 
The fact that a stronger claim may exist where a case is characterised as the breach 
of a negative obligation – even though the same capabilities are implicated regardless 
of how the claim is framed – proves the falseness of the dichotomy between positive 
and negative obligations. Moreover, it shows that a continued adherence to this 
dichotomy can have serious detrimental consequences for the realisation of critical 
socio-economic capabilities.  
 
4 3 Evidence of judicial competence to review resource allocation decisions 
 
Despite the analysis above of the shortcomings of the Constitutional Court’s 
approach, reasonableness review has developed in socio-economic rights and 
administrative justice jurisprudence to encompass many characteristics required for 
the evolution of a capabilities-centred approach to the adjudication of State resource 
allocation decisions. The capabilities-congruent elements of reasonableness review 
can be extracted from the jurisprudence in both these spheres of law, and further 
developed to enhance capabilities to the greatest extent possible. The following part 
will evaluate judgments in which the Constitutional Court evinced its competence to 
adjudicate resource allocation decisions.  
 
4 3 1 “Reasonable” resource allocation? 
 
In Grootboom the Constitutional Court stressed that the reasonableness approach 
does not query “whether public money could be better spent”,144 but instead questions 
whether the elected measures (which should include allocative choices) are 
reasonable. At the outset it is noteworthy that the Court acknowledged that the housing 
                                            
143 M Dafel “The Negative Obligation of the Housing Right: An Analysis of the Duties to Respect 
and Protect” (2013) 29 SAJHR 591 594-595.  
144 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 41.  
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budget allocated by national government appeared to be “substantial”.145 The Court’s 
assessment of resource allocation therefore took place in circumstances where 
substantial additional expenditure would not be necessary. In contrast to the position 
in Soobramoney, the minimal impact that a court order would have on resource 
allocation therefore diffused concerns based on polycentricity.  
Yet there is some ambiguity in the Court’s approach to the justiciability of resource 
allocation decisions. On the one hand, the Court appears to have adopted a narrow 
interpretation of “available resources”, in terms of which resources act solely as a 
limiting device. Limited resources accordingly widen the scope of the State’s margin of 
discretion to select “reasonable measures” to achieve the right in question while 
simultaneously circumscribing the State’s obligations under section 26(2): 
 
“[B]oth the content of the obligation in relation to the rate at which it is achieved as well as 
the reasonableness of the measures employed to achieve the result are governed by the 
availability of resources. Section 26 does not expect more of the state than is achievable 
within its available resources.”146 
 
Although the State’s chosen measures “must be calculated to attain the goal 
expeditiously and effectively”,147 the availability of resources will play an important role 
in determining what is reasonable. Whether this approach is sustainable given that it 
arguably elevates the influence of “available resources” over the influence that the 
content of the right exerts on a determination of reasonableness,148 has been 
elaborated upon above.149 
On the other hand, the Court intimated that resource allocation itself, in other words, 
what resources are made “available” to a particular socio-economic purpose, must be 
reasonable. For example, the Court stated that a “reasonable” part of the national 
budget must be allocated for the socio-economic purpose at issue, although the 
precise allocation was “in the first instance” for government to decide.150 The latter 
qualification does not, however, restrict a court’s power and duty to subsequently 
                                            
145 Para 47. 
146 Para 46 (emphasis added).  
147 Para 46. 
148 For example, the Court states that “the goal” must be achieved effectively but does not 
embark on an in-depth analysis of the right of access to adequate housing (para 46). 
149 Part 4 2 2 above.   
150 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 66.  
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enquire as to the reasonableness of resource allocation.151 In addition, the Court held 
that a reasonable programme must “ensure that the appropriate financial and human 
resources are available”.152 It follows that the resource allocation “appropriate” to a 
reasonable programme is a reasonable allocation of resources.  
The Court went on to highlight that national government plays an important role in 
allocating revenue to the provincial and local spheres of government153 and that 
effective implementation of socio-economic policy requires “adequate” budgetary 
support by the national sphere.154 Furthermore, the Court’s statement that “every step 
at every level of government must be consistent with the constitutional obligation”155 to 
achieve the socio-economic right in question should logically be interpreted as also 
pertaining to the budgeting process. Consequently, the budgeting process itself must 
be informed by the State’s socio-economic obligations and, by implication, the content 
of the particular socio-economic right.  
Finally, the Court concluded by noting that the achievement of socio-economic rights 
is undoubtedly a difficult task in the light of, inter alia, limited available resources. 
Nonetheless, the Court held that the State is obliged to fulfil its constitutional 
obligations and that “courts can and in appropriate circumstances, must enforce”156 
these obligations. 
 
4 3 2 Positioning the judiciary under the separation of powers  
 
In TAC, the Constitutional Court engaged with the implications that the separation 
of powers doctrine has for the adjudication of socio-economic rights. As previously 
noted in chapter two, the adjudication of resource allocation decisions brings to the 
                                            
151 See M Pieterse “Coming to Terms with Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights” 
(2004) 20 SAJHR 383 408 where he argues that “courts are not ill-equipped to scrutinise or 
evaluate budgets or policies just because they are ill equipped to engage in budgeting or policy 
making” (original emphasis). See also D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The 
Justification and Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights (2007) 104 who argues that courts 
do not overstep separation of powers boundaries by simply reviewing decisions already taken 
by the elected branch.  
152 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 39 
(emphasis added).  
153 Para 40. 
154 Para 68.  
155 Para 82. 
156 Para 94.  
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fore tensions inherent in the separation of powers doctrine.157 Concerns arise that the 
judiciary is an illegitimate and incompetent forum for the adjudication of matters such 
as resource allocation. The Court proceeded from the position that deference 
regarding the adjudication of policy decisions as well as deference at the remedial level 
of adjudication may affect the manner in which such issues are adjudicated, but does 
not negate the justiciability of policy-laden issues.158  
 
4 3 2 1 Institutional competence and polycentricity  
 
In its discussion of and refusal to apply the so-called minimum core approach,159 the 
Court reiterated statements in Grootboom to the effect that the State is not obliged to 
provide more than its available resources allow.160 The Court a priori assumed, without 
citing cogent budgetary or economic evidence, that “[i]t is impossible to give everyone 
access to even a ‘core’ service immediately”.161 The Court highlighted both the 
problems of institutional competence and polycentricity when it stated that “courts are 
not institutionally equipped… for deciding how public revenues should most effectively 
be spent” in the light of multiple pressing demands on the public fiscus. This line of 
reasoning thus mirrors the emphasis placed on polycentricity in the Soobramoney 
judgment. However, in casu, the severity of the threat to the right of access to health 
care ultimately trumped concerns related to polycentricity.162  
                                            
157 Chapter two part 2 4 2 above.  
158 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 22; K 
McLean Constitutional Deference, Courts and Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa (2009) 
127-128. 
159 For a discussion of the problems inherent in a minimum core approach to the adjudication 
of socio-economic rights, and the ability of Sen’s theory to circumvent these problems, see 
chapter two part 2 2 2 1 2 above.  
160 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 32; 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) paras 46, 94.  
161 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 35. See 
also D Bilchitz “Towards a Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the 
Foundations for Future Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence” (2003) 19 SAJHR 1 17 who 
questions whether this is merely “a pessimistic expression of despair at the severity of the 
problems facing the country” rather than a fact.  
162 See, for example, the acknowledgement of the various demands on the State but the 
conclusion that the State nevertheless bears this “difficult” burden in terms of the Constitution. 
Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 94.  
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The Court went on to delineate its role in the adjudication of resource allocation 
decisions within reasonableness review and the separation of powers doctrine as a 
restrained one:  
 
“Courts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where court orders could have multiple social 
and economic consequences for the community. The Constitution contemplates rather a 
restrained and focused role for the courts, namely, to require the state to take measures to 
meet its constitutional obligations and to subject the reasonableness of these measures to 
evaluation. Such determinations of reasonableness may in fact have budgetary 
implications, but are not in themselves directed at rearranging budgets. In this way the 
judicial, legislative and executive functions achieve appropriate constitutional balance.”163   
 
Given that socio-economic rights require the prioritisation of resources,164 a court 
order resulting in a “rearrangement” of budgets will be constitutionally mandated where 
government policy falls short of the obligations placed on the State by sections 26(2) 
and 27(2).  
In so far as the Court noted that it would not draft budgets as a forum of first instance, 
it is correct. However, given the basic capabilities protected by socio-economic rights 
and the centrality of resource allocation decisions to the realisation of these rights, 
courts should not shy away from closely examining budgets and resource allocation 
decisions. Simultaneously, the above quoted statement also reflects a wider 
understanding of reasonableness review. According to this reading, reasonableness 
informs “available resources” as opposed to a more restrictive approach in terms of 
which State obligations are simply limited or defined by the resources made “available” 
to socio-economic purposes.  
 
4 3 2 2 Circumventing the need to perform a cost-benefit analysis   
 
The Court’s decision in TAC was ultimately an easy one given the importance of the 
interests at stake coupled with the minor cost implications of its order. Questions of 
institutional competence and polycentricity were thus not as prominent as they were in 
the case of Soobramoney, where resources were scarce. In TAC, assertions of 
budgetary constraints and incapacity165 were outweighed by the nature of the interests 
                                            
163 Para 38 (emphasis added). 
164 See further chapter five part 5 3 3 1 below.  
165 See, for example, Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 
(CC) paras 54, 65, 89. 
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at stake and the serious consequences that a violation of the right would have.166 In 
casu, failure to provide anti-retroviral treatment to pregnant, HIV-infected women 
posed the risk that their infants would subsequently die. The consequences of 
infringing the right of access to health care in this case would thus be absolute 
capability deprivation.  
However, budgetary constraints were not in reality a concern in this case since 
substantial additional funds had been made available to health departments before the 
judgment was handed down.167 For the State to continue with its non-inclusive policy 
in such circumstances would thus appear to be patently irrational, and would only 
require a thin or weak standard of rationality review to be applied in order to find the 
policy constitutionally wanting.168  
If resource constraints had been of greater concern, a more difficult proportionality 
analysis that assigned different weights to real resource constraints vis-à-vis the nature 
of the interests at stake may have been required. Such a weighting exercise could 
have resulted in more meaningful guidelines regarding the justiciability of resource 
allocation decisions in the context of a proportionality enquiry. Furthermore, the 
allocation of additional funds relieved the Court of the task of performing a cost-benefit 
analysis involving the merits of expenditure forthwith on a right to secure savings in the 
future.169 Liebenberg notes that engagement with this issue “would have drawn the 
Court into a much more direct evaluation of resource allocation priorities”.170 The 
question as to whether similar infringements could in future be trumped by prima facie 
proof of budgetary constraints or whether the Court would be willing to find that the 
                                            
166 See, for example, paras 68, 93, 94.  
167 Para 120.  
168 See D Brand “The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic Rights 
Jurisprudence, or ‘What are Socio-Economic Rights For?’” in H Botha , A van der Walt & J van 
der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 33 41, 50-51 
who acknowledges that the level of scrutiny in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 
(No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) is stricter than that applied in Government of the Republic of South 
Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC), but goes on to argue that on closer inspection the 
standard of “rational coherence” – or a finding of “simple irrationality” – constituted an important 
element in the Court’s decision. 
169 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) paras 116, 
120.  
170 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 193.  
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State is obliged to solicit additional resources to secure vital socio-economic 
capabilities was therefore left unanswered.  
 
4 3 2 3 Asserting the judicial competence to formulate resource-intensive remedies 
 
The Court espoused a robust approach to the formulation of remedies with 
budgetary impacts that may require the State to look further afield for resources. In 
contextualising the Court’s powers to issue remedies – including mandatory remedies 
– within the separation of powers doctrine, the Court stated: 
 
“Government is constitutionally bound to give effect to such orders whether or not they affect 
its policy and has to find the resources to do so.”171 
 
It is noteworthy that the availability of additional, sufficient budgetary resources was 
considered crucial in the Court’s discussion of “circumstances relevant to the order to 
be made”.172  
Whereas the Court may have ultimately shied away from issuing a structural 
interdict,173 an approach whereby a deferential attitude toward the adjudication of 
resource allocation is considered at the remedial stage rather than at the review stage 
is to be welcomed.174 Such an approach creates a space in the review stage for the 
substantive interpretation of socio-economic rights, followed by a proportionality-as-
weighting exercise.175 If, during this stage, resource constraints emerge as a serious 
concern, a participatory remedy can open up dialogue between the court, the litigants, 
the State and other stakeholders. This could facilitate a co-operative solution as to how 
additional resources can be procured and most efficiently deployed. By requiring the 
active involvement of the State in this process, the reviewing court can ensure that it 
does not itself usurp the functions of the other branches of government.  
  
                                            
171 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 98 
(emphasis added).  
172 This discussion can be found at paras 115-120, with the absence of resource constraints 
emphasised at para 120.  
173 Para 129.  
174 The use of participatory yet strongly managerial remedies to circumvent concerns regarding 
possible infractions of the separation of powers doctrine will be more fully canvassed in chapter 
six, especially in part 6 3.  
175 See further chapter five part 5 3 below.  
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4 3 3 Engagement with complex evidence  
 
The Court’s assessment of technical evidence in Minister of Health v New Clicks 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign as Amicus Curiae)176 (“New 
Clicks”) provides a useful illustration of courts’ institutional competence and ability to 
deal with intricate policy issues. In casu, reasonableness review was definitively 
developed in administrative law to encompass more than a thin, highly deferential 
standard of rationality review. Although not pertinently dealing with the adjudication of 
State resource allocation decisions, the judgment is nevertheless valuable for the light 
it sheds on how complex and technical evidence can be reviewed under administrative 
law where socio-economic rights are implicated. New Clicks therefore illustrates the 
substantive evolution of administrative law reasonableness review, it demonstrates the 
synergy between administrative justice and socio-economic rights and it lays the 
foundation for overcoming objections that courts do not possess the expertise to 
adjudicate complex, polycentric budgetary evidence. 
In casu, the Constitutional Court had to decide on the validity of certain regulations 
made to give effect to a new pricing system for medicines. The Minister of Health had 
made the regulations on the recommendation of the Pricing Committee.177 Although 
the Court was called upon to decide numerous issues regarding the validity of the 
regulatory scheme as a whole, it is noteworthy that in evaluating whether the 
regulations set an “appropriate” dispensing fee178 that pharmacists could charge when 
selling medicines, the Court was compelled to engage with wide-ranging technical 
evidence by juxtaposed experts.179   
                                            
176 2006 2 SA 311 (CC). 
177 In casu, five judgments concluded that PAJA was applicable to the making of the 
regulations, one judgment concluded that PAJA was only applicable to the fixing of a 
dispensing fee that pharmacists could charge and five judgments decided that it was not 
necessary to decide the issue. Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd 
(Treatment Action Campaign as Amicus Curiae) 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) para 13.  
178 Instead of pharmacists being permitted to charge a mark-up over the purchase price as well 
as a small dispensing fee, the Medicines and Related Substances Act 101 of 1965 as amended 
by the Medicines and Related Substances Amendment Act 59 of 2002 now shifted 
pharmacists’ revenue from such mark-up to a prescribed dispensing fee. Para 319.  
179 See, for example, paras 320-388. The complex nature of the issue that fell to be adjudicated 
was aptly captured by Yacoob J when he described introduction of the new, transparent pricing 
system as “as difficult to achieve as it is vital to our democracy” (para 799).  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 205 
 
4 3 3 1 Judicial competence to review socio-economic matters  
 
Prior to turning to an evaluation of evidence, Chaskalson CJ stated that although 
the choice to introduce pricing regulation was a policy decision, it had to be borne in 
mind that the Court was not concerned with “better” ways of achieving the same 
purpose.180 Rather, the Court was fulfilling its role in democracy by determining 
whether the pricing scheme was implemented in accordance with the law.181 Moreover, 
the Court was not barred from adjudicating what an “appropriate” fee would entail, 
despite the absence of an “absolute standard” for determining thus: 
 
“I do not agree that a court should refrain from examining the lawfulness of the dispensing 
fee simply because the decision as to what it should be involves economic and political 
considerations. The exercise of all public power is subject to constitutional control and it is 
the duty of courts if called upon to do so to determine whether or not power has been 
exercised consistently with the requirements of the Constitution and the law.”182 
 
Chaskalson CJ contextualised his evaluation of the complex evidence by noting at 
the outset that courts must be sensitive to the “special role” that the executive has in 
making regulations. In addition, the Chief Justice highlighted the “special expertise” 
possessed by the Pricing Committee. Nevertheless, although “[w]hat is or is not 
relevant, and what is appropriate, were in the first instance matters for the Pricing 
Committee and the Minister to decide”,183 the Court could not rubber-stamp a decision 
based solely on the identity of the decision-maker.184 What is reasonable or not will 
entail a balancing of different interests. Similarly, the decision as to what level of 
deference should be accorded to the expertise of the decision-maker should be made 
after carefully balancing different considerations.185 The Court – while mindful of 
factors that arguably called for a measure of deference – did not shy away from 
                                            
180 Para 236.  
181 Para 33.  
182 Para 313 (emphasis added). Compare the Court’s reluctance to adjudicate issues that could 
have economic consequences in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 
5 SA 721 (CC) para 38. 
183 Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign as 
Amicus Curiae) 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) para 390. 
184 Citing Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 
SA 490 (CC) para 48. 
185 Cf the critical analysis of automatic resort to deference in the United Kingdom in chapter 
three part 3 2 3 2 above.  
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scrutinising how the Pricing Committee arrived at the establishment of the dispensing 
fee.  
 
4 3 3 2 Placing the justificatory onus on the primary decision-maker   
 
The majority of the Court (which held that the fee set was not “appropriate”) did not 
purport to establish what an “appropriate” dispensing fee was.186 Nevertheless, it 
required the Pricing Committee to have considered all relevant factors that emerged 
from the expert evidence presented,187 to clarify what weight was assigned to certain 
considerations188 as well as to produce positive evidence proving any assumptions 
relied on in determining the fee.189 Significantly, the onus was thus placed on the 
Minister and Pricing Committee to explain the “appropriateness” of the prescribed fee: 
 
“Absent such explanation, there is sufficient evidence on record to show that the dispensing 
fee is not appropriate.”190  
 
In this regard, Sachs J stated that the “novelty and the uncertainty of [the matter at 
hand’s] potential impact, requires persuasive evidence to indicate that the measure 
                                            
186 Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign as 
Amicus Curiae) 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) para 316. See also the judgment of Ngcobo J where he 
acknowledged that what is “appropriate” or not does not constitute a precise criterion but rather 
a range of possible outcomes. Moreover, the determination of such a fee involved economic 
and other policy considerations which in turn called for expertise and understanding of a 
complex market. Consequently, the Court should only interfere with an established fee if it fell 
outside the “range” of what was appropriate (paras 521-522). See further the judgment of 
Moseneke J at para 713.  
187 Paras 391, 399. 
188 Para 392. Compare the Court’s seeming presumption that the State’s evidence was correct 
without probing what factors were taken into account or what weight was assigned to different 
considerations in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) para 89.  
189 Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign as 
Amicus Curiae) 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) paras 400, 404. 
190 Para 404. See also paras 531, 535-541. With regards to the question of onus in respect of 
justification for socio-economic policy choices, cf the position in UK jurisprudence regarding 
discrimination in matters of general socio-economic strategy discussed in chapter three part 3 
2 3 3 3 above.  
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falls within the bounds of what is reasonable”.191 The onus may thus be heavier where 
a matter is novel and its impact is therefore uncertain.  
 
4 3 3 3 The interaction between administrative justice and socio-economic rights  
 
The robust engagement with complex and technical evidence was justified given 
that the socio-economic right of access to health care services was implicated. 
Conversely, the fact that administrative law review, which is familiar to our courts, was 
involved may have instilled confidence in the members of Court applying 
administrative-law principles to pronounce on complex matters and even interpret the 
right of access to health care services substantively. It was held that the provision in 
the Medicines Act that gave rise to the regulation setting an “appropriate” dispensing 
fee was aimed at giving effect to the right of access to health care services as 
enshrined in section 27(1) and (2) of the Constitution: 
 
“The right to health care services includes the right of access to medicines that are 
affordable. The state has an obligation to promote access to medicines that are 
affordable.”192  
 
Sachs J, while accepting the evaluations of the appropriateness or reasonableness 
of the fee by Chaskalson CJ and Ngcobo J in “broad terms”, sought to give even 
greater weight to the influence that the right of access to health care services should 
have exercised on the enquiry.193 Sachs J held that section 27 of the Constitution was 
“a major element informing the reasonableness of the work of the Pricing Committee” 
and that the “determination of the appropriate dispensing fee had accordingly to be 
evaluated as a measure undertaken to achieve the realisation of access to health care 
services”.194 Moreover, Sachs J went on to emphasise that “[t]he importance of this 
                                            
191 Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign as 
Amicus Curiae) 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) para 664 (emphasis added), where what is appropriate 
is equated with what is reasonable.  
192 Para 514 per Ngcobo J. See also the judgment of Chaskalson CJ at para 314.  
193 Moseneke J similarly emphasised the urgency in realising this and other socio-economic 
rights and proposed that the State should “accelerate reasonable and progressive schemes to 
ameliorate vast areas of deprivation afflicting millions of our people and in particular 
inadequate health care”. In addition, access to affordable medicines constitutes “an important 
component of any scheme directed at poverty reduction and the physical well-being of all our 
people”. Para 705.   
194 Para 650.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 208 
 
objective cannot be overestimated”195 within the socio-economic context of South 
Africa. The impact that the right at stake has on conduct by the State and subsequent 
review by the courts was well illustrated when he stated: 
 
“When reasonableness is considered it becomes particularly important to ensure that 
vulnerable sections of the population are protected. The discretion of the rulemakers 
becomes attenuated to the degree that the fundamental rights of the people who are most 
disadvantaged are affected.”196 
 
Set within the normative paradigm of the constitutional right at stake, arriving at an 
“appropriate” dispensing fee should entail a careful balancing of diverse, conflicting 
interests. On the one hand, the objective of promoting access to medicines “at the 
lowest cost possible”197 is congruent with the right of access to health care services 
and the obligation on the State to take reasonable measures, within available 
resources, to progressively realise this right. On the other hand, the interests of the 
pharmacists to remain in business would be threatened by a dispensing fee that was 
set too low. However, this latter interest could be outweighed by the “interests of the 
general public”.198 At the same time, the economic viability of pharmacies is essential 
for the supply of medicines and thus for the right of access to health care services.199 
Moseneke J pertinently stated with regard to this balancing process: 
 
“The ultimate question must be whether the determination of appropriateness falls within a 
range of what may be reasonably regarded as proper, well-suited and fair. That 
determination falls to be made by balancing out the relevant but often competing factors 
and thereafter striking equilibrium amongst all factors. The competing factors would include 
the factual context, the purpose of the power, the nature of the measures impugned and its 
impact on affected parties and on the public interest.”200 
  
                                            
195 Para 651.  
196 Para 653.  
197 Para 519.  
198 Para 519. 
199 Para 518.  
200 Para 713. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 209 
 
4 3 3 4 The role of explicit reasoning in evaluating an initial weighting exercise  
 
The Minister and Pricing Committee were thus obliged to strike this delicate balance 
in the first instance.201 In a crucial passage, Chaskalson CJ, in identifying the factors 
that need to be considered and balanced, acknowledged the difficulty that arose when 
courts are called upon to review the weight assigned to different values by the primary 
decision-maker. The obligation to consider all relevant circumstances encompasses 
the duty to “attach such weight… as the degree of importance [of the relevant 
consideration] requires”.202 The difficulty of reviewing such a weighting exercise 
renders a full explanation by the decision-maker crucial.203  
This approach is congruent with Sen’s postulation that once a focal space for 
evaluation of competing interests or capabilities is established (in this case by 
reference to the right of access to health care services), a “partial ordering” of 
differently weighted capabilities can be achieved.204 Through informational broadening 
and explicit reasoning (in casu, a comprehensive explanation as to how the fee was 
arrived at and what weights were assigned in making such decision), courts can further 
prioritise capabilities and develop “coherent and consistent criteria for social and 
economic assessment” through a process of reasoned evaluation.205 Whereas this is 
true for engagement with complex evidence in general, it is submitted that it is equally 
valid for the adjudication of polycentric and complex resource allocation decisions in 
particular. The adjudication of resource allocation decisions can thus be practically 
accomplished and theoretically justified.  
  
                                            
201 The polycentric nature of the setting of the fee was recognised in paras 527-531.  
202 Para 530. 
203 Para 531.  
204 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 78.  
205 253. Besides placing the onus on the State to explain and present evidence regarding its 
resource allocation decisions, further remedial mechanisms to facilitate informational 
broadening will be explored in chapter six. Such remedial mechanisms can arguably overcome 
objections to the justiciability of resource allocation decisions based on concerns regarding 
polycentricity, institutional competence and legitimacy.  
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4 3 4 Robust review of justificatory arguments   
 
In Blue Moonlight,206 the Constitutional Court was compelled to scrutinise the State’s 
defence based on limited resources in the context of the City of Johannesburg’s 
obligation to provide alternative accommodation to persons evicted from privately-
owned buildings. Such enquiry was necessary due to the fact that, firstly, the City’s 
assertion that it did not have a duty to provide alternative accommodation in these 
circumstances was closely linked to its interpretation of its own powers to raise funds 
and budget for this purpose. Secondly “it would be quite inappropriate for a court to 
order an organ of state to do something that is impossible, the more so in a young 
constitutional democracy”.207  
 
4 3 4 1 The Supreme Court of Appeal’s judgment in Blue Moonlight  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal had previously held that a duty to provide temporary 
accommodation in such circumstances was in fact incumbent on local government. As 
far as limited “available resources” were concerned, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
emphasised the need for proportionality. The Court noted that in the light of the need 
for cautious judicial intervention, the realities of limited resources and the import of 
socio-economic rights, “a court’s role can rightly be described as ‘the art of the 
possible’”.208  
The Supreme Court of Appeal held in this regard that the City, working within a 
budget surplus, had not shown that it was not possible to reallocate funds or meet its 
obligations, and that its papers had not “grappled with” or sought to inform the Court 
as to what was in fact possible.209 In addition, the City had argued its defence of 
resource constraints in “the vaguest terms” and had not categorically averred that it did 
not have the funds to meet its obligations.210 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
pointed out that the City was itself to blame for any resource constraints it experienced 
                                            
206 See part 4 2 1 5 above.  
207 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 69 (emphasis added).  
208 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2011 4 SA 337 (SCA) para 54.  
209 Para 49. 
210 Para 50.  
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as “it could have adopted a long-term strategy, which ought to have included financial 
planning, to deal with such exigencies”.211  
The Supreme Court of Appeal thus evidently employed a wide interpretation of 
“available resources”. According to this definition, not only already allocated resources 
are considered, but resources that could have and should have been marshalled by 
the State to fulfil its constitutional obligations are also taken into account. Fault on the 
part of the City was exacerbated by the fact that it had been aware of the occupier’s 
situation for three financial years but had failed to procure the necessary funds. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal therefore concluded: 
 
“As a result, the City has, through its general reports, vague responses to its budget surplus 
and denial of any obligations towards the occupiers, failed to make out a case that it does 
not have the resources to provide temporary accommodation for the occupiers if they are 
to be evicted.”212 
 
4 3 4 2 The Constitutional Court’s judgment in Blue Moonlight  
 
The Constitutional Court commended the Supreme Court of Appeal for delivering a 
“strongly reasoned” judgment and confirmed its conclusions in all material respects.213  
 
4 3 4 2 1 Inter-governmental allocative responsibility   
 
The Court dismissed the City’s argument that, on its purported interpretation of 
Chapter 12 of the National Housing Code of 2000 (revised in 2009) (“Chapter 12”) and 
the judgment in Grootboom,214 it was not “entitled”215 to nor obliged to fund emergency 
housing.216 In its discussion of Grootboom – and in an effort to determine to what extent 
the Constitutional Court in that case had delineated the roles of the three spheres of 
                                            
211 Para 51. 
212 Para 52 (emphasis added).  
213 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 102.  
214 The City argued that Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 
46 (CC) paras 39-40 and 47 did not use any “funding” language in relation to local government, 
and that any implementation of obligations on the part of government could only be fulfilled 
pursuant to legislation. City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) paras 48-50.  
215 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 48. 
216 Paras 48-50, 52, 54.  
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government to provide access to adequate housing – the Court stated that “[w]ithout a 
national policy to get the ball rolling from a legislative and budgetary perspective, it 
would be impossible for the other spheres of government to do anything 
meaningful”.217 Nevertheless, the Court noted that whereas national policy and 
budgetary support were essential to facilitate the fulfilment of local government’s 
obligations regarding the provision of emergency housing, the decision in Grootboom 
was not authority for the proposition that local government was not entitled to self-fund. 
In contrast, local government was best placed to react to and prospectively plan for 
emergency housing situations.218  
The City further sought to rely on its own policy document and its interpretation of 
Chapter 12 to argue that its capacity to provide emergency accommodation was 
directly dependent on provincial government’s provision of funding. According to the 
City, its own responsibilities were thus limited to submitting an application to provincial 
government for emergency assistance and to subsequently implement emergency 
measures funded by the province. The Court, however, expressed scepticism at the 
City’s implied submission that Chapter 12 should be interpreted in accordance with its 
own policy document, since that policy document was itself based on an interpretation 
of Chapter 12.219  
The City attempted to bolster its argument by submitting that it could not budget for 
unforeseeable items, outside the scope of its current need, such as the provision of 
emergency accommodation. All it could do in such instances was to identify emergency 
situations and apply to provincial government for funding.220 The Court rejected the 
City’s arguments in this regard and pointed out that the wording of Chapter 12 did not 
explicitly render the City’s obligation to provide emergency housing wholly dependent 
on funding by provincial government. The Court went on to state that budgetary 
demands resulting from emergency situations were at least relatively foreseeable, and 
that the City could make predictions based on available information gleaned from the 
use of, for example, surveys.221 The Court further scrutinised Chapter 12 and 
concluded that the City was duty-bound to “plan and budget proactively” in its yearly 
application for funds for emergency situations such as that before the Court in this 
                                            
217 Para 56. 
218 Paras 54-57.  
219 Para 61.  
220 Para 62.  
221 Para 63.  
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case.222 The Court therefor concluded that “the City has both the power and the duty 
to finance its own emergency housing scheme”.223  
 
4 3 4 2 2 Adjudicating a defence of limited resources    
 
The Court went on to deal pertinently with the City’s defence based on limited 
resources, in terms of which the City argued that it was “not obliged to go beyond its 
available budgeted resources to secure housing for homeless people” and that 
“[r]esources not budgeted for are not available”.224 The City thus advocated a narrow 
interpretation of “available resources” that focused exclusively on already-allocated, 
existing resources.  
The Court noted that although the City objected to the use of financial projections 
that predicted a budget surplus, it failed to substantiate claims that such projections 
were unreliable and that it was now predicted that a budget deficit would allegedly 
occur. Moreover, the Court appears to have been prepared to analyse the adequacy 
of the City’s housing budget within the context of its overall budget. However, relevant 
evidence in this regard had not been placed before the Court by the City.225 The Court 
ostensibly attempted to draw a link between resource allocation and the model of 
reasonableness review applied in socio-economic rights jurisprudence when it stated:  
 
“This Court’s determination of the reasonableness of measures within available resources 
cannot be restricted by budgetary and other decisions that may well have resulted from a 
mistaken understanding of constitutional or statutory obligations. In other words, it is not 
good enough for the City to state that it has not budgeted for something, if it should indeed 
have planned and budgeted for it in the fulfilment of its obligations.”226 
 
The Court concluded that the Supreme Court of Appeal’s finding that the City had 
not sufficiently proved that it did not possess adequate resources to provide 
emergency housing had not been impugned and therefore had to stand.227  
In determining whether a lack of resources relieved the State of its constitutional 
responsibilities, the Court prima facie appears to have applied a standard of 
                                            
222 Paras 65-67.  
223 Para 67. 
224 Para 72.  
225 Para 74.  
226 Para 74 (emphasis added). 
227 Para 75.  
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reasonableness. The Court linked the correct interpretation of the State’s constitutional 
duties to resource allocation when it stated that its determination of reasonableness 
could not be circumscribed by budgetary decisions based on a misapprehension by 
the City of its constitutional or statutory obligations.228 Consequently, an accurate 
budgeting or allocation process will affect a determination of whether the State’s 
measures to fulfil a socio-economic right in section 26 or 27 are reasonable.229  
However, the question that arises is whether reasonableness review will still be 
applied to resource allocation where the government has understood its obligations 
correctly and has rationally allocated resources accordingly. In the absence of a 
mistaken apprehension of its duties, does a rational (as opposed to reasonable) link 
between the State’s obligations (properly understood) and its resultant resource 
allocation suffice? It is argued in this dissertation that a more robust standard of 
reasonableness should be applied consistently both to the measures adopted by the 
State to fulfil the rights in sections 26 and 27 and likewise to the allocation and use of 
resources for this purpose.230 A reading of the Court’s dicta in this case that supports 
a direct link between reasonableness review and reasonable resource allocation is 
therefore preferable to an approach that advocates reasonable measures while 
paradoxically only requiring rational resource allocation decisions.   
                                            
228 Para 74 (emphasis added). 
229 See further chapter five part 5 4 2 1 below.  
230 C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A Choice between Corrective 
and Distributive Justice (2009) 94-95 ostensibly advocates the adjudication of resource 
allocation in terms of the reasonableness of allocation and use of said resources, while noting 
that the Constitutional Court has not elaborated what relationship exists between resource 
allocation and reasonableness review or whether resource allocation should in fact be tested 
for reasonableness. But compare Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 
2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 66 where it was stated that a “reasonable part” of the national housing 
budget had to be allocated to the purpose relevant in that case, thereby suggesting that 
reasonableness may in fact be the judicial standard whereby resource allocation should be 
assessed. See also criteria for reasonableness review in Government of the Republic of South 
Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) regarding reasonable financial and human resources 
being made available for a particular programme. See in this regard part 4 3 1 above. See also 
H Kruuse “‘The Art of the Possible’ in Realising Socio-Economic Rights: The SCA Decision in 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd” 
(2011) 128 SALJ 620 621 who argues that this judgment introduces new insight regarding the 
development of reasonableness review in that the reasonableness test empowers courts to 
interrogate management of public resources dedicated to a socio-economic purpose and that 
the judgment “envisages a much more active role for courts in relation to public resource 
management than ever before” (621). 
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4 3 4 2 3 Aspects in need of further judicial attention   
 
The Court’s willingness to demand clear and convincing evidence of resource 
constraints based on a correct interpretation of the State’s constitutional obligations is 
to be welcomed. So too is its apparent preparedness to probe the constitutionality of 
“available resources” in the broad sense, by determining the relation of specifically 
allocated resources to the organ of State’s overall budget. Moreover, the Court 
employed a transformative approach to the adjudication of resource allocation 
decisions by examining the reasonableness of measures aimed at the procurement of 
additional resources or the lack of any attempt to solicit supplementary funds.  
However, the Court’s seeming disregard of the polycentric effects that such an order 
might have on the State’s other housing obligations is somewhat puzzling in the light 
of the approach adopted in Soobramoney.231 The Court might have contributed to a 
more theoretically sound basis for its approach to the adjudication of resource 
allocation decisions if it had distinguished this case from Soobramoney and stated that 
any polycentric impact must be proven clearly. The Court instead merely stated that 
the Supreme Court of Appeal had found that the City had not asserted that funds could 
not be reallocated and thus skirted over the issue of polycentricity.232  
Furthermore, the Court could have expanded on the Supreme Court of Appeal’s 
emphasis on proportionality by delineating under what circumstances certain rights 
and duties that form part of a transformative constitution will trump concerns of 
polycentricity in particular, and institutional competence in general. Again, by assigning 
weights to various socio-economic needs in an attempt to strike a balance between 
competing resource allocations, the Court could have contributed to the development 
of a capabilities approach to the adjudication of socio-economic rights and resource 
allocation in the South African context.233  
Although the roles of the national and provincial spheres of government were 
discussed in relation to the obligations of local government,234 joinder of these spheres 
                                            
231 The only reference to the polycentric effect that a diversion of funds might have is embedded 
in a footnote regarding submissions by the City, which was in any event held to be irrelevant 
as it had not been argued at the hearing. City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v 
Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) n 67.  
232 Para 71.  
233 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 78.  
234 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2012 2 SA 104 (CC) paras 53-57, noting the need for a coherent national policy framework 
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of government235 and an evaluation of the reasonableness of co-operation and 
resource allocation inter-spheres would also have been desirable. Joinder could have 
served to further clarify to what extent polycentricity was a noteworthy factor in this 
case.  
 
4 3 4 3 Factors contributing to robust judicial review of resource-based justificatory 
arguments   
 
The judgments of both the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court in 
Blue Moonlight offer insight as to what factors may promote a more robust approach 
to the adjudication of resource allocation decisions. Although many of these discernible 
factors are couched in negative terms as they form part of the respective courts’ 
criticism of the City’s failure to solicit additional resources, it is possible to deduce 
corresponding positive factors. It must also be borne in mind that the Court did not 
make an independent enquiry as to the constitutionality of the State’s resource 
allocation decisions in relation to its socio-economic obligations. Rather, it closely 
examined the State’s defence based on resource constraints.   
In the first place, a correct understanding by the State of its constitutional and 
statutory duties is imperative for resource allocation decisions to be upheld as 
reasonable.236 Next, the foreseeability of future budgetary demands is a factor that can 
contribute to the rejection of a defence based on resource constraints.237 Prior 
knowledge or awareness that the need for additional resources may arise may also 
result in the conclusion that the State is to blame for the unavailability of resources and 
                                            
and budgetary support for local government to be able to fulfil its obligations to provide 
emergency housing; paras 42-46 regarding the importance of joinder and the conclusion that 
non-joinder of the provincial government was not fatal in this case.  
235 Rule 5 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court GN R1675 in GG 25726 of 31-10-2003 
requires the joinder of an organ of state responsible for executive, administrative or legislative 
conduct that is constitutionally challenged.  
236 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2012 2 SA 104 (CC) paras 69, 74 and City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue 
Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 337 (SCA) para 52 where the Supreme Court of 
Appeal cited the State’s denial of its constitutional and statutory obligations as a reason for 
rejecting its defence based on resource constraints.  
237 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 63.  
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the concomitant application of a more stringent standard of review.238 Fault, even if 
manifested as negligence, is therefore a factor that may lead to a close examination of 
resource allocation decisions and an ultimate rejection of a defence based on 
unavailability of resources.  
Whereas a budget deficit or overspending was a factor limiting the justiciability of 
resource allocation decisions in Soobramoney, the opposite results where a budget 
surplus is alleged or not disproved.239 Furthermore, in Blue Moonlight the 
Constitutional Court emphasised the need to assess a particular instance of resource 
allocation within the context of the organ of State’s overall budgetary position.240 Such 
a broader enquiry may therefore be required even where a budget deficit in a particular 
department has been proved. Vagueness in alleging that additional resource allocation 
is not affordable or that reallocation from existing resources is not possible will likewise 
produce judicial reluctance to find that resources are not “available” within the meaning 
of sections 26 and 27.241 The burden to prove resource constraints therefore rests on 
the party alleging such. The production of explicit, transparent budgetary evidence is 
thus a factor as is the possibility of complying with constitutional obligations.242  
In addition, an inflexible policy or “entrenched position”, as well as the unjustified 
exclusion of a class of persons (in casu, persons evicted by private landowners),243 
are both compelling factors that led the Supreme Court of Appeal to closely scrutinise 
and ultimately reject the City’s arguments with regards to its resource allocation 
decisions. Both last-mentioned factors centred on the differentiation by the City 
between persons evicted by the City itself from so-called “bad buildings” and those 
evicted by private landowners.244 The Court noted that the City failed to take into 
                                            
238 Para 71; City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 
(Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 337 (SCA) paras 51, 52. 
239 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2012 2 SA 104 (CC) paras 71, 73; City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue 
Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 337 (SCA) para 49.  
240 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 74.  
241 Para 71; City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 
(Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 337 (SCA) para 50.  
242 See further chapter five part 5 4 2 3 below.  
243 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2011 4 SA 337 (SCA) para 51.  
244 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 89.  
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account the needs of those evicted by private landowners.245 Moreover, the Court 
stressed the severity of the deprivation of the right and the serious light in which it 
views evictions leading to homelessness when it concluded that “[t]o the extent that 
eviction may result in homelessness, it is of little relevance whether removal from one’s 
home is at the instance of the City or a private property owner”.246 The extent of 
deprivation of a right and possible homelessness resulting from eviction are thus two 
final factors that may enhance the justiciability of resource allocation.  
 
4 4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has sought to demonstrate that a pressing need exists for the 
development of a capabilities-based standard of review for the adjudication of State 
resource allocation decisions. The Constitutional Court’s insufficient focus on 
interpreting the content of socio-economic rights threatens the development of a 
substantive standard of reasonableness review across the spheres of socio-economic 
rights and administrative justice jurisprudence. If reasonableness review is allowed to 
collapse into a thin, proceduralised standard of review, the important capabilities that 
socio-economic rights aim to give rise to may not be sufficiently protected, while the 
State will have little guidance as to what would constitute proportionate allocative 
decisions. A unified, capabilities-based standard of review across both fields of law is 
therefore required, and will be further elaborated upon in the following chapter.  
The need for a capabilities-based standard of review for the adjudication of State 
resource allocation decisions is further illustrated by the Constitutional Court’s narrow 
definition of available resources in certain cases. Where the availability of resources is 
permitted to define the content of a socio-economic right, the State can potentially 
                                            
245 Para 92.  
246 Para 95. But compare C McConnachie & C McConnachie “Concretising the Right to a Basic 
Education” (2012) 129 SALJ 554 579 who criticise the judgment for relegating the 
reasonableness of the exclusion in the light of the occupiers’ circumstances to a mere footnote. 
It is submitted, however, that the Court takes at least some notice of the occupiers’ 
circumstances in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 
39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC) paras 6-9. Although the individual circumstances of the 
occupiers could have been given greater attention, placing a duty on the State to provide 
accommodation even where eviction occurs at the instance of private landowners bears 
testimony to the (albeit implicit) importance the Court places on the impact of eviction leading 
to homelessness on poor persons. In addition, the Court emphasised that the government 
policy must take cognisance of the contextual needs of occupiers.  
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minimise its constitutional obligations by allocating minimal resources for the fulfilment 
of the particular right. This can drain socio-economic rights of their normative and 
remedial force.  
Furthermore, deference should not be allowed to determine what standard of 
scrutiny should be applied to a State resource allocation decision. Instead, a standard 
of review that consigns the consideration of the judiciary’s constitutional and 
institutional competence in matters of resource allocation to the remedial stage of 
adjudication is more congruent with a two-stage capabilities approach to 
adjudication.247 Such an approach circumvents the problem of double-counting 
deference, while ensuring that the capabilities at stake in a given case remain 
prominent during the review stage of adjudication.  
Finally, the rigid distinction between the positive and negative obligations imposed 
upon the State by socio-economic rights rests on a false premise and should be 
discarded. All rights require resource allocation, and identical capabilities may be 
implicated regardless of how an obligation is characterised. This false distinction 
should not be allowed to trigger a more robust standard of review. Instead, the 
capabilities at issue together with the historical, social and factual context of the case 
at hand should determine the appropriate standard of scrutiny to be applied to an 
impugned allocative decision.  
Despite these aspects of the Constitutional Court’s approach to the adjudication of 
socio-economic rights that call out for reform, the Court has evinced its judicial 
competence to adjudicate State resource allocation decisions in several cases. There 
are indications in existing jurisprudence that courts may insist on “reasonable” 
resource allocation decisions where capabilities are imperilled. A more rigorous 
standard of review holds the potential to focus the State and the reviewing court’s 
attention on the capabilities at stake, instead of allowing review to be subsumed by 
questions of deference and the court’s institutional limitations.  
Positive developments in administrative law reasonableness review have moreover 
illustrated that courts are able to subject complex, technical evidence to stringent 
review. Such review calls for the evaluation of weights that the State has assigned to 
competing considerations and is congruous with the weighting exercise demanded by 
a capabilities approach to adjudication. Where vital capabilities are at issue, a robust 
                                            
247 See chapter six part 6 3 1 below.  
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interrogation of any resource-related justificatory arguments raised by the State is thus 
appropriate.  
Proportionality as standard of review most closely resembles the weighting exercise 
inherent in the prioritisation of oft-competing capabilities. Development towards the 
recognition of proportionality as an appropriate standard of review in socio-economic 
rights and administrative justice cases will be elucidated in the following chapter. 
Furthermore, it will be argued that proportionality can be carefully developed for the 
review of State resource allocation decisions that impact upon socio-economic rights. 
Finally, general and specific capabilities-based review criteria for the adjudication of 
State resource allocation decisions will be espoused. 
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Chapter 5: Developing a capabilities-based standard of review for the 
adjudication of State resource allocation decisions 
 
5 1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter, the need for a capabilities-based standard of review for the 
adjudication of State resource allocation decisions was demonstrated. It was argued 
that where insufficient attention is paid to the content of socio-economic rights, and a 
narrow definition of “available resources” is employed, an overly deferential standard 
of review may follow. Where the judiciary places undue focus on its own institutional 
limitations instead of on the capabilities at issue,1 the overarching purpose of socio-
economic rights, conceived of as the ability to achieve the functioning outcome of living 
an autonomous, dignified life in a position of substantive equality with others, may be 
insufficiently protected and promoted. It was further postulated that aspects of relevant 
Constitutional Court jurisprudence in fact evince the judicial competence to adjudicate 
State resource allocation decisions in a manner that can protect important capabilities.  
In this chapter, a capabilities-based standard of review will be developed. In 
particular, the suitability of proportionality review for serving as a judicial tool to 
accomplish a capabilities-centred weighting exercise will be scrutinised. The 
development of a capabilities-based standard of review is an essential component of 
a theoretical paradigm designed for the adjudication of State resource allocation 
decisions that impact on socio-economic rights. This standard of review is necessary 
to ensure that crucial socio-economic capabilities are recognised and protected when 
courts review allocative decisions. Furthermore, a structured weighting analysis can 
aid the State and reviewing courts to prioritise different rights and interests in the 
complex area of resource allocation. 
The susceptibility of reasonableness review to further development in order to 
encompass proportionality review where important capabilities are at stake, will be 
examined with reference to elements of proportionality review apparent from relevant 
Constitutional Court jurisprudence. Thereafter, proportionality as weighting will be 
critically analysed. The extent to which the doctrine of proportionality can be adapted 
for the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions in particular, will be 
                                            
1 The institutional limitations of the judiciary must of course be acknowledged, but can be 
addressed at the remedial phase of adjudication. See further chapter six part 6 3 below.  
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investigated. Moreover, the normative nature of the balancing exercise necessitated 
by proportionality review and its ability to aid the resolution of cases where capabilities 
vie for scarce resources will be investigated. Finally, the overarching features of a 
capabilities-based standard of review, as well as specific review criteria that should be 
observed in its application, will be elucidated.  
 
5 2 Elements of proportionality review in Constitutional Court jurisprudence  
 
Proportionality as a standard of review most accurately reflects the weighting 
exercise required by a capabilities approach to adjudication. Proportionality review fits 
comfortably within a two-stage adjudicatory process in which the substantive, 
normative content of a socio-economic right dictates a priority-setting process. Once 
weights have been assigned to the capabilities that a socio-economic right represents 
in a given context, further weight can be assigned to competing factors such as the 
alleged existence of resource constraints.  
Furthermore, as a fully developed reasonableness review standard, proportionality 
review can give expression to elements of an application of the capabilities approach 
to adjudication under a transformative constitution. These elements are the recognition 
of the fundamental values that inform capabilities, the acceptance of judicial 
responsibility to enhance capabilities, participation and informational broadening, and 
explicitness and substantive reasoning.2  
The following part analyses certain Constitutional Court judgments that incorporated 
elements of a proportionality enquiry in adjudicating administrative law and socio-
economic rights claims. Although not all the elements of a capabilities approach to 
adjudication are apparent from the jurisprudence expounded below, positive aspects 
can be developed to constitute a capabilities-based standard of review for the 
adjudication of State resource allocation decisions. 
 
5 2 1 Foreshadowing proportionality: The minority judgment in Bel Porto  
 
Socio-economic rights are often realised through the medium of administrative 
action. In certain cases, a claim to protect an important socio-economic capability may 
                                            
2 The application of a capabilities approach to the adjudication of State resource allocation 
decisions under a transformative constitution is discussed in chapter two part 2 4 above.  
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be framed in terms of administrative law if it is not recognised as forming part of a 
justiciable socio-economic right.3 In other instances, sufficient resources might be 
allocated to the fulfilment of a socio-economic right such as the right to social security, 
but the right’s realisation may be impeded by unjust administrative action.4 It is 
therefore imperative to develop a unified standard of reasonableness review across 
the spheres of socio-economic rights and administrative justice jurisprudence to 
ensure that crucial capabilities are protected regardless of how a particular claim is 
characterised.  
In Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape5 (“Bel Porto”), the 
dissenting judgment of Mokgoro and Sachs JJ focused on the issue of “basic fairness” 
in administrative law, rather than following the formalistic approach adopted by the 
majority of the Court, which was analysed in the previous chapter.6 Whereas the 
majority had held that the transitional right to administrative justice enshrined in the 
interim Constitution7 merely demanded rational administrative action, Mokgoro and 
Sachs JJ interpreted it as demanding something more,8 and as being “governed” and 
“animated” by a “broad concept of fairness”.9 Importantly, the dissenting judgment 
recognised the close relationship that exists between procedural and substantive 
fairness.10  
  
                                            
3 See, for example, Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 55 (CC), where access to 
electricity supply was at issue. 
4 In the context of social security, see for example Ndevu v The Member for the Executive 
Council for Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government 2002 JDR 0621 (SE) 2-3 and MEC 
for the Department of Welfare v Kate 2006 4 SA 478 (SCA) para 3.  
5 2002 3 SA 265 (CC).  
6 Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 149. 
See the discussion of the majority judgment in chapter four part 4 2 3 2 above.   
7 For an explanation of why this case was decided in terms of s 24 of the interim Constitution, 
see chapter four part 4 2 3 2 above.  
8 Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 164.  
9 Para 152: According to the dissent, a different interpretation could result in “a reversion to 
what has been criticised as the sterile, symptomatic and artificial classifications which 
bedevilled much of administrative law until recently”. 
10 Para 152. 
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5 2 1 1 Substantive review incorporating the principle of proportionality  
 
The acknowledgment of the sometimes inseparable nature of procedure and 
substance cleared the way for the minority to advocate substantive review of 
administrative action. Significantly, it was explicitly recognised that the right to just 
administrative action included the principle of proportionality.11 Proportionality allows 
for varying levels of scrutiny, which can range from rationality to what a court may 
regard as the “best” possible outcome.12 The substantive proportionality enquiry 
espoused included the consideration of factors such as “the nature of the right or 
interest involved; the importance of the purpose sought to be achieved by the decision; 
the nature of the power being exercised; the circumstances of its use; the intensity of 
its impact on the ... rights of the persons affected; the broad public interest involved” 
and “whether or not there are manifestly less restrictive means to achieve the 
purpose”.13 This flexible test allows the normative substance of the rights at play to 
influence the level of scrutiny to which resource allocation decisions are subsequently 
subjected. Furthermore, the normative and factual context is permitted to refine the 
ordering of capabilities and other competing factors.14  
In applying a substantive test of reasonableness, the minority judgment 
nevertheless acknowledged that courts should not intervene in policy without 
circumspection. The need for fiscal discipline and the “hard choices” that accompany 
it should be recognised by a reviewing court.15 Where an administrative decision is 
wide in ambit and related to policy, judicial intrusion may not be appropriate. A more 
limited decision with a grave impact on a determinable number of persons could merit 
intervention. Ultimately, however, the minority stated that where the circumstances so 
demand, “fairness in implementation must outtop policy”.16 
  
                                            
11 Para 162. The minority judgment (para 165) contains a precursor to the test for contextual 
reasonableness propagated in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC). 
12 Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 164.  
13 Para 165.  
14 Para 166.  
15 Para 154.  
16 Para 156.  
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5 2 1 2 Requiring constitutional compliance despite scarce resources   
 
In contrast to the majority judgment, which viewed scarce resources as a justification 
for unequal resource allocation, Mokgoro and Sachs JJ did not regard strained 
resources as constituting a basis for exemption from other constitutional obligations: 
 
“There can be no objection to rigorous bookkeeping to ensure that State moneys are 
effectively used. Yet the bottom line of the constitutional enterprise is not to be found at the 
foot of a balance-sheet, but rather in respect for human dignity. Fairness in dealings by the 
government with ordinary citizens is part and parcel of human dignity.”17 
 
Just as the overarching value of dignity identifies which capabilities form part of the 
content of socio-economic rights in certain contexts,18 dignity also informs the right to 
just administrative action. The review of allocative decisions taken by administrators 
should therefore be informed by this fundamental value, and not by concerns such as 
those related to the judiciary’s constitutional or institutional competence.  
 
5 2 1 3 Confirming the justiciability of resource allocation decisions  
 
Finally, it serves to note that in refusing to allow averments of scarce resources to 
trump considerations of administrative justice, Mokgoro and Sachs JJ rejected 
arguments that considerations of polycentricity should preclude the justiciability of 
resource allocation. The minority pointed to the adjudication of the educational budget 
by the Constitutional Court on two occasions in the past.19 The minority in Bel Porto 
                                            
17 Para 170. 
18 See chapter two part 2 4 1 2 above.  
19 In the context of the requirement for procedural fairness, in Premier, Mpumalanga v 
Executive Committee, Association of State-Aided Schools, Eastern Transvaal 1999 2 SA 91 
(CC) and Permanent Secretary of the Department of Education of the Government of the 
Eastern Cape Province v Ed-U-College (PE) (Section21) Inc 2001 2 SA 1 (CC). Cf the later 
judgment of KwaZulu-Natal Joint Liaison Committee v MEC Department of Education, 
Kwazulu-Natal 2013 4 SA 262 (CC) in which the majority of the Constitutional Court 
conceptualised the reduction of subsidies to independent schools after the legal payment date 
had passed as constituting a breach of a “publicly promulgated promise to pay” (para 48). The 
claim had not been framed in terms of PAJA, and could therefore not be decided in terms of 
administrative law. The Court emphasised that the State was discharging its obligations in 
terms of the right to basic education (s 29(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996 (the “Constitution”)) when it decided to pay subsidies to independent schools (para 45). 
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thus concluded that in neither case was there the “suggestion that the particular aspect 
complained of was so interwoven with the general scheme that it could not be detached 
and dealt with separately, nor that potential budgetary implications ruled out a re-
consideration”.20 This statement is to be supported in that considerations of 
polycentricity should only be decisive at the remedial stage of adjudication21 rather 
than be allowed to impact on the question of justiciability. 
 
5 2 2 An authoritative formulation of a substantive test: Bato Star  
 
In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism22 
(“Bato Star”) the Constitutional Court was called upon to review the allocation of natural 
resources on the grounds of, inter alia, reasonableness. Specifically, a challenge was 
brought based on the allegedly insufficient allocation of fishing quotas to new entrants 
in a particular sector of the fishing industry.  
In reviewing the reasonableness of the allocative decision, O’Regan J located 
judicial review for reasonableness in section 6(2)(h) of PAJA,23 as informed by section 
33 of the Constitution. Significantly, O’Regan J refused to construe the provision as 
                                            
The Court held that courts should take cognisance of budget cuts, such as the one which led 
to the reduction of the subsidy in casu. However, the Court concluded in this regard that “[i]t 
can never be acceptable in a democratic constitutional state for budget cuts to be announced 
to those to whom undertakings have been made after payment has by regulation already fallen 
due” (para 64). The Court situated the justifiability of enforcing the “publicly promulgated 
promise to pay” in the reliance on the promise by independent schools, accountability, and 
rationality (in that it was irrational to revoke payment after its due date had passed) (paras 63-
65). This judgment shows that where a resource allocation decision violates a fundamental 
constitutional right such as the right to basic education, courts may be willing to situate such 
claims in vaguely defined public duties. 
19 Bel Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 168. 
20 Para 168.  
21 The value of participatory remedies that involve government and can therefore mitigate 
polycentric effects of orders relating to the allocation of resources is further considered in 
chapter six and in particular part 6 3 below.  
22 2004 4 SA 490 (CC).  
23 S 6(2)(h) of PAJA states: 
“6(2) A court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an administrative action if –  
(h) the exercise of the power or the performance of the function authorised by the 
empowering provision, in pursuance of which the administrative action was purportedly 
taken, is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have so exercised the power or 
performed the function.” 
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espousing a highly restrictive, Wednesbury formulation of reasonableness.24 Instead, 
she held that the test was a “simple” one according to which a decision that a 
reasonable decision-maker could not reach, was susceptible to review.25  
Noting that the test for reasonableness is a contextual one, O’Regan J went on to 
list factors that could assist in determining whether a decision was reasonable or not. 
Reminiscent of the substantive test formulated in the minority judgment in Bel Porto, 
relevant factors include “the nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of the 
decision-maker, the range of factors relevant to the decision, the reasons given for the 
decision, the nature of the competing interests involved and the impact of the decision 
on the lives and well-being of those affected”.26 Although purportedly considerations to 
help determine the actual reasonableness of a decision, these factors can also be 
applied to determine to what level of scrutiny such decision must be subjected.  
The last two enumerated factors, namely “the nature of the competing interests 
involved and the impact of the decision on the lives and well-being of those affected”, 
signal a proportionality analysis that can allow the normative content of the right at 
stake to determine the level of scrutiny to which a State resource allocation is 
subsequently subjected.27 The importance of the “interest” or capabilities at play should 
therefore narrow the range of weights that could potentially be assigned to competing 
capabilities and other factors, including the cogency of justificatory arguments raised 
by the State for making a particular resource allocation decision.28 The separate 
judgment of Ngcobo J, although assessing the decision on grounds of lawfulness, 
illustrates how the foundational constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality 
should animate scrutiny of legislation, policy or administrative action.29 It follows that 
where a particular State resource allocation decision is adjudicated, the values that 
                                            
24 See chapter three part 3 2 3 1 above.  
25 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 44.  
26 Para 45.  
27 This initial proportionality analysis can therefore indicate that proportionality review as a 
robust manifestation of reasonableness review should be applied to any resource-related 
justification proffered by the State.  
28 See chapter two part 2 3 2 2 above.  
29 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) paras 72-73.  
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inform both the capabilities approach and socio-economic and administrative justice 
rights must be allowed to influence the standard of scrutiny applied.30  
Whereas the last two listed factors may invoke a proportionality analysis, the first 
two factors may require that due weight be accorded to the decision under review. As 
noted in the previous chapter,31 O’Regan J stated that where a complex decision 
required an equilibrium to be struck between competing interests or required particular 
expertise, judicial respect was appropriate. However, these observations did not 
detract from the need to ensure that the government conduct was capable of 
reasonably resulting in the relevant goal, for example the realisation of a socio-
economic right: 
 
“This does not mean however that where the decision is one which will not reasonably result 
in the achievement of the goal, or which is not reasonably supported on the facts or not 
reasonable in the light of the reasons given for it, a court may not review that decision. A 
court should not rubber-stamp an unreasonable decision simply because of the complexity 
of the decision or the identity of the decision-maker.”32 
 
When conducting a weighting exercise, expertise can therefore be acknowledged 
but cogent justificatory arguments and evidence should always be required from the 
State. Where polycentricity or the institutional competence of the reviewing court is of 
real concern in adjudicating a particular State resource allocation, this should be 
openly acknowledged. However, for the capabilities at stake to remain the focus of the 
weighting exercise, such concerns should to the greatest extent possible be mitigated, 
for example through the creation of innovative remedies.33 
  
                                            
30 See further chapter two part 2 4 1 above.   
31 Chapter four part 4 2 3 above.  
32 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 
(CC) para 48 (emphasis added).  
33 See generally chapter six below. For a discussion of how concerns regarding the judiciary’s 
constitutional and institutional competence in matters of resource allocation can be addressed 
at the remedial stage of adjudication, see in particular chapter six part 6 3 1.  
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5 2 3 Allowing the normative context to trigger robust review: Khosa   
 
The foundational constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality will usually 
be implicated where socio-economic rights are concerned.34 These values help identify 
the important capabilities at stake and trigger a more robust approach to the 
adjudication of resource allocation or a defence of resource constraints raised by the 
State. In Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social 
Development35 (“Khosa”) the right to equality36 and the right of access to social 
security37 directly intersected.  
In casu, the Court applied a robust proportionality analysis to determine whether 
financial considerations of limiting social security grants to citizens outweighed the 
impact of such policy on permanent residents, including the impact on their life and 
dignity.38 Notably, the Court placed the burden of adducing evidence – including 
evidence related to resource constraints – on the State. The correct placement of the 
onus is especially important where court orders are likely to have budgetary 
implications.39  
Having noted that equality is implicit in socio-economic rights in that the latter are 
conferred upon “everyone”, the Court stated that even in cases where the State can 
                                            
34 See, for example, Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 
(CC) para 83 and Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social 
Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC) para 40. See also Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 
2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 21: 
“Each time an applicant approaches the courts claiming that his or her socio-economic 
rights have been infringed the right to dignity is invariably implicated. The appellants’ 
reliance on section 10 as a self-standing right therefore does not add anything to this 
matter…”  
35 2004 6 SA 505 (CC).  
36 S 9 of the Constitution. For the potential pitfalls of allowing equality to inform the content of 
rights, and how to avoid these, see part 5 4 2 1 2 below. 
37 S 27(1)(c) of the Constitution.  
38 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 
SA 505 (CC) para 82; S Liebenberg & B Goldblatt “The Interrelationship between Equality and 
Socio-economic Rights under South Africa’s Transformative Constitution” (2007) 23 SAJHR 
335 359-360; M Wesson “Equality and Social Rights: An Exploration in Light of the South 
African Constitution” (2007) PL 748 757; C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South 
Africa: A Choice between Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 88. 
39 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 
SA 505 (CC) para 19. See also C Mbazira Litigating Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: A 
Choice between Corrective and Distributive Justice (2009) 98.  
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justify not allocating resources to “everyone”, the allocative criteria must be “consistent 
with the Bill of Rights as a whole”.40 The Court went on to clarify that allocative criteria 
had to be reasonable under section 27(2).41 The Court therefore clearly linked the 
requirement of reasonableness to the determination and subsequent evaluation of 
resource allocation. 
The Court turned to an analysis of the State’s defence of its exclusionary allocation, 
which was based on the “impermissibly high financial burden” that allocation would 
place on the State. It was argued that social grant expenditure had increased 
significantly and would continue to do so, that provision had to be made for other socio-
economic programmes and that the requested relief would result in provincial 
budgetary shortfalls.42 The Court embarked on a close examination of the State’s 
submissions,43 and concluded that the vague evidence presented was indicative of 
speculation.44 The Court concluded that “the cost of including permanent residents in 
the system will be only a small proportion of the total cost”.45 
The Court held that the financial considerations raised by the State were outweighed 
by the impact that its current policy had on the life and dignity of permanent residents 
of South Africa.46 Resource allocation should always be judged against the normative 
values enshrined in the Bill of Rights, as the State manifests its commitment to the 
transformative ideals set out in the Constitution through its allocative and budgetary 
                                            
40 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 
SA 505 (CC) para 44.  
41 Para 53.  
42 Para 60.  
43 See also S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative 
Constitution (2010) 159, 193 and S Fredman “Providing Equality: Substantive Equality and the 
Positive Duty to Provide” (2005) 21 SAJHR 163 181.  
44 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 
SA 505 (CC) para 62. The State provided a wide range for the possible increase in expenditure 
that would result from widening the scope of its provision of social security to permanent 
residents.  
45 Para 62. The Court calculated that the cost of extending the benefits to permanent residents 
would only constitute 2% of the present costs.  
46 Para 82. In his dissenting judgment, Ngcobo J regarded the State as justified in its concern 
that widened provision would impact detrimentally on other socio-economic rights (para 127). 
Moreover, he insisted that unless evidence to the contrary was presented, “courts should be 
slow to reject reasonable estimates made by policymakers” (para 128). Finally, it is noteworthy 
that he did not consider the fact that the increase in expenditure would not be substantial as a 
relevant factor (para 129).  
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choices.47 The values of freedom, dignity and equality can therefore inform a weighting 
exercise whereby a particular resource allocation decision is subjected to robust 
scrutiny as a second step following normative interpretation.48  
 
5 3 Conceptualising a capabilities-based standard of review   
 
It emerges from the discussion in the previous chapter that there is a need for the 
development of a capabilities-based standard of review for the adjudication of State 
resource allocation decisions.49 Furthermore, it has been argued that the Constitutional 
Court has evinced judicial competence to adjudicate resource allocation decisions,50 
and that it has adopted a robust standard of scrutiny resembling a proportionality 
analysis in certain cases.51 In the following parts, the broad contours of proportionality 
as a capabilities-based standard of review are elucidated.  
 
5 3 1 Proportionality as weighting  
 
5 3 1 1 Weighting  
 
In devising a capabilities-based standard of review, it must be acknowledged that 
the prioritisation of resource allocation for the attainment of a broad spectrum of 
capabilities is by no means a simple task. “Difficult decisions”52 must be made in 
appropriating the national budget, in dividing revenue among provinces and in 
allocating limited resources for the administration of particular policies. Sen 
acknowledges that a capabilities perspective is “inescapably pluralist” and that the 
prioritisation of capabilities, functionings and concomitant resource allocation can give 
                                            
47 In its equality analysis, the Court stated that “decisions about the allocation of public benefits 
represent the extent to which poor people are treated as equal members of society” (para 74; 
footnotes omitted). This statement should be regarded as equally relevant to the adjudication 
of resource allocation decisions in socio-economic rights adjudication. 
48 Regarding the importance of the fundamental values that underlie the capabilities approach 
and the Constitution, see further chapter two part 2 4 1 above.  
49 Chapter four part 4 2 above.  
50 Chapter four part 4 3 above.  
51 Part 5 2 above.  
52 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 29.  
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rise to lasting debate.53 However, as elaborated upon in chapter two, Sen postulates 
that a weighting exercise can successfully occur through a process of “reasoned 
evaluation”.54  
 
5 3 1 1 1 The focal space in which weighting should occur 
 
As an initial step, the socio-economic rights together with the right to administrative 
justice enshrined in the Constitution signal that certain functioning outcomes have 
been identified as significant within our constitutional democracy. Thus, the functioning 
outcomes of having a basic education, adequate housing, good health, sufficient food 
and water and the ability to participate meaningfully in the administration of an open, 
responsive and accountable government have all received constitutional recognition. 
In turn, the realisation of these functioning outcomes has the potential to result in 
capability sets that make the attainment of more complex functionings possible.55  
A focal space for weighting and reasoned evaluation has therefore been created by 
the inclusion of these rights in the Constitution.56 The partial ordering thus created 
indicates that these capability sets merit prioritised resource allocation when compared 
with expenditure on interests that do not enjoy the status of constitutional rights.57 
However, where different constitutional rights, or expenditure on short term versus long 
term capability realisation, vie for resource allocation, the weighting exercise espoused 
by the capabilities approach requires careful adaptation for judicial use.   
  
                                            
53 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 76-77.  
54 78. Where consensus needs to be reached on the weights assigned to capabilities and other 
factors, Sen argues that agreement should be reached through a process of public reasoning 
(79). See further chapter two part 2 3 2 4 above.  
55 For example, political, economic and social participation becomes possible.  
56 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 78.  
57 See chapter two part 2 3 2 1 above; N Ferreira “Feasibility Constraints and the South African 
Bill of Rights: Fulfilling the Constitution’s Promise in Conditions of Scarce Resources” (2012) 
129 SALJ 274 275.  
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5 3 1 1 2 The role of the courts  
 
In chapter two it was argued that the judiciary is well placed to perform the weighting 
exercise required by a capabilities approach to adjudication.58 To the extent that Sen’s 
emphasis on a process of public reasoning for the valuation of capabilities does not 
recognise the role that courts can play under a transformative constitution, his theory 
stands to be developed. Courts are equipped to make evaluative judgments and to 
contribute to a process of public reasoning by providing substantive reasons for their 
judgments.59 Furthermore, courts are experienced in conducting balancing 
exercises.60 In order to serve as one amongst many deliberative fora as required under 
a transformative constitution,61 courts must endeavour to promote participatory 
processes, consider the widest range of interests practicable in making evaluative 
judgments, and engage in explicit, substantive interpretation and reasoning. Where 
these tenets are adhered to, subsequent public scrutiny of judgments is made possible. 
Where circumstances change, courts must be willing to adapt their initial judgments in 
the light of evolving reality.  
As discussed in chapter two, Nussbaum recognises the valuable role that courts 
can play in capability realisation. According to her development of the capabilities 
theory, courts fulfil an indispensable role in enforcing constitutions in a manner that 
promotes capability realisation. Furthermore, courts bear the responsibility of 
elaborating on initially abstract capabilities.62 Thus, for example, if the right of access 
to adequate housing finds a direct corollary in the capability to have access to adequate 
housing, interpretative work needs to be done to further specify which basic capability 
                                            
58 For a discussion of Sen’s failure to acknowledge the role that the judiciary can play, see 
further chapter two part 2 3 3 1.  
59 D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-
Economic Rights (2007) 122. 
60 For example, in the context of the limitations analysis in terms of s 36 of the Constitution. 
See H Botha “Rights, Limitations and the (Im)Possibility of Self Government” in H Botha, A van 
der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 
13 22. See further the discussion of the Constitutional Court’s complex balancing exercise in 
Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign as Amicus 
Curiae) 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) in chapter four part 4 3 3 above.  
61 For the centrality of participation to the project of transformative constitutionalism, see 
chapter two part 2 4 3 above.  
62 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 40-43, 62. See further chapter two part 2 3 1 2 
regarding the role of the courts in a capabilities approach to adjudication.  
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subsets63 and overarching, more complex capabilities the right additionally 
encompasses.64 It is the role of the courts to interpret rights and to assign weights to 
the capabilities that rights represent in a particular context.  
 
5 3 1 2 Proportionality  
 
Constitutional adjudication will often require the balancing of different rights and 
interests. Where the content of the socio-economic right in a given case includes 
critical capabilities, and resources are diverted for the fulfilment of other important 
capabilities, balancing will be required. Proportionality analysis holds the potential to 
be developed specifically for the balancing of competing rights, competing capabilities 
within the same right, or rights versus other resource-intensive interests in the context 
of limited resources: 
 
“Proportionality is a doctrinal tool for the resolution of conflicts between a right and a 
competing right or interest, at the core of which is the balancing stage which requires the 
right to be balanced against the competing right or interest.”65 
 
5 3 1 2 1 Proportionality under the Constitution  
 
Various different formulations of the test for proportionality exist.66 In South Africa, 
the general limitations clause enshrined in section 36 of the Constitution has been 
generally accepted by our courts as requiring a proportionality analysis.67 The general 
                                            
63 For example, the capability to enjoy access to infrastructure, to live in proximity to one’s 
place of work, and to enjoy access to basic services.  
64 For example, the complex capability set required to achieve the functioning outcome of living 
an autonomous, dignified life in a position of substantive equality with others. For a discussion 
of Nussbaum’s recognition of the important role that courts can and should play in promoting 
capabilities, see chapter two parts 2 3 1 2 and 2 3 3 3.  
65 K Möller “Proportionality: Challenging the Critics” (2012) 10 I Con 709 710.  
66 See, for example, T Hickman “Proportionality: Comparative Law Lessons” (2007) JR 31. 
67 See, for example S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 104; S v Bhulwana 1996 1 SA 
388 (CC) para 18; S v Manamela (Director-General of Justice Intervening) 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) 
para 32. S 36 of the Constitution reads: 
“(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application 
to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant 
factors, including –  
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limitations clause is based on the following passage in S v Makwanyane,68 which was 
decided under the interim Constitution:69 
 
“The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a 
democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an 
assessment based on proportionality… Principles can be established, but the application of 
those principles to particular circumstances can only be done on a case by case basis. This 
is inherent in the requirement of proportionality, which calls for the balancing of different 
interests. In the balancing process, the relevant considerations will include the nature of the 
right that is limited, and its importance to an open and democratic society based on freedom 
and equality; the purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that purpose 
to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy, and particularly where the limitation 
has to be necessary, whether the desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other 
means less damaging to the right in question.”70 
 
(a) A flexible enquiry  
 
The proportionality analysis encapsulated in section 36 implies that “the Court must 
engage in a balancing exercise and arrive at a global judgment on proportionality and 
                                            
(a) the nature of the right;  
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;  
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law 
may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.” 
68 1995 3 SA 391 (CC).  
69 S 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 contained a different 
limitations clause, the pertinent part of which reads: 
“33 Limitation 
(1) The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be limited by law of general application, 
provided that such limitation- 
(a) shall be permissible only to the extent that it is- 
(i) reasonable; and 
(ii) justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; and 
(b) shall not negate the essential content of the right in question, and provided further that 
any limitation to- 
(aa) a right entrenched in section 10, 11, 12, 14 (1) , 21, 25 or 30 (1) (d) or (e) or (2) ; or 
(bb) a right entrenched in section 15, 16, 17, 18, 23 or 24, in so far as such right relates to 
free and fair political activity, shall, in addition to being reasonable as required in paragraph 
(a) (i) , also be necessary.” 
70 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 104.  
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not adhere mechanically to a sequential check-list”.71 Rigid adherence to the factors 
enumerated in section 36 is therefore unnecessary. Furthermore, the factors listed in 
section 36 do not constitute a closed list.  
The limitations analysis is traditionally regarded as applying to positive limiting 
measures, where the State enacts or applies a law that limits a constitutional right. It 
may thus not be wholly applicable to State omissions, such as the failure to allocate 
adequate resources to the fulfilment of a particular socio-economic right. Thus, the 
exact formulation of the section 36 limitations clause need not be adopted verbatim 
into the internal qualification found in sections 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution, or 
the requirement for reasonable administrative action in section 33(1) of the 
Constitution.72 To the extent that formulations of the doctrine of proportionality in other 
jurisdictions may not exactly track the section 36 enquiry, they are nevertheless 
instructive.  
 
(b) Accommodating the first stage of a two-stage capabilities-based rights analysis 
 
Constitutional adjudication in South Africa generally follows a two stage rights 
analysis. In the first stage, the infringement of the constitutional right must be 
established. If an infringement is thus established, the second stage requires the court 
to determine whether the limitation of the right is justifiable – this is where the 
proportionality enquiry becomes relevant.73 In order to determine whether a right-
infringement has occurred as required by the first stage of the right analysis, the right 
must necessarily be interpreted.  
As has been argued throughout this dissertation,74 it is therefore crucial to 
substantively interpret the normative purposes of the right at issue,75 and to fully 
engage with the capabilities that a given right seeks to promote. For example, the right 
                                            
71 S v Manamela (Director-General of Justice Intervening) 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) para 32. 
72 This is apparent from the case law discussed in part 5 2 above that incorporated elements 
of proportionality without relying on s 36 of the Constitution. See in particular Bel Porto School 
Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) para 162 and Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) para 45.  
73 S Woolman & H Botha “Limitations” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 34-1 (b).  
74 See, inter alia, chapter two part 2 3 2 2 3 above.  
75 See generally D Bilchitz “Does Balancing Adequately capture the Nature of Rights?” (2011) 
25 SAPL 423. 
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to basic education may include capabilities such as the capability to become educated 
in safe buildings, the capability to be well nourished and have access to hygienic 
sanitation facilities while receiving an education so as to realise the capability to enjoy 
an adequate standard of health, the capability to consult and learn from resources such 
as textbooks in a position of substantive equality with other learners, and so forth. The 
content of the socio-economic right will depend on the context of the case at hand. 
Once right is interpreted in its context, weights should be assigned to the capabilities 
at issue.  
The “nature of the right” constitutes the first enumerated factor which a court should 
consider in conducting a limitations analysis under section 36 of the Constitution.76 
Woolman and Botha question the placement of this factor, pointing out that the 
interpretation of the right must occur at the first stage of the analysis prior to the 
second, justificatory stage.77 According to the authors, the inclusion of this factor 
signals that the importance of the right must determine the level of scrutiny to which 
justificatory arguments are subjected.78  
Once the socio-economic right has been interpreted, the gravity of the infringement 
of the right (in other words the detrimental impact on the right’s underlying capabilities) 
should be determined. Thus, where a basic or fertile capability is imperilled, and the 
infringement impacts gravely on the complex capability to live an autonomous and 
dignified life in a position of substantive equality with others, the standard of scrutiny 
applied to the second stage of the analysis should be significantly sharpened. The 
enquiry as to the gravity of the infringement of the right finds its corollary in section 
36(1)(c) of the Constitution, which directs a reviewing court to consider “the nature and 
extent of the limitation” in conducting its proportionality analysis: 
 
                                            
76 S 36(1)(a) of the Constitution.  
77 For the argument that the “nature of the right” differs from an enquiry as to the scope of the 
right, and therefore correctly falls into the second stage of the rights analysis, see K Iles “A 
Fresh Look at Limitations: Unpacking Section 36” (2007) 23 SAJHR 68 81-82.  
78 S Woolman & H Botha “Limitations” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 34-8 (c)(i). The authors observe that the Constitutional 
Court has rejected the notion of varying levels of scrutiny for different constitutional rights in 
the context of the limitations analysis. According to the authors, the Court’s view that the more 
important the right at stake, the more compelling must the justification for its infringement be, 
amounts to a distinction without a difference.   
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“The level of justification required to warrant a limitation upon a right depends on the extent 
of the limitation. The more invasive the infringement, the more powerful the justification 
must be.”79 
 
The first stage of the rights analysis is therefore commensurate with a capabilities 
approach to the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions.80 
 
5 3 1 2 2 The structure of the proportionality enquiry  
 
The proportionality enquiry that enters the second stage of the rights analysis 
encompasses four steps that can aid the State, in the first instance, and the reviewing 
court, subsequently, to ensure that State conduct does not interfere with rights 
disproportionately. Once the reviewing court has interpreted the socio-economic right 
at stake and assigned weights to the capabilities represented by the right in a particular 
context, the second stage of the analysis allows the court to assign weight to competing 
factors, such as resource constraints. It is at the final step of the proportionality enquiry 
that the weights assigned to the relevant capabilities are balanced against the weight 
assigned to competing factors, in order to determine whether an allocative decision is 
proportionate to the imperilled capabilities.81  
 
(a) Legitimacy 
 
First, a legitimate goal or policy aim must be pursued. Legitimacy under our 
constitutional dispensation requires that the purpose of the limitation must at least be 
in congruence with an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom.82 While one would expect State goals to be legitimate, no presumptive 
legitimacy attaches to government aims or policies, which should accordingly be 
                                            
79 S v Manamela (Director-General of Justice Intervening) 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) para 69. This 
factor will have to be considered again at the balancing step of the limitations analysis, in order 
to determine whether the extent of the infringement is proportionate to the nature of the right. 
S Woolman & H Botha “Limitations” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 34-8 (c)(iii).  
80 See chapter two part 2 3 2 2 3 above.  
81 For the application of a capabilities-based proportionality enquiry to State resource allocation 
decisions in particular, see part 5 3 3 2 below.  
82 S 36(1)(b) lists “the importance of the purpose of the limitation” as a factor to be considered 
by the court in conducting a limitations analyses.  
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subjected to scrutiny. If government for instance allocated additional resources to the 
realisation of basic education or the effective functioning of the court system, but 
insufficient resources to the provision of access to sufficient water, the former two goals 
will nevertheless be legitimate. However, should an unconstitutional aim be pursued, 
it could be rejected at this first step of the enquiry.83 For example, a law which diverts 
resources to a project aimed at the criminalisation of homosexual sex in a professed 
attempt to curb the spread of HIV would be paternalistic, unconstitutional and thus 
illegitimate. In the context of the proportionality analysis that takes place under section 
36 of the Constitution, this step can look beyond the legitimacy of the policy or aim and 
determine the importance of the purpose of the limitation.  
 
(b) Suitability  
 
Second, the suitability of the measures adopted to reach the legitimate aim must be 
established.84 The measures must thus be capable of securing the legitimate objective, 
or must be rationally related thereto.85  
  
                                            
83 K Möller “Proportionality: Challenging the Critics” (2012) 10 I Con 709 712; M Kumm “The 
Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of Rights-Based 
Proportionality Review” (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 141 148.  
84 This corresponds to the fourth factor listed in s 36 for the reviewing court’s consideration, viz 
“(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose”.  
85 S Woolman & H Botha “Limitations” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional 
Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 34-8 (c)(iv); K Iles “A Fresh Look at Limitations: Unpacking 
Section 36” (2007) 23 SAJHR 68 83; K Möller “Proportionality: Challenging the Critics” (2012) 
10 I Con 709 713; M Elliot “Proportionality and Deference: The Importance of a Structured 
Approach” in C Forsyth, M Elliot, S Jhaveri, M Ramsden & A Scully-Hill (eds) Effective Judicial 
Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance (2010) 264 265. See further, for example, 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) 
para 56 where it was held that there was no rational connection between the measure of 
denying benefits to same-sex partners and the objective of protecting family life.   
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(c) Necessity 
 
Third, the adopted measure must be necessary for the achievement of the aim or 
objective, in that no less restrictive means of reaching the objective equally well 
exists.86 In colloquial terms, one must not use a sledgehammer to crack a nut.87 
A necessity test is not strictly required by the section 36 proportionality analysis: a 
reviewing court should merely consider the existence of less restrictive means to 
achieve the purpose of the limitation.88 Woolman criticises the deletion of the necessity 
test from the final Constitution.89 However, the author convincingly argues that where 
the importance of the right requires the adoption of a strict level of scrutiny,90 the 
requirements encompassed by the listed factors will be correspondingly sharpened. In 
appropriate cases, the means chosen by government to achieve its objective must be 
no more restrictive than is “absolutely necessary”.91 In this way, the less restrictive 
means test can encompass the necessity test where the nature of the right and the 
gravity of the infringement so demand.  
Möller points out in this regard that a difficulty arises where, for example, a less 
restrictive measure does exist but would require additional resources in order to meet 
the objective in question. The author goes on to note that this can be resolved 
structurally either at the necessity step or at the final, balancing step of 
proportionality.92 Hickman characterises this question as one of “relative 
proportionality”, but goes on to state that “the precise way the balancing exercise is 
phrased is less important than that the exercise is carried out, and that it is recognised 
as different both from the question of overall proportionality and also from identifying 
                                            
86 K Möller “Proportionality: Challenging the Critics” (2012) 10 I Con 709 713; M Elliot 
“Proportionality and Deference: The Importance of a Structured Approach” in C Forsyth, M 
Elliot, S Jhaveri, M Ramsden & A Scully-Hill (eds) Effective Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of 
Good Governance (2010) 264 265. 
87 A Barak Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (2012) 333-334.  
88 S 36(1)(e).  
89 S Woolman “Out of Order? Out of Balance? The Limitation Clause of the Final Constitution” 
(1997) 13 SAJHR 102 105. 
90 Woolman (108-109) suggests that some rights can a priori be assumed to be more important 
than others. However, the importance of the right should rather be determined in concrete 
contexts, by determining what capabilities it protects in particular circumstances.  
91 108-109.  
92 K Möller “Proportionality: Challenging the Critics” (2012) 10 I Con 709 714.  
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whether a measure is the ‘least injurious’”.93 Ultimately, however, Hickman advocates 
that the question of relative proportionality should be considered at the necessity step 
of the proportionality enquiry.94 If one follows Alexy’s argument that the steps of 
suitability and necessity relate to what is factually possible, whereas the balancing step 
relates to what is legally possible,95 then structural clarity might best be served by 
confining the consideration of alternative measures that require trade-offs to the 
normative, balancing step.96 
 
(d) Balancing  
 
The final step in the proportionality analysis is that of balancing, or proportionality 
stricto sensu. This crucial step is not explicitly included in the section 36 proportionality 
analysis and must be inferred from the wording of the section and the Constitutional 
Court’s interpretation thereof.97 The balancing step is a value-laden enquiry which, 
rather than dwelling exclusively on the relation between the means adopted and the 
objective sought to be achieved by the State, returns judicial focus to the rights at 
issue.98 This final, balancing step is where a normative, capabilities-based weighting 
exercise will find its most fulsome expression. Barak elaborates: 
 
“[Balancing] is an expression of the understanding that the law is not ‘all or nothing.’ Law is 
a complex framework of values and principles, which in certain cases are all congruent and 
lead to one conclusion, while in other situations are in direct conflict and require resolution. 
The balancing technique reflects this complexity. At the constitutional level, balancing 
enables the continued existence, within a democracy, of conflicting principles or values, 
while recognizing their inherent constitutional conflict.”99 
 
                                            
93 T Hickman “The Substance and Structure of Proportionality” (2008) PL 694 713. 
94 713, 714.  
95 R Alexy A Theory of Constitutional Rights (2002) 67 and in particular 400-401. 
96 A Barak Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (2012) 338-339 also 
favours this approach.  
97 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 104; S Woolman & H Botha “Limitations” in S 
Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 34-
8 (b).  
98 A Barak Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (2012) 342-344.  
99 345-346; see also H Botha “Rights, Limitations and the (Im)Possibility of Self Government” 
in H Botha, A van der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative 
Constitution (2003) 13 22 quoted in chapter two part 2 3 3 1 above.  
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According to the balancing test, the marginal benefit or social importance of the 
limiting measure, and the probability of its realisation, should outweigh the marginal 
harm and social importance of preventing such harm to the right at issue.100 Alexy, who 
conceptualises rights as principles that should be optimised to the greatest extent 
factually and legally possible,101 similarly holds that “[t]he greater the degree of non-
satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater must be the importance of 
satisfying the other”.102  
Although balancing can be characterised as “interest balancing”, according to which 
a cost-benefit analysis is carried out between two weights placed on a set of scales, a 
conceptualisation of “balancing as reasoning” resonates more strongly with the 
capabilities approach and is preferable.103 The focal space created by the inclusion of 
socio-economic rights and the right to just administrative action in the Constitution was 
itself the outcome of a “reasoned ‘consensus’ on... a range of weights”.104 The further 
narrowing of the range of weights to prioritise capabilities and related resource 
allocation must likewise take place through a process of public reasoning. Public 
reasoning should, in the first place, be carried out by the State in consultation with a 
wide range of stakeholders in its own proportionality analysis of resource allocation 
decisions.105 Subsequently, courts should utilise a process of reasoned evaluation in 
conducting a weighting exercise, and should catalyse subsequent public reasoning 
through engagement in explicitness and substantive interpretation.106   
                                            
100 A Barak Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (2012) 363.  
101 R Alexy A Theory of Constitutional Rights (2002) 47-48 (original emphasis): 
“[P]rinciples are norms which require that something be realized to the greatest extent 
possible given the legal and factual possibilities. Principles are optimization requirements, 
characterized by the fact that they can be satisfied to varying degrees, and that the 
appropriate degree of satisfaction depends not only on what is factually possible but also 
on what is legally possible. The scope of the legally possible is determined by opposing 
principles and rules.”  
102 102.  
103 K Möller “Proportionality: Challenging the Critics” (2012) 10 I Con 709 715.  
104 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 78. See further for a discussion of the role of 
reasoning in the capabilities approach, chapter two part 2 3 2 4.  
105 See W Sadurski “Reasonableness and Value Pluralism in Law and Politics” in G 
Bongiovanni, G Sartor & C Valentini (eds) Reasonableness and Law (2009) 129 138-139 for 
the argument that the analysis of the relationship between means and ends demanded by the 
first three steps of the proportionality analysis is primarily a legislative, and not a judicial, 
function.  
106 See chapter two part 2 3 2 4 above.  
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5 3 1 3 Proportionality as reasonableness 
 
Reasonableness review in socio-economic rights and administrative justice 
jurisprudence can be viewed as a continuum that ranges from “weak” reasonableness 
review, or rationality review, to proportionality review, or reasonableness in the “strong 
sense”.107 Proportionality is therefore a robust manifestation of reasonableness review 
that is appropriate where critical capabilities are at stake.108 Where crucial capabilities 
are implicated, proportionate resources should be allocated for their protection and 
realisation.  
Reasonableness review generally lacks the structured form of proportionality 
analysis and can benefit from following the stages of proportionality review to enhance 
analytical clarity. In this way, the substantive interpretation of rights is followed by three 
steps during which justificatory arguments for insufficient resource allocation are 
elucidated, and culminates in a final weighting step. Reasonableness review 
corresponds closely to the first interpretative stage and final balancing step of the 
proportionality enquiry.  
Like the first stage of the rights analysis that precedes proportionality review, 
reasonableness review is capable of allowing the capabilities at issue coupled with the 
severity of their deprivation to dictate the intensity of review subsequently applied to 
an allocative decision. That proportionality is a genus of reasonableness is most 
apparent when one turns to the final, balancing step of the proportionality analysis. 
Reasonableness is a normative concept that requires the assignment of varying 
weights to different, oft-competing factors. Indeed, “at the heart of reasonableness lies 
the notion of balancing”.109  
                                            
107 W Sadurski “Reasonableness and Value Pluralism in Law and Politics” in G Bongiovanni, 
G Sartor & C Valentini (eds) Reasonableness and Law (2009) 129 131-132; and see further in 
general G Quinot & S Liebenberg “Narrowing the Band: Reasonableness Review in 
Administrative Justice and Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence in South Africa” (2011) 22 
Stell LR 639.  
108 G Barrie “The Application of the Doctrine of Proportionality in South African Courts” (2013) 
28 SAPL 40 40. Conversely, KG Young Constituting Economic and Social Rights (2012) 129 
views reasonableness as a subset of proportionality analysis.  
109 A Barak Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (2012) 375. See also R 
Alexy “The Reasonableness of Law” in G Bongiovanni, G Sartor & C Valentini (eds) 
Reasonableness and Law (2009) 5 14: 
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A review standard of proportionality that gives primary weight to the capabilities at 
issue is thus congruent with the model of reasonableness review applied in both socio-
economic rights and administrative justice cases. Moreover, it is possible to develop a 
version of proportionality review specifically for the adjudication of State resource 
allocation decisions that impact on the capability sets represented by socio-economic 
rights and the right to just administrative action. This will effectively allow capabilities 
to set the agenda whenever the appropriate standard of review is in question.  
 
5 3 1 4 Proportionality in socio-economic rights jurisprudence   
 
As demonstrated above, there has been some progress in South African socio-
economic rights and administrative justice jurisprudence towards recognising that a 
robust proportionality analysis is appropriate where fundamental rights are 
concerned.110 However, the application of elements of a proportionality enquiry has not 
always been carried out on the basis of justifiable principles.111 Furthermore, the 
application of proportionality as standard of review specifically to the adjudication of 
State resource allocation decisions has not been fully developed.  
A coherent approach to strong-form reasonableness review of resource allocation 
decisions can advance the unified development of such standard of review where 
socio-economic rights and the right to just administrative action overlap. Socio-
economic rights are often realised through the medium of administrative action. This 
overlap is apparent where, for example, the right of access to social security is at 
stake,112 given that decisions related to grant payments usually constitute 
administrative action. Where a decision is challenged as being unreasonable, a claim 
can be framed in terms of the implicated socio-economic right or the right to just 
administrative action, or both. It is therefore necessary to ensure the coherent 
development of reasonableness review in socio-economic rights and administrative 
justice jurisprudence. Unified development of the standard of review can ensure that 
the capabilities that underlie the socio-economic right and the right to administrative 
                                            
“Reasonable application of constitutional rights requires proportionality analysis. 
Proportionality analysis includes balancing. The incorporation of human rights into a legal 
system therefore underscores and enhances the role of balancing.”   
110 See part 5 2 above.   
111 See in particular chapter four part 4 2 4 above.  
112 S 27(1)(c) of the Constitution.  
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justice in such a case, receive the same judicial protection regardless of the way in 
which the claim is framed.  
The question arises as to whether it is possible or desirable to apply the general 
limitations clause found in section 36 of the Constitution, which necessitates a 
proportionality enquiry, to those socio-economic rights that already contain an internal 
limitations clause.113 In Khosa,114 the Constitutional Court acknowledged that an 
overlap between the internal limitations clause in sections 26(2) and 27(2) and the 
general limitations clause in section 36 may exist.115 Furthermore, section 36 would 
only be applicable if the standard of reasonableness in this provision differed from that 
in sections 26(2) and 27(2). However, the Court declined to decide the issue in the 
absence of argumentation on the point. Instead, the majority held that, in casu, even if 
the reasonableness standard in the two provisions differed, the infringement of the 
right of access to social security would fail the reasonableness test in both sections 36 
and 27(2).116 The minority judgment per Ngcobo J mounted an enquiry in terms of both 
sections 27 and 36. Ultimately, however, Ngcobo J was of the opinion that “the 
outcome would be the same even if the enquiry were to begin and end in section 
27(2)”.117 It therefore remains uncertain whether and to what extent section 36 can be 
applied to the positive duties implied by qualified socio-economic rights.118 
It bears reiteration that section 36 does not explicitly espouse the final, balancing 
step of the proportionality enquiry. This crucial step, which goes to the heart of 
                                            
113 Ie ss 26(2) and 27(2) of the Constitution.  
114 See part 5 2 3 above.  
115 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 
6 SA 505 (CC) para 83.  
116 Para 84.  
117 Para 107.  
118 Cf the s 36 analysis in Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) and 
criticism of the application of a robust standard of scrutiny based on the “negative” duty 
concerned in chapter four part 4 2 4 above. S 36 has also never been applied to an alleged 
limitation of the right to just administrative action in terms of s 33(1) of the Constitution. K Iles 
“Limiting Socio-Economic Rights: Beyond the Internal Limitations Clauses” (2004) 20 SAJHR 
448 464 is of the opinion that where access to a socio-economic right, and not the content of 
the right itself, is limited, a section 36 enquiry should replace the internal limitations clause 
enquiry. For example, access will be at issue where it is uncontentious that social grants form 
part of the content of the right of access to social security in terms of s 27(1)(c) of the 
Constitution, but certain categories of citizens are denied access to the content of the right (ie 
grant payments). However, he argues that the adjudication of State resource allocation 
decisions should be confined to the internal limitations clause. 
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reasonableness, must therefore be inferred from the wording of section 36. 
Proportionality can likewise be read into the requirement for “reasonable” measures in 
the socio-economic rights internal limitations clauses – and accordingly into the right 
to administrative action that is reasonable. The position of Quinot and Liebenberg with 
regard to the limitation analysis can therefore be supported: 
 
“‘Reasonableness’ in the second subsection can in fact incorporate the proportionality 
inquiry of section 36, making section 36 largely redundant ... However, the strategic danger 
of subsuming the limitations inquiry into the rights definitional stage of the inquiry is that the 
traditional two stage-methodology of constitutional analysis is blurred. This can lead to a 
lack of principled, focused attention on the scope and purposes of the relevant socio-
economic right, before turning to consider the State’s justificatory arguments... [C]rucial to 
a proper application of the proportionality requirement is a clear understanding of the nature 
of the right affected, and the impact of the challenged conduct or omissions on the normative 
purposes and values which the relevant right seeks to promote...”119 
 
Reasonableness review in terms of the second subsection of the rights enshrined 
in sections 26 and 27 can therefore sufficiently accommodate a robust proportionality 
standard of review. In order to constitute a capabilities-based standard of review, it is 
imperative that a two-stage analysis is adhered to.  
 
5 3 2 Overcoming the perceived difficulties of applying proportionality review 
 
5 3 2 1 Eroding the normative force of rights?  
 
Despite having evolved into “a central structural feature of rights adjudication in 
liberal democracies worldwide”,120 proportionality review has not escaped criticism. 
One pertinent criticism raised by Tsakyrakis is that through balancing rights against 
other interests, human rights are “eroded” and the priority that they should be accorded 
is ignored.121 Put differently, rights should be regarded as “trumps” instead of mere 
                                            
119 G Quinot & S Liebenberg “Narrowing the Band: Reasonableness Review in Administrative 
Justice and Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence in South Africa” (2011) 22 Stell LR 639 660. 
120 M Kumm “The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of 
Rights-Based Proportionality Review” (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 141 142; see 
also A Stone Sweet & J Mathews “Proportionality, Judicial Review, and Global 
Constitutionalism” in G Bongiovanni, G Sartor & C Valentini (eds) Reasonableness and Law 
(2009) 173. 
121 S Tsakyrakis “Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?” (2009) 7 I Con 468 489-490. 
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principles that can be traded off against other considerations such as the public 
interest.122  
The notion of trumping is antithetical to that of balancing or weighting. This 
exclusionary approach cannot be supported since it fails to leave room for the 
acknowledgement that socio-economic rights will often come into conflict with each 
other, with other rights and with different considerations and interests. Different 
capabilities forming part of the content of a single socio-economic right may also come 
into conflict with each other. Given the fact that resources are necessary to realise all 
rights, as well as other government purposes, diverse objectives will inevitably 
compete for resources in cases that fall to be adjudicated. Balancing therefore 
becomes indispensable.  
The first two suitability steps of the proportionality enquiry ensure that only 
competing interests of constitutional importance123 are allowed to enter into a weighting 
exercise.124 In this way, the priority and protection that should be accorded to 
capabilities that have crossed the threshold of importance for recognition as “rights” 
are acknowledged.125 The most difficult questions related to the justiciability of State 
resource allocation decisions will arise when two important socio-economic rights vie 
for resource allocation. The same difficulty will arise where different capabilities that 
form part of the content of the same right compete for resources. This will be the case 
where, for example, provisioning for short-term capability needs in terms of the right of 
access to adequate housing competes with the resource demands for fulfilling longer-
term housing needs. Given the general absence of a hierarchy of rights, weighting 
becomes essential.  
The first stage of the weighting exercise establishes the scope, importance and 
normative underpinning of the rights with reference to the capabilities that inform their 
                                            
122 R Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1977); R Dworkin “Rights as Trumps” in J Waldron (ed) 
Theories of Rights (1984) 153. See A Barak Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their 
Limitations (2012) 488-489 for a discussion of this criticism.  
123 This is reflected in s 36(1)(b) of the Constitution, which requires a reviewing court to 
consider the “the importance of the purpose of the limitation”. S Woolman & H Botha 
“Limitations” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 
ed (OS 2008) 34-8 (c)(ii).  
124 M Klatt & M Meister “Proportionality – A Benefit to Human Rights? Remarks on the I CON 
Controversy” (2012) 10 I Con 687 690-691.  
125 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 366-367 and see further chapter two part 2 3 2 3 above.   
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content.126 It is important to bear in mind that a weighting exercise does not diminish 
the scope of the rights. Only the extent to which their full realisation is possible within 
prevailing circumstances is affected.127 The factual and normative context can 
therefore aid a reviewing court in assigning comparative weights to the rights at 
issue.128 A process of reasoned evaluation, weighting and balancing can justly 
prioritise a plurality of rights in concrete contexts without eroding their normative force.  
 
5 3 2 2 A value-neutral enquiry? 
 
Tsakyrakis has also accused the proportionality enquiry of being “objective, neutral, 
and totally extraneous to any moral reasoning”,129 thereby constituting an exercise in 
obfuscation as opposed to transparency. Woolman and Botha echo this concern by 
noting the scientific language of a cost-benefit analysis that often accompanies 
balancing enquiries.130  
However, the opposite is true. Weighting and the balancing component of 
proportionality are inherently normative. By assigning different weights to the social 
importance of conflicting rights, their underlying capabilities and other interests, moral 
                                            
126 See generally D Bilchitz “Does Balancing Adequately capture the Nature of Rights?” (2011) 
25 SAPL 423. 
127 A Barak Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (2012) 87-89. For a 
discussion of Sen’s recognition of this point, see chapter two part 2 3 2 3 3 above.  
128 M Klatt & M Meister “Proportionality – A Benefit to Human Rights? Remarks on the I CON 
Controversy” (2012) 10 I Con 687 690. On the need for comparative assessments, see further 
A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 96, 103-104 and the discussion in chapter two part 2 3 2 4 2 
above. 
129 S Tsakyrakis “Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?” (2009) 7 I Con 468 474. This 
is in fact the conceptualisation of proportionality espoused by DM Beatty The Ultimate Rule of 
Law (2004), but which cannot be supported. Beatty purports to reduce everything, including 
the constitutionality of insufficient resource allocation to guarantee even survival, to a question 
of fact: 
“With its focus on the particulars of each act of government, proportionality transforms 
questions that in moral philosophy are questions of values into questions of fact… Whether 
a state can legitimately… withhold resources [that people] need to survive, depends entirely 
on the factual details of each case.” (170.) 
130 S Woolman & H Botha “Limitations” in S Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) 
Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 34-8 (d)(i)(bb)(z).  
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and practical reasoning is engaged.131 The moral perspective132 adopted for the 
application of the proportionality analysis will affect the prioritisation of competing 
interests at the balancing stage. Kumm captures the relationship between value-
based, moral reasoning and practical reasoning:  
 
“If rights as principles are like statements of value, the proportionality structure provides an 
analytical framework to assess the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a right 
takes precedence over competing considerations. Reasoning about rights means reasoning 
about how a particular value relates to the exigencies of the circumstances. It requires 
general practical reasoning.”133 
 
A capabilities approach to adjudication can inform the moral perspective necessary 
to conduct the weighting exercise. Moreover, the capabilities approach does not 
suggest that the issue of weighting can be resolved through resort to a precise metric 
or the application of an ideal formula.134 Rather, the need for reasoning, public scrutiny 
and evaluative judgments is fully acknowledged and supported.135 
 
5 3 2 3 Incommensurability as incomparability?  
 
Related to the inherently moral character of the proportionality analysis is the 
criticism that values at opposite ends of the hypothetical scale are incommensurable, 
and thus cannot be balanced against each other. Rights and the capabilities that form 
their content are neither quantifiable nor susceptible to technical, mathematical 
calculation and comparison.136 It is therefore argued that it is not possible to compare 
diverse capabilities such as education and health care with each other in order to 
establish priorities. However, commensurability should not be confused with 
                                            
131 M Klatt & M Meister “Proportionality – A Benefit to Human Rights? Remarks on the I CON 
Controversy” (2012) 10 I Con 687 692-695; K Möller “Proportionality: Challenging the Critics” 
(2012) 10 I Con 709 717. 
132 KG Young Constituting Economic and Social Rights (2012) 129.  
133 M Kumm “The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of 
Rights-Based Proportionality Review” (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 141 147.  
134 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 79.  
135 80. 
136 S Woolman “Out of Order? Out of Balance? The Limitation Clause of the Final Constitution” 
(1997) 13 SAJHR 102 114-118; S Woolman & H Botha “Limitations” in S Woolman, M Bishop 
& J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 34-8 (d)(i)(bb)(w); FJ 
Urbina “A Critique of Proportionality” (2012) 57 Am J Juris 49 54-57.  
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comparability.137 The fact that rights, capabilities and values are incommensurable 
makes weighting and balancing indispensable. Klatt and Meister explicate this point:  
 
“It is precisely the hard cases which are counting in favor of the model ... [To assume the 
impossibility of weighting] would amount to denying any possibility of rational moral and 
legal reasoning, and, thus, not only to a far-reaching skepticism, but also to giving up the 
idea of constitutional law scholarship as a rational enterprise.”138 
 
Barak argues that whereas a common denominator may be required, it need not be 
quantitative, but should merely constitute a shared premise for evaluation.139 He 
locates such shared premise within the need to balance the social importance of the 
limiting measures with the social importance of preventing harm to the right concerned. 
“Social importance” thus emerges as the shared metric.140 In order to determine what 
can be regarded as being of social importance, Barak postulates that the economic 
and political context and ideology of the relevant legal system, along with its history, 
should be taken into account. In this way, “[t]he assessment of the social importance 
of each of the conflicting principles should be conducted against the background of the 
normative structure of each legal system”.141  
Under our transformative Constitution, this approach leaves room for the social and 
historical context of South Africa to inform the social importance of conflicting 
principles. The need to address the structural disadvantage caused by apartheid 
policies will therefore be an important factor informing the social importance of 
competing principles. Social importance can also be measured by a relevant principle’s 
ability to contribute to the general project of transformative constitutionalism and to the 
                                            
137 VA da Silva “Comparing the Incommensurable: Constitutional Principles, Balancing and 
Rational Decision” (2011) 31 OJLS 273; M Klatt & M Meister “Proportionality – A Benefit to 
Human Rights? Remarks on the I CON Controversy” (2012) 10 I Con 687 696. 
138 M Klatt & M Meister “Proportionality – A Benefit to Human Rights? Remarks on the I CON 
Controversy” (2012) 10 I Con 687 696. 
139 A Barak Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (2012) 483. See further 
I Currie “Balancing and the Limitation of Rights in the South African Constitution” (2010) 25 
SAPL 408 419 who argues that the Constitution and its values constitute the “common point 
of view” against which balancing can take place. See further D Bilchitz “Does Balancing 
Adequately capture the Nature of Rights?” (2011) 25 SAPL 423 444 who states that the 
foundational values of dignity, freedom and equality should inform Currie’s “constitutional 
perspective”.  
140 A Barak Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (2012) 484.  
141 349.  
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manifestation of the fundamental values of freedom, dignity and equality in the lived 
reality of all who reside in South Africa.  
Capabilities can be used to identify the overarching normative purpose of socio-
economic rights as leading to the functioning outcome of living an autonomous, 
dignified life in a position of substantive equality with others. Socio-economic rights 
thus enjoy considerable social importance. Competing rights can accordingly be 
weighted and ordered within a rich normative paradigm informed by the foundational 
values of freedom, dignity and equality.  
 
5 3 3 Developing a weighting paradigm for the adjudication of State resource allocation 
decisions  
 
5 3 3 1 The inherently prioritising nature of socio-economic rights 
 
The Constitutional Court has recognised that socio-economic rights will often come 
into conflict with each other.142 However, instead of characterising instances where 
important rights vie for the allocation of limited resources as “tragic choices” that cast 
an insurmountable, polycentric obstacle to adjudication, such cases can instead be 
adjudicated through the application of a proportionality-as-weighting standard of 
review.143 In balancing the rights of access to housing against the right to property,144 
the Constitutional Court in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers145 
acknowledged the need for balancing as opposed to rigid ordering or the application 
of a precise formula: 
 
“The judicial function in these circumstances is not to establish a hierarchical arrangement 
between the different interests involved, privileging in an abstract and mechanical way the 
rights of ownership over the right not to be dispossessed of a home, or vice versa. Rather 
it is to balance out and reconcile the opposed claims in as just a manner as possible taking 
                                            
142 Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) para 31; 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 25; Minister 
of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 35.  
143 M Pieterse “Health Care Rights, Resources and Rationing” (2007) 127 SALJ 514 515-520; 
MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 37.  
144 S 25 of the Constitution.  
145 2005 1 SA 217 (CC).  
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account of all the interests involved and the specific factors relevant in each particular 
case.”146 
 
This approach leaves room for a normative process of reasoned evaluation, as 
espoused by the capabilities approach.147 Moreover, proportionality as weighting can 
be fruitfully developed and applied to State resource allocation decisions. The 
proportionality enquiry can be infused with substance by asking what capabilities need 
to be realised in order to achieve the complex functioning outcome that constitutes the 
overarching purpose of socio-economic rights. Courts can then ensure that more basic 
capabilities, which inform the content of socio-economic rights, will be justly prioritised 
and optimally protected. Nussbaum’s approach, according to which ranking is possible 
even where all possible orderings will involve some type of capability violation, can 
therefore be incorporated into Sen’s weighting paradigm.148  
By acknowledging the prioritising function of rights, and especially socio-economic 
rights, courts can grapple with the expenditure choices faced by government.149 
Although courts will never make these choices directly in the first instance, the 
subsequent reasoned evaluation of the State’s choices within a capabilities framework 
ensures accountability and transparency in the allocative decisions that government 
makes.150 This, in turn, ensures that the “inevitability” of non-realisation of socio-
economic rights is not merely assumed, but must be accounted for whenever it is 
alleged that resource allocation decisions are unreasonable.151 
 
5 3 3 2 Application of a proportionality standard of review to State resource allocation 
decisions   
 
Proportionality has traditionally enjoyed a defensive role in that, when applied to civil 
and political rights, it sets the boundaries of what limitations are permissible and 
                                            
146 Para 23. 
147 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 79-80.  
148 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 37; A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 
79-80; chapter two part 2 3 4 4 above. 
149 C Scott & P Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A 
Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” (2000) 16 SAJHR 206 252. 
150 E Mureinik “Beyond a Charter of Luxuries: Economic Rights in the Constitution” (1992) 8 
SAJHR 464 466, 471-472; M Pieterse “Health Care Rights, Resources and Rationing” (2007) 
127 SALJ 514 518.  
151 M Pieterse “Health Care Rights, Resources and Rationing” (2007) 127 SALJ 514 516.  
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thereby restricts government power. In contrast, when applied to State resource 
allocation decisions, proportionality assumes a creative character in the sense of 
seeking to establish to what extent proportionate resource allocation for the realisation 
of socio-economic capabilities is possible given finite resources.152 The creative or 
positive nature of the enquiry furthermore pushes the boundaries of the judicial function 
within the separation of powers – bearing in mind that a fluid demarcation of functions 
is appropriate under a transformative constitution and within a culture of justification.153 
The Supreme Court of Appeal in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue 
Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty)154 aptly expressed the essence of the judicial function in 
this regard: 
 
“Proportionality is a constitutional watchword. In dealing with the interrelated issues of the 
limits of judicial intrusion and the reality of available resources, balanced against the 
assertion of socio-economic rights, a court’s role can rightly be described as ‘the art of the 
possible’.”155 
 
5 3 3 2 1 Establishing the content of the right and the severity of the infringement  
 
As emphasised throughout this dissertation,156 the first stage of the rights analysis 
is crucial for the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions. Where the right at 
stake is not sufficiently interpreted, subsequent adjudication of resource-based 
justificatory arguments put forth by the State will be forced to take place within a 
normative vacuum. This poses the risk that “available resources” will be interpreted 
narrowly, thereby leaving the political choices that led to the allocation of insufficient 
resources unquestioned.  
As a first step, therefore, the reviewing court must determine the substantive, 
normative scope of the right at stake. Where socio-economic rights overlap with the 
                                            
152 See X Contiades & A Fontiadou “Social Rights in the Age of Proportionality: Global 
Economic Crisis and Constitutional Litigation” (2012) 10 I Con 660 665 for the characterisation 
of proportionality as “defensive” and “creative”, respectively. However, the authors view the 
creative function of proportionality as determining the content of socio-economic rights. This 
view cannot be supported. See further the discussion in part 5 3 3 2 1 below.  
153 For the role of the judiciary under a reconceptualised separation of powers doctrine, see 
chapter two part 2 4 2 above.   
154 2011 4 SA 337 (SCA).  
155 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2011 4 SA 337 (SCA) para 54.  
156 See especially chapter two part 2 3 2 2 3. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 254 
 
right to just administrative action, the normative purposes that inform the latter right 
must also be explicitly elaborated upon. In order to substantively interpret the rights at 
issue, the court can ask what capabilities are necessary in the relevant context157 to 
achieve the functioning outcome of living an autonomous, dignified life in a position of 
substantive equality with others. The important nature of the capabilities at issue may 
justify a strict level of scrutiny and demand proportionate resource allocation. Thus, for 
example, where a fertile capability that can promote and enhance the attainment of 
greater capability sets is imperilled, a much more intense level of scrutiny will be 
warranted. Where basic capabilities are negated and severe infringement of freedom, 
dignity and equality occurs, scrutiny must likewise be sharpened.158 The weight 
accorded to the fulfilment of vital capabilities will therefore be significant. Only 
justificatory arguments for insufficient resource allocation of greater weight will render 
such resource allocation decisions “reasonable”.  
In addition, the court must consider the normative, historical, social and factual 
context of the case at hand when establishing the severity of the alleged capability 
deprivation. Thus, for example, where the right of access to social security is limited, 
the court will ask what would constitute a sufficient social grant in order to make the 
functioning outcome of living an autonomous, dignified life in a position of substantive 
equality with others possible. The court will need to “dig into the history and social 
reality”159 of the litigants in order to establish the gravity of the impact that the allocation 
of insufficient social grants has on their capability sets.160 The historical and social 
context may indicate that insufficient access to social assistance will exacerbate class- 
and race-based patterns of disadvantage. The factual context might indicate that 
several more basic capabilities must be realised in order to render the complex 
functioning outcome feasible. Thus, in the absence of adequate social security, the 
claimants may lack the capability to access food, water, shelter, health care services 
and so forth. The process by which the current allocation was arrived at and the 
payment of social grants itself would also need to be administratively just, thus adding 
a further dimension to the scope of capabilities concerned. Where these capability sets 
                                            
157 The broader social and historical context of South Africa, as well as the factual context or 
“lived reality” of the given case.  
158 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 99. See further chapter two part 2 3 2 2 1 
above.  
159 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 176.  
160 For the importance of context in adjudicating State resource allocation decisions in terms 
of a capabilities approach, see further chapter two part 2 3 3 3 3 above. 
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are negated, the negative impact of an insufficient resource allocation decision on the 
achievement of the complex, overarching functioning outcome will be severe. 
Whereas Contiades and Fontiadou argue that the second stage of the rights 
analysis determines the content of the right,161 the inverse should be supported: the 
interpretation of the content of the rights at issue must necessarily precede the 
application of the proportionality enquiry at the second stage of the rights analysis. Due 
weight must accordingly be apportioned to the relevant rights. Only the extent of the 
current possibility of the right’s realisation, and not its scope, can subsequently be 
limited if the justificatory arguments for not allocating sufficient resources outweigh the 
importance of the capabilities concerned.  
 
5 3 3 2 2 Establishing the purpose for which resources are diverted 
 
During the second stage of the rights analysis, the justificatory arguments for not 
allocating proportionate resources to the rights at issue are extracted. The purpose for 
which resources have been diverted from the socio-economic rights in question should 
be identified. Additionally, a rational connection between the measures adopted by the 
State and such purpose should be established. Where litigants allege, for example, 
that their right of access to health care services has been infringed by an insufficient 
allocation of resources, the State will need to demonstrate why it did not allocate 
adequate resources for the fulfilment of the relevant aspect of the right. In TAC, few 
resources were required and the State’s omission to provide Nevirapine could not be 
justified by reference to a legitimate purpose. As Barak argues, the State would 
therefore fail the “rational connection” hurdle and the Court could have found the 
insufficient allocation of resources unreasonable at this phase of its analysis.162  
The discretion of the State to pursue a wide range of legitimate goals is recognised 
at this step of proportionality.163 Whether such purposes are of sufficient constitutional 
                                            
161 X Contiades & A Fontiadou “Social Rights in the Age of Proportionality: Global Economic 
Crisis and Constitutional Litigation” (2012) 10 I Con 660 667.  
162 A Barak Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (2012) 432. 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court proceeded to the final, balancing step of proportionality 
and ultimately found the State’s conduct unreasonable and unconstitutional despite failing to 
apply a structured proportionality enquiry. See chapter four part 4 3 2 above.  
163 The range of weights or band of options is therefore wide at this point. See A Sen 
Development as Freedom (1999) 78-80 and generally G Quinot & S Liebenberg “Narrowing 
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weight to justify the deprivation of important capabilities, is an assessment that will only 
be made at the proportionality stricto sensu step of the analysis. Nevertheless, where 
the State points to a legitimate purpose, cases may arise where the litigants or an 
amicus curiae point to wasteful or irregular expenditure. If, for example, a Head of State 
were to spend a significant amount to effect luxury upgrades to his private residence,164 
no legitimate purpose could be said to exist. However, whether the equivalent of such 
expenditure should be directed to the realisation of the socio-economic capabilities at 
issue or to different purposes entirely, is a question that a court can only decide with 
reference to normative considerations. Although wasteful or irregular expenditure can 
therefore be raised at this point of the enquiry, it may only be susceptible to judicial 
resolution at the final, balancing step of the analysis.  
Thus, although a court may be reluctant to order the redirection of such resources 
to the socio-economic right at issue, fruitless expenditure could be a factor contributing 
to the decision that the State’s resource allocation decisions were unreasonable, 
thereby violating a socio-economic right. Following such a conclusion, the court could 
make use of innovative remedies in order to compel the State to devise a feasible plan 
to allocate additional, proportionate resources to the realisation of the right 
concerned.165  
 
5 3 3 2 3 Establishing the necessity of the omission   
 
The necessity step of proportionality similarly questions whether the omission by the 
State to allocate sufficient resources to a particular capability or capability set was 
necessary to achieve the legitimate purpose identified in the preceding step. Necessity 
entails a means-ends test whereby the court asks whether other, equally effective 
measures could have been adopted that would be less harmful to the rights affected 
thereby.166 In terms of section 36 of the Constitution, the necessity step is not explicitly 
included in the proportionality enquiry. However, the importance of the right and the 
severity of its infringement may sharpen the justificatory requirements set out in section 
                                            
the Band: Reasonableness Review in Administrative Justice and Socio-Economic Rights 
Jurisprudence in South Africa” (2011) 22 Stell LR 639.  
164 Public Protector Secure in Comfort Report No 25 of 2013/14 (2014). 
165 See generally chapter six below.  
166 J Gerards “How to Improve the Necessity Test of the European Court of Human Rights” 
(2013) 11 I Con 466.  
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36(1). Thus, the injunction for the court to consider whether “less restrictive means” of 
achieving its purpose were available to the State, may be sharpened to require that 
the means chosen were necessary for the achievement of the purpose.167  
When applied to State resource allocation decisions, the State will often be able to 
show that it can only achieve its purpose as effectively – while simultaneously 
allocating sufficient resources to the right at stake – through the procurement of 
additional resources. In such cases, the assessment of the options available to the 
State in the light of the normative content of the infringed right will necessitate reasoned 
evaluation and weighting that should rather be embarked upon at the final step of the 
proportionality enquiry.168  
However, there are many cases where the State will be called upon to justify its 
inadequate resource allocation but will be unable to do so. In Mazibuko, the Court held 
that the provision of a higher quantity of water would be “expensive”.169 Yet there is no 
indication of whether it was necessary for the City to allocate resources to a different 
purpose to the detriment of the capabilities of the residents of Phiri. The Court should 
have required the State to allege and prove that inadequate allocation to the residents 
of Phiri was necessary in order to meet the needs of the “worst off” in society.170 Put 
differently, where government is unable to show that it was unaffordable within 
available resources to allocate sufficient resources to both the capabilities at stake and 
a different legitimate purpose, it will fail to satisfy the necessity test. In failing to adduce 
sufficient evidence, the State will in fact conversely show that “public money could be 
better spent”.171 However, given the factual nature of the suitability and necessity 
                                            
167 S Woolman “Out of Order? Out of Balance? The Limitation Clause of the Final Constitution” 
(1997) 13 SAJHR 102 108-109. 
168 See part 5 3 1 2 above.  
169 See, for example, Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) paras 84, 88, 89 and 
143 and see further chapter four part 4 2 3 3 above.   
170 The Court in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) observed that the 
residents in Phiri were not the “worst-off” (paras 7, 14). For the importance of promoting 
resource allocation beyond the minimum, see chapter two part 2 2 2 1 2 above.  
171 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 41 where 
the Court explicitly stated that a court is not tasked with asking “whether public money could 
be better spent”. However, to the extent that the importance of the capabilities at issue and the 
severity of the capability deprivation justify a proportionality analysis, it must be asked whether 
public money could be better spent. To hold that a State resource allocation is unreasonable 
is to admit that public money could have and should be better – or more reasonably – spent. 
See further chapter four part 4 3 1 above.  
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phases of the proportionality enquiry, justification should be demanded but contentious 
disputes can be resolved at the balancing step of the analysis. Nevertheless, the 
necessity step constitutes a crucial justificatory component of the proportionality 
enquiry.172 
 
5 3 3 2 4 Balancing  
 
Finally, the proportionality stricto sensu or balancing step of the proportionality 
enquiry should be applied to the impugned resource allocation decision. It is during 
this step that the weights accorded to the normative factors elucidated during the first 
stage of the enquiry will be balanced vis-à-vis the importance and necessity of the 
reasons that the State has proffered for not allocating sufficient resources to secure 
the capabilities in question. The social importance of preventing capability deprivation 
will thus be weighed against the social importance of whatever purpose the State has 
instead allocated resources to.  
The social importance of both ends of the scale must be evaluated with reference 
to the overarching, complex capability that socio-economic rights aim to realise, 
namely the ability to lead an autonomous, dignified life in a position of substantive 
equality with others. This complex capability must be considered in the light of the 
social and historical context of South Africa, and the need to address the structural 
disadvantage caused by apartheid policies. Furthermore, the factual context or “lived 
reality” of the litigants and similarly placed persons will help to identify the more basic 
capabilities that must be realised in order to make the achievement of the complex 
capability possible. The factual context will also indicate the gravity of the capability 
deprivation resulting from the State’s omission. The weight assigned to these factors 
must be balanced against the weight assigned to the purpose for which the State 
diverted resources from the right at issue.  
In discussing the application of the proportionality test to “positive” rights, Barak 
conceptualises the test, which can be adapted for a capabilities approach to the 
adjudication of State resource allocation decisions in particular, as follows: 
 
“[T]he basic balancing rule requires that the more important the marginal protection of the 
[capability] and the greater the chances of fulfilling that [capability], then the requirement 
                                            
172 For the application of this step to “positive” rights, see A Barak Proportionality: Constitutional 
Rights and their Limitations (2012) 433.  
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that the marginal benefits to the public interest or to another constitutional right [or 
capability] by avoiding the [allocation of resources to the first capability] should be more 
socially important and more urgent, and the probability of their occurrence greater.”173 
 
This is an unmistakably normative exercise that will require value judgments to be 
made. However, the task is facilitated by the factual evidence that has been presented 
during the previous steps of the enquiry. By adhering to a process of reasoned 
evaluation that complies with the ethos and review standards demanded by a 
capabilities approach to adjudication,174 the task of balancing is not insurmountable. 
Comparative judgments can therefore be made in the light of the nature of, for 
example, competing capabilities and the urgency with which a particular capability 
deprivation should be remedied.175  
This is also in line with the “proportionality plus test” espoused by Vandenhole for 
the resolution of conflicts between socio-economic rights.176 According to the author, 
additional criteria should be incorporated when the proportionality test is applied to 
socio-economic rights. Vandenhole argues that the vulnerability of the groups in 
question as well as the need to protect the essential level of the rights at stake should 
be taken into account.177 Considerations regarding the urgency of remedying capability 
deprivation and the vulnerability of those affected are accommodated within the first, 
interpretative stage of the rights analysis. The protection of the “essential levels” of 
socio-economic rights can also be considered, since the minimum core approach 
remains relevant to a determination of reasonableness.178  
The capabilities approach likewise takes cognisance of the existence of “non-
eliminable principles”,179 the violation of which would result in injustice. Severe 
infringement of, for example, human dignity therefore cannot be tolerated and will 
rarely if ever be outweighed by a competing right, capability informing the content of 
the same right or government purpose.  
                                            
173 433-434 as adapted for a capabilities approach to the adjudication of State resource 
allocation decisions in particular.  
174 See part 5 4 below.  
175 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 106; see further chapter two part 2 3 2 4 2 above.  
176 W Vandenhole “Conflicting Economic and Social Rights: The Proportionality Plus Test” in 
E Brems (ed) Conflicts between Fundamental Rights (2008) 559.  
177 565-571.  
178 See chapter two part 2 2 2 1 2 above.  
179 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 106. 
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The resources allocated by the State must be proportionate to the importance of the 
capabilities concerned and the severity of their deprivation. The normative and social, 
historical and factual context of both ends of the dispute must thus be carefully 
considered by the court, and weights must accordingly be assigned and balanced. The 
fact that the weighting exercise might involve difficult decisions does not absolve the 
judiciary from its constitutional obligation to adjudicate conflicts between rights and 
other interests.  
 
5 4 Capabilities-based review criteria    
 
The following part will explore the overarching features of a capabilities-based 
standard of review. This is important in order to clarify the role and competence of the 
judiciary to adjudicate complex State resource allocation decisions. Furthermore, 
certain specific review criteria will be elucidated. These criteria can guide a court to 
ask the right questions to ensure that State resource allocation decisions are 
proportionate to the capabilities they impact upon.   
 
5 4 1 Overarching features of capabilities-based review 
 
5 4 1 1 A culture of justification 
 
The application of a capabilities-based standard of proportionality review to State 
resource allocation decisions promotes a shift from a culture of authority to a culture 
of justification.180 Where capabilities are permitted to guide State action and 
subsequent adjudication, resource allocation decisions can no longer be left 
unexamined due to their potentially complex and polycentric nature. Instead, courts 
must demand “substantive justification”181 for the deprivation of crucial capabilities and 
the consequent infringement of the rights that protect them. A culture of justification is 
therefore harmonious with a capabilities approach to adjudication under a 
                                            
180 E Mureinik “A Bridge to Where?: Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31 
32. 
181 M Cohen-Eliya & I Porat “Proportionality and the Culture of Justification” (2011) 59 Am J 
Comp L 463 466.  
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transformative constitution – and with proportionality review conceptualised as a 
capabilities-centred weighting exercise.182  
According to the overarching requirement for justification, every allocative decision 
– from the appropriation of revenue nationally to particular allocations for the 
implementation of specific policies – must be reasonable.183 Where capabilities 
demand the application of a robust standard of scrutiny, but the need for justification is 
waived based on the identity of the decision-maker, the danger of lapsing into a judicial 
method appropriate to a culture of authority arises.184 This can lead to restrictive 
standards of review that are developed incoherently, and unprincipled resort to judicial 
deference.185 Where such an approach to judicial review is adopted, it is unlikely that 
the crucial capabilities that underlie socio-economic rights and the right to 
administrative justice will be realised. 
The State must therefore be compelled to provide explicit evidence of its focus on 
the substantive content and purposes of socio-economic rights throughout the entire 
budgeting and allocative process. Where socio-economic capabilities compete for 
resource allocation, the State must demonstrate that it conducted its own 
proportionality exercise. The interpretation of rights with reference to the capabilities 
that inform their content should form the core of the justificatory process.186 For courts, 
the content and importance of the right that falls to be interpreted will indicate whether 
the resource allocation decision was proportionate to the capability needs at issue. For 
the State as primary decision-maker, justification will only be adequate where it can 
show that a constitutionally compliant interpretation187 of rights has consistently guided 
its allocative decisions.   
                                            
182 See further chapter two part 2 4 4 above. 
183 See further Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) 
para 82 and chapter four part 4 3 1 above.  
184 M Cohen-Eliya & I Porat “Proportionality and the Culture of Justification” (2011) 59 Am J 
Comp L 463 476. The problems associated with this type of judicial approach were analysed 
in the context of the United Kingdom in chapter three part 3 2 3 above.  
185 See chapter three part 3 2 3 above.  
186 Cf M Kumm “The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of 
Rights-Based Proportionality Review” (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 141 144-152, 
who conceptualises the rise of proportionality review as signalling a shift from interpretation to 
justification. 
187 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 74 and further chapter four part 4 3 4 above.  
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Making evaluative judgments regarding the prioritisation of capabilities and resource 
allocation must occur through a process of public reasoning.188 Kumm’s elaboration of 
the role of public reason in eliciting justification for purposes of proportionality review 
resonates with a capabilities approach to adjudication. Kumm argues that State action 
can only be justified by reasons of the type that can reasonably be accepted by the 
public.189 Where a process of reasoning is conducted by the judiciary, South Africa’s 
constitutional project implies that only constitutionally consistent decisions will merit 
reasoned acceptance. A State action that cannot reasonably be justified is accordingly 
not legitimate.190 Public reason therefore permeates the proportionality or weighting 
enquiry and likewise constitutes a hallmark of a culture of justification. Congruously, 
public reasoning forms a crucial component of the capabilities approach.191  
Finally, transparency in reasoning is a prerequisite for a culture of justification and 
for successful proportionality analysis. Proportionality review requires the State to 
follow a capabilities-based process of reasoning in allocating resources for the 
fulfilment of socio-economic rights and the different capability sets these rights aim to 
foster. The guidance that the structured approach provides subsequently allows for 
transparent decision-making. This, in turn, holds the potential to “trigger public 
debate”192 about what a proportionate resource allocation decision in the light of vital 
capabilities would entail.  
Transparency finds its correlation in the requirement for explicitness in terms of a 
capabilities approach to adjudication.193 Explicitness, or substantive reasoning, 
renders a State resource allocation decision open to public scrutiny. Where the public 
can evaluate the State’s explicit decisions, the opportunity for public participation in 
establishing what priorities the State should set is created.194  
  
                                            
188 For the role of reasoning, see further chapter two part 2 3 2 4 above. 
189 M Kumm “The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of 
Rights-Based Proportionality Review” (2010) 4 Law & Ethics of Human Rights 141 168-169. 
190 170.  
191 See further chapter two part 2 3 2 4 above.  
192 X Contiades & A Fontiadou “Social Rights in the Age of Proportionality: Global Economic 
Crisis and Constitutional Litigation” (2012) 10 I Con 660 669.  
193 See further chapter two part 2 4 4 above.  
194 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 30.  
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5 4 1 2 The role of deference  
 
One key question that arises in the application of a capabilities-based standard of 
review is what role, if any, judicial deference should play. It has been argued that the 
normative assumptions that explain resort to deference in the United Kingdom are 
inappropriate in South Africa’s system of constitutional supremacy.195 In South Africa, 
the State enjoys a wide discretion to identify legitimate purposes for resource allocation 
and to consider and adopt the means necessary to achieve such purposes. However, 
discretion is not tantamount to deference.196 Even where the State enjoys leeway to 
identify diverse priorities and the means to achieve its purposes, a State resource 
allocation decision will not be reasonable in terms of the final step of the weighting 
analysis if allocation is disproportionate to vital socio-economic capabilities or the 
severity of their deprivation.197 Where important capabilities are imperilled by resource 
allocation, proportionality review therefore constitutes a robust standard of review and 
does not accommodate weak standards of scrutiny in its application. 
Rivers appositely argues that the seriousness of the relevant right-infringement 
determines the intensity of review applied to government action.198 He classifies this 
as the “substantive principle” of proportionality, which should be distinguished from the 
“formal principle” of intensity of review. According to the formal principle, the 
seriousness of any rights infringement should be paralleled by a decreasing level of 
judicial restraint199 or deference.200 Where an inadequate State resource allocation 
decision impacts severely on socio-economic capabilities and consequently negates 
the functioning outcome of living an autonomous, dignified life in a position of 
substantive equality with others, restraint or deference becomes increasingly 
inappropriate. Instead, courts should adopt a capabilities approach to adjudication, 
thereby ensuring that all resource allocation decisions are substantively justified. A 
capabilities-based proportionality analysis leaves room for the recognition that a 
                                            
195 See chapter three in general.  
196 A Barak Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (2012) 431.  
197 M Elliot “Proportionality and Deference: The Importance of a Structured Approach” in C 
Forsyth, M Elliot, S Jhaveri, M Ramsden & A Scully-Hill (eds) Effective Judicial Review: A 
Cornerstone of Good Governance (2010) 264 280.  
198 J Rivers “Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review” (2006) 65 Cambridge LJ 174 177.  
199 Judicial restraint is based on concerns of legitimacy whereas deference is based on 
concerns of institutional competence. 
200 J Rivers “Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review” (2006) 65 Cambridge LJ 174 177. 
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diverse range of important objectives should be pursued by the democratically 
accountable legislature. It similarly allows a court to acknowledge that the State has a 
range of policy options available to it in deciding how to fulfil a given socio-economic 
right.  
Questions of institutional competence do not automatically give rise to the need for 
deference. Where an amicus curiae or other party can provide expert evidence refuting 
the government’s claims as to the means chosen to realise its objective, such evidence 
should be scrutinised and given due weight.201 Moreover, a court can seek to minimise 
its institutional shortcomings through the use of innovative remedies.202 Finally, the 
balancing step of the weighting enquiry should be informed by the importance of the 
capabilities at stake and the gravity of their deprivation. Deference should not be 
permitted to subsume this crucial, capabilities-centred judicial balancing exercise. 
Proportionality as weighting creates the opportunity for meaningful dialogue among 
courts, the State and other stakeholders. By promoting participation among a wide 
range of stakeholders, a diverse range of interests and perspectives can be brought to 
the court’s and State’s attention. This can help to address the participatory deficit 
associated with the judiciary, and thereby increase the legitimacy of the courts to 
adjudicate complex, allocative decisions. The need for deference based on the 
perceived illegitimacy of the judiciary is thereby diminished.  
Furthermore, participation can also highlight a range of issues and therefore pre-
empt polycentric consequences to a certain extent. The transparency and explicitness 
demanded throughout the weighting process ensure that State resource allocation 
decisions and subsequent judgments render allocative choices susceptible to public 
scrutiny and debate. Initial judgments can thus be adapted in the light of evolving 
reality. In this way, concerns that the judiciary lacks the constitutional and institutional 
competence to adjudicate complex State decisions are addressed. This, in turn, 
obviates the need for automatic resort to deference.  
  
                                            
201 M Elliot “Proportionality and Deference: The Importance of a Structured Approach” in C 
Forsyth, M Elliot, S Jhaveri, M Ramsden & A Scully-Hill (eds) Effective Judicial Review: A 
Cornerstone of Good Governance (2010) 264 274.  
202 See further chapter six part 6 3 below; M Elliot “Proportionality and Deference: The 
Importance of a Structured Approach” in C Forsyth, M Elliot, S Jhaveri, M Ramsden & A Scully-
Hill (eds) Effective Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance (2010) 264 274.  
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5 4 2 Specific criteria of capabilities-based review  
 
A court that adopts a capabilities approach to the judicial review of State resource 
allocation decisions can adhere to certain specific review criteria to facilitate 
adjudication. First, a court should ensure that the State considered the ability of the 
fundamental values of freedom, dignity and equality to aid the interpretation of the 
content of socio-economic rights. In particular, it will be demonstrated that the 
fundamental values can help the court to evaluate the State’s prioritisation of 
competing capabilities with particular reference to the value of substantive equality. 
Next, a court should take care to interpret “available resources” widely.  
Thereafter, a reviewing court must require the State to explicitly demonstrate how it 
came to its allocative decision, and that such decision was subsequently implemented 
effectively. The State must show that it considered its socio-economic obligations and 
capability realisation in its allocative processes. Courts should also require the State 
to illustrate that it took benchmarks related to capability realisation into account in 
making its allocative decisions. These benchmarks can thereafter be compared by a 
reviewing court to the actual priorities of the State as reflected in its budget. 
Benchmarks can also help a court determine whether the State has effectively 
implemented its allocative decisions. Finally, the State should bear the onus of showing 
that participatory processes led to the formulation of its allocative decisions, and that 
such decisions are themselves aimed at fostering participation.  
 
5 4 2 1 Allowing the content of rights to inform resource allocation 
 
5 4 2 1 1 The role of the fundamental values in identifying important capabilities 
 
A court should adjudicate a given State resource allocation decision in the light of 
the capabilities such allocative choice seeks to promote or threatens to impinge. The 
importance of the capabilities constituting the content of the right should guide both the 
adjudication of State resource allocation decisions and the primary allocative decision 
made by the State. A reviewing court should thus ensure that the demands posited by 
the functioning outcome of living an autonomous, dignified and substantively equal life 
are taken into account by the State when allocating resources.  
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As was argued in a previous chapter,203 the fundamental values of freedom, dignity 
and equality require the allocation of sufficient resources for material conditions that 
allow people to live autonomous and dignified lives in a position of substantive equality 
with others. The fundamental values thus enable a conceptualisation of the 
overarching purpose of socio-economic rights. Thereafter, more specific capabilities 
that are necessary to achieve the complex functioning outcome can be identified in 
varying contexts. For example, the ultimate purpose of the right to basic education may 
be to live an autonomous, dignified life in a position of substantive equality with others. 
The social and historical context of South Africa might indicate that certain schools 
were prejudiced by apartheid policies. This may justify increased allocation to these 
schools to bring them into a position of substantive equality with historically privileged 
schools. The factual context or lived reality of the learners may furthermore indicate 
that many more basic capabilities must be realised for the functioning outcome to be 
feasible. This may include the capabilities to enjoy nutritional programmes to combat 
hunger while learning, infrastructure to access schools, infrastructure within schools 
such as furniture, and educational resources such as qualified teachers and textbooks. 
Furthermore, once it is recognised that capabilities may entail an amalgamation of 
substantive and procedural elements,204 the values of freedom, dignity and equality 
also require the State to allocate resources that are directed to the process aspect of 
freedom. The ability to live an autonomous, dignified life calls for participation and 
agency. Courts should thus ensure that State resource allocation decisions result from 
participatory processes and are simultaneously aimed at promoting further social, 
economic and political participation.205 
 
5 4 2 1 2 The role of the fundamental values in ranking important capabilities 
 
Although the fundamental values of freedom, dignity and equality will all be involved 
in most socio-economic rights cases,206 it is possible that in certain instances 
                                            
203 Chapter two part 2 4 1.  
204 For the need to develop Sen’s distinction between opportunity and process in order to 
acknowledge the sometimes inseparable substantive and procedural aspects of capabilities, 
see chapter two part 2 2 2 2 3 above.  
205 See further chapter two part 2 4 3 above.  
206 See part 5 2 3 above and, for example, Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 83; Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v 
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competing capabilities will each implicate a particular value to a greater extent. For 
example, capability sets connected to short-term provisioning of housing and the basic 
services that accompany that right may implicate dignity, whereas longer-term 
functioning outcomes dependent on adequate housing will involve freedom and 
equality. Basic capabilities as well as more complex capabilities, constituting different 
aspects of the same right, may accordingly vie for resource allocation. In some cases, 
it is conceivable that one of the values may aid a court in ranking capabilities to 
establish the proportionality of conflicting State resource allocation decisions.  
 
(a) The interdependence of the fundamental values  
 
However, all three fundamental values are crucial both for purposes of the project 
of transformative constitutionalism and a capabilities approach to resource allocation 
and subsequent adjudication. If viewed in isolation, the value of equality presents 
potential pitfalls that should be noted and avoided.207 For example, Bilchitz argues that 
an equality approach to reasonableness review conflates the issues of scope (who the 
beneficiaries of socio-economic rights are) with that of content (to what such 
beneficiaries are entitled).208 This can lead to insufficient attention being paid to the 
substantive content and meaning of socio-economic rights. Yet by perceiving all three 
fundamental values as interconnected, sufficient normative content can be attributed 
to socio-economic rights. By conceptualising the overarching normative purpose of 
socio-economic rights as the achievement of the functioning outcome of living an 
autonomous, substantively equal and dignified life, the importance of each value is 
recognised. These values can furthermore help specify the substantive content of the 
rights in a given historical, social and factual context.  
  
                                            
Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC) para 40; Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen 
v Stoltz 2005 2 SA 140 (CC) para 21. 
207 S Liebenberg & B Goldblatt “The Interrelationship between Equality and Socio-economic 
Rights under South Africa’s Transformative Constitution” (2007) 23 SAJHR 335 355 state: 
“[T]he temptation to seek to justify socio-economic rights in terms of one overarching value 
or related right should be resisted. Such an approach is too restrictive and does not do 
justice to the range of values and fundamental interests which socio-economic rights were 
intended to promote in different contexts.” 
208 D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-
Economic Rights (2007) 166-173.  
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(b) Using the value of equality to prioritise competing capabilities  
 
By way of illustration, the value of equality can facilitate the prioritisation of 
competing capabilities. Although each value could aid prioritisation in a particular 
context, the value of equality will be relevant where, for example, two groups both 
instigate claims for limited resources. One group of poor persons may require short-
term housing in order to realise the most elementary capabilities that are required for 
achieving the functioning outcome of living an autonomous, dignified life in a position 
of substantive equality with others. This would include the basic capability of enjoying 
shelter from the elements and access to services such as the provision of sufficient 
water in order to realise the more complex capability of enjoying an adequate state of 
health. A second group made up of poor, black women may argue that they too require 
increased resource allocation in respect of their housing needs. This second group 
may already enjoy basic housing, and may therefore be in a relatively better position 
than those who have no access to housing at all.  
Where a weighting analysis has shown that the State’s resources are in fact too 
limited to realise the capabilities of both groups, the historical and present social 
context of each disadvantaged group will be of paramount importance.209 Where a 
failure to allocate reasonable resources will reinforce patterns of inequality and 
discrimination, an alternative resource allocation decision may be preferable.210 This 
factor may thus support the allocation of additional resources beyond the minimum to 
the second group consisting of poor, black women. The value of substantive equality 
can therefore identify the important capabilities that inform the content of the right at 
issue. It does not merely obfuscate the distinction between content and scope as 
Bilchitz contends. 
 
(c) Ensuring resource allocation beyond the minimum  
 
Care should be taken that State resource allocation decisions and subsequent 
adjudication do not equalise important capabilities in all circumstances. Although the 
capabilities approach fully accommodates the notion of the equal dignity of all persons, 
                                            
209 S Liebenberg & B Goldblatt “The Interrelationship between Equality and Socio-economic 
Rights under South Africa’s Transformative Constitution” (2007) 23 SAJHR 335 357.  
210 359. 
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this does not mean that the living conditions of all should be identical.211 Whereas 
capabilities constitute an appropriate space in which equality can be assessed,212 the 
demands of equality are heavily context-dependent and variable.213 Where relative 
poverty is sought to be eliminated without recognising the absolute capability 
deprivation that poverty represents,214 the danger arises that “levelling down” may 
occur.215  
In such a scenario, where two groups vie for State resource allocation, resources 
will be withheld from the group with the greater capability set so as to ensure that they 
enjoy no more capabilities than the less advantaged group. This perverse application 
of “equality of the graveyard”216 ignores the impact that all forms of capability 
deprivation exert on the possibility of achieving the functioning of living a free and 
dignified life. Instead of securing equal capability deprivation for all, certain inequalities 
of capabilities must be tolerated until additional resources can be marshalled to provide 
equal access to adequate levels of socio-economic goods. This would prevent the 
further detrimental impact of resource allocation decisions on freedom- and dignity 
enhancing capabilities in the name of a misconstrued concept of equality. Bilchitz aptly 
argues in this regard: 
 
“[Levelling down] implies that everyone should be reduced to the same level of desperation, 
thus minimising overall well-being in the context of scarce resources... [E]quality in relation 
to resources can only be achieved as the aspirational end of progressive realisation, where 
everyone is entitled equally to an adequate level of service-provision. In the interim, some 
inequalities need to be tolerated in seeking to achieve this long-term goal.”217 
 
By bearing in mind the essential interaction between all three fundamental values 
for the achievement of the functioning outcome of living an autonomous, dignified life 
in a position of substantive equality with others, the State and courts can thus ensure 
that equality does not become an impediment to full capability realisation. Freedom, 
                                            
211 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 31.  
212 A Sen “Equality of What?” (1979) The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 197 218.  
213 219; A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 297-298.  
214 A Sen “Poor, Relatively Speaking” (1983) 35 Oxford Economic Papers 153 159, 162. 
215 Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 1 SA 524 (CC) para 149; A Sen The Idea of Justice 
(2009) 296.  
216 As opposed to “equality of the vineyard”: Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie 2006 1 SA 524 
(CC) para 149.  
217 D Bilchitz “Is the Constitutional Court Wasting Away the Rights of the Poor? Nokotyana v 
Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality” (2010) 127 SALJ 591 604.  
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dignity and equality should direct every instance of State resource allocation for 
meaningful capability realisation to occur.  
 
5 4 2 2 Interpreting “available resources” widely 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter,218 a narrow definition of “available 
resources” stunts the realisation of capabilities and thus of valuable functionings. The 
need for expenditure and prioritisation in order to realise the positive duties imposed 
by all rights was recognised by the Constitutional Court in Ex parte Chairperson of the 
Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996:219 
 
“It is true that the inclusion of socio-economic rights may result in courts making orders 
which have direct implications for budgetary matters. However, even when a court enforces 
civil and political rights such as equality, freedom of speech and the right to a fair trial, the 
order it makes will often have such implications. A court may require the provision of legal 
aid, or the extension of state benefits to a class of people who formerly were not 
beneficiaries of such benefits. In our view it cannot be said that by including socio-economic 
rights within a bill of rights, a task is conferred upon the courts so different from that 
ordinarily conferred upon them by a bill of rights that it results in a breach of the separation 
of powers.”220 
 
Moellendorf interprets this passage as signalling that, as is the case with “traditional” 
civil and political rights, socio-economic rights warrant judicial protection even where 
such entails a reprioritisation of fiscal resources.221 When adjudicating State resource 
allocation decisions through a lens of capabilities, a court must therefore determine 
how widely “available resources” should be interpreted.  
In Rail Commuters Action Group v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail222 the Constitutional 
Court elucidated the relationship between reasonableness review and a wider 
interpretation of “available resources”: 
 
                                            
218 Chapter four part 4 2 2 above.   
219 1996 4 SA 744 (CC).  
220 Para 77 (emphasis added).  
221 D Moellendorf “Reasoning about Resources: Soobramoney and the Future of Socio-
Economic Rights Claims” (1998) 14 SAJHR 327 331.  
222 2005 2 SA 359 (CC). 
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“[A]n organ of state will not be held to have reasonably performed a duty simply on the basis 
of a bald assertion of resource constraints. Details of the precise character of the resource 
constraints, whether human or financial, in the context of the overall resourcing of the organ 
of state will need to be provided. The standard of reasonableness so understood conforms 
to the constitutional principles of accountability, on the one hand, in that it requires decision-
makers to disclose their reasons for their conduct, and the principle of effectiveness on the 
other, for it does not unduly hamper the decision-maker’s authority to determine what are 
reasonable and appropriate measures in the overall context of their activities.”223 
 
The Court’s statements in Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom224 regarding national government’s responsibility to provide “adequate” 
budgetary support to the provincial and local governmental spheres also indicate that 
overall allocations to votes in the national budget can be scrutinised.225 Courts should 
accordingly be able to evaluate evidence of disproportionate resource allocation 
between different votes horizontally,226 or spheres of government vertically,227 and of 
wasteful expenditure or under-spending generally.228 Resources spent inefficiently or 
wastefully should rather be allocated and efficiently administered for the realisation of 
the crucial capabilities represented by socio-economic rights. “Available resources” 
should consequently be interpreted more widely than already allocated resources to 
prevent the State from allocating inadequate resources in order to minimise its 
obligations. Bilchitz sums up what the judicial approach under a wide definition of 
“available resources” should look like: 
                                            
223 Para 88 (emphasis added).  
224 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). See the discussion of this judgment in chapter four parts 4 2 1 2 and 4 
3 1 above.  
225 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 68. See 
further chapter four part 4 3 4 2 1 above regarding the allocative responsibility of different 
spheres of government.  
226 In terms of the relevant Appropriation Act.  
227 In terms of the relevant Division of Revenue Act.  
228 See K Lehmann “In Defense of the Constitutional Court: Litigating Socio-Economic Rights 
and the Myth of the Minimum Core” (2006) 22 Am Univ Int Law Rev 163 193-196 who argues 
that there is no principled reason why courts cannot scrutinise macro-economic budgetary 
choices. For examples of wasteful expenditure, see Public Protector Against the Rules Report 
No 33 of 2010/11 (2011) and Public Protector Secure in Comfort Report No 25 of 2013/14 
(2014). With regard to under-spending, see the various reports compiled by the office of the 
Auditor-General, for example Auditor-General General Report on the Audit Outcomes of 
Provincial Government PFMA 2012-13: Eastern Cape (2013) 51 and Auditor-General General 
Report on the Audit Outcomes of Provincial Government PFMA 2012-13: Free State (2013) 
39. 
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“The first stage is to consider the current allocation of the government to the specific area 
under consideration and determine whether the policy in such a department accords with 
the dictates of fundamental rights. If it does not meet these standards and this defect cannot 
be corrected within existing budgetary allocations, then a court will be required to consider 
the overall budgetary allocations of the government.”229 
 
In determining whether current allocations “[accord] with the dictates of fundamental 
rights”, the capabilities at issue must play a determinative role. Where people are 
forced to live in conditions that deprive them of their basic capabilities, the reviewing 
court must look at a wider pool of available resources. Given that such conditions are 
wholly incongruent with the founding values of the Constitution, a robust standard of 
scrutiny that requires the State to fully justify disproportionate, wasteful or inefficient 
expenditure is called for in terms of a capabilities approach to adjudication.230  
When a court is called upon to look beyond the revenue available for appropriation 
among votes and division vertically, complex questions are raised. If a court were to 
make an order that necessitated raising corporate tax, this might have the polycentric 
effect of discouraging future investment in South Africa. Likewise, an order that 
compels government to acquire more debt may unnecessarily burden future 
generations.231 Simultaneously, such “burden” must be weighed against the benefits 
that a more equal society would hold for everyone, including future generations.232  
However, it will be rare for a court applying a robust standard of scrutiny to look 
beyond the national revenue where disproportionate allocation is blatant, and wasteful 
expenditure and corruption are rife. Where such exceptional cases arise, a 
collaborative approach where the State investigates its macro-economic options and 
reports back to the court may be the only institutionally competent option available to 
the court.233 Nevertheless, review of macro-economic choices is justified under the 
capabilities approach in that capabilities – and not the instrumental need for macro-
                                            
229 D Bilchitz Poverty and Fundamental Rights: The Justification and Enforcement of Socio-
Economic Rights (2007) 233.  
230 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 48-49; see further chapter two part 2 2 3 above.  
231 C Barberton “Paper Tigers? Resources for Socio-Economic Rights” (1999) 2 ESR Review 
6 7-8. 
232 RG Wilkinson & K Pickett The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone (2010) 237.  
233 Regarding the use of collaborative, innovative remedies to overcome concerns based on 
the institutional competence of the judiciary to adjudicate matters that have macro-economic 
implications, see generally chapter six below. See also S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: 
Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 198.  
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economic stability – form the focus of any judicial enquiry as to the reasonableness of 
State resource allocation decisions.234  
 
5 4 2 3 Explicitness  
 
When adjudicating a State resource allocation decision, a court must require that 
the State demonstrate an explicit rights-centred allocative process.235 The court must 
require that State to show that resource allocation decisions were based on a correct 
interpretation of constitutional rights and of the State’s own constitutional 
obligations.236 The State must therefore demonstrate to the reviewing court that it 
considered the constitutional text, authoritative judgments by the Constitutional Court 
and lower courts where relevant, and reports by constitutionally mandated 
institutions237 and civil society organisations.  
 
5 4 2 3 1 A capabilities-centred allocation process  
 
The State can exhibit its commitment to preventing basic capability deprivation by 
prioritising expenditure from a capabilities perspective. By marshalling resources to 
alleviate the plight of those in urgent need, the State should be able to demonstrate 
proportionate resource allocation in the light of the most serious imperilment of 
freedom, dignity and equality. An approach whereby basic capability deprivation is met 
with prioritised expenditure is also in line with established Constitutional Court 
jurisprudence.238 Furthermore, the fertile nature of certain capabilities, such as 
education, should also be explicitly acknowledged.239 
                                            
234 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 141; for a discussion of the adjudication of macro-
economic policy see chapter two part 2 2 3 3 above.  
235 For the importance of explicitness in terms of a capabilities approach to adjudication, see 
further chapter two part 2 4 4 above.  
236 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2012 2 SA 104 (CC) para 74; chapter four part 4 3 4 above.  
237 Such as the Financial and Fiscal Commission established in terms of ss 220-222 of the 
Constitution. See also the Financial and Fiscal Commission Act 99 of 1997. 
238 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 43.  
239 See further chapter two part 2 3 2 2 above; MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 99.  
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The State should be able to demonstrate to a reviewing court its awareness of the 
interdependence of rights and the capabilities that inform their content.240 Trade-offs 
that result from allocating finite resources should therefore be made after careful 
consideration of what allocation to one priority will entail for other capabilities.  
Moreover, the State must display an awareness of the interlinkages between the 
opportunity and process aspects of substantive freedom.241 Thus, for example, where 
the State allocates resources for the provision of social security, the right to just 
administrative action in the allocation process must be accommodated. Resources 
must therefore be allocated for the provision of the substantive socio-economic good 
itself as well as for an administrative process that is reasonable, procedurally fair and 
lawful. Whereas a resource allocation decision may appear prima facie adequate, it 
cannot be held to be reasonable where an administratively just process was not 
followed. In applying a capabilities-based standard of review, courts should therefore 
require explicit evidence from the State regarding its allocation processes.  
 
5 4 2 3 2 Using capabilities-based benchmarks to determine proportionality    
 
Bearing in mind the interconnectedness of all rights, capabilities-specific 
benchmarks should be developed through comprehensive and participatory 
engagement with diverse stakeholders.242 The State should formulate benchmarks in 
                                            
240 See further chapter two part 2 3 3 3 1 above.  
241 See further chapter two part 2 2 2 2 3 above; Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various 
Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 39.  
242 Qualitative benchmarks encompass normative standards against which current 
circumstances are compared, whereas performance benchmarks set specific targets that are 
usually linked to deadlines. Indicators are measurement units that are used to monitor the 
extent of change in a particular human rights situation. For comprehensive definitions of these 
concepts, see further A Würth & FL Seidensticker Indices, Benchmarks, and Indicators: 
Planning and Evaluating Human Rights Dialogues (2005) 23-24. Applying rights-specific 
benchmarks will require that the content of the right first be interpreted. See R O’Connell, A 
Nolan, C Harvey, M Dutschke & E Rooney Applying an International Human Rights Framework 
to State Budget Allocations (2014) 61. The Financial and Fiscal Commission has stated that 
the State has failed to set explicit national minimum norms and standards, which has led to 
protracted maladministration and misallocation of resources. Financial and Fiscal Commission 
Submission on National Intervention in Financially Distressed Provincial Governments (2012) 
Concluding Remarks and Recommendations. If the State does not remediate this problem in 
the future, it could constitute a ground for a judicial finding that a given State resource allocation 
decision is unreasonable.  
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the first instance. Such benchmarks can subsequently be utilised by a reviewing court 
in determining whether impugned resource allocation decisions have been effective in 
realising capabilities. The State should take cognisance of international organisations’ 
interpretation of socio-economic rights and benchmarks that have developed in this 
regard.243 Comparative assessments can also be made by determining how similarly 
placed countries are prioritising expenditure.244  
A variety of capabilities-based benchmarks should thus be considered by the State 
in its allocative processes, and by courts in establishing whether State resource 
allocation decisions are proportionate to capability needs. These diverse benchmarks 
should not be viewed in isolation but as vital and interrelated components of essential 
capability sets. Only by considering all of the State’s discrete objectives as aiming to 
achieve the common purpose of capability realisation, can the State show that it has 
carried out a meaningful proportionality exercise and prioritised its expenditure 
reasonably.  
 
5 4 2 3 3 Budget analysis    
 
Once capabilities-infused benchmarks have been developed by the State in 
consultation with other parties, budget analysis becomes especially useful. Budget 
analysis can aid the State in identifying “blind spots”245 in its allocative priorities. 
Furthermore, it can aid courts to subsequently determine whether an actual State 
resource allocation decision corresponds proportionately to capabilities-based 
benchmarks.  
Whereas benchmarks may appear to be informed by the need to advance critical 
capabilities, the way in which resources are actually raised and spent attests to the 
                                            
243 For instance, various General Comments of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights could be considered. See also UN Office of the High Commissioner Manual on 
Human Rights Monitoring (2011) ch 20 regarding the monitoring of the realisation of socio-
economic rights. An analysis of the justiciability of State resource allocation decisions in 
international law falls outside the scope of this dissertation.  
244 SPII Monitoring the Progressive Realisation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa 
(2011) 7 <http://spii.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/SER-methodology-paper.pdf> 
(accessed 12-01-2013). 
245 R Dixon “Creating Dialogue about Socio-economic Rights: Strong-form versus Weak-form 
Judicial Review Revisited” (2007) 5 I Con 391 394. 
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true priorities of government.246 By comparing allocations among various priorities, 
courts247 can identify the true priorities of the State and furthermore establish whether 
rights are being progressively realised. Courts can thus compare actual expenditure 
trends with capabilities-based benchmarks formulated by the State. Where the State 
fails to fully grasp its constitutional obligations as elaborated upon by the Constitutional 
Court, its budgets will reflect this shortcoming.248  
Given the myriad important purposes that explicitness in the allocative process 
serves, courts should only uphold resource allocation decisions as reasonable where 
the State has succeeded in clearly demonstrating a consistently transparent and 
accountable allocative process.  
 
5 4 2 4 Effectiveness   
 
Sen postulates that through skilled implementation of social programmes, 
capabilities can be realised in countries that have more limited resource pools at their 
disposal than “wealthy” countries.249 However, in order to successfully realise valuable 
capabilities, scarce resources must be effectively allocated. To be reasonable, a State 
resource allocation decision aimed at capability realisation should thus be both 
                                            
246 H Hofbauer, A Blyberg & W Krafchik Dignity Counts (2004) 29; SPII Monitoring the 
Progressive Realisation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa (2011) 6-8 
<http://spii.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/SER-methodology-paper.pdf> (accessed 12-
01-2013). 
247 This is of course not solely the judiciary’s responsibility. For example, the South African 
Human Rights Commission is mandated by s 184(3) of the Constitution to obtain information 
from relevant organs of State pertaining to “the measures that they have taken towards the 
realisation of the rights in the Bill of Rights concerning housing, health care, food, water, social 
security, education and the environment”.   
248 See SPII Monitoring the Progressive Realisation of Socio-economic Rights in South Africa 
(2011) 26 <http://spii.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/SER-methodology-paper.pdf> 
(accessed 12-01-2013) regarding government’s misapprehension of its duties related to 
progressive realisation. 
249 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 46-49; chapter two part 2 2 3 above.  
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adequate and effective.250 An allocation of reasonable scope is not sufficient – such 
resources must be reasonably implemented.251  
 
5 4 2 4 1 Using benchmarks to measure effectiveness  
 
When evaluating the effectiveness of State resource allocation decisions aimed at 
capability realisation, courts can rely on the explicitness already extracted from the 
State with regards to a given allocative decision or prioritising process. Thus, a 
reviewing court can compare the benchmarks elicited from the State with the results 
actually achieved. Benchmarks, minimum standards and concrete timeframes should 
be scrutinised by courts to determine the effectiveness of State resource allocation in 
the light of the duty to progressively realise qualified socio-economic rights.252  
 
5 4 2 4 2 Reviewing legislation for “blindspots” or “burdens of inertia”  
 
Effective resource allocation may be impeded at various stages of government 
operation. The legislature can suffer from various “blindspots” or “burdens of inertia”.253 
                                            
250 The National Treasury of the Republic of South Africa Estimates of National Expenditure 
2013 (2013) Foreword: 
“[D]epartments and spending agencies do have to learn to do more with less. In the period 
ahead, improvements in outcomes have to come from qualitative improvements in the use 
of available budgets and other inputs. All institutions need to increase their efficiency and 
effectiveness in terms of service delivery...” 
See also Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 
46. 
251 Cf Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) paras 40-
43.  
252 For criticism of the Constitutional Court’s failure to relate socio-economic rights to 
benchmarks, minimum standards and timeframes, see M Pieterse “Coming to Terms with 
Judicial Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights” (2004) 20 SAJHR 383 407.  
253 R Dixon “Creating Dialogue about Socio-economic Rights: Strong-form versus Weak-form 
Judicial Review Revisited” (2007) 5 I Con 391 402. Effective resource allocation may be 
impeded at various stages of government operation. The legislature may lack the technical 
expertise to meaningfully amend money Bills. However, the legislature has been granted the 
power to amend money Bills, including the Bills which form the budget, in terms of the Money 
Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Act 9 of 2009. The establishment of a 
Parliamentary Budget Office to assist the legislature in understanding – and, if necessary 
amending – the budget is a promising development. Nevertheless, it will take some time for 
the Budget Office to operate optimally. PMG “Pre-Budget briefing by the Parliamentary Budget 
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Blind spots may occur where the legislature fails to note that the application of a given 
law and concomitant resource allocation will infringe a socio-economic right or the right 
to just administrative action; where a failure to take the perspectives of poor sectors of 
society into account results in a misapprehension of the impact that legislation and 
concomitant resource allocation will have on those affected; or where the legislature 
fails to grasp how a claim to resources can be better accommodated within the 
legislative scheme.254 Burdens of inertia may hinder effective resource allocation 
where the legislature views other expenditure priorities as politically more pressing.255 
Courts should therefore examine relevant legislation to determine whether any such 
shortcomings are apparent.  
 
5 4 2 4 3 Reviewing policy in the absence of explicit national guidelines  
 
Even where legislation lays the foundation for effective resource allocation, 
derivative policy or implementation may not be effective. For instance, national 
government has been criticised for not explicitly defining minimum norms and 
standards that must be upheld in the provincial sphere.256 This results in an inability to 
accurately determine the cost of socio-economic goods and services, which may in 
turn lead to future unprincipled resource allocation decisions and varying levels of 
capability realisation among different provinces.257  
Furthermore, where inefficient spending follows inevitably from a lack of explicit 
guidelines by national government,258 accountability is reduced. At provincial level, 
                                            
Office” (19-02-2014) PMG <http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20140219-pre-budget-briefing-
parliamentary-budget-office> (accessed 01-06-2014). 
254 R Dixon “Creating Dialogue about Socio-economic Rights: Strong-form versus Weak-form 
Judicial Review Revisited” (2007) 5 I Con 391 402. 
255 403. Furthermore, where the legislative framework for public finance management is 
unclear, accountability diminishes and effective resource allocation decisions may become 
extremely difficult. For criticism of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999, see Financial 
and Fiscal Commission Submission on National Intervention in Financially Distressed 
Provincial Governments (2012) Concluding Remarks and Recommendations. 
256 Financial and Fiscal Commission Submission on National Intervention in Financially 
Distressed Provincial Governments (2012) Concluding Remarks and Recommendations. 
257 Financial and Fiscal Commission Briefing to the Standing Committee on the Appropriation 
Bill (2013) 8. 
258 Financial and Fiscal Commission Submission on National Intervention in Financially 
Distressed Provincial Governments (2012) Causes of Fiscal Stress, Budget Analysis and 
Accountability.  
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serious financial mismanagement and inefficient allocative practices have severely 
threatened service delivery and its intended capability realisation.259 A lack of 
transparency and accountability has contributed to this widespread ineffective 
resource allocation. Oversight must therefore be sharpened, and effective use of 
budget analysis may aid in overcoming this problem.260 At local level, municipalities 
have likewise struggled to effectively allocate and direct resources at capability 
realisation. Delays and poor planning have also been exacerbated by a lack of 
accountability mechanisms in this sphere.261 Courts should thus require the State to 
show that accountability measures to ensure effective resource expenditure are in 
place.  
 
5 4 2 4 4 Reviewing irregular spending 
 
In addition to ineffective and wasteful expenditure, courts should be aware of the 
dangers that corruption and other forms of irregular spending pose for capability 
realisation. As noted in the minority judgment of Glenister v President of the Republic 
of South Africa,262 corruption “undermines the ability of the government to meet its 
commitment to fight poverty and to deliver on other social and economic rights 
guaranteed in our Bill of Rights”.263 Extravagant expenditure by government, coupled 
                                            
259 Inefficiency and maladministration, leading to wasteful expenditure, prompted Cabinet to 
announce in 2011 that it would place key departments in Limpopo and the Free State under 
administration and assist the Gauteng Department of Health and Social Development with its 
financial administration and supply chain management processes in terms of s 100 of the 
Constitution. Cabinet “Statement on Special Cabinet meeting of 5 December 2011” (05-12-
2011) GCIS <http://www.gcis.gov.za/content/newsroom/media-releases/cabinet-
statements/statement-cabinet-meeting-5-december-2011> (accessed 20-12-2011). Financial 
and Fiscal Commission Submission on National Intervention in Financially Distressed 
Provincial Governments (2012) Concluding Remarks and Recommendations. Regarding 
wasteful spending and under-spending, see also the various reports compiled by the office of 
the Auditor-General, for example Auditor-General General Report on the Audit Outcomes of 
Provincial Government PFMA 2012-13: Eastern Cape (2013) and Auditor-General General 
Report on the Audit Outcomes of Provincial Government PFMA 2012-13: Free State (2013). 
260 Financial and Fiscal Commission Submission on National Intervention in Financially 
Distressed Provincial Governments (2012) Concluding Remarks and Recommendations. 
261 Financial and Fiscal Commission Briefing to the Standing Committee on the Appropriation 
Bill (2013) 11. 
262 2011 3 SA 347 (CC). 
263 Para 57; see also paras 166, 176. 
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with pervasive tender fraud, detract significantly from the resource pool available for 
allocation to socio-economic capabilities.264 
In addition, blatantly wasteful expenditure flouts the right to just administrative action 
and further directs resources away from establishing mechanisms to ensure effective 
resource allocation. Where corruption and patently uneconomical spending are rife, a 
court should demand even greater justification from the State for inadequate and 
ineffective resource allocation.  
Scarce resources that are depleted through maladministration cannot necessarily 
be redirected to the fulfilment of the particular right at issue. Nevertheless, the 
resources lost through such activities must be taken into account both at the 
justificatory stage of the proportionality enquiry and at the remedial stage of 
adjudication. When a court adjudicates a State resource allocation decision, the 
effectiveness of the decision’s implementation as well as any mechanisms to ensure 
effective allocation and expenditure must thus be carefully considered before an 
allocative decision can be upheld as reasonable.  
 
5 4 2 5 Participation as informational broadening  
 
When courts adjudicate State resource allocation decisions, they must ensure that 
the judicial process facilitates participation among various parties. A participative 
judicial process where the information available to the court is broadened to the 
greatest extent possible, is thus congruent with a project of transformative 
constitutionalism, the tenets of administrative justice and a capabilities approach to 
adjudication.265 Mechanisms through which the judiciary can foster participation and 
informational broadening will be examined in the following chapter.266  
Where a court reviews a certain State resource allocation decision, it must not only 
promote participation itself but also ensure that the State has done so in coming to its 
allocative decision. Participation and informational broadening, as manifested in the 
                                            
264 See in this regard, for example, Public Protector Against the Rules Report No 33 of 2010/11 
and Public Protector Secure in Comfort Report No 25 of 2013/14 (2014). Regarding irregular 
tender processes see, for example, Auditor-General Report of the Auditor-General to the 
Northern Cape Provincial Legislature on an Investigation at the Northern Cape Department of 
Health (2011). Reports of wasteful and corrupt expenditure in South Africa are frequent. See, 
for example Corruption Watch Anniversary Report (2012). 
265 See further chapter two part 2 4 3 above.  
266 Chapter six part 6 4 1.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 281 
 
need for public reasoning, are crucial components of the capabilities approach.267 In 
formulating its priorities and allocating resources accordingly, the State should thus in 
the first place arrive at its decision after consulting with a wide variety of stakeholders. 
Participation in this sense is mandated by the constitutional requirement for 
procedurally fair administrative action,268 and in the remedy of meaningful 
engagement.269 Simultaneously, the State should be aware of the fact that its resource 
allocation decisions must be directed to the realisation of capabilities that are vital 
prerequisites for subsequent participation by its recipients.  
The nature of the capabilities to which resource allocation is directed, coupled with 
the context at play,270 will determine with whom and to what extent the State should 
consult and foster participation prior to coming to a final allocative decision. Given that 
the realisation of vital capabilities will depend on the allocation of proportionate 
resources, a robust form of engagement will usually be appropriate.271 A court 
adjudicating a State resource allocation decision must thus confirm that an 
appropriately robust process of meaningful engagement was followed, and that 
sufficient resources to enable an effective engagement process were allocated. In 
addition to garnering meaningful input from those suffering from capability deprivation 
prior to establishing its priorities, the State must also enable participation and dialogue 
among different government departments and between government and other 
institutions.272 Where the State has not demonstrated such comprehensive 
participation in order to establish proportionate resource allocation, a court should be 
hesitant to uphold an allegedly insufficient allocative decision as reasonable.  
  
                                            
267 See further chapter two part 2 4 3 above; A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 78-79. 
268 S 33(1) of the Constitution. See also ss 3 and 4 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act 3 of 2000.  
269 For a discussion of meaningful engagement, see chapter six part 6 4 1 2 below.  
270 For the importance that context plays in a capabilities approach to adjudication, see further 
chapter two part 2 3 3 3 3 above.  
271 For a discussion of meaningful engagement as an incarnation of robust procedural fairness, 
see S van der Berg “Meaningful Engagement: Proceduralising Socio-economic Rights Further 
or Infusing Administrative Law with Substance?” (2013) 29 SAJHR 376.  
272 The importance of inter-governmental communication for the realisation of the National 
Planning Commission National Development Plan (2011) is noted in Financial and Fiscal 
Commission Submission for the Division of Revenue 2014/2015 (2013) 12. See further the 
discussion of inter-governmental allocative responsibility in chapter four part 4 3 4 2 1 above.  
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5 5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that a capabilities approach to the adjudication of 
State resource allocation decisions requires a two-stage adjudicative process, 
according to which the normative content of the right at issue is allowed to determine 
the level of scrutiny to which State resource allocation decisions are subjected during 
the second, justificatory stage of the analysis. Where diverse rights compete for 
prominence and resource allocation, or where long-term and short-term capability 
realisation vies for resources, the weighting exercise required for the ranking of 
capabilities calls for sophisticated development. Proportionality review, as a robust 
manifestation of reasonableness review, can be carefully adapted to constitute a 
judicial tool for the capabilities-based adjudication of State resource allocation 
decisions.  
Elements of proportionality review are discernible from existing socio-economic 
rights and administrative law jurisprudence. These elements are thus susceptible to 
development and adaptation by the South African courts in the direction of a more 
systematic capabilities-infused weighting analysis. The benefits of the proportionality 
enquiry constituted by the multi-factor test set out in the general limitations clause of 
the Constitution can thus be exploited and further refined to form part of 
reasonableness review as required by qualified socio-economic rights and the right to 
administrative justice. As a normative, balancing test, proportionality as weighting 
allows the capabilities that inform the content of socio-economic rights to dictate with 
what level of scrutiny State resource allocation decisions should be adjudicated.  
When applying proportionality as a capabilities-based standard of review, courts 
should be mindful to promote the tenets on which a culture of justification is based. 
Proportionality elicits responsiveness, openness and accountability from the State as 
primary decision-maker as well as from the subsequently reviewing court. The judiciary 
must be willing to accept its constitutional interpretative and enforcement 
responsibilities, lest an overly deferential attitude is allowed to impede a shift from a 
culture of authority to a culture of justification.  
Moreover, when adjudicating complex State resource allocation decisions, courts 
should ensure that the State’s allocative choices pass muster when judged according 
to various capabilities-based review criteria. It is incumbent on the court to interpret the 
content and normative purposes of socio-economic rights with reference to the 
foundational constitutional values in order to review an allocative decision that impacts 
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on these rights. The court must likewise ensure that the State considered the 
fundamental values of freedom, dignity and equality in arriving at its prioritisation 
decisions. These values can also be used to aid the prioritisation of competing 
capabilities. Furthermore, Courts should not shy away from interpreting “available 
resources” widely when adjudicating a State resource allocation that detrimentally 
affects critical capabilities.  
In addition, the State must adhere to explicit, capabilities-based allocative processes 
in order for a particular resource allocation decision to be upheld as reasonable and 
proportionate to the capabilities at issue. However, a resource allocation decision that 
is sufficient in scope is not necessarily reasonable – such decisions must be 
implemented effectively. Given the limited resources at the State’s disposal for the 
realisation of socio-economic capabilities, irregular and wasteful expenditure, as well 
as under-spending, should be eliminated. Finally, where the State cannot demonstrate 
that it has allowed participatory processes to broaden the information available to it in 
determining what resource allocation is necessary for capability realisation, its 
subsequent inadequate allocative choices cannot be held to be reasonable. By 
applying a capabilities-based standard of review, State resource allocation decisions 
can thus be adjudicated to ensure allocative choices that systemically and effectively 
advance critical socio-economic capabilities.  
The following chapter will critically evaluate and develop a capabilities approach to 
remedies that can address objections to the adjudication of State resource allocation 
decisions based on considerations of constitutional and institutional competence.
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Chapter 6: A capabilities approach to remedies  
 
6 1 Introduction 
 
Where a court applies a capabilities-based standard of review to a State resource 
allocation decision and finds such allocative decision to be unreasonable, the 
infringement of a socio-economic right will be established. The court’s next task is to 
devise an appropriate remedy. First, a court must declare the allocative legislation, 
policy or administrative action in question constitutionally invalid.1 Thereafter, it must 
proceed with the more onerous duty of issuing “just and equitable”2 relief.  
A capabilities approach to remedies posits that relief must effectively vindicate the 
capabilities underlying the infringed right. Where socio-economic capabilities are 
realised through proportionate resource allocation, the infringement is remedied and 
the socio-economic right is fulfilled. Capability realisation thus constitutes the measure 
against which the efficacy of the remedy can be assessed. This chapter will investigate 
how a remedy can be designed to ensure the effective formulation of an allocative plan 
aimed at remedying capability deprivation.  
A capabilities approach to remedies further requires that appropriate relief includes 
three important capabilities-based characteristics that interact with each other to 
ensure effective resource allocation and concomitant capability realisation. First, it will 
be argued that a capabilities approach to remedies requires that a remedy should 
include participatory processes aimed at broadening the information available to the 
court and State for the formulation and implementation of an effective remedial 
allocative plan. This is the requirement for “participation and informational broadening”. 
Second, it will be contended that the court must issue explicit normative guidelines that 
can aid the State in its formulation of an effective remedial allocative plan. The State 
should also explicitly indicate its progress in formulating and implementing its remedial 
action. This is the requirement for “explicitness”. Both the requirements for 
informational broadening and explicitness are central tenets of a capabilities approach 
to adjudication.3 Finally, it will be shown that the court must retain supervision to 
monitor compliance with its orders and ensure that remedial action is being instituted 
effectively.  
                                            
1 S 172(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (the “Constitution”).  
2 S 172(1)(b).  
3 See chapter two parts 2 4 3 and 2 4 4 and chapter five parts 5 4 2 3 and 5 4 2 5 above.  
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Focus is thus placed on the structural interdict as a remedy for deficient State 
resource allocation decisions due to its potential to include these characteristics. A 
structural interdict should be distinguished from a “reporting order” in that it involves a 
negotiated plan and “ongoing supervision and the issuing of periodic directions by the 
Court”.4 A structural interdict requires parties to enter into a process of engagement in 
order to formulate an allocative plan and report back to the reviewing court on a regular 
basis in order to obtain judicial approval or further instructions.5  
This chapter will commence by analysing the judiciary’s remedial powers and the 
reasons for the Constitution Court’s reluctance to issue structural interdicts in cases 
where qualified socio-economic rights were at issue. Thereafter, the focus turns to 
whether a capabilities-focused structural interdict is capable of addressing concerns 
that courts lack the constitutional and institutional competence to adjudicate polycentric 
resource allocation decisions. Finally, the possibility of designing structural interdicts 
that comply with a capabilities approach to remedies is critically examined with 
reference to pertinent jurisprudence. In particular, it will be argued that a capabilities 
approach to remedies can be adopted by ensuring that a remedy incorporates the 
requirements of participation and informational broadening, explicitness, and the 
retention of supervision.  
 
6 2 The judiciary’s remedial powers  
 
6 2 1 Remedial powers under the Constitution 
 
The South African judiciary enjoys wide remedial powers under the Constitution. 
Anyone who enjoys locus standi in terms of the broad provision made therefore in 
section 38 “has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill 
of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate relief, 
including a declaration of rights”.6 Where a socio-economic right or the right to just 
administrative action is infringed by a resource allocation decision, courts are 
                                            
4 See further regarding this distinction S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication 
under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 424-425. See also M Bishop “Remedies” in S 
Woolman, M Bishop & J Brickhill (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (OS 2008) 9–
6. 
5 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 424.  
6 S 38 of the Constitution.  
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empowered to grant “appropriate” relief. A capabilities approach to remedies implies 
that “appropriate” relief must be relief aimed at the realisation of the capabilities which 
the relevant infringed socio-economic right protects.7 The Constitution and a 
capabilities approach to adjudication justify the judiciary’s remedial competence, even 
where relief calls for increased resource allocation, or for institutional reform in order 
to ensure effective resource allocation.8 Section 172 of the Constitution expands on 
the remedial powers of the courts: 
 
“172. (1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court - 
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid 
to the extent of its inconsistency; and 
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including - 
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and 
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, 
to allow the competent authority to correct the defect.” 
 
Where resource allocation is disproportionate to the socio-economic capabilities at 
stake, the unjustifiable infringement of a socio-economic right occurs. Courts are 
obliged under section 172(1)(a) to declare such allocative decision invalid. However, a 
declaration of invalidity runs the risk of leading to polycentric results. For instance, if 
the executive takes a decision regarding precise allocations to specific programmes 
within a particular State department, such order could result in ramifications for the 
relevant department’s budget.9 It would accordingly be “just and equitable” to suspend 
such a declaration of invalidity10 and to couple such order with a structural interdict11 
to allow government to formulate a plan to rectify an unconstitutional resource 
allocation decision and thereby fulfil the infringed socio-economic right.   
                                            
7 For the relationship between capabilities and functionings, see A Sen Development as 
Freedom (1999) 75 and chapter two part 2 2 2 1.  
8 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 141-143. For the importance of public expenditure 
to capability realisation see further chapter two part 2 2 3. For the meaning and importance of 
“effective” resource allocation, see chapter five part 5 4 2 4.  
9 The executive can formulate allocative policy in a broad sense or a narrow sense. Where the 
executive formulates policy in the narrow sense in the course of implementing legislation such 
as a provincial Appropriation Act, such conduct can constitute administrative action. See 
Permanent Secretary of the Department of Education of the Government of the Eastern Cape 
Province v Ed-U-College (PE) (Section21) Inc 2001 2 SA 1 (CC) paras 18-19. 
10 S 172(1)(b)(ii) of the Constitution.  
11 For the potential of the structural interdict to mitigate polycentric effects and effect capability 
realisation, see further part 6 3 2 below.  
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6 2 2 Remedial powers under PAJA 
 
Where a resource allocation decision that results in socio-economic capability 
deprivation also infringes the right to just administrative action,12 sections 38 and 
172(1) of the Constitution are likewise applicable.13 However, direct application of the 
Constitution will seldom be appropriate in administrative law cases.14 Fortunately, 
section 8 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”) grants 
courts similarly wide remedial powers.  
In Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of 
the South African Social Security Agency15 (“Allpay”), the Constitutional Court stated 
that “[s]ection 8 of PAJA gives detailed legislative content to the Constitution’s ‘just and 
equitable’ remedy”. However, in granting a remedy for an irregular tender award,16 the 
Court relied exclusively on its remedial powers in terms of the Constitution, and not on 
those set out in PAJA.17 A more consistent approach to claims framed in terms of 
PAJA18 would require remedies to be devised and granted in terms of this Act, while 
acknowledging the complementary relationship between section 172 of the 
Constitution and section 8 of PAJA. The most pertinent provisions for the remediation 
                                            
12 S 33 of the Constitution.  
13 For an elaboration of the arguments made in part 6 2 2 in the context of an argument for the 
reconceptualisation of the remedy of meaningful engagement as infusing administrative law 
with substance, see S van der Berg “Meaningful Engagement: Proceduralising Socio-
economic Rights Further or Infusing Administrative Law with Substance?” (2013) 29 SAJHR 
376 378-381.  
14 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 516; Minister of Health v New 
Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign as Amicus Curiae) 2006 2 SA 311 
(CC) para 96; Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 
4 SA 490 (CC) para 25.  
15 2014 1 SA 604 (CC) para 12.  
16 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC).  
17 With the exception of rejecting a claim for compensation in terms of s 8(1)(c)(ii)(bb) of PAJA. 
See Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) para 72.  
18 The doctrine of subsidiarity dictates that where a statute gives effect to constitutional 
provisions, including remedies, the statute, and not the Constitution, should be relied on. Bato 
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 4 SA 490 (CC) 
para 22. 
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of administratively unjust resource allocation decisions resulting in capability 
deprivation are as follows:  
 
“Remedies in proceedings for judicial review  
8. (1) The court or tribunal, in proceedings for judicial review in terms of section 6(1), may 
grant any order that is just and equitable, including orders –  
(a) directing the administrator –  
(i) … 
(ii) to act in the manner the court or tribunal requires; 
(b) … 
(c) setting aside the administrative action and –  
(i) remitting the matter for reconsideration by the administrator, with or without directions; 
or 
(ii) in exceptional cases –  
(aa) substituting or varying the administrative action or correcting a defect resulting from the 
administrative action…”  
 
In congruence with section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, courts are empowered by 
section 8(1) of PAJA to make “any order that is just and equitable”. Concerns that 
courts may lack the constitutional and institutional competence to adjudicate 
polycentric resource allocation decisions can therefore be addressed through the 
design of innovative remedies.  
In terms of PAJA, a court may substitute its own decision for that of an administrator 
in “exceptional cases”.19 In the recent judgment of Trencon Construction (Pty) Limited 
v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited,20 the Constitutional 
Court elucidated what the test for “exceptional circumstances” entails under our 
constitutional dispensation. The Court noted at the outset that courts considering 
substitution orders must take cognisance of the separation of powers doctrine and the 
judiciary’s obligations under the Constitution, including the obligation to provide 
effective relief.21 The Court proceeded to state that under the separation of powers 
                                            
19 S 8(1)(c)(ii) of PAJA. According to pre-constitutional jurisprudence the court’s decision could 
be substituted for that of the administrator only where the result was a foregone conclusion 
and it would be a waste of time to remit the matter to the administrator; where delay would 
cause unjustifiable prejudice; where the decision-maker showed bias or serious incompetence; 
or where the court considered itself as being as well-qualified as the original decision-maker. 
Johannesburg City Council v Administrator, Transvaal 1969 2 SA 72 (T) 76; Theron v Ring van 
Wellington van die NG Sendingkerk in Suid Afrika 1976 2 SA 1 (A) 31B-E; Darson Construction 
(Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2007 4 SA 488 (C) 502.   
20 2015 JDR 1325 (CC). 
21 Paras 43-46.  
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doctrine, two factors hold significant weight in determining whether a substitution order 
is appropriate: First, a court must determine whether it is in as good a position as the 
administrator to make the relevant decision. Thereafter, a court must decide whether 
the decision of the administrator is a foregone conclusion. Both these factors must be 
considered cumulatively. Only once these determinations are made can a court 
consider other factors, including delay, bias or the incompetence of an administrator. 
The Court emphasised that the “ultimate consideration is whether a substitution order 
is just and equitable” and that the determination of this issue will “involve a 
consideration of fairness to all implicated parties”.22 Importantly, the Court 
acknowledged that the “exceptional circumstances enquiry” must take place on a case-
by-case, contextual basis and that all relevant facts and circumstances must be taken 
into account.23  
Despite the judiciary’s constitutional responsibility to interpret the content of socio-
economic rights,24 courts can seldom be regarded as being “as qualified” as 
administrators to implement socio-economic policy. Where a particular administrative 
decision requires on-going allocative expertise – or the court does not have all the 
relevant information before it – the court will not be in as good a position as the 
administrator to take the decision at issue.25 Furthermore, in polycentric disputes 
involving resource allocation decisions that result in socio-economic capability 
deprivation, the result of an allocative decision will rarely amount to “a foregone 
conclusion”.26 Once these two factors have been considered, a court must proceed to 
determine whether a delay in remedying unreasonable resource allocation might cause 
unjustifiable prejudice to the capabilities impinged by a deficient allocative decision. 
Inefficient expenditure in the form of wasteful expenditure and maladministration could 
also justify a substantive remedy on the basis of the incompetence of the 
administrator.27 Ultimately, a court will rarely regard itself as constitutionally and 
                                            
22 Para 47.  
23 Para 47.  
24 See further chapter four part 4 2 1 above.  
25 Trencon Construction (Pty) Limited v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa 
Limited 2015 JDR 1325 (CC) para 48. 
26 Para 49. The Constitutional Court further held that “there can never be a foregone conclusion 
unless a court is in as good a position as the administrator” (para 50).  
27 See further chapter five part 5 4 2 4 above regarding the need for effective expenditure; part 
6 4 3 below; K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is 
it Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 345. 
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institutionally competent to substitute its own decision for an administrator’s polycentric 
resource allocation decision.  
The court’s ability to direct the administrator to act in the manner the court requires 
may find wider application than its power to substitute its own decision for that of an 
administrator.28 This remedy could potentially amount to a structural interdict. Thus, 
where a resource allocation decision is unreasonable both in terms of a qualified socio-
economic right and the right to administrative justice, a claim framed in terms of PAJA 
could yield a similar remedy to a claim framed in terms of the relevant socio-economic 
right. In terms of a structural interdict, a court could compel the administrator to take 
positive steps to fulfil its administrative duties in consultation with other stakeholders, 
and could retain supervision until the administrative action meets the requirements 
found to have been lacking in the initial, flawed allocative decision.29  
Furthermore, the court’s power to set aside the administrative act and remit the 
matter to the administrator for reconsideration “with or without directions”30 is also 
significant for the formulation of a capabilities-focused remedy such as the structural 
interdict. Importantly, a capabilities approach to a remedy could be accommodated by 
remitting the matter with explicit normative directions that include substantive 
guidelines for the capabilities-directed allocation of resources.31 The court could again 
retain supervision to ensure effective relief.  
 
6 2 3 The remedial approach of the Constitutional Court in qualified socio-economic 
rights cases   
 
Where qualified socio-economic rights are at issue, the availability of resources – 
and the reasonableness of allocative decisions – is always of central significance. It is 
therefore instructive to analyse the Constitutional Court’s approach to remedies where 
complex, polycentric matters of resource allocation were at issue.  
  
                                            
28 S 8(1)(a)(ii) of PAJA.  
29 C Hoexter Administrative Law in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 561-564.  
30 S 8(1)(c)(i) of PAJA.  
31 For the importance of issuing explicit normative guidelines when granting a remedy, see 
further part 6 4 2 1 below.  
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6 2 3 1 The potential inefficiency of declaratory orders 
 
In Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom32 (“Grootboom”), the 
court issued a declaratory order regarding the constitutional shortcomings of the 
State’s housing policy.33 In terms of the declaratory relief issued, the Court held that 
“[s]ection 26(2) of the Constitution requires the state to devise and implement within 
its available resources a comprehensive and coordinated programme progressively to 
realise the right of access to adequate housing”.34 Regrettably, the order was not 
expeditiously implemented and a delay of over three years ensued before the State 
devised a revised housing policy that catered for those in urgent housing need.35 
During this period of delay, all persons “in desperate need”36 of temporary housing 
continued to live in “intolerable conditions”,37 without access to any type of shelter. It 
is clear that in such conditions severe basic capability deprivation occurs.38 Not even 
elementary functioning outcomes such as possessing adequate shelter, enjoying basic 
services or attaining a basic state of good health can be achieved in such 
circumstances. In this case, a capabilities approach to a remedy would thus have 
required the participation of all stakeholders to identify the capability needs at stake 
and respond accordingly. Moreover, the retention of supervision may have helped to 
ensure that the State revised its programme expeditiously. The retention of supervision 
would have been justified in the light of the grave capability deprivation that occurred 
in the absence of provision for emergency housing relief.  
In addition, uncertainty arose regarding which sphere of government should be 
responsible for resource allocation in this regard. The national Housing Department 
                                            
32 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). See the discussion of this judgment in chapter four parts 4 2 1 2 and 4 
3 1 above.  
33 The Constitutional Court previously made the negotiated settlement between the parties an 
order of court, dated 21 September 2000 (on file with author) which was implemented to a 
certain extent. K Pillay “Implementing Grootboom: Supervision Needed” (2002) 3 ESR Review 
13 14; S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 401.  
34 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 99.  
35 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 401-403.  
36 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 52.  
37 Para 52.  
38 As discussed in chapter two part 2 2 2 1 1, Sen perceives poverty as constituting basic 
capability deprivation. A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 20.  
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was of the opinion that it was impracticable to assign funding responsibility to provinces 
with diverse and urgent housing needs. However, the Treasury advised that resource 
allocation for emergency housing needs fell within the competence of each province. 
By removing the power to administrate emergency funds from the national sphere, the 
risk of over- or under-spending by provinces with differing budgetary needs 
consequently arose.39 Had supervisory jurisdiction been retained and combined with a 
participatory remedy,40 these problems could have been substantially avoided.  
 
6 2 3 2 A reluctance to retain supervision  
 
Subsequently, in Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2)41 (“TAC”), 
the Constitutional Court clarified that, contrary to the State’s arguments in casu, courts 
are not limited to issuing declaratory orders only:    
 
“There is … no merit in the argument advanced on behalf of government that a distinction 
should be drawn between declaratory and mandatory orders against government. Even 
simple declaratory orders against government or organs of state can affect their policy and 
may well have budgetary implications. Government is constitutionally bound to give effect 
to such orders whether or not they affect its policy and has to find the resources to do so.”42  
 
In terms of TAC, courts are therefore empowered to grant orders that affect policy 
and resource allocation,43 while remaining sensitive to the institutional roles of the 
different branches of government under the separation of powers doctrine.44 According 
to the Court, where the nature of the right infringed, the nature of the infringement45 
and the circumstances of the particular case so demand, “courts may - and if need be 
                                            
39 K Pillay “Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the Enforcement of Socio-Economic 
Rights” (2002) 6 LDD 255 267-268.  
40 Thereby compelling dialogue among, inter alia, the national and provincial spheres 
responsible for housing as well as the National Treasury. Participatory remedies should always 
include engagement with the rights beneficiaries, ie the litigants and similarly placed persons.  
41 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). See the discussion of this judgment in chapter four part 4 3 2 above. 
42 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 99 
(emphasis added). 
43 Para 99. 
44 Para 113. For an analysis of the Court’s approach in respect of its remedial competence to 
issue strong remedies, see chapter four part 4 3 2 3 above.  
45 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 106. 
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must - use their wide powers to make orders that affect policy as well as legislation”.46 
After conducting a comparative survey, the Court concluded that structural interdicts 
do not breach the separation of powers doctrine, “particularly when the state’s 
obligations are not performed diligently and without delay”.47  
However, the Court, in issuing declaratory and mandatory orders, again declined to 
retain supervisory jurisdiction, stating that a structural interdict was unnecessary since 
“government has always respected and executed orders” of the Court.48 Given the 
delayed implementation of a revised housing policy in Grootboom, and certain 
provinces’ recalcitrance in implementing the orders made in TAC,49 the Court’s 
reluctance to issue a structural interdict was inapt. Moreover, the consequences that 
delayed or inadequate government action would have on those whose right of access 
to health care services had been infringed would be severe. In casu, the failure to 
provide immediate and effective relief would lead to the death of a significant number 
of HIV-infected infants. In other words, the capability deprivation of an exceptionally 
vulnerable group (infants) would be absolute. The urgent necessity of protecting these 
vital capabilities, including the capabilities related to life itself, would therefore have 
justified a capabilities approach to a remedy in the form of a structural interdict.  
 
6 2 3 3 The need for participation where potentially polycentric remedies are granted 
 
The Constitutional Court has issued remedies with manifest resource implications 
in those cases where it also applied a robust standard of scrutiny to State arguments 
of resource constraints.50 Whereas the capabilities at issue and the impact of allegedly 
disproportionate resource allocation should determine the standard of scrutiny applied 
to allocative decisions,51 the complex and polycentric nature of resource allocation 
should not be ignored.  
The Constitutional Court has, for instance, used the remedy of “reading in” to extend 
social security benefits to permanent residents of South Africa in Khosa v Minister of 
                                            
46 Para 113. 
47 Para 112.  
48 Para 129.  
49 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 333-334; C Hoexter Administrative Law 
in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 562-563.  
50 See further chapter five part 5 2 3 above.  
51 See in this regard chapter five part 5 3 3 2 above.  
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Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development52 (“Khosa”). The 
Court was seemingly fortified in its decision to read additional social grant beneficiaries 
into the impugned legislation given the limited size of the beneficiary group and the 
relatively small “budgetary intrusion”53 constituted by the inclusion of permanent 
residents as social grant beneficiaries.54 Nevertheless, the order could have had 
polycentric effects, especially where strained provincial budgets were at issue.55  
Where complex resource allocation decisions are concerned, and the capabilities of 
diverse groups – not all of whom are before the Court – are at stake, more participatory 
remedies will normally be preferable. Such an approach resonates with Rodríguez-
Garavito’s model of dialogic activism espoused in chapter two.56 It will be recalled that 
this model advocates the judicial implementation of strong (substantively interpreted) 
rights, moderate (participatory) remedies and strong monitoring.57 Furthermore, it 
accords with a capabilities approach to adjudication in that a court should strive to 
expand the information available to it to the greatest extent possible and incorporate 
the perspectives of a diverse range of stakeholders in order to formulate appropriate 
remedies.58 Participation is also central to the project of transformative 
constitutionalism. The requirement for participation justifies the role of courts in 
                                            
52 2004 6 SA 505 (CC). See the discussion of this judgment in chapter five part 5 2 3 above. 
53 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC) 
para 75. 
54 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 
SA 505 (CC) paras 59, 62. 
55 Para 60. At the time of this judgment, the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 was administered 
provincially. Subsequently, in Mashavha v President of the Republic of South Africa 2005 2 
SA 476 (CC) it was argued, inter alia, that the provincial administration of the Act could subject 
grant beneficiaries in different provinces to different provincial budgeting processes. 
Furthermore, a particular province could re-allocate funds earmarked for social assistance 
grants for other purpose (para 10). The Constitutional Court held in casu that the Act was to 
be administered by the national sphere in the future, and that this would necessarily include 
budgeting decisions (para 59). The Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 was subsequently 
enacted in order to, inter alia, provide for “a national policy for the efficient, economic and 
effective use of the limited resources available for social assistance” (Preamble of the Social 
Assistance Act 13 of 2004). 
56 C Rodríguez-Garavito “Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on 
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America” (2011) 89 Texas L Rev 1669 1688 discussed in 
chapter two part 2 4 3 above.  
57 1692. 
58 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 56-57.  
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facilitating participatory processes while serving as deliberative fora in which a 
multiplicity of interests can be represented.59  
However, in Khosa, the Court observed the intransigence of government in failing 
to produce relevant financial and other evidence, or to comply with directions issued 
by the Court.60 The lack of explicitness in the State’s submissions related to resource 
allocation may therefore have contributed to the Court’s decision to grant a “reading 
in” remedy.61 A capabilities approach requires explicit reasoning. This allows for the 
subsequent public scrutiny of evaluative judgments concerning what action or policy 
measures capability realisation may require in a given situation.62 Explicitness is also 
central to a transformative approach to adjudication, in that it reinforces a shift from a 
culture of authority to a culture of justification.63 The requirement for explicitness thus 
demands that State actors must account for the formulation and implementation of 
socio-economic policy, generally, as well as for their resource allocation decisions in 
particular. 
An order directing government to provide alternative accommodation, without 
issuing a corollary order to meaningfully engage with stakeholders while retaining 
supervisory jurisdiction, is similarly problematic.64 The robust review of resource-based 
justificatory arguments proffered by the State in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd65 is supported. However, the 
                                            
59 For the links between the importance of participation under a transformative constitution and 
“informational broadening” in terms of the capabilities approach, as well as the transformation 
imperative to reconceptualise courts as platforms for participation and deliberation, see 
chapter two part 2 4 3. See also S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a 
Transformative Constitution (2010) 33: 
“The adjudication of human rights norms may be seen as a significant forum for deliberation 
on whether the outcomes of formal democratic processes are consistent with these norms. 
Within this conception, courts are significant components of deliberative democracy…” 
60 Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 
SA 505 (CC) paras 18-22. 
61 See for a discussion of the need for the State to produce explicit justificatory evidence in 
respect of an impugned resource allocation decision, chapter five part 5 4 2 3 above.  
62 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 30.  
63 E Mureinik “A Bridge to Where?: Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31 
32; M Pieterse “What do we Mean when we Talk About Transformative Constitutionalism?” 
(2005) 20 SAPL 155 156, 161, 165.  
64 See chapter four part 4 3 4 above.  
65 2012 2 SA 104 (CC). 
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remedy issued lacked the participatory and supervisory elements needed to ensure its 
congruence with a capabilities approach to remedies.66  
 
6 3 Overcoming the judicial reluctance to issue structural interdicts in qualified 
socio-economic rights cases  
 
6 3 1 Constitutional and institutional competence  
 
From the above discussion it emerges that the Constitutional Court has been 
reluctant to grant structural remedies (or to delegate this function to the High Courts) 
in cases where qualified socio-economic rights were at issue.67 Instead, the Court has 
                                            
66 See further parts 6 4 1 and 6 4 3 below.  
67 In contrast, the Constitutional Court has issued supervisory remedies in cases where the 
unqualified right to education, enshrined in s 29(1)(a) of the Constitution, was at stake. See 
Head of Department: Mpumalanga Department of Education v Hoërskool Ermelo 2010 2 SA 
415 (CC) paras 97-104, where the Court made a supervisory order directing the school 
governing body to review its language policy and report back to the Court and further obliged 
the Head of the Mpumalanga Department of Education to file a report with the Court setting 
out the likely demand for school places and the steps taken by the Department to cater for 
such demand. This case therefore concerned the right enshrined in s 29(2) to receive 
education in the official language of one’s choice, but entailed indirect implications for the 
unqualified right enshrined in s 29(1)(a). In Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School 
v Essay NO 2011 8 BCLR 761 (CC), the Court weighed the unqualified right to basic education 
in s 29(1)(a) of the Constitution against the property rights of a private entity. In determining 
under what circumstances the eviction of a public school from private property would be 
justified, the Court required the Member of the Executive Council for Education for KwaZulu-
Natal to file a report indicating how learners would be accommodated in neighbouring schools. 
In Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School; 
Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Harmony High School 
2014 2 SA 228 (CC), the Court ordered the relevant school governing body to review its policy 
pertaining to pregnant learners despite the constitutionality of the policy not having been before 
the Court. Furthermore, the Court made an order for the parties to the litigation to meaningfully 
engage with each other (para 125) and retained supervision in terms of a reporting back order 
(para 128). All these cases concerned the imposition of a reporting order as opposed to a 
structural interdict (see further regarding this distinction S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: 
Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 424-425). Furthermore, it is pertinent 
that the right to basic education does not contain an explicit qualification that the State need 
only take steps to realise these rights within its available resources. The Court has also felt 
constitutionally and institutionally competent to issue mandatory orders and retain supervision 
in cases where civil and political rights were at stake. See August v Electoral Commission 1999 
3 SA 1 (CC); Minister of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention (NICRO) 2005 
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seemingly conceptualised the structural interdict as a “remedy of last resort”68 only to 
be granted where it is crucial to ensure compliance with a court order “where 
governments are incompetent or intransigent with respect to the implementation of 
rights”.69  
 
6 3 1 1 The need to accept judicial responsibility for the granting of effective relief  
 
Davis ascribes the judicial reluctance to grant managerial remedies where qualified 
socio-economic rights are concerned to the same factor arguably responsible for the 
Court’s resort to a “proceduralised”, normatively weak model of reasonableness 
review:70 namely, the Court’s hesitancy to encroach upon the terrain of the executive 
or legislative branches of government.71 The Supreme Court of Appeal has also voiced 
its separation of powers-based concerns regarding the nature of the structural interdict: 
 
“Structural interdicts… have a tendency to blur the distinction between the executive and 
the judiciary and impact on the separation of powers. They tend to deal with policy matters 
and not with the enforcement of particular rights… Then there is the problem of sensible 
enforcement: the state must be able to comply with the order within the limits of its 
capabilities, financial or otherwise.”72 
 
However, it must be borne in mind that the separation of powers allocates 
adjudicative responsibility to the judiciary. This includes the power to grant just, 
                                            
3 SA 280 (CC) and Sibiya v Director of Public Prosecutions: Johannesburg 2005 5 SA 315 
(CC). 
68 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) paras 112, 129.  
69 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 327. Rail Commuters Action Group v 
Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 2 SA 359 (CC) para 109.  
70 D Brand “The Proceduralisation of South African Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, or 
‘What are Socio-Economic Rights For?’” in H Botha, A van der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) 
Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution (2003) 33. For a discussion of the 
need to develop a capabilities-based standard of review in lieu of a normatively weak model 
of reasonableness review, see chapter four part 4 2 1 6 above.  
71 D Davis “Adjudicating the Socio-Economic Rights in the South African Constitution: Towards 
‘Deference Lite’?” (2006) 22 SAJHR 301 311. See also an elaboration of this argument in S 
van der Berg “Meaningful Engagement: Proceduralising Socio-economic Rights Further or 
Infusing Administrative Law with Substance?” (2013) 29 SAJHR 376 382.  
72 Modder East Squatters v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd, President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2004 3 All SA 169 (SCA) para 39. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 298 
 
equitable and effective remedies. In Allpay, in which the Constitutional Court issued 
what it termed a structural interdict73 in respect of the running of a new tender process 
for the payment of social security grants, the Court emphasised this point: 
 
“There can be no doubt that the separation of powers attributes responsibility to the courts 
for ensuring that unconstitutional conduct is declared invalid and that constitutionally 
mandated remedies are afforded for violations of the Constitution. This means that the Court 
must provide effective relief for infringements of constitutional rights.”74 
 
6 3 1 2 The structural interdict as an effective and participatory remedy 
 
The structural interdict potentially embodies an effective and participatory remedy 
that can overcome traditional concerns that courts lack the constitutional and 
institutional competence required to adjudicate complex resource allocation decisions. 
By accommodating these concerns at the remedial stage of adjudication, the need for 
deference in applying a capabilities-based standard of review to allocative decisions is 
obviated.  
Once a court has identified the ways in which an impugned resource allocation 
decision infringes a socio-economic right,75 it will formulate an appropriate remedy. 
Where the capabilities underlying the breached socio-economic right are critical, their 
deprivation is severe, and the source of infringement involves polycentric decision-
making, a capabilities approach to a remedy may necessitate a participatory structural 
interdict. The effectiveness of this remedy will depend on its ability to vindicate the 
capabilities at stake through its remediation of the right-infringement. To ensure its 
effectiveness, the court will have to elicit the input of various stakeholders through, for 
example, the use of amici curiae interventions or the consideration of other expert 
evidence. However, participation aimed at broadening the information available to 
devise an effective remedy must continue beyond the courtroom.  
                                            
73 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) para 71. The fact that the Court did 
not expressly make the reports thus lodged subject to judicial approval following an 
engagement process may amount to mere judicial oversight, and serves as a further 
demonstration of the Court’s failure to adhere to the capabilities tenet of explicitness in casu. 
See further part 6 4 2 1 1 below.  
74 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) para 42.  
75 Capabilities-based review criteria are set out in chapter five part 5 4 above.  
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The court should issue an order that compels the State to meaningfully engage with 
the litigants and a wider group of stakeholders, in order to broaden the information 
available to it to the greatest extent possible.76 With a sufficiently broad array of 
information at its disposal, the State can accurately determine what resources are 
necessary for the realisation of the socio-economic right at issue. Besides the 
instrumental value of participation for the formulation of effective remedial action, the 
substantive freedom to participate is a manifestation of agency and is central to the 
capabilities approach. Participatory capabilities are thus intrinsically important in 
addition to their instrumental importance for the development of capabilities-focused 
public policy.77  
Once meaningful engagement has been ordered, the court will retain supervision in 
order to approve the State’s allocative plan and the implementation thereof at various 
stages, or to issue further instructions where necessary. Supervisory jurisdiction is 
therefore essential to ensure that the revised allocative decision results from a 
participatory process, and is effective in the sense of being directed at capability 
realisation. The realisation of greater capability sets and more complex functioning 
combinations will in turn lead to more meaningful social, economic and political 
participation.78 Participation is thus of instrumental importance for the effective 
realisation of capabilities, and simultaneously constitutes a valuable capability in 
itself.79 The retention of supervision coupled with an order to engage thereby fosters 
the foundational constitutional values of accountability, responsiveness and 
openness.80 
 
6 3 1 3 Addressing concerns based on constitutional competence  
 
The participatory and dialogic elements of a capabilities-informed structural interdict 
are capable of accommodating concerns that the judiciary may lack the constitutional 
                                            
76 See part 6 4 1 2 below.  
77 See further A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 18-19, 53 and chapter two part 2 2 2 2 
1.  
78 See chapter two part 2 4 3 above.  
79 The substantive freedom to participate in the social, economic and political milieu constitutes 
a capability set.  
80 S 1(d) of the Constitution; S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a 
Transformative Constitution (2010) 436.  
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or institutional competence to adjudicate State resource allocation decisions.81 
Legitimacy concerns are mitigated by conceptualising the structural remedy as a 
dialogic engagement among all stakeholders, including the legislature. Stakeholders 
thus express their agency through participation, and simultaneously influence the 
formulation of public policy that can potentially lead to new legislation. This possibility 
was recognised in Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly in 
the context of participation in the legislative process:82   
 
“The participation by the public on a continuous basis provides vitality to the functioning of 
representative democracy. It encourages citizens of the country to be actively involved in 
public affairs, identify themselves with the institutions of government and become familiar 
with the laws as they are made. It enhances the civic dignity of those who participate by 
enabling their voices to be heard and taken account of. It promotes a spirit of democratic 
and pluralistic accommodation calculated to produce laws that are likely to be widely 
accepted and effective in practice. It strengthens the legitimacy of legislation in the eyes of 
the people.”83 
 
6 3 1 4 Addressing concerns based on institutional competence  
 
Furthermore, a structural interdict affords leeway to the executive to design a plan 
for the procurement of additional resources aimed at capability realisation, or for the 
effective implementation of existing allocations.84 Besides government recalcitrance in 
adhering to court orders or cases where non-compliance would cause irremediable 
damage,85 Roach and Budlender identify a third situation where the structural interdict 
would be appropriately granted. According to the authors, courts should feel fortified in 
granting a managerial remedy where a mandatory order is stated in general terms, due 
to the nature of the duty involved86 or the need to grant the State as much latitude as 
                                            
81 The characteristics of a capabilities-infused structural interdict, including the ways in which 
the adversarial nature of litigation should be relaxed and judicial mechanisms should be 
developed and utilised where capabilities are at stake, are discussed in part 6 4 below.  
82 2006 6 SA 416 (CC). 
83 Para 115.  
84 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 334.  
85 Where basic capability deprivation occurs due to unreasonable resource allocation, non-
compliance with a court order will potentially lead to irremediable damage.  
86 For example, to allocate “reasonable” or “proportionate” resources to the fulfilment of a socio-
economic right. However, see part 6 4 2 below regarding the importance of explicitness both 
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possible to devise its own plan.87 This may be the case where broad structural reform 
is necessary, or where the remediation of the law or conduct in question raises 
complex, polycentric issues. The authors explain the benefit of a structural interdict to 
the State in such instances:   
 
“This approach to structural relief has some benefits to governments. It may provide 
governments with a timeline to follow. The approval of a plan by the court can allow the 
government to move forward with the implementation of its plan secure in the knowledge 
that implementation will constitute compliance with its obligations. The court can make an 
order which is as non-intrusive as possible on the choices which the elected government 
makes, because it can be secure in the knowledge that this will not be an invitation to non-
compliance but rather an invitation to the government to formulate a plan in order to achieve 
compliance with the Constitution.”88 
 
Allowing the State such latitude, in turn, ensures that the executive can devise a 
plan with which it can comply within the limits of its financial capabilities. A capabilities-
infused structural interdict can therefore complement a fluid conceptualisation of the 
separation of powers doctrine.89 Rodríguez-Garavito elaborates: 
 
“[D]ialogic judgments tend to outline procedures and broad goals and, in line with the 
principle of separation of powers, place the burden on government agencies to design and 
implement policies.”90 
 
By affording the State the discretion to devise an allocative plan in consultation91 
with the broadest range of stakeholders possible, concerns regarding the judiciary’s 
                                            
in granting a structural interdict (explicitness on the part of the court) and complying therewith 
(explicitness on the part of the State).  
87 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 334. See also Western Cape Forum for 
Intellectual Disability v Government of the Republic of South Africa 2011 5 SA 87 (WCC) where 
the Court stated that “[s]uch relief … is appropriate when the court does not wish to prescribe 
to the respondent the detail of what steps must be taken” (para 50). 
88 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 334.  
89 S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution 
(2010) 436; CF Sabel & WH Simon “Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation 
Succeeds” (2004) 117 Harv LR 1016 1090. 
90 C Rodríguez-Garavito “Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on 
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America” (2011) 89 Texas L Rev 1669 1691.  
91 See part 6 4 1 below.  
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constitutional and institutional competence to review allocative decisions can be 
addressed at the remedial stage of adjudication.92   
 
6 3 2 Polycentricity 
 
The polycentricity inherent in State resource allocation decisions is often highlighted 
as a bar to their justiciability.93 Nevertheless, in August v Electoral Commission,94 the 
Constitutional Court held: 
 
“We cannot deny strong actual claims timeously asserted by determinate people, because 
of the possible existence of hypothetical claims that might conceivably have been brought 
by indeterminate groups.”95 
 
Yet the potential of a decision to result in unknown ramifications for a complex web 
of other issues is increased in proportion to the range of interests not represented 
before a court.96 At the remedial stage of adjudication, “[f]airness requires a 
consideration of the interests of all those who might be affected by the order”.97 
However, given that increased budgetary allocation can impact on different votes in 
the national budget and even on the macro-economic obligations of the State, it will 
                                            
92 For the inappropriateness of deference in terms of a capabilities approach to adjudication 
under a transformative constitution, see chapter two part 2 4 2; chapter four part 4 2 3; and 
chapter five part 5 4 1 2 above.  
93 L Fuller “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication” (1978) 92 Harv LR 353 394. Resource 
allocation decisions are polycentric, since a judgment on a specific instance of resource 
allocation could result in unforeseen consequences for other budgetary allocations. 
Unforeseen consequences for budgetary allocations could result where groups in need of 
State resources are left unrepresented in litigation. For the importance of participation and 
informational broadening in both the interpretative and remedial phases of adjudication, see 
chapter two part 2 4 3 and chapter five part 5 4 2 5 above and part 6 4 1 below.  
94 1999 3 SA 1 (CC). 
95 Para 30.  
96 C Mbazira “Confronting the Problem of Polycentricity in Enforcing Socio-economic Rights in 
the South African Constitution” (2008) 23 SAPL 30 41 states in this regard: 
“Polycentricity comes alive [in cases demanding distributive justice] because the court must 
try to understand the wide range of interests involved in the case and appreciate the 
polycentric repercussions of any decision it makes. In this regard, when faced with a socio-
economic rights case, the court’s focus will go beyond the interests of the individual 
litigant(s).” 
97 Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 1 SA 1 (CC) para 43 (emphasis added).  
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seldom be possible to understand and accommodate all the interests at stake. 
Nevertheless, the emphasis that a capabilities approach to adjudication places on 
informational broadening can significantly extend the scope of represented interests.98 
The information available to the court for the formulation of an appropriate remedy can 
be expanded through, for example, the use of amici curiae interventions or the 
consideration of other expert evidence. An even wider range of perspectives can be 
incorporated into the design of a remedy by requiring the State to engage with a broad 
range of stakeholders and report back to the court.  
Moreover, the latitude afforded to the State to formulate a constitutionally compliant 
allocative plan, as well as the retention of supervision, promotes the flexibility needed 
to cater for adjustments in the light of the materialisation of initially unforeseen 
consequences. The Constitutional Court has observed that “any planning which leaves 
no scope whatsoever for relatively marginal adjustments in the light of evolving reality, 
may often not be reasonable”.99 The polycentric nature of resource allocation decisions 
can therefore be accommodated by the granting of structural interdicts, which allow for 
changes in allocative plans as circumstances change.100  
Sabel and Simon furthermore point out the capacity of “experimentalist” 
remedies,101 including structural interdicts, to deal with polycentric effects as they arise:  
 
“Just as the court’s liability determination destabilizes relations and practices within the 
defendant institution, so does it ramify to other institutions and practices. These 
ramifications, and their monitored feedback on the institutions in the case, are the web 
effect. The web effect makes it possible to address sequentially - in a sequence determined 
in the course of problem-solving itself - reforms too complex to be addressed whole. This 
effect is polycentricity viewed as an aid, not an obstacle, to problem solving.”102 
 
                                            
98 See part 6 4 1 below.  
99 President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd 2005 
5 SA 3 (CC) para 49. 
100 For a discussion of the capabilities approach’s incorporation of flexible contextualism that 
accommodates changing circumstances, see chapter two part 2 3 2 3 4 above. See further for 
the scope left for the re-examination of polycentric decisions in Sen’s adaptation of social 
choice theory chapter two part 2 3 2 4 4 above.  
101 Democratic experimentalism falls beyond the scope of this dissertation and is only 
discussed where it is apposite to the discussion of the structural interdict.  
102 CF Sabel & WH Simon “Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds” (2004) 
117 Harv LR 1016 1080. 
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The retention of supervision therefore allows a court to modify its orders 
sequentially, as circumstances change or initially unavailable information comes to 
light. Without the retention of supervision and the establishment of a dialogic 
relationship between the court and other branches of government, unforeseen 
consequences of a particular court order could not be accommodated. A traditional 
remedy, such as a simple mandatory order without the retention of supervision, does 
not allow for similar flexibility. However, the flexibility inherent in the structural interdict 
must be combined with explicit normative parameters, set by the court, in order to 
ensure effective, constitutionally compliant resource allocation decisions.103   
 
6 4 A capabilities approach to remedies 
 
A capabilities approach to remedies posits that where the infringement of a socio-
economic right entails the deprivation of critical capabilities, a remedy that can 
effectively vindicate those capabilities is required. Whereas the remedy will thus be 
directed at remediating the infringement of the socio-economic right, its effectiveness 
can be measured by its success in realising the capabilities underlying the right.  
Basic socio-economic capability deprivation can have a grave impact on the 
fundamental constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality. For example, an 
unreasonable resource allocation decision may infringe the right of access to social 
security.104 Where the right-holder consequently lacks the basic means of subsistence 
necessary to make any meaningful life choices, even her most elementary capabilities 
will be curtailed. The severity of this type of rudimentary capability deprivation will 
negate her freedom to achieve the complex functioning outcome105 of living an 
autonomous, dignified life in a position of substantive equality with other persons 
whose rights have not similarly been infringed.106 The serious consequences of socio-
economic capability deprivation call for the most effective relief possible.  
The structural interdict can be designed so as to incorporate three capabilities-
based features that are mutually reinforcing and conducive to effective relief: First, the 
                                            
103 For a discussion regarding the importance of explicit, normative parameters in granting a 
structural remedy, see part 6 4 2 below.  
104 S 27(1)(c) of the Constitution.  
105 See for an explanation of the concept of functionings, chapter two part 2 2 2 1 above.  
106 For the relationship between the fundamental values of freedom, dignity and equality and 
capabilities, see further chapter two part 2 4 1.  
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structural interdict can facilitate participation by a wide range of stakeholders. This 
process of informational broadening can identify the capability needs at stake, and 
assist in the formulation of an appropriate allocative response thereto. Participation in 
the sense of informational broadening constitutes an on-going requirement. A court will 
require the input of, for example, amici curiae, prior to issuing its initial order. In its 
order, a court may then require the State to elicit further participation from a range of 
stakeholders in order to assess what capability realisation requires in a given instance. 
This will allow the State to formulate a progressive remedial plan in response to the 
needs thus identified. If participation is not promoted on a continuous basis, the State’s 
resource allocation may remain under-inclusive and disproportionate to the capability 
needs at issue.  
Second, any order that compels the State to engage with stakeholders and respond 
accordingly can be accompanied by explicit normative guidelines that outline the broad 
contours of what proportionate resource allocation may necessitate. Such normative 
parameters can aid the State in understanding its constitutional obligations and enable 
it to devise an effective allocative plan. By also requiring the State to explicitly indicate 
its progress in formulating and implementing a remedial plan, accountability is fostered. 
The issuing of normative guidelines resonates with the requirement for substantive 
reasoning under a culture of justification. It can therefore likewise be said to be required 
under a transformative constitution. Furthermore, it accords with the capabilities 
approach requirement for explicit reasoning when making evaluative judgments.107 
Explicit reasoning allows for subsequent public scrutiny of decisions reached. The 
normative parameters initially set by a court can thus evolve as the results of an on-
going process of participation become known.  
Finally, the retention of supervision will allow the court to monitor compliance with 
its orders, and to revise its orders as needed in the light of the challenges identified by 
an on-going process of participation amongst all stakeholders. Where, for example, 
additional resources become available, a court can modify its order to require the 
immediate allocation of such resources to capability realisation. Where resources 
become more limited or capability needs become greater, a court can accordingly alter 
its order to grant the State additional time to procure the resources necessary to 
remedy a capability deprivation.  
                                            
107 See further chapter two part 2 4 4.  
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All three features of a capabilities approach to the structural interdict are mutually 
supporting and combine to encapsulate an effective remedy. The features will thus 
overlap with each other during the remedial process. First, a court will facilitate 
participation prior to issuing an initial order. The first order will be accompanied by 
explicit normative guidelines. A process of participation will then continue amongst the 
State and various other stakeholders. The results of the participatory process may in 
turn require the court to adapt its initial normative guidelines. The retention of 
supervision makes an on-going process of participation and the revision of orders 
possible.  
 
6 4 1 Participation and informational broadening 
 
Under South African’s transformative Constitution, participation should be promoted 
in all spheres of government and in any decision that may have an impact on rights.108 
Participation is thus a key foundational requirement that should be facilitated by the 
judiciary as part of a collaborative partnership with other branches of the State,109 
aimed at the realisation of the ideals encapsulated by the Constitution. Just as 
participation should be fostered when applying a capabilities-based standard of review 
to an impugned resource allocation decision,110 it should again be promoted at the 
remedial stage of adjudication.  
Participation is also a central tenet of a capabilities approach to adjudication, in that 
it fosters the agency of those whose capabilities are affected by State allocative 
decisions.111 Participatory capabilities112 are thus intrinsically valuable. They are also 
instrumentally important in that participation can shape government allocative policy 
and so lead to the realisation of other capabilities that are prerequisites for meaningful 
participation in the social, economic and political milieu.  
                                            
108 KE Klare “Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism” (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 155; 
D Brand “Judicial Deference and Democracy in Socio-economic Rights Cases in South Africa” 
(2011) 22 Stell LR 614 622-623.  
109 For a discussion of a collaborative partnership between all branches of government in the 
Indian context, see chapter three part 3 3 2 3 2 above.  
110 Chapter five part 5 4 2 5.  
111 For the importance of agency to the capabilities theory, see chapter two part 2 2 2 2 1.  
112 Participatory capabilities refer to the capabilities related to social, economic and political 
participation.  
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The informational base used for making evaluative judgments is also of central 
significance to the capabilities theory.113 Thus, a capabilities approach to adjudication 
uses the informational base of capabilities as the measure against which resource 
allocation as well as remedial effectiveness can be judged. For remedial action to be 
effective, capability needs in a given contextual setting as well as the potential means 
for meeting such needs must be identified. The information must be sufficient to 
demonstrate the costs of remedying capability deprivation, as well as the resources 
potentially at the State’s disposal for this purpose. The information available to a court 
and the State for the formulation and implementation of a remedy must thus be 
broadened to the greatest extent practicable. Sen states with regards to the 
requirement for informational broadening: 
 
“[W]hat is possible and what is not may turn crucially on what information is taken into 
effective account in making social decisions.”114 
 
Bearing in mind that socio-economic rights adjudication can be described as the “art 
of the possible”,115 courts must stimulate participation as informational broadening at 
the remedial stage of adjudication in order to determine what is possible regarding the 
achievement of systemically reasonable allocative decisions.116 In order to determine 
what resource allocation will be proportionate to the socio-economic capabilities at 
issue, public reasoning demands that no relevant perspectives are omitted from the 
State’s remedial plans and calculations.117 
A capabilities approach to remedies’ emphasis on informational broadening through 
participatory processes resonates strongly with Rodríguez-Garavito’s proposal for 
dialogic remedies coupled with strong monitoring. The author expounds his arguments 
for strongly interpreted rights, dialogic remedies and the retention of supervision: 
 
                                            
113 For a comprehensive discussion of the importance of informational broadening and 
participation to a capabilities approach to adjudication, see chapter two part 2 4 3 above.  
114 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 253.  
115 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2011 4 SA 337 (SCA) para 54.  
116 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 57. 
117 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 44. This central tenet of the capabilities approach is 
reflected in Constitutional Court jurisprudence. See Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 1 
SA 1 (CC) para 43. 
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“Dialogic decisions tend to open a monitoring process that encourages discussion of policy 
alternatives to solve the structural problem detected in the ruling. Unlike monologic judicial 
proceedings, the minutiae of the policies arise during the course of the monitoring process, 
not in the judgment itself… [T]his constitutional dialogue involves a broader spectrum of 
stakeholders in the monitoring process. In addition to the court and state agencies directly 
affected by the judgment, implementation involves victims whose rights have been violated, 
relevant civil-society organizations, international human rights agencies, and other actors 
whose participation is useful…”118 
 
It is thus through a process of informational broadening – starting in the 
courtroom,119 expanding to other stakeholders and returning to the courtroom for 
approval and normative guidance – that capabilities-focused allocative choices can be 
ensured.  
 
6 4 1 1 Informational broadening in the courtroom  
 
Informational broadening must commence in court in order to effectively apply a 
capabilities-based standard of review, and to formulate an appropriate remedy aimed 
at achieving proportionate resource allocation. Where relevant capabilities and 
interests are not considered, allocative policy may remain under-inclusive or 
ineffective.120 By assimilating a multitude of perspectives, the formulation of an 
effective remedy directed at reasonable and proportionate resource allocation is 
possible.121  
  
                                            
118 C Rodríguez-Garavito “Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on 
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America” (2011) 89 Texas L Rev 1669 1691-1692.  
119 Participation should be observed in the exercise of all public power, including the drafting 
of legislation and formulation and implementation of policies related to resource allocation. 
Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign as Amicus 
Curiae) 2006 2 SA 311 (CC) para 625. Participation in the allocative process will thus be one 
factor a court should consider in applying a capabilities-based standard of review. See chapter 
five part 5 4 2 5 above. However, once a resource allocation decision is found to be 
unreasonable or disproportionate, thus infringing a socio-economic right, participation as 
informational broadening again becomes crucial.  
120 See further chapter two part 2 4 3 above.  
121 C Mbazira “Confronting the Problem of Polycentricity in Enforcing Socio-economic Rights 
in the South African Constitution” (2008) 23 SAPL 30 43. 
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6 4 1 1 1 Joinder  
 
One way in which the judiciary can initiate the process of informational broadening 
is to direct the joinder of all relevant parties. Joinder will be appropriate where a party 
has a substantial interest in the matter.122 Furthermore, informational broadening 
through joinder can circumvent problems related to legitimacy and institutional 
competence by allowing relevant organs of State to participate in matters within their 
expertise.123 Thus, if the national government had been joined in Soobramoney v 
Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal),124 the Court may have scrutinised budgetary 
allocations to the relevant provincial Health Department more closely in the light of the 
obligations imposed by section 27 of the Constitution. If the facts of the case had called 
for a remedy in response to insufficient budgetary allocation, the involvement of the 
national government in allocating additional resources would have been of critical 
importance.125  
In Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education,126 the Court stated obiter 
that while difficult, a case could feasibly be made to contest insufficient budgetary 
allocations to provincial Departments of Education by challenging the national 
budget.127 In declining to retain supervisory jurisdiction, the Court highlighted the fact 
that the relevant fiscal authorities had not been cited in casu.128 However, the court did 
not clarify precisely which organs of state constituted the “fiscal authorities” in this 
matter.  
                                            
122 See the comprehensive discussion of joinder in the context of eviction law in G Muller The 
Impact of Section 26 of the Constitution on the Eviction of Squatters in South African Law LLD 
dissertation Stellenbosch (2011) 231. See further G Muller & S Liebenberg “Developing the 
Law of Joinder in the Context of Evictions of People from their Homes” (2013) 29 SAJHR 554. 
123 Mabaso v Law Society, Northern Provinces 2005 2 SA 117 (CC) para 13. 
124 1998 1 SA 765 (CC). For a critical analysis of this judgment, see chapter four parts 4 2 1 1 
and 4 2 2 above.  
125 For a discussion of inter-governmental allocative responsibility with reference to 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) and City of 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 
104 (CC), see chapter four part 4 3 4 2 1 above.  
126 2014 4 SA 274 (GP). 
127 The national budget could be challenged by challenging the constitutional validity of the 
relevant Appropriation Act or Division of Revenue Act.  
128 Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 4 SA 274 (GP) para 74. 
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Where a particular State department is in violation of the State’s duties to realise a 
socio-economic right due to the inadequate allocation of resources, various 
government channels may exist for the procurement of additional resources. Since it 
is “the State” as a unified entity that bears the obligations imposed by the Constitution, 
a practical approach may be to join the Presidency from the outset. By citing the 
national and provincial governments at the initiation of the proceedings, provision can 
be made for the inclusion of all relevant organs of State while fostering 
intergovernmental participation and accountability.129 The non-joinder of parties with 
an interest in the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions can therefore have 
a critical bearing on the possibility of an effective remedy to ensure systemic resource 
allocation aimed at capability realisation.130  
 
6 4 1 1 2 Interventions  
 
Another way in which informational broadening can occur in the courtroom is by 
drawing from the Indian Supreme Court’s experience in appointing commissions to 
provide information, help in the design of remedies and monitor the implementation of 
remedies where necessary.131 Mechanisms already exist in legislation and court rules 
to garner information from parties who may lack a direct interest in reasonable resource 
allocation aimed at socio-economic capability realisation, but whose input may 
nonetheless “throw light on particular judgements”.132  
Amici curiae interventions constitute an exceptionally valuable mechanism for 
broadening the information available to the reviewing court and the State in order to 
                                            
129 For example, “the government of the Republic of South Africa” and the “Premier of the 
Province of the Western Cape” were cited in Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). A similar approach was followed in the recent case of 
Madzodzo v Minister of Basic Education 2014 3 SA 441 (ECM).  
130 Rule 8(1) of the Rules of the Constitutional Court GN R1675 in GG 25726 of 31-10-2003 
states: 
“Any person entitled to join as a party or liable to be joined as a party in the proceedings 
may, on notice to all parties, at any stage of the proceedings apply for leave to intervene as 
a party.” 
131 See chapter three part 3 3 2 3 above; PN Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest 
Litigation” (1985) 23 Colum J Transnat’l L 561 575-577; J Cassels “Judicial Activism and Public 
Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?” (1989) 37 Am J Comp L 495 500, 506. 
132 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 44.  
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formulate effective remedies.133 An amicus curiae “acts in the interests of the broader 
society rather than of specific individuals, focusing on the broader implications of a 
case”.134 Amici curiae can thus alert the court and State to any overlooked and 
unrepresented interests. They can also timeously identify at least some of the 
polycentric effects that might result from ordering the State to devise and implement 
reasonable allocative decisions.135  
In the recent judgment of Allpay, the Constitutional Court highlighted the multi-
dimensional approach necessary to formulate a “just and equitable” remedy and the 
Court’s inability to identify all the interests that may be affected by its order.136 In casu, 
one of the amici curiae’s submissions that any order made should not result in the 
interruption of social grants was duly noted by the Court,137 which indicated at the 
outset of its judgment that the order to rerun the tender process for the payment of 
social grants would not result in an interruption of such payment.138 The amicus curiae 
therefore brought the capabilities of the unrepresented grant beneficiaries squarely 
into focus for the Court to consider in formulating an appropriate remedy, even though 
its submissions were not pertinent to the determination of the merits of the matter at 
hand.  
In addition to amici curiae interventions, courts can utilise provisions that allow for 
the appointment of expert referees with the consent of the parties in technical, complex 
and polycentric matters such as those related to resource allocation.139 The findings of 
such referees can subsequently be incorporated into the normative guidelines issued 
                                            
133 Rule 10 of the Rules of the Constitutional Court GN R1675 in GG 25726 of 31-10-2003 
makes provision for amicus curiae interventions.  
134 L Chenwi “Litigating Socio-economic Rights through Amicus Briefs” (2009) 10 ESR Review 
7 8. 
135 See further Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 9; Hoffmann v 
South African Airways 2001 1 SA 1 (CC) para 63; M Heywood “Debunking ‘conglomo talk’: A 
Case Study of the Amicus Curiae as an Instrument for Advocacy, Investigation and 
Mobilization” (2001) 5 LDD 133. 
136 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) paras 39-40.  
137 Para 27.  
138 Para 4. 
139 S 19bis of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959; J Fowkes “How to Open the Doors of the 
Court: Lessons on Access to Justice from Indian PIL” (2011) 27 SAJHR 434 457; D 
Butterworth, J de Oliviera & C de Moor “Are South African Administrative Law Procedures 
Adequate for the Evaluation of Issues resting on Scientific Analyses?” (2012) 129 SALJ 
461 476 n 42. 
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by a court along with a participatory remedy and the retention of supervision. Finally, 
courts can order the formulation of specialised task forces to investigate the allocative 
needs of litigants and those similarly placed, in order for any resultant resource 
allocation decision to be proportionate to the capability needs thus identified.140  
 
6 4 1 2 Informational broadening among the State and other stakeholders  
 
In addition to fostering participation in the courtroom, courts can issue participatory 
remedies in combination with explicit normative guidelines and the retention of 
supervision.141 One of the most promising developments in recent socio-economic 
rights and administrative justice jurisprudence is the innovation of requiring meaningful 
engagement both as a prerequisite for reasonable socio-economic policy and as a 
remedy in appropriate cases.142 In Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers143 
Sachs J stated: 
 
“[T]he procedural and substantive aspects of justice and equity cannot always be separated. 
The managerial role of the courts may need to find expression in innovative ways. Thus one 
potentially dignified and effective mode of achieving sustainable reconciliations of the 
different interests involved is to encourage and require the parties to engage with each other 
in a pro-active and honest endeavour to find mutually acceptable solutions. Wherever 
                                            
140 See Madzodzo v Minister of Basic Education 2014 3 SA 441 (ECM), where a dedicated 
Furniture Task Force was established in order to identify the furniture needs of the relevant 
schools. This, in turn, enabled an estimation of the budgetary resources required to meet said 
needs.  
141 For an elaboration of the arguments made in part 6 4 1 2 in the context of an argument for 
the reconceptualisation of the remedy of meaningful engagement as infusing administrative 
law with substance, see S van der Berg “Meaningful Engagement: Proceduralising Socio-
economic Rights Further or Infusing Administrative Law with Substance?” (2013) 29 SAJHR 
376. Participatory remedies must be preceded by strong, substantively interpreted rights 
during the application of a capabilities-based standard of review. See chapter five part 5 4 2 1 
above and C Rodríguez-Garavito “Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on 
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America” (2011) 89 Texas L Rev 1669 1691-1692.  
142 B Ray “Proceduralisation’s Triumph and Engagement’s Promise in Socio-economic Rights 
Litigation” (2011) 27 SAJHR 107 116-120 argues that engagement, if properly developed and 
institutionalised, can constitute an effective and valuable tool for the poor with which to 
vindicate their socio-economic rights. Moreover, once institutionalised, an order of meaningful 
engagement will gradually become less resource intensive.  
143 2005 1 SA 217 (CC). The remedy of meaningful engagement was foreshadowed in 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 87.  
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possible, respectful face-to-face engagement or mediation through a third party should 
replace arms-length combat by intransigent opponents.”144 
 
Meaningful engagement was first utilised as a remedy in Occupiers of 51 Olivia 
Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg.145 
The Constitutional Court issued an interim order for the City of Johannesburg to 
engage meaningfully with potential evictees from “bad buildings”. The Court indicated 
that meaningful engagement was “in some sense foreshadowed by [the occupiers’] 
contention that the City was obliged to give the occupiers a hearing before taking the 
decision to evict on the basis that the decision was an administrative one”.146 The Court 
also linked the duty to engage meaningfully with several constitutional duties owed to 
occupiers that are intricately connected to the fundamental rights of dignity and life.147 
The Court held that a failure to meaningfully engage with the occupiers would 
constitute conduct that stood at odds with the City’s constitutional obligations. 
Meaningful engagement is capable of forming a valuable component of a capabilities 
approach to remedies, given the role of dignity in identifying which socio-economic 
capabilities may be threatened by unconstitutional State conduct in a given case.148 
Meaningful engagement can thus be used as a mechanism to identify which 
capabilities are at stake. Once this information is known, allocative decisions can be 
revised accordingly.149   
                                            
144 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 39.  
145 2008 3 SA 208 (CC). 
146 Para 9. See also the later decision of Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v 
Thubelisha Homes 2010 3 SA 454 (CC) para 297. 
147 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City 
of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) para 16.  
148 See chapter two part 2 4 1 and chapter five part 5 4 2 1 regarding the role of the fundamental 
values of dignity, equality and freedom in identifying which socio-economic capabilities may 
be implicated in a given case. Once relevant socio-economic capabilities are identified, they 
can be utilised to inform socio-economic rights with substance.  
149 Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City 
of Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC) paras 18, 22: The Court stated that meaningful 
engagement is “also” squarely grounded in section 26(2) of the Constitution. Furthermore, the 
Court elevated meaningful engagement to the status of one of the considerations that will be 
taken into account in terms of section 26(3) when a court is asked to grant an eviction order. 
In Schubart Park Residents’ Association v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality 2013 1 
SA 323 (CC), the Constitutional Court recognised meaningful engagement as potentially 
applying to a range of cases beyond eviction. The Court stated that many provisions in the 
Constitution “require the substantive involvement and engagement of people in decisions that 
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6 4 1 2 1 Affording the State sufficient leeway to formulate proportionate 
allocative decisions 
 
The participatory element of a capabilities-focused structural interdict acknowledges 
that latitude must be afforded to the other branches of government to design 
reasonable allocative policies in the light of the polycentricity inherent in matters of 
resource allocation. Chenwi states in this regard: 
 
“The meaningful engagement remedy … surmounts concerns around the separation of 
powers and issues of polycentricity in socioeconomic rights adjudication, giving the 
government some leeway in policy-decision making, while embracing other democratic 
principles such as transparency and accountability.”150 
 
Meaningful engagement or robust procedural fairness can thus be used by the State 
to identify a broad category of socio-economic capabilities at stake and to tailor its 
allocative policy accordingly.  
 
6 4 1 2 2 Engaging with a broad range of stakeholders  
 
In designing reasonable allocative policies, the State should engage with as broad 
a range of stakeholders as possible. By broadening the pool of information available 
to the State in formulating its remedial action, a wide definition of “available resources” 
is simultaneously supported: The State may have to consult with a diverse range of 
stakeholders in order to adequately identify what resources should be made 
available.151 Where necessary, the participatory process may further be utilised to 
                                            
may affect their lives” (para 43) and that “often competing rights and interests can best be 
resolved by engagement between the parties” (para 44). Moreover, the Court held that the 
right to dignity entitled the occupiers to be treated as equals in the engagement process (para 
49) and that engagement could be ordered in terms of s 38 of the Constitution (para 51), which 
empowers a court to grant “appropriate relief”. Meaningful engagement on this conception is 
thus clearly not exclusively rooted in s 26(2) and applicable to s 26(3) of the Constitution. 
150 L Chenwi “A New Approach to Remedies in Socio-Economic Rights Adjudication: Occupiers 
of 51 Olivia Road and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others” (2009) 2 CCR 371 382.  
151 Engagement processes should include not only the litigants in the case, but those similarly 
placed, civil society organisations, and Chapter 9 institutions. In terms of s 181(1) of the 
Constitution, the Public Protector, the Human Rights Commission and the Auditor General may 
provide relevant information which can be consulted in order to further clarify what direction 
the participatory process should take. Thus, for example, where resource allocation in respect 
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identify sources of additional resources beyond those already allocated to the 
programme in question.152  
 
6 4 1 2 3 Ordering meaningful engagement as part of a structural interdict 
 
In National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental 
Organisations v MEC for Social Development153 (“NAWONGO 1”) the Court issued a 
structural interdict aimed at bringing the Free State Department of Social 
Development’s funding policy for the funding of non-profit organisations (“NPO’s”) that 
provide social welfare services to those in need in the Free State in line with its 
constitutional and statutory obligations.  
In evaluating the funding policy for compliance with the constitutional obligations 
placed on the State by the socio-economic rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights,154 the 
Court noted that the NPO’s concerned were in reality providing services that the 
department was required to provide.155 Paradoxically, in fulfilling the duties of the State, 
the NPO’s were merely allocated partial subsidies that were determined as a 
prerogative of the department.156 After comparing the amount expended by the 
department per person in need in its own State-run facilities to the significantly lesser 
amounts subsidised to NPO’s, the Court concluded that all NPO subsidies were 
woefully insufficient in the light of the obligations placed upon the State by sections 26, 
                                            
of health care is at issue, a civil society organisation such as Section 27 (see 
<http://www.section27.org.za/> for further information) may offer valuable insights as to the 
capabilities at stake and the resources required to realise them. Where unreasonable or 
disproportionate resource allocation occurred in a province which underspent its budget, or 
where other financial irregularities occurred, the information provided by the office of the 
Auditor General may be fruitfully consulted on the relevant issues. This information can then 
be used to further identify what stakeholders should be engaged, or in what direction the 
participatory process should proceed.  
152 A wide definition of “available resources” is espoused in chapter two part 2 2 3 and chapter 
five part 5 4 2 2.  
153 (1719/2010) [2010] ZAFSHC 73 (5 August 2010). 
154 It was alleged that the State was in breach of its constitutional obligations in terms of, inter 
alia, ss 26, 27 and 28 of the Constitution.  
155 See also C Ngwenya & L Pretorius “Substantive Equality for Disabled Learners in State 
Provision of Basic Education: A Commentary on Western Cape Forum for Intellectual Disability 
v Government of the Republic of South Africa” (2012) 28 SAJHR 81 101. 
156 National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v 
MEC for Social Development (1719/2010) [2010] ZAFSHC 73 (5 August 2010) para 31.  
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27 and 28 of the Constitution.157 The Court subsequently made two further orders in 
terms of the structural interdict.158 
In NAWONGO 2, the Court ordered the State to meaningfully engage with the 
under-funded NPO’s in order to bring its funding policy in line with its constitutional 
obligations.159 However, when NAWONGO 3 came before the Court, the State had not 
complied with the engagement order. The State’s failure to engage with the NPO’s and 
thereby broaden the information available to it was consequently reflected in its still 
constitutionally deficient funding policy. In castigating the State for its non-compliance, 
the Court emphasised that “[m]eaningful engagement is a minimum required for 
formulating social welfare policy”160 and, as the facts of the case show, for socio-
economic allocative policies as well. One factor leading to the ineffective design of a 
constitutional allocative policy in this case was thus likely the State’s failure to engage 
with a broad range of stakeholders.  
The policy was finally upheld as constitutionally compliant in NAWONGO 4. The 
robust process of engagement that preceded the third revision of the policy contributed 
to the Court’s finding that the policy was constitutionally sound.161 The engagement 
process included the provision of the working policy document to the NPO’s for 
comment, a full written response by the State to the NPO comments, the formulation 
of a task team that included the department, KPMG, the NPO’s and social welfare 
                                            
157 Paras 33-36. Thereafter, the Court turned to an analysis of the obligations of the department 
and took as its point of departure in this respect the foundational constitutional values of human 
dignity, equality and freedom (paras 37-46).  
158 National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v 
MEC for Social Development (1719/2010) [2011] ZAFSHC 84 (9 June 2011) (“NAWONGO 2”) 
and National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v 
MEC for Social Development, Free State (1719/2010) [2013] ZAFSHC 49 (28 March 2013) 
(“NAWONGO 3”). The allocative policy was finally upheld as constitutional in National 
Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v Member of the 
Executive Council for Social Development, Free State (1719/2010) [2014] ZAFSHC 127 (28 
August 2014) (“NAWONGO 4”).  
159 National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v 
MEC for Social Development (1719/2010) [2011] ZAFSHC 84 (9 June 2011) para 28 order 2. 
160 National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v 
MEC for Social Development, Free State (1719/2010) [2013] ZAFSHC 49 (28 March 2013) 
para 15. 
161 National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v 
Member of the Executive Council for Social Development, Free State (1719/2010) [2014] 
ZAFSHC 127 (28 August 2014) paras 16-22.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 317 
 
experts to calculate the core costs involved in funding prioritised programmes, a three 
day workshop involving all stakeholders and follow-up meetings.162 This case therefore 
demonstrates the critical importance of adhering to all three of the interacting tenets 
espoused by a capabilities approach to remedies (informational broadening, 
explicitness and supervision) in order to ensure effective relief.  
 
6 4 1 3 Informational broadening within different spheres and organs of State   
 
In Grootboom, the need for co-operation between different spheres of government 
in their efforts to realise socio-economic rights was highlighted.163 As observed by 
Pillay, a breakdown in communication between different spheres of government 
following the order in Grootboom resulted in uncertainty regarding who bore the 
responsibility for resource allocation, and consequently in ineffective allocative 
decisions.164 The requirement for informational broadening therefore requires different 
spheres of government and organs of State to co-operate and share information in 
order for reasonable allocative decisions to be designed and implemented effectively.  
The duty of different organs of State to co-operate inter se has subsequently been 
emphasised by the Constitutional Court in several cases in which the right to education 
was implicated.165 Thus, in Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State 
Province v Welkom High School; Head of Department, Department of Education, Free 
State Province v Harmony High School166 the Constitutional Court stated the following 
regarding the relationship between the Department of Education and school governing 
bodies: 
 
“[T]he relationship between public school governing bodies and the state should be 
informed by close cooperation, a cooperation which recognises the partners’ distinct but 
inter-related functions. The relationship should therefore be characterised by consultation, 
cooperation in mutual trust and good faith.”167 
                                            
162 Paras 16-22.  
163 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 68. See 
further the discussion of inter-governmental allocative responsibility in chapter four part 4 3 4 
2 1 above.  
164 K Pillay “Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the Enforcement of Socio-
Economic Rights” (2002) 6 LDD 255 267-268. 
165 S 29 of the Constitution.  
166 2014 2 SA 228 (CC).  
167 Para 125. 
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The concurring judgment of Froneman J and Skweyiya J affirmed the duty of 
different public organs to co-operate with each other in good faith, locating this duty in 
the co-operative governance provisions of the Constitution.168 Significantly, the justices 
stated that in appropriate cases, the remedial provisions contained in section 172 of 
the Constitution empowered courts to ensure compliance with this co-operative duty.169 
Subsequently, in MEC for Education in Gauteng Province v Governing Body of Rivonia 
Primary School170 the Court repeated the necessity for “proper engagement between 
all parties affected”,171 and highlighted “the damage that results when some 
functionaries fail to take the general obligation to act in partnership and co-operation 
seriously”.172 
Inter-governmental co-operation where complex, polycentric resource allocation 
decisions are concerned is of similarly critical importance. This is confirmed by the very 
raison d’etre of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act 97 of 1997, the purpose of 
which is stated to be “[t]o promote co-operation between the national, provincial and 
local spheres of government on fiscal, budgetary and financial matters”.173 Where a 
court adopts a wide definition of “available resources” in applying a capabilities-based 
standard of review to allocative decisions, different departments of State may need to 
engage with each other on macro-economic matters where this is necessary for the 
remediation of unreasonable resource allocation decisions.174 Informational 
                                            
168 S 41 of the Constitution.  
169 Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Welkom High School; 
Head of Department, Department of Education, Free State Province v Harmony High School 
2014 2 SA 228 (CC) para 162.  
170 2013 6 SA 582 (CC). 
171 MEC for Education in Gauteng Province and Other v Governing Body of Rivonia Primary 
School 2013 6 SA 582 (CC) para 72. 
172 Para 74. See S Liebenberg “Deepening Democratic Transformation in South Africa through 
Participatory Constitutional Remedies” (2015) National Journal of Constitutional Law 
(forthcoming) for a comprehensive survey and insightful evaluation of all the education-related 
judgments in which engagement and the duty to co-operate featured prominently. 
173 Preamble of the Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations Act 97 of 1997. 
174 See Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 4 SA 274 (GP) para 80 
where the Court acknowledged that, while difficult, a case could arguably be made to challenge 
vote allocations in the national budget. 
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broadening among different spheres of government and organs of State is therefore 
imperative in terms of a capabilities approach to remedies.175  
Participation at the remedial stage of adjudication thus fosters the fundamental 
constitutional values of openness and responsiveness,176 while forming an 
indispensable component of a capabilities approach to remedies. To furthermore foster 
the value of accountability and promote a culture of justification, a capabilities 
approach to remedies additionally requires explicitness.   
 
6 4 2 Explicitness  
 
A capabilities approach to the adjudication of State resource allocation decisions 
demands explicit reasoning when making evaluative judgments regarding the 
weighting and prioritisation of diverse capabilities and other interests.177 Moreover, 
explicitness in the adjudicative process resonates with the demands of a culture of 
justification under our transformative Constitution.178 Courts are therefore required to 
adopt a strategy of substantive reasoning in adjudicating State resource allocation 
decisions, whereas the State must explicitly justify its resource allocation decisions in 
                                            
175 The involvement of, for example, the National Treasury where critical socio-economic 
capabilities are imperilled by unreasonable resource allocation is of crucial importance. See, 
for example, Madzodzo v Minister of Basic Education 2014 3 SA 441 (ECM) para 37 where it 
was pointed out that the State could rely on certain Treasury regulations relating to emergency 
procurement in order to solicit the resources necessary to meet the relevant schools’ furniture 
needs. The same argument was made in Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v 
Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 
(CC) para 11 in relation to the contingency that Cash Paymaster might have refused to perform 
in terms of its contract with SASSA. See further Treasury Regulations GN R556 in GG 21249 
of 31-05-2000 as amended by GN R225 in GG 27388 of 15-03-2005. The authority to conclude 
such a contract is in Regulation 16A6.4. The representation and participation of all relevant 
State departments may be best ensured by citing the national and provincial governments, as 
opposed to individual departments, at the initiation of proceedings. See further in this regard 
part 6 4 1 1 1 above.   
176 S 1(d) of the Constitution.  
177 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 75. For the importance of explicitness under a 
transformative constitution, see chapter two part 2 4 4 above.  
178 E Mureinik “A Bridge to Where?: Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” (1994) 10 SAJHR 31 
32; M Pieterse “What do we Mean when we Talk About Transformative Constitutionalism?” 
(2005) 20 SAPL 155 156, 161, 165; chapter two part 2 4 4 above.  
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the light of the capabilities at stake.179 Explicit reasoning allows for the subsequent 
public scrutiny of decisions made by courts and the State and thereby facilitates public 
participation in socio-economic value formation. In order to ensure effective State 
resource allocation decisions aimed at capability realisation, explicitness is equally 
important at the remedial stage of adjudication. To constitute a capabilities approach 
to remedies, explicitness should therefore be observed both by a court in granting a 
structural interdict and by the State in devising a new capabilities-infused allocative 
plan subject to approval by the relevant court.  
 
6 4 2 1 Judicial explicitness 
 
A participatory remedy directed at informational broadening, in itself, may not 
constitute effective relief. A capabilities approach to remedies requires meaningful 
engagement and similar procedural remedies to be accompanied by explicit normative 
guidelines and the retention of judicial supervision.180 Liebenberg forcefully argues for 
the provision of explicit normative guidelines where meaningful engagement is 
ordered: 
 
“If not combined with sufficient normative interpretative guidance on what the particular 
constitutional right requires of the duty-bearers, other groups similarly placed may not be 
able to derive the systemic benefits which should flow from constitutional rights litigation ... 
The potential radiating benefits of constitutional litigation will not be generated as organs of 
state will be left with insufficient guidance regarding the normative parameters and 
objectives of engagement processes – parameters and objectives which should be 
inextricably linked to the substantive interests and values which the relevant rights were 
designed to protect.”181 
 
                                            
179 The importance of explicitness on the part of the State in the justificatory stage of a 
proportionality as weighting exercise is fully discussed in chapter five part 5 4 2 3 above.  
180 See S Liebenberg “Deepening Democratic Transformation in South Africa through 
Participatory Constitutional Remedies” (2015) National Journal of Constitutional Law 
(forthcoming). See further L Chenwi “A New Approach to Remedies in Socio-Economic Rights 
Adjudication: Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others” 
(2009) 2 CCR 371 389-391 for criticism of the Constitutional Court’s failure to set normative 
parameters and its “sheer unwillingness” to make determinations on substantive issues in 
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street, Johannesburg v City of 
Johannesburg 2008 3 SA 208 (CC).  
181 S Liebenberg “Deepening Democratic Transformation in South Africa through Participatory 
Constitutional Remedies” (2015) National Journal of Constitutional Law (forthcoming). 
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The same objectives could be achieved through administrative law by situating the 
remedy of meaningful engagement within the constitutional requirement for procedural 
fairness and combining it with the administrative-law remedy of remitting a matter to 
an administrator with directions. Where the retention of supervision is necessary, 
administrative law allows for the creative use of structural interdicts.182  
By combining an explicit order with an on-going process of participation and the 
retention of supervision, provision is also made for the adaptation of the order in the 
light of information yielded by the process of engagement described above. Michelman 
explains revisability in the context of democratic experimentalism: 
 
“As the discursive benchmarking moves along and the emerging answers gain public 
recognition and authorization, the court might turn up the heat on deployment of its powers 
of review. At a relatively early stage, what the court presumes to dictate will be agendas of 
questions to be addressed and answered by one or another stakeholder group or class. At 
later stages, the court starts calling for substantive compliance with the emergent best-
practice standards, in the name of the constitutional right (say) to access to healthcare 
services. The screws tighten on what can count as cogent or ‘reasonable.’ The court serves 
as arbiter but it never has or claims a door-closing last word.”183 
 
The need for the reassessment of initial judgments regarding the valuation or 
effective realisation of capabilities is also recognised by Sen, who acknowledges that 
initially unforeseen consequences may need to be addressed.184 The requirements for 
explicitness and informational broadening through participatory processes thus 
dynamically interact with each other. This symbiotic relationship can be catered for by 
the on-going nature of the structural interdict.  
  
                                            
182 For a generous approach to procedural fairness, see Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 
4 SA 55 (CC) and in particular para 64. See also G Quinot “Substantive Reasoning in 
Administrative-law Adjudication” (2010) 3 CCR 111. For the granting of a reporting back order 
in a tender case, see Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive 
Officer of the South African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC). 
183 FI Michelman “Constitutionally Binding Social and Economic Rights as a Compelling Idea: 
Reciprocating Perturbations in Liberal and Democratic Constitutional Visions” in HA García, K 
Klare & LA Williams (eds) Social and Economic Rights in Theory and Practice (2015) 277 288-
289. 
184 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 107. See further chapter two part 2 3 2 4 4 above.  
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6 4 2 1 1 Explicitness in the Constitutional Court 
 
A capabilities approach to remedies requires that courts set explicit, normative 
parameters indicating what a capabilities-focused, reasonable and proportionate 
resource allocation decision will comprise. The process of explicitness starts at the 
application of a capabilities-based standard of review to challenged resource allocation 
decisions,185 but must be reinforced at the remedial stage of adjudication. The setting 
of normative parameters in which remediation should occur helps to ensure that the 
State fully comprehends its constitutional obligations in a given case. Where the State 
understands its allocative responsibilities, it can act expeditiously to remedy the socio-
economic right violation at issue, and thereby effectively vindicate the capabilities 
underlying the infringed right.186  
In a recent procurement law judgment where the right to social security187 was 
directly implicated, the Constitutional Court failed to adhere to the capabilities precept 
of explicitness. In Allpay, the Constitutional Court declared a tender award by the South 
African Social Security Agency (“SASSA”) to Cash Paymaster Services (Pty) Ltd 
(“Cash Paymaster”) for the payment of social security grants invalid. The Court 
acknowledged the importance of the right to social security, and of not disrupting the 
payment of grants to socio-economically vulnerable beneficiaries in granting a 
remedy.188 However, explicit normative guidelines bringing the important socio-
economic right and its underlying capabilities into focus for each component of the 
remedy would have been valuable. The Court in Allpay set the tender award aside and 
ordered SASSA to rerun the tender process. The mandatory order was coupled with a 
reporting back order. Pending a decision by SASSA as to whether to award a new 
                                            
185 Chapter five part 5 4 2 3 above.  
186 The danger of granting a participatory injunction such as meaningful engagement without 
setting explicit normative parameters is illustrated by the judgment of Mamba v Minister of 
Social Development CCT 65/08 (21 August 2008) even though resource allocation was not at 
issue in this case. The Constitutional Court ordered meaningful engagement with a view to 
resolve disputes that arose between the State and refugees when the State attempted to close 
camps that had been established to safeguard said refugees from xenophobic violence. The 
Court provided no additional normative guidance and the State responded by largely ignoring 
the order and proceeding with closure of the camps.  
187 S 27(1)(c) of the Constitution.  
188 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency 2014 1 SA 604 (CC) paras 1, 56, 74.  
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tender or not, the order of invalidity was suspended.189 If SASSA were to decide not to 
award a new tender, the declaration of invalidity would be further suspended until Cash 
Paymaster’s initial contractual term would have come to an end.190  
The Court did not grant any consideration to the resource implications of funding a 
new tender for a period of five years. The lack of explicitness in this regard could 
potentially lead to unintended consequences, such as the diversion of resources from 
grant payments. If this were to occur, serious socio-economic capability deprivation 
would follow. Furthermore, although the Court set normative boundaries for the 
administratively just award of a new tender,191 it failed to explicitly provide any 
substantive normative or practical guidelines for SASSA to utilise in deciding whether 
to award a new tender at all. Given the protracted litigation in this matter,192 SASSA 
might feasibly decide not to award a new tender so as to bring the matter to a close 
after having rerun the tender process. SASSA could then proceed to administer the 
                                            
189 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) para 78 order 2. In Bengwenyama 
Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 4 SA 113 (CC) para 84 the Court 
indicated that an invalid administrative act may not always have to be set aside:  
“It would be conducive to clarity, when making the choice of a just and equitable remedy in 
terms of PAJA, to emphasise the fundamental constitutional importance of the principle of 
legality, which requires invalid administrative action to be declared unlawful. This would 
make it clear that the discretionary choice of a further just and equitable remedy follows 
upon that fundamental finding. The discretionary choice may not precede the finding of 
invalidity. The discipline of this approach will enable courts to consider whether relief which 
does not give full effect to the finding of invalidity, is justified in the particular circumstances 
of the case before it. Normally this would arise in the context of third parties having altered 
their position on the basis that the administrative action was valid and would suffer prejudice 
if the administrative action is set aside, but even then the ‘desirability of certainty’ needs to 
be justified against the fundamental importance of the principle of legality.” 
190 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) para 78 order 4.  
191 In the judgment on the merits: Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief 
Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency 2014 1 SA 604 (CC). 
192 See the earlier judgments of the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal in Allpay 
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African 
Social Security Agency (GPPHC) 28-08-2012 Case no 7447/2012 and AllPay Consolidated 
Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v CEO of the South African Social Security Agency 2013 4 SA 
557 (SCA) respectively, and the later judgment of the Constitutional Court in Allpay 
Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South African 
Social Security Agency 2015 6 BCLR 653 (CC). 
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payment of grants itself, as planned.193 Normative guidelines for deciding whether or 
not to award a new tender could have required SASSA to consider what course of 
action would most effectively vindicate the right of access to social security. In this way, 
normative guidelines could have brought the capabilities underlying the right of access 
to social security into focus in both scenarios contemplated by the court, viz SASSA 
deciding to grant a new tender or deciding to administer grant payments itself. In this 
way, explicit normative parameters could have promoted capabilities-centred 
administrative action on a systemic level.  
 
6 4 2 1 2 Explicitness in the High Courts  
 
The High Courts have displayed a greater willingness to issue structural interdicts 
than the Constitutional Court in general, and in cases pertaining to resource allocation 
in particular.194 The constitutional and institutional competence assumed by the High 
Courts in granting managerial remedies has, for the most part, been reflected in the 
issuance of normative and practical guidelines for the benefit of the State and other 
stakeholders.  
 
(a) Centre for Child Law v MEC for Education, Gauteng 
 
In Centre for Child Law v MEC for Education, Gauteng195 the Court had to determine 
whether deplorable conditions in a school of industry infringed the children’s 
unqualified rights enshrined in section 28 of the Constitution.196 In casu, the applicant 
sought orders compelling the State to take positive action and provide each child with 
a sleeping bag, and to establish proper access control and psychological support 
                                            
193 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) para 13.  
194 Cf, however, Basic Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 4 SA 274 (GP) 
paras 73-75 in which the High Court relied on the explicitness of the information provided by 
the State regarding its budgetary constraints to not order a structural interdict. I submit that this 
approach is untenable, given the State’s previous non-compliance with court orders coupled 
with the fertile capability (education) at stake. 
195 2008 1 SA 223 (T).  
196 The rights of children in s 28(1) of the Constitution are not subject to considerations of 
“available resources” or “progressive realisation”.  
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structures.197 The Court pointed out that section 28 constituted an unqualified right free 
from internal limitations related to availability of resources and progressive realisation. 
The Court went on to explain that “[l]ike all rights, they remain subject to reasonable 
and proportional limitation [in terms of the general limitations clause], but the absence 
of any internal limitation entrenches the rights as unqualified and immediate”.198 The 
Court highlighted that, to the extent that judicial involvement in “budgetary or 
distribution matters” gave rise to concerns of polycentricity, the Constitution recognised 
that budgetary implications should not “compromise” the justiciability199 of these types 
of unlimited rights. Each case deserved scrutiny on the basis of its own merits and 
circumstances and “the potential for negative or irreconcilable resource allocations”.200  
Having dismissed all the State’s defences and alternative proposals in relation to 
the relief claimed, the Court went on to issue a detailed declaratory order and structural 
interdict.201 The Court deemed a structural interdict to be appropriate in the light of the 
“dilatory and lackadaisical approach” adopted by the State.202 Furthermore, the Court 
issued explicit instructions in order to avoid any uncertainty.203 The remedy included a 
mandatory order to provide each student with a sleeping bag and to carry out a 
developmental quality-assurance process. The composition of the team tasked with 
carrying out the developmental quality-assurance process was explicitly elaborated. 
Moreover, the Court extracted explicitness from the State by compelling it to present 
its plan to implement the recommendations of the team to the Court and the applicants. 
The applicants were allowed to re-enrol the matter for further hearing if necessary in 
the light of the reports thus filed.204 The judgment illustrates that a structural interdict 
may be appropriate despite the explicit recognition of the polycentricity inherent in 
ordering the State to allocate resources. Explicitness both in recognising the effect that 
a remedy may have, as well as in directing the State on how to act in order to guarantee 
                                            
197 Centre for Child Law v MEC for Education, Gauteng 2008 1 SA 223 (T) 225D-F. 
198 227H-J.  
199 Qualified socio-economic rights with budgetary implications such as those enshrined in ss 
26 and 27 are of course also justiciable despite inherently evoking polycentric concerns. Ex 
parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 78; Minister of Health v Treatment 
Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 5 SA 721 (CC) para 25. 
200 Centre for Child Law v MEC for Education, Gauteng 2008 1 SA 223 (T) 228A-B.  
201 230E-231G.  
202 229H.  
203 230D.  
204 230F-231F.  
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reasonable and proportionate resource allocation, resonates strongly with a 
capabilities approach to remedies.   
 
(b) Western Cape Forum for Intellectual Disability v Government of the Republic of 
South Africa 
 
In Western Cape Forum for Intellectual Disability v Government of the Republic of 
South Africa205 the Court was called upon to adjudicate the allocation of available, 
albeit scarce, resources in terms of the unqualified right to basic education.206 The 
Western Cape Forum for Intellectual Disability (the “applicant”) alleged that the State’s 
provision for children with severe or profound intellectual disabilities (the “affected 
children”) was unconstitutional in that it was significantly less than that provided for 
other children, it was inadequate to cater for the educational needs of such children, 
and it was in any event only made available where a non-governmental organisation 
provided the necessary facilities.207 The constitutionally appropriate allocation of 
resources was therefore central in this matter.  
The State averred that limited resources justified the exclusion of the affected 
children in the face of competing demands and that “the right to education should not 
trump rights to housing, food, water, health care and social security”.208 The polycentric 
effects that the prioritisation of resource allocation has on a myriad socio-economic 
capabilities were thus squarely brought to the fore. The State further relied on the 
                                            
205 2011 5 SA 87 (WCC). 
206 S 29(1)(a) provides that everyone has the right to basic education. This right is not limited 
by considerations of “available resources” or “progressive realisation” as is the case in ss 26(2) 
and 27(2). In Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School v Essay NO 2011 8 BCLR 
761 (CC) para 37 the Constitutional Court affirmed the unqualified nature of the right in 
explaining that: 
“Unlike some of the other socio-economic rights, this right is immediately realisable. There 
is no internal limitation requiring that the right be ‘progressively realised’ within ‘available 
resources’ subject to ‘reasonable legislative measures’. The right to a basic education in 
section 29(1)(a) may be limited only in terms of a law of general application which is 
‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom’.” 
See also Section 27 v Minister of Basic Education 2013 2 SA 40 (GNP). 
207 Western Cape Forum for Intellectual Disability v Government of the Republic of South Africa 
2011 5 SA 87 (WCC) para 4.  
208 Para 17.  
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magnitude of the socio-economic situation in South Africa in requesting that the Court 
“soften the budgetary impact of an unqualified reading of the right to education”.209 
The Court rejected the State’s resource-based defences and issued a structural 
interdict which explicitly included an order directing the State to allocate resources “to 
organizations which provide education for severely and profoundly intellectually 
disabled children… such as to enable them to… have the use of adequate facilities for 
this purpose [and]… hire adequate staff for this purpose”.210 Moreover, the Court 
extracted explicitness from the State by requiring it to file a report setting out which 
steps it had taken to comply with the order as well as which further steps it planned to 
take.  
However, the Court failed to provide sufficient explicit normative guidelines to aid 
the prioritisation of resource allocation among competing socio-economic rights. The 
capabilities approach tenet of explicitness would have been better served had the 
Court dealt head-on with the unqualified nature of the right at issue, on the one hand, 
and its relation to other socio-economic rights and resource demands, on the other 
hand.211 The Court evaded the issue as to when a defence of resource constraints 
could be upheld in the context of an unqualified right when it stated that the applicants 
                                            
209 Para 17. The State had set out its policy and strategy aimed at the progressive realisation 
of the right to education over several years. However, the Court noted that even when these 
policies were implemented, certain children with severe or profound intellectual disability would 
remain excluded from the ambit of the State’s resource allocation (para 19).  
210 Para 52.  
211 See N Murungi “The Duty to Provide Basic Education for Children with Severe and Profound 
Intellectual Disabilities” (2011) 12 ESR Review 10 11 who notes that while education may 
deserve special weight due to its nature as an “empowerment right” that aids the achievement 
of other rights, it should not without more be argued that education must trump other socio-
economic rights. The author goes on to analyse international law, which points to the absolute 
nature of the right to primary education as opposed to the qualified nature of the right to further 
education, and concludes by acknowledging that the debate regarding the nature of this 
unqualified right persists (12). It is submitted that although the text of the Constitution should 
be adhered to in adjudicating unqualified rights, the Court should carefully weigh the nature of 
competing socio-economic interests in each case before it in order to determine what 
prioritisation will facilitate the realisation of the capabilities of all those who could be affected 
by that judgment. The unqualified nature of the right points to its relatively superior ability to 
realise potential or capabilities and should require stringent proof of the impossibility of 
procuring additional resources to secure its fulfilment, which can be adjudicated through the 
application of the general limitations clause. See further S Liebenberg Socio-Economic Rights: 
Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 244-245 regarding the justification for 
the higher protection afforded to the right to education.  
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were not requesting the allocation of extra funds, but merely asserting that available 
funds should be distributed more fairly among all children.212 A redistribution of 
resources could, of course, lead to decreased allocation in other areas of basic 
education. The Court should thus have explicitly considered whether the State was 
obliged to solicit additional funds so as not to reduce allocation in other spheres of 
basic education. The lack of explicitness in casu thereby weakens the structural 
interdict’s ability to accommodate the polycentric consequences of ordering the State 
to allocate resources.  
 
(c) Section 27 v Minister of Basic Education 
 
In Section 27 v Minister of Basic Education213 the Court was approached in an 
attempt to solve the structural failure to realise the right to basic education in the 
Limpopo province. In casu, the widespread non-delivery of textbooks to schools in 
Limpopo was at issue. The Court, per Kollapen J, commenced its judgment by 
elaborating the normative importance of the right to education. Importantly, the Court 
recognised that education was vital for people to be able to reach their potential, and 
contributed to the general upliftment of society.214 The normative purposes thus 
ascribed to the right resonate with the fertile nature of the capability to be educated, in 
that by realising this capability, various other capabilities become possible. The Court 
continued to employ a capabilities approach to adjudication by taking into account the 
historical context of the right to education.215 The Court observed that given the gross 
inequality of the education system under the apartheid regime, education was now of 
macro- and micro-significance: 
 
“It becomes at the macro level an indispensable tool in the transformational imperatives that 
the Constitution contemplates and at the micro level it is almost a sine qua non to the self 
determination of each person and his or her ability to live a life of dignity and participate fully 
in the affairs of society.”216 
 
                                            
212 Western Cape Forum for Intellectual Disability v Government of the Republic of South Africa 
2011 5 SA 87 (WCC) para 28.  
213 2013 2 SA 40 (GNP).  
214 Paras 1-4.  
215 For the role of context in identifying important capabilities and thereby infusing socio-
economic rights with content, see chapter two part 2 3 3 3 3 above.  
216 Section 27 v Minister of Basic Education 2013 2 SA 40 (GNP) para 6. 
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A capabilities approach posits that in order to achieve the complex functioning 
outcome of living a dignified life as an educated person who participates fully in the 
affairs of society, a myriad much more basic capabilities must first be realised. For 
example, the capability to be educated must be realised in a manner that does not 
infringe the dignity of the learners in question. This in turn implies that learners must 
be capable of becoming educated in an adequate physical environment and within a 
functioning infrastructure. If these capabilities constitute the content of the right to 
education in a given case, it follows that dilapidated buildings or unsafe sanitation 
facilities would result in capability deprivation, and thus the infringement of the right to 
basic education.217 Furthermore, learners must be capable of becoming educated in a 
position of equality with other members of society. In other words, the learners must 
have equally valuable educational materials and resources such as qualified teachers 
at their disposal.  
In this case, the question was even narrower in only asking whether the provision 
of textbooks formed part of the content of the right: The Court answered this question 
in the affirmative.218 In capabilities parlance, the substantive freedom to consult, 
engage with and learn from textbooks therefore constitutes a part of the content of the 
right to basic education. Where that freedom is negated, the right is infringed. Having 
provided a rich normative framework for the adjudication of the matter at issue, the 
Court held that the Department of Basic Education’s failure to deliver textbooks to 
schools in Limpopo constituted an infringement of the right to basic education.219 
The Court went on to grant the relief requested by the applicants in the form of a 
detailed structural interdict. First, the Court ordered the Department of Basic Education 
to deliver the textbooks to all schools in Limpopo on an urgent basis.220 Moreover, the 
Court ordered the department to devise a comprehensive “catch up” or “remedial” plan 
to address the severe educational shortcomings that resulted from a lack of textbooks. 
Without prescribing the content of the plan, the Court provided explicit guidelines 
                                            
217 The Court did not decide the issue as to whether matters such as “infrastructure, learner 
transport, security at schools [and] nutrition” formed part of the content of the right to education, 
but described definitions advocating a broad and encompassing interpretation of the content 
of the right as “compelling” (para 22).  
218 Para 25. 
219 Para 32.  
220 Para 43 order 3. 
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outlining the contours of the plan.221 These guidelines instructed the department to 
identify the “gaps” in the curriculum, identify the extent to which quality teaching was 
prejudiced, identify remedial measures to address these concerns in consultation with 
various stakeholders, provide a timeframe for the implementation of the plan and 
identify monitoring mechanisms to monitor its implementation, ensure that the plan is 
comprehensive, identify a point of responsibility at the national and provincial levels of 
government, and to submit monthly reports detailing both the achievements and 
setbacks experienced in the implementation of the plan as well as how any setbacks 
would be addressed.222 
In providing these explicit guidelines, the Court’s approach was wholly congruent 
with a capabilities approach to remedies. However, the department did not comply with 
the initial order and a further order was necessitated. Nonetheless, the implicit 
utilisation of a capabilities approach to remedies yielded valuable structural benefits. 
Veriava describes the impact of the judgment: 
 
“The mobilisation of public opinion and rights consciousness raising that occurred in the 
Limpopo textbook case has been unprecedented… The victory in the Limpopo textbook 
case and the subsequent failure of the state to comply has generated an awareness of the 
scale of the education crisis. Discussions on the Limpopo textbook crisis are often located 
within a broader discussion on the inadequacies in public schooling. It has also led to a 
heightened awareness of the other ills in the education system. In short, it contributed to a 
national mobilisation against inferior education. This case has also generated somewhat of 
a domino effect inspiring new cases and highlighting ongoing campaigns for improvements 
to educational quality in public schools. The case is also regularly cited as proof of the 
absence of an accountable government, and of the failure of the current government to 
deliver.”223 
 
Even where State compliance cannot be guaranteed, a capabilities approach to 
remedies transforms a court into a deliberative platform where government action can 
be subjected to public scrutiny. Explicitness in the form of substantive, normative 
reasoning is critical for the promotion of meaningful public scrutiny, debate and 
subsequent mobilisation of non-judicial actors. A capabilities approach to remedies can 
                                            
221 F Veriava The 2012 Limpopo Textbook Crisis: A Study in Rights-bases Advocacy, the 
Raising of Rights Consciousness and Governance (2013) 38. 
222 Section 27 v Minister of Basic Education 2013 2 SA 40 (GNP) para 43 order 4. 
223 F Veriava The 2012 Limpopo Textbook Crisis: A Study in Rights-bases Advocacy, the 
Raising of Rights Consciousness and Governance (2013) 38. 
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thus facilitate structural reform, even if it is initially ineffective in extracting compliance 
from a recalcitrant government.224  
 
(d) NAWONGO 1  
 
In the NAWONGO 1 case,225 the Court held that the State’s funding policy for NPO’s 
was ultimately flawed to the extent that it did not explicitly recognise “as a fundamental 
principle of funding, that NPO’s that provide care [such as in this case] … fulfil the 
constitutional and statutory obligations of the department”.226 Furthermore, the Court 
clarified what a “reasonable” funding policy would entail:  
 
“Reasonableness in this regard must be determined in the context of the Bill of Rights as a 
whole. What should be contributed from own resources and/or sources of income by the 
NPO’s that fulfil the obligations of the department, cannot be determined arbitrally [sic]. To 
be a reasonable measure in this regard, the policy must contain a fair, equitable and 
transparent method of determination of what these NPO’s are able and should contribute 
to the provision of care for children, older children and vulnerable persons in need and 
statutory services. The department must show that the policy is reasonable in this 
respect.”227 
 
The Court could have provided more substantive guidelines regarding what a “fair, 
equitable and transparent method” for determining allocation would entail. For 
example, the Court could have explicitly engaged with the capabilities underlying the 
socio-economic rights at stake. By identifying the importance and urgency of the 
relevant capability needs, the socio-economic rights in question could be imbued with 
                                            
224 In contrast, when the issue of textbook delivery again came before the Court in Basic 
Education for All v Minister of Basic Education 2014 4 SA 274 (GP), the Court declined to issue 
a structural interdict. Despite the implication of the fertile capability to be educated in the 
matter, the Court justified its refusal to grant a structural remedy with reference to the 
demonstrable resource constraints of the Department as well as separation of powers 
concerns (paras 75-76). Given the litigation history in this matter, the recalcitrance and 
intransigence of the Department and the implication of a fertile capability (the deprivation of 
which can have dire consequences for the freedom, dignity and equality of learners without 
textbooks), the Court’s approach in casu eschews a capabilities approach to remedies and 
cannot be supported.  
225 See part 6 4 1 2 3 above.  
226 National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v 
MEC for Social Development (1719/2010) [2010] ZAFSHC 73 (5 August 2010) para 47.  
227 Para 49 (emphasis added).  
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content. Once socio-economic rights acquire content, clarity regarding what resource 
allocation should aim to fulfil, becomes possible.  
The Court deemed it appropriate to retain supervisory jurisdiction over the revision 
of the policy and issued a structural interdict. This remedy was justified by the lack of 
leadership and capacity exhibited by the department and the consequent doubt that 
arose as to whether the policy would be revised “expeditiously or efficiently”.228 The 
order reiterated the requirements identified by the Court for the policy to be 
“reasonable”. According to the Court, a reasonable funding policy should explicitly 
recognise “as a fundamental principle of funding that nonprofit organisations that care 
for children, older persons or vulnerable persons in need or provide statutory services, 
fulfil the obligations of the first and second respondents” and contain a “fair, equitable 
and transparent method of determination of the contributions that the aforesaid non-
profit organisations should make from own resources”.229  
Explicitness can thus stop short of the judicial quantification of reasonable 
allocations. However, the remedy could have been reinforced by requiring the 
department to investigate the possibility of procuring additional resources instead of 
merely requiring reprioritisation within a palpably inadequate budget.230 
 
6 4 2 2 State explicitness 
 
Just as a reviewing court should adhere to the capabilities tenet of explicit 
reasoning, the State should also explicitly indicate how its remedial allocative plan 
complies with a relevant court order. The following part investigates the State’s 
compliance with the requirement for explicitness in terms of a capabilities-directed 
structural interdict.   
                                            
228 Para 53.  
229 Para 56. 
230 Subsequent to National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental 
Organisations v MEC for Social Development (1719/2010) [2011] ZAFSHC 84 (9 June 2011), 
the government appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal. However, the appeal was struck 
off the roll since the Court found that the government had acted prematurely in appealing 
before finalising its policy. Thus, the process had to be started from scratch and parties first 
had to return to the High Court prior to recourse to the Supreme Court of Appeal. (Telephone 
conversation with Carina du Toit, Attorney at the Centre for Child Law (as amicus curiae) 03-
02-2012).  
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6 4 2 2 1 NAWONGO 2  
 
In NAWONGO 2, the government returned to court with a revised policy ostensibly 
based on an allocation model developed by the accounting firm, KPMG. The Court 
examined this technical evidence and concluded that one provision of the revised 
policy (the “impugned provision”) was in fact inconsistent with the KPMG allocation 
model. In terms of the KPMG allocation model, where an NPO was unable to contribute 
from its own resources, it would be allocated a subsidy by the department that covered 
its full costs. In addition, the KPMG allocation formula was constrained by the premise 
that the total budget available for transfer to the NPO’s, plus the funds contributed by 
NPO’s from their own resources, equalled or exceeded the costs incurred by the NPO’s 
in rendering social welfare services.231 Incongruously, the impugned provision, in 
aiming to ensure that the approved awards to NPO’s did not exceed the funds allocated 
by the department for transfer to NPO’s, arbitrarily reduced the amount allocated to 
NPO’s by a subjective, discretionary “appropriate percentage”.232  
The Court acknowledged that although a policy should contain a mechanism 
whereby an insufficient budget is allocated, such mechanism should be reasonable. In 
this instance, the proposed mechanism was instead illogical and irrational.233 In 
capabilities parlance, the discretionary reduction of allocation by an “appropriate 
percentage” was not explicit in indicating what criteria the department in fact used to 
make such decisions.  
Given that the budgetary process spanned over several months and provided the 
department with advance indications of the funds likely to be appropriated to it, the 
Court held that there was no reason why the department could not plan and prioritise 
its allocations in respect of the NPO service plans. In concluding that the department 
could not allocate its resources “senselessly” and end up paying “palpably insufficient 
amounts to all approved NPO’s”, the Court stated:  
 
                                            
231 National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v 
MEC for Social Development (1719/2010) [2011] ZAFSHC 84 (9 June 2011) para 10.  
232 Thus, once service plans are approved based on objective criteria, and the NPO 
contribution is subtracted, the amount that should be allocated in terms of the KPMG allocation 
model is further reduced by what could amount to almost half of the initially determined 
allocation (para 15).  
233 Para 16.  
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“The department’s constitutional and statutory obligations require planning and 
prioritisation. In so doing, even though this may require some tough decisions, the 
department could justify in a manner consistent with the Bill of Rights as a whole, the 
effective funding of the prioritised services…”234 
 
To be reasonable, resource allocation decisions must therefore be consistent with 
the normative objectives of the Bill of Rights and must in addition be fair, equitable and 
transparent.235 Any prioritisation necessitated by an insufficient budget must be made 
by means of transparent and ascertainable criteria.236 Moreover, the State must 
explicitly demonstrate its utilisation of such criteria. In NAWONGO 2, the Court thus 
demanded a further revision of the funding policy to bring it in line with the normative 
criteria expounded in NAWONGO 1, and additionally ordered the department to 
consult with the NPO’s prior to filing a revised policy.237 By combining explicitness with 
informational broadening and retaining supervision,238 the Court thus by and large 
adopted a capabilities approach to remedies where State resource allocation was at 
issue. 
 
6 4 2 2 2 NAWONGO 3 and NAWONGO 4  
 
However, in NAWONGO 3, the revised funding policy was again held to be 
unconstitutional due to the retention of an “undefined discretion”239 and a resulting lack 
of explicitness. The Court emphasised the need for explicitness in prioritising resource 
allocation:  
 
                                            
234 Para 22. Compare Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social 
Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC) para 45.  
235 In Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 
6 SA 505 (CC) para 45 the Constitutional Court likewise stated that allocative criteria for scarce 
resources must be consistent with the Bill of Rights as a whole. See chapter five part 5 2 3 
above.  
236 National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v 
MEC for Social Development (1719/2010) [2011] ZAFSHC 84 (9 June 2011) para 24.  
237 Para 28 order 2.  
238 The Court adhered to the capabilities tenet of informational broadening when it ordered the 
State to meaningfully engage with the NPO’s. See part 6 4 1 2 3 above.  
239 National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v 
MEC for Social Development, Free State (1719/2010) [2013] ZAFSHC 49 (28 March 2013) 
para 19. 
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“The non-profit organisations must know what they are funded for, their funds cannot be 
determined by a discretion in relation to budget. The content of the item covered must be 
clearly and unambiguously spelled out.”240 
 
In NAWONGO 4, the revised policy was upheld as constitutional. The Court 
emphasised that it could not determine the exact amounts that the State should 
allocate to fund NPO programmes. However, the Court reiterated that a funding policy 
that did not address the needs of the most vulnerable or needy would not constitute a 
reasonable measure.241 In casu, the Court concluded that the department’s 
prioritisation of programmes which it would fund was reasonable.242 In addition, the 
Court emphasised that once the policy was finalised, the department could approach 
the Treasury for increased allocation. The Court observed the importance of submitting 
an explicitly motivated request for increased allocation:  
 
“The department’s budget submissions could clearly set out the needs and the core costs 
thereof. In this manner the extent of denial of rights by inadequate allocation will be clear 
and Treasury will have to make a decision in this regard that complies with the 
Constitution.”243 
 
The Court expressed its optimism that Treasury would allocate additional funds to 
the department in the light of an explicit or “properly motivated and costed request for 
funding”.244 The State must therefore make its prioritising decisions explicit, and must 
likewise submit explicit justifications for requests to receive increased allocations from 
Treasury.  
 
6 4 2 2 3 Hlophe v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 
 
Hlophe v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality245 is another example of 
the State not displaying explicitness in its remedial action. In casu, the City of 
Johannesburg was obliged to provide alternative accommodation to residents of a 
                                            
240 Para 17 (emphasis added). 
241 National Association of Welfare Organisations and Non-Governmental Organisations v 
Member of the Executive Council for Social Development, Free State (1719/2010) [2014] 
ZAFSHC 127 (28 August 2014) para 23. 
242 Paras 25-27.  
243 Para 26. 
244 Para 27.  
245 2013 4 SA 212 (GSJ). 
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privately owned building prior to eviction.246 The matter came to be heard by Satchwell 
J following the City’s non-compliance with two previous court orders.247  
Both previous orders had required the City to provide detailed reports regarding the 
“nature and location” of the temporary accommodation the City was obliged to provide 
to the occupiers.248 However, the City concluded in its first resulting report that it would 
be impossible for it to comply with the order to provide alternative accommodation due 
to “the lack of available buildings and financial and other resources”.249 The second 
order250 again required the City to file a further report, and stated in detail what 
information the report was to contain.251 When the City responded by filing another 
inadequate report, Satchwell J proceeded to strongly condemn the lack of explicitness 
displayed by the City: 
 
“[T]he City was ordered to detail certain specified information viz ‘the nature and location of 
the accommodation to be provided’. This both reports failed to do. General elucidation of 
accommodation provided to other persons is of no assistance to the court; information about 
other buildings which are not available for use in housing these occupiers does not take 
resolution of this matter any further; mission and vision and policy development are 
irrelevant to the particular task ordered by the court; budgetary and asset constraints were 
not sought by the court… On reading the report of November 2012, it would seem that 
nothing was done - the past and the present were simply described and the future was 
hoped for. There is no semblance of action and no pretence thereto.”252 
 
The Court accordingly ordered a further report to be filed, and spelled out the 
minutiae of what the report should contain in the hope that explicit instructions “might 
focus the minds of both politicians and functionaries on the work needed to be done 
                                            
246 For a discussion of City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight 
Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 2 SA 104 (CC), which confirmed the State’s obligation to provide 
alternative accommodation even where people are evicted from privately owned buildings, see 
chapter four part 4 3 4 above.  
247 A consent order issued by Claassen J on 12 June 2012 (Hlophe v City of Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Municipality GSJ 12-06-2012 Case no 20127/2011) and a further order issued by 
Lamont J on 6 February 2013 (Hlophe v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality GSJ 
13-02-2013 Case nos 48103/2012 and 20127/2011). 
248 Hlophe v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 2013 4 SA 212 (GSJ) para 11. 
249 Para 13. 
250 Dated 6 February 2013 per Lamont J. Hlophe v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality GSJ 13-02-2013 Case nos 48103/2012 and 20127/2011. 
251 Hlophe v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality 2013 4 SA 212 (GSJ) para 15. 
252 Para 21. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 337 
 
by the City to meet its Constitutional obligations”.253 The City finally responded by 
tendering alternative accommodation.254 Unfortunately, whereas recalcitrance on the 
part of the State is the most common justification for granting a structural interdict, 
neither explicitness – nor effectiveness – can always be extracted from intransigent 
officials.  
The City subsequently lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court of Appeal claiming 
that a mandamus directing functionaries to perform their constitutional obligations is 
never appropriate.255 The Supreme Court of Appeal rejected this argument256 but 
proceeded to set aside the detailed reporting order issued by Satchwell J. The 
reporting order was set aside on the basis that only the nature and location of 
alternative accommodation were at issue before the court a quo.257 This outcome might 
be avoided in the future by requiring litigants to place a wider array of issues before 
the court in an effort to elicit State compliance with its constitutional obligations. 
However, the Supreme Court of Appeal’s further finding that the reporting order 
breached the separation of powers in that it purported “to give directions to the City in 
respect of what is required to comply with its constitutional obligations to provide 
temporary accommodation to homeless persons in general” cannot be supported.258 
Where the State has displayed a misapprehension of its constitutional obligations or 
has been recalcitrant in its attempts to remedy a right-violation, a court should provide 
explicit guidelines detailing what compliance with the State’s relevant constitutional 
obligations demands.259  
  
                                            
253 Para 27. An interim order to meaningfully engage with the applicants was issued in Hlophe 
v City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality GSJ 14-06-2013 Case nos 48103/2012 and 
20127/2011. 
254 For a summary of this protracted litigation, see SERI “Hlophe and Others v City of 
Johannesburg and Others (‘Hlophe’)” (2013) SERI-SA <http://www.seri-sa.org/index.php/19-
litigation/case-entries/196-hlophe-and-others-v-city-of-johannesburg-and-others-hlophe> 
(accessed 15-09-2014).  
255 Respondent’s heads of argument in City of Johannesburg v Hlophe SCA Case no 
1035/2014.  
256 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Hlophe 2015 2 All SA 251 (SCA) para 26. 
257 Para 27. 
258 Para 28.  
259 See part 6 4 2 1 above regarding the requirement for judicial explicitness.  
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6 4 2 2 4 Madzodzo  
 
Finally, in Madzodzo v Minister of Basic Education260 (“Madzodzo”), the right to 
education was again at issue, this time in relation to school furniture shortages at 
schools in the Eastern Cape. Non-compliance with a consent order to, inter alia, 
establish a Furniture Task Team, conduct an audit of school furniture shortages, and 
to meet the furniture needs of the schools resulted in a further supervisory order. The 
Court again required explicitness on the part of the State when it held: 
 
“[I]t is not good enough to state that inadequate funds have been budgeted to meet the 
needs and that the respondents therefore cannot be placed on terms to deliver the identified 
needs of schools within a fixed period of time. Nor is it good enough to state that the full 
extent of the needs is unknown. The information available to the respondents from 2011 
was such that reasonable estimates of the funding required could be made and reasonable 
steps taken to plan for such expenditure.”261 
 
The Court accordingly held that the imposition of a structural interdict was called for 
to ensure reasonable compliance by the State with its constitutional obligations.262 
While recognising that the procurement of additional resources from the Provincial and 
National Treasuries, and a tender process to procure furniture, would take some time, 
the Court observed that the State had not explicitly indicated how much time would be 
needed for these purposes. The Court thus imposed a 90 day time limit for the State 
to meet the furniture needs of the relevant schools. In the event that the State required 
an extension, the Court again emphasised the need for explicitness in that the State 
would have to make “full disclosure” as to the steps already taken to meet the deadline, 
as well as the time period needed to comply with the original order.263 
Explicitness at the remedial stage of adjudication is therefore crucial to ensure 
constitutionally complaint, capabilities-focused resource allocation decisions. Courts 
are required to provide the normative contours of a reasonable resource allocation 
decision, whereas the State must in turn provide explicit information regarding its 
efforts to devise reasonable allocative plans.  
  
                                            
260 2014 3 SA 441 (ECM). 
261 Para 35. 
262 Para 36. 
263 Para 40. 
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6 4 3 Supervision 
 
A capabilities approach to development posits that capabilities can be realised in 
countries with limited resources through skilled implementation of social 
programmes.264 The capabilities approach therefore postulates that programmes 
aimed at capability realisation must be effective. Similarly, where an unreasonable 
resource allocation decision results in the infringement of a socio-economic right, an 
effective remedy must follow. The effectiveness of a remedy can be assessed by 
determining to what extent it can and does realise the capabilities underlying the 
infringed socio-economic right. Capability realisation is therefore the measure against 
which the effectiveness of a remedy can be judged. In Fose v Minister of Safety and 
Security265 the Constitutional Court echoed the need for effective remedies: 
 
“In our context an appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy, for without effective 
remedies for breach, the values underlying and the rights entrenched in the Constitution 
cannot properly be upheld or enhanced. Particularly in a country where so few have the 
means to enforce their rights through the courts, it is essential that on those occasions when 
the legal process does establish that an infringement of an entrenched right has occurred, 
it be effectively vindicated. The courts have a particular responsibility in this regard and are 
obliged to ‘forge new tools’ and shape innovative remedies, if needs be, to achieve this 
goal.”266 
 
By adopting a capabilities approach to remedies, courts are able to discharge their 
responsibility by shaping innovative, effective remedies. An injunction to broaden the 
information available to the State in devising a reasonable allocative plan through 
participative processes, engagement and intergovernmental co-operation is essential. 
Where the State lacks the information necessary to determine what capability 
realisation requires in a given case, its remedial plan will not be effectively tailored to 
that end. Explicit normative parameters that broadly indicate what a reasonable 
allocative decision must encompass in order to remedy the infringement of a socio-
economic right, is also an essential constituent of an effective remedy. This allows the 
State to gain a better understanding of its constitutional obligations, and can reduce 
the time required for the formulation of an effective remedial plan. In addition, the 
                                            
264 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 46-49; chapter two part 2 2 3, chapter five part 5 4 
2 4 above.  
265 1997 3 SA 786 (CC). 
266 Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) para 69 (emphasis added).  
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dialogic aspect of a structural interdict transcends the need for reflexive resort to 
deference based on concerns of constitutional and institutional competence in the 
context of polycentric matters of resource allocation. However, participatory processes 
aimed at informational broadening and explicit reasoning are not sufficient. In addition, 
the retention of supervision is a crucial element of an effective remedy.267   
Supervisory jurisdiction is not only justified where the State has demonstrated 
intransigence, but also where vital, basic socio-economic capabilities are imperilled by 
unreasonable resource allocation decisions. Where reasonable resource allocation 
decisions are not effectively secured by a chosen remedy, “irremediable” damage can 
result to those whose capabilities are being deprived as a result of the right-
infringement.268 By monitoring the various participatory processes aimed at 
informational broadening, courts can ensure that relevant capabilities and concomitant 
allocative needs are properly identified in a situation of bargaining parity.269 
Furthermore, the continued involvement of the court allows it to revise and adapt its 
orders based on the information that comes to light during the process of engagement 
and informational broadening. Supervision is also necessary to ensure that revised 
resource allocation decisions are not only aimed at capability realisation for the parties 
to the litigation, but that allocative decisions are systemically improved. Liebenberg 
states in this regard: 
 
“[J]udicial supervision to ensure that bargaining disparities do not undermine the rights of 
particular litigants is insufficient on its own … Constitutional remedies should strive as far 
as possible to ensure that others similarly situated benefit from the relief that a court is 
prepared to give to the particular successful litigants in a case. This principle captures the 
forward-looking dimension of constitutional remedies by seeking to secure systemic 
compliance with constitutional rights.”270   
 
                                            
267 C Rodríguez-Garavito “Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism on 
Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America” (2011) 89 Texas L Rev 1669 1691-1692. The 
retention of supervision is made possible by the broad provision made for remedies in s 172 
of the Constitution and by s 8 of PAJA. 
268 K Roach & G Budlender “Mandatory Relief and Supervisory Jurisdiction: When is it 
Appropriate, Just and Equitable” (2005) 122 SALJ 325 334. 
269 S Liebenberg “Deepening Democratic Transformation in South Africa through Participatory 
Constitutional Remedies” (2015) National Journal of Constitutional Law (forthcoming). 
270 S Liebenberg “Deepening Democratic Transformation in South Africa through Participatory 
Constitutional Remedies” (2015) National Journal of Constitutional Law (forthcoming). 
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In Magidimisi NO v The Premier of the Eastern Cape271 the High Court was called 
upon to deal with a failure by government to comply with monetary judgments against 
it relating to social security. Owing to the apparent failure by the State to understand 
its constitutional obligation to comply with judgments, the Court felt compelled to make 
a declaratory order clarifying that judgments sounding in money constituted a direct 
charge against the Provincial Revenue Fund.272 The Court therefore observed the 
capabilities-informed tenet of explicitness. Furthermore, the Court issued a detailed 
structural interdict by means of which it retained jurisdiction to ensure compliance with 
the various judgments in question in an attempt to guarantee the effectiveness of the 
remedy.273 The Court elucidated the added benefits of structural interdicts: 
 
“[Structural interdicts] have contributed to a better understanding on the part of public 
authorities of their constitutional legal obligations in particular areas, whilst it has also 
assisted the judiciary in gaining a valuable insight in the difficulties that these authorities 
encounter in their efforts to comply with their duties.”274 
 
Courts can accordingly discharge their constitutional duty to devise effective 
remedies by compelling the State to report back to the court regarding the steps it has 
taken to formulate reasonable allocative decisions in consultation with a broad range 
of stakeholders. Such plans must be made subject to judicial approval,275 and should 
facilitate further public scrutiny. In appropriate cases, a court may revise its order and 
adapt its initial explicit normative guidelines in the light of the information garnered 
during the process of engagement. Where participatory processes have not been 
sufficiently adhered to, a court can issue explicit instructions compelling the State to 
rectify defects in relation to its engagement efforts. In so doing, the State can remedy 
any lacunae in its allocative plan that resulted from the participation deficit in the 
engagement process.  
Where the State files a report regarding its progress in formulating and implementing 
reasonable resource allocation decisions, other stakeholders should be granted the 
first opportunity to comment on such report. This may alleviate the supervising court’s 
                                            
271 2006 JDR 0346 (B).  
272 Para 36.  
273 Para 39.  
274 Para 32. 
275 Cf Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the South 
African Social Security Agency (No 2) 2014 4 SA 179 (CC) where a reporting back order, and 
not a structural interdict, was granted. 
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burden to some extent. The assistance of organisations such as the South African 
Human Rights Commission or ad hoc commissions276 may also be solicited in order to 
supervise the implementation of the order, with the court only approving plans or 
issuing further directions at protracted intervals.277 The retention of supervision can 
thus catalyse a truly collaborative partnership between the courts, the State, and all 
stakeholders who have an interest in reasonable resource allocation decisions aimed 
at socio-economic capability realisation.  
 
6 5 Conclusion  
 
A capabilities approach to remedies postulates relief that can effectively vindicate 
the capabilities underlying a socio-economic right that was infringed through 
disproportionate resource allocation. The effectiveness of a remedy can thus be 
assessed against the measure of capability realisation. Furthermore, in this chapter it 
was argued that a capabilities approach to remedies requires the incorporation of three 
features that interact with each other in the common pursuit of ensuring effectiveness. 
These are participation aimed at broadening the information available to the court and 
the State for the formulation of an effective remedy, explicitness in the provision of 
normative guidelines by the court and the formulation of a remedial plan by the State, 
and the retention of supervision by the court. Where all three these principles are 
adhered to, remedies are capable of ensuring reasonable and proportionate resource 
allocation decisions at a systemic level. It was further shown that the structural interdict 
can be designed so as to include all three of these crucial capabilities-based features.  
                                            
276 For the use of commissions in India to monitor the implementation of remedies, see chapter 
three part 3 3 2 3 3 above; PN Bhagwati “Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation” (1985) 
23 Colum J Transnat’l L 561 575-577; J Cassels “Judicial Activism and Public Interest 
Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?” (1989) 37 Am J Comp L 495 500, 506.  
277 Where institutions or commissions are charged with monitoring the progress of a structural 
interdict, the supervising court must explicitly define their roles and functions to avoid the 
confusion that resulted when the South African Human Rights Commission agreed to “monitor” 
State compliance with its constitutional obligations in the wake of the judgment in Government 
of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC). See K Pillay “Implementing 
Grootboom: Supervision Needed” (2002) 3 ESR Review 13 14. See further M Ebadolahi “Using 
Structural Interdicts and the South African Human Rights Commission to Achieve the Judicial 
Enforcement of Economic and Social Rights in South Africa” (2008) 83 NYULR 1565 1602-
1605.  
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Thus far, the Constitutional Court has displayed reluctance to issue remedies that 
meet all three of these requirements in cases where qualified socio-economic rights 
were at issue. Instead, the Court has focused on issuing exclusively participatory 
remedies,278 or remedies that encompass explicit normative guidelines or instructions 
but lack participatory and supervisory elements.279 The Court has been loath to retain 
jurisdiction to monitor the formulation of reasonable allocative decisions and 
implementation of its orders, or to delegate this function to the High Courts. However, 
a structural interdict directed at systemic capability realisation has the potential to 
constitute an effective remedy where unreasonable State resource allocation decisions 
are concerned. 
Moreover, a capabilities approach to the design of a structural interdict is capable 
of substantially addressing concerns that courts are constitutionally and institutionally 
incompetent fora for the adjudication of polycentric resource allocation decisions. The 
capabilities precept to broaden the information available to the State to the greatest 
extent possible in revising its allocative decisions grants the State sufficient latitude to 
devise its own allocative plans within its spheres of competence. A court thus provides 
normative parameters in which such remediation must occur, but leaves the minutiae 
of allocative decisions to the branches of government best equipped to grapple with 
matters of resource allocation. Furthermore, the flexibility inherent in a participatory 
remedy coupled with on-going judicial supervision enables polycentric consequences 
to be dealt with sequentially, as they arise. Polycentric effects are also minimised in 
proportion to the range of interests identified and represented through a process of 
informational broadening.  
However, reasonable capabilities-centred resource allocation decisions can only be 
guaranteed at a systemic level if all three requirements of informational broadening, 
explicitness and supervision are met. A reviewing court must ensure that a 
participatory process directed at informational broadening genuinely occurs among the 
widest range of stakeholders possible. A court is also responsible for elucidating the 
normative contours of what a reasonable and proportionate resource allocation 
decision will encompass in the light of the vital socio-economic capabilities at stake. 
                                            
278 For example, an order to meaningfully engage without accompanying explicit normative 
guidelines.  
279 For example, declaratory orders or mandatory orders not coupled with an order to engage 
and the retention of supervision.  
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Similarly, a court must demand that the State explicitly demonstrate its progress in 
formulating and implementing a remedial plan.  
Finally, the retention of supervision is crucial to ensure an effective remedy. 
Supervision is not only justified where the State has displayed intransigence in devising 
reasonable allocative decisions in the past, but also where the critical importance of 
the basic socio-economic capabilities at issue demands structural relief. A capabilities 
approach to remedies thus aims at institutionalising capabilities-focused resource 
allocation decisions for the benefit of all those whose socio-economic rights remain 
unfulfilled.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
7 1 The need for a coherent theoretical paradigm  
 
Poverty and inequality negate the capabilities of millions of people to live meaningful 
lives.1 For many, the transformative ethos of the Constitution thus exists only on paper. 
The enjoyment of socio-economic rights constitutes a critical prerequisite for the 
transformation of South African society and the unlocking of the potential of its people.2 
Administrative law often serves as a conduit for the realisation of socio-economic 
rights, since the implementation of socio-economic legislation and policy occurs 
through administrative processes. The right to just administrative action thus entails 
that socio-economic goods should not simply be delivered to passive beneficiaries, but 
should rather occur through administrative processes that are lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair.3 Given that the procedural and substantive elements of these rights 
are often inextricable, coherent development across both these spheres of law will be 
conducive to the project of transformative constitutionalism.  
Resources are critical for the combatting of systemic socio-economic disadvantage 
and vulnerability. However, resources are finite. Difficult allocative choices must thus 
be made in an effort to alleviate poverty and inequality on multiple, intersecting levels. 
The fulfilment of different rights, and short-term and long-term poverty alleviation 
programmes and policies, all vie for resources. This dissertation aims to make a 
modest contribution to scholarship concerning the ways in which the law can be utilised 
to aid the alleviation of poverty and socio-economic vulnerability. It does this by 
proposing a theoretical paradigm which can both justify and facilitate the judicial review 
of State resource allocation decisions.  
 
7 2 The value of a capabilities paradigm  
 
Where an unequal distribution of resources threatens the very values on which our 
constitutional democracy is built, accountable, efficient and transparent resource 
allocation becomes essential. In this dissertation it was argued that the judiciary can 
fulfil a meaningful role in extracting constitutionally compliant allocative decisions from 
                                            
1 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 74. 
2 Preamble to the Constitution.  
3 S 33(1).  
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the State. Where different rights and other interests compete for limited resources, 
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capabilities theory can be developed to create a framework in 
which diverse rights and other factors can be weighted and ranked. It was argued that 
the purpose of socio-economic rights is to recognise and protect important human 
capabilities. These underlying capabilities – which resonate with the founding 
constitutional values of human dignity, equality and freedom – can contribute to 
developing the normative content of the relevant socio-economic rights provisions in 
the Constitution.  
Government, civil society organisations, Chapter 9 institutions and courts all 
interpret the meaning and content of rights. The capabilities approach represents an 
exceptionally fruitful means through which socio-economic rights can be imbued with 
substantive content. Content can be determined by asking what specific capabilities 
need to be realised to achieve the normative functioning outcome of living an 
autonomous, dignified life in a position of substantive equality with others. The social 
and historical context may indicate that a group who suffers from patterns of class- and 
race-based disadvantage require increased allocation of socio-economic provisioning 
to bring them into a position of substantive equality with others who have not suffered 
from similar patterns of disadvantage. The factual context or lived reality of those in 
need of socio-economic resource allocation may further identify precisely which 
important capabilities need to be realised in order to achieve the functioning outcome 
described above. Once the content of a socio-economic right has been established in 
a particular context, weight can be assigned to its importance. A measure now exists 
whereby a relevant State resource allocation decision that impacts on socio-economic 
rights can be assessed.  
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capabilities theory can therefore be developed to constitute 
an appropriate theoretical approach to justify and practically aid the judicial review of 
State resource allocation decisions impacting on socio-economic rights. If 
constitutional rights in general, and socio-economic rights in particular, are 
conceptualised as protecting the capabilities or substantive freedom to choose 
meaningful lives, State resource allocation decisions are placed into normative 
perspective. When poverty is viewed as a deprivation of basic capabilities4 such as 
those related to health care and education, allocative decisions can consequently be 
                                            
4 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 20; for a discussion of why poverty should be viewed 
as capability deprivation rather than in terms of low income, see further 87-110 and chapter 
two part 2 2 2 1 1.  
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judged against the measure of capability realisation. Furthermore, resources should 
be allocated progressively beyond the minimum so as to fulfil basic capabilities as well 
as promote the realisation of more complex functioning outcomes such as meaningful 
social, political and economic participation.5  
In chapter two it was demonstrated that a capabilities approach to economic policy 
justifies a wide interpretation of “available resources”.6 A capabilities approach to 
development perceives economic and macro-economic stability as instrumental to 
capability realisation. This implies that capabilities should be central to any evaluation 
of economic progress. In the context of adjudication, capabilities theory justifies an 
evaluation of State resource allocation decisions extending beyond the envelope of 
already allocated resources. At the same time, it contributes to allaying concerns that 
the judiciary lacks the constitutional competence to engage with matters related to 
resource allocation and macro-economic policy.  
 
7 3 A paradigm for valuation and prioritisation 
 
Importantly, the development of the capabilities approach for adjudication can 
facilitate the weighting and ranking of rights and other factors that will often be 
demanded from a reviewing court where the allocation of limited resources is at issue. 
This is especially true since the realisation of socio-economic rights will require the 
State to prioritise its resources. Allocative trade-offs between different socio-economic 
rights, socio-economic rights and other rights, or short-term versus long-term 
measures will frequently be the challenging reality with which the State – and the 
subsequently reviewing court – is faced. In this respect, Nussbaum’s scholarship has 
focused to a greater extent than Sen’s on the important role that national constitutions 
and the judiciary can play in capability realisation.7 The further development of a 
capabilities-based review paradigm can therefore aid adjudication and help mitigate 
concerns that courts lack the institutional competence to review allocative decisions. 
Our transformative Constitution has identified the capabilities our society regards as 
worthy of legal recognition and protection. It is primarily incumbent on the legislative 
and executive branches of government to further elaborate and specify the content and 
                                            
5 For the importance of allocating resources beyond minimum thresholds, see chapter two part 
2 2 2 1 2.  
6 Chapter two part 2 2 3.  
7 MC Nussbaum Creating Capabilities (2011) 170; chapter two part 2 3 1.  
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normative purposes of constitutional rights. The interpretation of the meaning of rights 
should occur in collaboration with civil society organisations and Chapter 9 institutions 
– and, in appropriate cases, the courts. The Constitution can thus be regarded as 
having created an initial focal space or partial ordering where preliminary values have 
been assigned to justiciable rights. However, these values may need to be judicially 
adjusted and further weighted and ranked when rights and other interests vie for 
resources. Such a weighting exercise can only occur where courts are willing to imbue 
socio-economic rights with content drawn from the normative, social, historical and 
factual context of the case at hand.  
As emphasised throughout this dissertation, the overarching normative purpose of 
socio-economic rights can be conceptualised as the achievement of the functioning 
outcome of living an autonomous, dignified life in a position of substantive equality with 
others. The factual context (along with the social and historical context) of the particular 
case can then elucidate what concrete capabilities should be realised to achieve this 
complex, normative functioning outcome. Once the content of the right is established, 
weight can be assigned to the importance of the various capabilities represented by 
the right in a given context. In this way, the partial ordering created by the inclusion of 
abstract socio-economic rights in the Constitution is further refined.  
However, it will be necessary for a court to assign weight to other relevant factors, 
such as considerations of resource constraints or competing socio-economic purposes 
the State seeks to achieve. By assigning weight to various relevant considerations, a 
court determines a range of weights. Where a court finds that the purpose and content 
of a right is particularly important (for example, where basic capabilities are at stake), 
and the deprivation resulting from an inadequate allocation of resources is severe, the 
range of weights should be significantly narrowed. The weight assigned to the 
importance of the right and the severity of capability deprivation resulting from its non-
realisation should thus determine that the intensity of scrutiny applied to the State’s 
justificatory arguments should be sharpened. Thereafter, the court can apply the 
various steps of the proportionality analysis to the impugned allocative decision.8 The 
proportionality analysis culminates in the balancing enquiry, where the court will 
balance the weight assigned to the importance of the right and the severity of the 
                                            
8 Legitimacy, suitability and necessity or the least restrictive means test. See chapter five part 
5 3 3.  
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capability deprivation with the weight assigned to the justificatory arguments raised by 
the State.  
For example, a claimant group may argue that the State has allocated insufficient 
resources for the realisation of the right of access to health care services.9 They may 
show that the realisation of this right is necessary for them to attain the functioning 
outcome of living an autonomous, dignified life in a position of substantive equality with 
others. The social and historical context may indicate that this particular group has 
suffered from class- and race-based patterns of disadvantage, which has deprived 
them of health care services that historically privileged groups enjoy. The factual 
context or lived reality of the group may further indicate that unless they possess the 
capabilities to access safe, hygienic health care facilities and essential medicines such 
as those prescribed for the treatment of tuberculosis or HIV, they will never enjoy a 
good state of health. If they do not possess the capability to enjoy a good state of 
health, they will, in turn, not be able to achieve the functioning outcome of living an 
autonomous, dignified life in a position of substantive equality with others. A court can 
thus ascribe weight to the purpose (the functioning outcome) and content (the various 
capabilities that must be realised for the functioning outcome to be achieved) of the 
right of access to health care services.  
Once this step of the weighting exercise is completed, a reviewing court can 
consider the impugned resource allocation decision. If the State claims it is diverting 
resources from health care to realise the right of access to housing, the court will assign 
weight to the State’s purported policy objective. If the State avers that it simply lacks 
the resources to realise the claimant group’s right, the court will assign weight to the 
consideration of resource constraints. However, the weight assigned to the purpose 
and content of the right, and the gravity of the capability deprivation that results from 
insufficient resource allocation, will determine the level of scrutiny to which the State’s 
justificatory arguments are subjected. If the court assigns significant weight to the right, 
it may apply a standard of robust proportionality to the State’s arguments. The State 
will then have to show that its resource allocation decision is proportionate to the 
importance of the purposes and content of the right of access to health care services 
in the context of the case at hand.  
  
                                            
9 S 27(1)(a) of the Constitution.  
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7 4 The role of the judiciary in a two-stage adjudicatory process 
 
A capabilities-based weighting exercise can effectively aid the adjudication of 
complex allocative decisions only if a two-stage adjudicatory process is followed. The 
assignment of normative content and weight to the socio-economic right at stake 
constitutes a crucial first step that determines what level of scrutiny should be applied 
to an impugned resource allocation decision. Only then, as a second step, should the 
selected level of scrutiny be applied to any justificatory argument of resource 
constraints raised by the State.10 Given the role of constitutional rights as “priority 
setters”11 for government, it is imperative that the judiciary accepts its constitutional 
responsibility for the adoption of a two-stage capabilities-based weighting exercise. A 
capabilities approach to adjudication under a transformative constitution obliges a 
court to engage in substantive reasoning and incorporate the perspectives of a wide 
range of stakeholders in reaching a decision. Automatic resort to judicial deference is 
therefore not appropriate in terms of this approach.  
In implementing a capabilities approach to the adjudication of State resource 
allocation decisions, courts should strive to facilitate participation. Without discounting 
the problems associated with fostering participation in the courtroom,12 this dissertation 
has demonstrated how courts can serve as one (amongst many) deliberative platforms 
by adhering to the capabilities tenet of “informational broadening”.13 Courts should thus 
serve as fora for the public reasoning necessary to rank competing rights, capabilities 
and other interests by expanding the information and diverse interests before it to the 
greatest extent possible. Where socio-economic capabilities are vindicated through 
adjudication, people become equipped with the capability sets necessary to participate 
meaningfully in society.   
Furthermore, courts must promote a culture of justification under a transformative 
constitution. This implies that in adopting a capabilities approach to the adjudication of 
State resource allocation decisions, courts must observe the capabilities tenet of 
“explicitness” by engaging in substantive reasoning.14 Courts are therefore mandated 
                                            
10 Chapter two part 2 3 2 2.  
11 C Scott & P Alston “Adjudicating Constitutional Priorities in a Transnational Context: A 
Comment on Soobramoney’s Legacy and Grootboom’s Promise” (2000) 16 SAJHR 206 252; 
chapter two part 2 3 4 4.  
12 Chapter two part 2 4 3.  
13 A Sen Development as Freedom (1999) 253, 286.  
14 75; chapter two part 2 4 4.  
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to require cogent justification from the State for their allocative decisions that impact 
on socio-economic rights, and must simultaneously justify their own weighting and 
ranking judgments.  
 
7 5 The instructive value of a comparative perspective  
 
Difficulties in reviewing complex, polycentric resource allocation decisions are 
bound to arise in practice. Domestic courts may draw from the judicial experience of 
reviewing complex matters such as resource allocation decisions in other common-law 
jurisdictions. In this way, our courts can adapt and incorporate the strengths of foreign 
adjudicative approaches while avoiding pitfalls encountered in other jurisdictions. 
Cognisance should thus be taken of the comparative perspective offered in chapter 
three, and its implications for the adoption of a capabilities approach to adjudication.  
In this dissertation, a normative-dialogical and functionalist methodology was 
adopted to analyse the similarities and differences between the judicial approaches in 
the United Kingdom and India in respect of the shared problem of the review of State 
resource allocation decisions. Differences in review strategies can usually be ascribed 
to the different constitutional designs prevalent in the jurisdictions under scrutiny. 
However, where similarities are identified, it must be asked whether the normative 
assumptions underlying foreign judicial strategies should be shared by our judiciary, 
which operates under a supreme, transformative constitution.15  
 
7 5 1 The United Kingdom  
 
The judicial approach in the United Kingdom constitutes an aversive example of 
how formalistic reasoning and an overwhelming awareness of parliamentary 
sovereignty under a rigid separation of powers doctrine can hinder a judicial 
contribution to capability realisation.16 The difficulties caused by the adherence to a 
narrow test for Wednesbury unreasonableness17 in the United Kingdom should be 
                                            
15 For the argument that constitutional difference should constitute the starting point for a 
comparative analysis, see chapter one part 1 6 4 3 1 above.  
16 Chapter three part 3 2.  
17 From the well-known English decision of Associated Provincial Picture Houses, Limited v 
Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA) 233-234. See further chapter three part 3 2 3 
1.  
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avoided by South African courts in their application of reasonableness review both in 
socio-economic rights and administrative law cases. Whereas our pre-constitutional 
model of administrative law review was inherited from the United Kingdom, a more 
unified standard of constitutional review should be developed in order to contribute to 
our project of transformative constitutionalism. If our judiciary fails to develop a 
substantive test for reasonableness review across the fields of socio-economic rights 
and administrative justice jurisprudence, it risks encountering the same problems that 
are apparent from the analysis of the position in the United Kingdom. Most significantly, 
if our judiciary reverts to a thin conception of judicial review, important capabilities may 
be imperilled and socio-economic rights may not enjoy sufficient protection. 
Furthermore, the normative assumption that underlies UK courts’ reflexive resort to 
deference and the application of restrictive standards of scrutiny to government’s 
allocative decisions is that the will of the legislature is supreme. Courts in the United 
Kingdom thus ascribe their constitutional and institutional incompetence to review 
resource allocation decisions to the system of parliamentary sovereignty prevalent in 
that jurisdiction. Whereas this assumption is questionable in the United Kingdom,18 it 
is clearly inappropriate in South Africa’s system of constitutional supremacy. In South 
Africa, the judiciary is obliged to contribute to the transformation of society through its 
interpretation and enforcement of constitutional rights.  
Moreover, South African courts should recognise the focal space created for the 
weighting of capabilities by the inclusion of socio-economic rights and the right to 
administrative justice in the Constitution. A similar partial ordering of important 
capabilities does not exist in the United Kingdom. However, a move towards rights-
based review following the adoption of the Human Rights Act, 1998, is instructive to 
the extent that it illustrates that the normative purposes of rights justify judicial 
involvement in complex matters.19 In addition, calls from leading academics in the 
United Kingdom to adopt proportionality review as a uniform head of review should be 
acknowledged by the South African judiciary.20 Proportionality as a robust 
manifestation of reasonableness review resonates strongly with the weighting exercise 
required by a capabilities approach to the adjudication of resource allocation decisions.  
 
                                            
18 See, for example, the academic calls for judicial reform in the United Kingdom discussed in 
chapter three part 3 2 2 above.  
19 See further chapter three part 3 2 2.  
20 P Craig Administrative Law 7 ed (2012) 668-673; chapter three part 3 2 4.  
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7 5 2 India 
 
The judicial approach in India serves as a more positive comparative example than 
that of the United Kingdom. The normative assumption that underlies innovative 
judicial strategies in India is that of a supreme constitution aimed at the egalitarian 
socio-economic transformation of society. This normative assumption is therefore 
congruent with that which underlies our own constitutional enterprise.  
The Indian Supreme Court’s innovation of Public Interest Litigation demonstrates 
that the institutional and structural characteristics of the judiciary can be adapted in 
order to bring capabilities into focus in the judicial process.21 The Indian example 
illustrates that procedures can be relaxed, and the adversarial model can be altered, 
so as to partially overcome objections that courts lack the constitutional and 
institutional competence necessary to review complex resource allocation decisions. 
Furthermore, the separation of powers doctrine has to a large extent been 
reconceptualised in India as a more collaborative endeavour that sets social justice as 
a common goal for all branches of government.  
However, the Indian Supreme Court has not been immune to the challenges 
presented by the need to adjudicate complex, polycentric issues such as State 
resource allocation decisions. This has been reflected in a lack of coherence in the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, which hinders the incorporation of the capabilities 
approach tenet of explicitness into its adjudicative approach. A similar problem can be 
avoided by South African courts by adopting the theoretical paradigm espoused in 
chapter two.  
The Indian Supreme Court’s recent unprincipled resort to judicial deference is also 
problematic, especially in cases where economic or developmental policy was 
challenged. This pitfall can be avoided by South African courts by adhering to a 
capabilities approach to adjudication that requires explicit, substantive reasoning as 
postulated in chapter two.22 Furthermore, in this dissertation it was argued that 
deference-related concerns should not influence the weighting process required by a 
capabilities approach to adjudication. Instead, concerns regarding the judiciary’s 
                                            
21 Chapter three part 3 3 2 3.  
22 Chapter two part 2 4 4. 
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constitutional and institutional competence to review State resource allocation 
decisions should be addressed at the remedial stage of adjudication.23  
Yet another characteristic of the Indian legal system that should be avoided in South 
Africa is the fragmented nature of administrative law review. This problem can be partly 
ascribed to the fact that India, like South Africa, inherited its model of administrative 
law review from the United Kingdom. Instead of allowing judicial review to develop 
along the parallel lines of common-law judicial review and constitutional review, a 
unified standard of review is desirable from the perspective of capability realisation. 
This dissertation has shown that administrative justice can often not be extricated from 
socio-economic rights, and additionally serves as a critical conduit for the realisation 
of these rights.24 In South Africa, reasonableness review holds the potential to be 
developed across both the fields of socio-economic rights and administrative justice to 
constitute a uniform head of review that shares many similarities with a capabilities-
based standard of review. The unified, substantive development of reasonableness 
review within and beyond administrative law is thus necessary, and to the extent that 
Indian law eschews such development it should not be followed.  
 
7 6 The need for a coherent approach in our jurisprudence  
 
Proportionality as a context-sensitive standard of review has not been consistently 
applied or adequately developed by the South African Constitutional Court. Instead, a 
variable standard25 of reasonableness review has developed across the spheres of 
socio-economic rights and administrative justice jurisprudence. Because socio-
economic rights are often realised through the medium of administrative action, it is 
important for this common standard of review to be developed coherently.  
In chapter four, it was argued that a pressing need for development of a capabilities-
based standard of scrutiny exists. It was demonstrated that the Constitutional Court 
has placed excessive focus on the reasonableness of the State action at issue, as 
                                            
23 See, for example, chapter four parts 4 2 3 and 4 3 2; chapter five part 5 2 1 3; chapter six 
parts 6 3 1 and 6 3 2. 
24 See chapter two part 2 2 2 2 3 for the futility of attempting to separate matters of procedure 
from substance, since these are often intertwined – especially where socio-economic rights 
are at issue.  
25 Reasonableness review encompasses a spectrum of different levels of scrutiny ranging from 
“weak” rationality scrutiny, “medium” reasonableness scrutiny, and “robust” proportionality 
scrutiny.  
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opposed to the rights at stake. By failing to interpret the substantive content of socio-
economic rights, the Constitutional Court has not adhered to the capabilities tenet of 
engaging in explicit, substantive reasoning.26 Where courts do not engage in 
substantive reasoning, it is difficult to evaluate and challenge judgments through a 
subsequent process of public scrutiny.  
Moreover, the Court’s approach hitherto has by and large collapsed the 
interpretative and justificatory stages of adjudication. If the value of the theoretical 
paradigm composed of a capabilities approach to adjudication is recognised, a two-
stage adjudicatory process must be consistently applied in the future. The normative 
content and purposes of socio-economic rights must thus be determined, as a first 
step, in order to establish what level of scrutiny should appropriately be applied to the 
State’s resource allocation decisions as a second step.  
Furthermore, by failing to allow the content of the rights at issue to determine what 
resources should be allocated for their realisation, the Court has at times adopted a 
narrow definition of “available resources”.27 If a capabilities approach to the 
adjudication of resource allocation decisions is adopted, “available resources” should 
be interpreted widely so as not to limit the normative content or remedial potential of 
socio-economic rights.  
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court has evinced the competence to adjudicate 
State resource allocation decisions in certain cases analysed in chapter four.28 An 
approach to reviewing resource allocation decisions which focuses on the critical 
capabilities represented by socio-economic rights is to be commended and should be 
continued in the future. In particular, the Court has demonstrated that it is 
constitutionally and institutionally competent to adjudicate intricate, polycentric policy 
matters.29 There is therefore no reason why a similar weighting exercise cannot be 
conducted where complex resource allocation decisions that implicate critical 
capabilities fall to be adjudicated. The Court has also on occasion subjected the State’s 
justificatory arguments regarding constrained resources to robust scrutiny where 
socio-economic rights were imperilled by the allocation of inadequate resources.30  
                                            
26 Chapter four part 4 2 1.  
27 Chapter five part 4 2 2.  
28 Chapter four part 4 3.  
29 Minister of Health v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign as 
Amicus Curiae) 2006 2 SA 311 (CC); chapter four part 4 3 3.  
30 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 
2012 2 SA 104 (CC); chapter four part 4 3 4.  
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A capabilities approach to adjudication requires that these promising developments 
be consistently elaborated and applied in cases where capability deprivation may result 
from unreasonable allocative decisions. As was illustrated in the analysis of the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence in chapter five, this goal can best be achieved by 
employing proportionality as a standard of review where socio-economic capabilities 
are imperilled by constitutionally deficient resource allocation.31 
 
7 7 A capabilities-based standard of review 
 
A capabilities approach to adjudication requires that courts engage with the 
normative content and purposes of socio-economic rights with reference to the 
capabilities these rights represent and the fundamental values that they seek to foster.  
A capabilities-based standard of review can address the problematic aspects of the 
Constitutional Court’s approach to adjudication identified in chapter four. Where 
diverse capabilities, or short-term versus long-term capability realisation vie for 
resources, the weighting exercise required for the ranking of capabilities and other 
factors can be carefully adapted for judicial use. Proportionality review, as a robust, 
context-sensitive manifestation of reasonableness review, can be developed to 
constitute a judicial tool for the capabilities-based judicial review of State resource 
allocation decisions.32 Proportionality review constitutes an inherently normative 
balancing test that allows the content of rights to determine the level of scrutiny to 
which impugned resource allocation decisions are subjected. In addition, 
proportionality review is congruent with the values underlying a culture of justification, 
in that it elicits responsiveness, openness and accountability from the State and the 
reviewing court.33  
                                            
31 Proportionality as a standard of review was foreshadowed in the minority judgment of Bel 
Porto School Governing Body v Premier, Western Cape 2002 3 SA 265 (CC) and further 
elaborated in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 
4 SA 490 (CC) para 45. Proportionality has also been accepted as an appropriate standard of 
review where socio-economic rights overlap with the right to equality. Khosa v Minister of 
Social Development; Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development 2004 6 SA 505 (CC). See 
chapter five part 5 2. The Constitutional Court has also subjected the violation of the “negative” 
aspect of socio-economic rights to the strict limitations test under s 36 of the Constitution, 
which incorporates a proportionality analysis. Jaftha v Schoeman; Van Rooyen v Stoltz 2005 
2 SA 140 (CC). See further chapter four part 4 2 4.  
32 Chapter five part 5 3.  
33 Chapter five part 5 4 1.  
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In its application of proportionality as a capabilities-based standard of review, a 
reviewing court should guard against reflexively adopting a posture of deference. It 
should instead observe the capabilities tenet of explicitness by engaging in substantive 
reasoning.34 This means that a court should clearly indicate what weights it assigned 
to various considerations, and why it came to its evaluative conclusions. Furthermore, 
courts should engage with all evidence presented, and not only evidence adduced by 
other branches of the State. In this way, a court can give due consideration to a wide 
range of relevant perspectives. 
Moreover, courts should endeavour to ensure that State resource allocation 
decisions, regardless of their complexity, pass muster when judged against specific 
capabilities-based review criteria.35 First, a reviewing court should require the State to 
demonstrate its awareness of the normative content and purposes of socio-economic 
rights in allocating resources for the fulfilment of these rights. Next, in reviewing 
allocative decisions, courts should interpret “available resources” widely so as to 
prevent the State from attempting to limit the extent of its obligations by allocating 
inadequate resources to the right in question. Courts should thus assume the 
competence to evaluate evidence of disproportionate resource allocation between 
different votes horizontally,36 or spheres of government vertically,37 and of wasteful 
expenditure or under-spending generally. In addition, a reviewing court must extract 
explicitness from the State by requiring it to clearly indicate the rights- and capabilities-
centred allocative process it followed.  
The court can rely on the explicitness required from the State to compare the 
capabilities-based benchmarks elicited from the State and other institutions with the 
results actually achieved. This will ensure that allocated resources are not only 
reasonable in scope, but are also effectively implemented.  
Finally, courts should foster participatory processes through informational 
broadening. This implies that courts should consider a broad range of perspectives by, 
for example, encouraging amici curiae interventions or considering other expert 
evidence. Courts should also require the State to meaningfully engage with diverse 
stakeholders in order to tailor its allocative decisions in the light of the capability needs 
identified through engagement processes. By applying a capabilities-based standard 
                                            
34 Chapter five part 5 4 1.  
35 Chapter five part 5 4 2.  
36 In terms of the relevant Appropriation Act.  
37 In terms of the relevant Division of Revenue Act.  
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of review, the courts can nudge the State to ensure that future allocative decisions 
effectively advance critical socio-economic capabilities. 
 
7 8 A capabilities approach to remedies 
 
If a capabilities-based standard of review finds judicial acceptance, a congruent 
approach to remedies should be developed.38 A capabilities approach to remedies 
requires effective relief. The need for an effective remedy is underscored by the grave 
impact that socio-economic capability deprivation can have on the fundamental values 
of freedom, dignity and equality. The effectiveness of a remedy can thus be assessed 
by its ability to realise the capabilities underlying the infringed socio-economic right. 
The structural interdict can be designed to promote the central capabilities tenets of 
explicitness, informational broadening and, ultimately, effectiveness through the 
retention of supervision. Where all three of these principles are observed, remedies 
are capable of ensuring reasonable and proportionate resource allocation decisions at 
a systemic level.  
In future, courts should provide explicit normative guidelines outlining what a 
reasonable resource allocation decision will encompass in order to remedy the 
infringement of a socio-economic right in the light of the socio-economic capabilities at 
stake. Furthermore, courts should ensure that a process of informational broadening 
occurs by including the perspectives of the widest range of stakeholders practicable in 
designing an appropriate remedy. In addition, the retention of supervision is crucial to 
ensure an effective remedy. The retention of supervision will be appropriate where the 
importance of the socio-economic capabilities at issue demands structural relief.  
Moreover, a capabilities approach to the design of structural interdicts is capable of 
addressing concerns that courts are constitutionally and institutionally incompetent fora 
for the adjudication of complex, polycentric resource allocation decisions. While 
requiring the State to broaden the information at its disposal when devising allocative 
policies, the court grants the State sufficient latitude to devise its own allocative plans 
within its spheres of competence. Although a court provides normative guidelines 
according to which remediation should take place, it leaves the details of allocative 
decisions to the branches of government best equipped to deal with matters of 
resource allocation. In addition, the flexibility inherent in a participatory remedy coupled 
                                            
38 Chapter six.  
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with on-going judicial supervision enables polycentric consequences to be dealt with 
as they arise. A capabilities approach to remedies thus aims at institutionalising 
reasonable resource allocation decisions to ensure capability realisation at a systemic 
level.  
 
7 9 Future developments  
 
This dissertation aims to catalyse further debate and scholarship regarding the 
important role that the capabilities approach can play in constitutional adjudication. 
However, it is by no means a comprehensive or final exposition. Whereas this 
dissertation postulates a capabilities paradigm for the judicial review of State resource 
allocation decisions impacting on socio-economic rights, a capabilities approach to 
adjudication can be fruitfully developed for socio-economic rights adjudication in 
general, and expanded further for all aspects of constitutional review.  
 
7 9 1 A capabilities approach to administrative justice  
 
This dissertation recognises and addresses the important instrumental value of 
administrative justice for the realisation of socio-economic rights. Nevertheless, given 
the extensive scope and inherent importance of administrative justice in our 
constitutional democracy, a capabilities approach for administrative law in particular 
can be elaborated.  
The distinction that Sen draws between the “opportunity” and “process” aspects of 
freedom cannot be supported.39 Sen argues that the opportunity aspect of freedom 
relates to the opportunities that people have to live the lives they have reason to value, 
given their social circumstances. In contrast, the process aspect of freedom concerns 
the nature of the processes through which choices are made. Sen concludes that the 
capabilities approach only applies to the opportunity aspect of freedom, and that its 
scope does not allow for a focus on fairness of procedures.40 This position is unsound, 
since the procedural and substantive facets of rights are often indivisible.41 
Reasonable, fair procedures thus constitute part of the lives we have reason to value. 
                                            
39 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 228-230; chapter two part 2 2 2 2 3.  
40 A Sen The Idea of Justice (2009) 295. 
41 Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) para 39. 
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A pressing need exists to further analyse and develop the inextricable links that often 
exist between procedure and substance.  
Once this lacuna in Sen’s capabilities theory is sufficiently addressed, a capabilities 
approach to administrative law review – and administrative law in general – can 
potentially hold significant benefits for the coherent development of this field of law in 
congruence with the ethos of a transformative constitution. However, this important 
project falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
 
7 9 2 A wider comparative and international law perspective 
 
This dissertation has expounded a limited comparative perspective which focuses 
on the judicial approach to the review of resource allocation decisions and analogously 
complex policy matters in the United Kingdom and India. The selection of jurisdictions 
was partly motivated by a historical and classificatory methodological approach, given 
the extensive influence of English law on the legal systems in India and South Africa.42  
Again, expansion of this contribution to encompass a wider comparative perspective 
that focuses on recent developments in, for example, Canada and Columbia, is 
necessary. In Canada, indirect protection is afforded to socio-economic rights by the 
application of the equality provision in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.43 
Although the Canadian Supreme Court has shown deference to government’s socio-
economic resource allocation,44 it has nevertheless required that government justify its 
allocative choices where vulnerable groups are excluded from social benefits. The 
approach of the Canadian Supreme Court therefore merits closer scrutiny.  
                                            
42 For a further exposition of the rationale for the selection of the comparative jurisdictions as 
well as the methodological approach adopted, see chapter one part 1 6 4.  
43 S 15 of the Canadian Charter on Rights and Freedoms. See S Liebenberg Socio-Economic 
Rights: Adjudication under a Transformative Constitution (2010) 125 for a discussion of the 
indirect protection of socio-economic rights afforded by the application of values such as 
equality in the Canadian context. See also M Jackman & B Porter “Canada: Socio-economic 
Rights under the Canadian Charter” in M Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging 
Trends in International and Comparative Law (2008) 209; S Fredman “Providing Equality: 
Substantive Equality and the Positive Duty to Provide” (2005) 21 SAJHR 163 for a discussion 
and criticism of the application of the values of substantive equality and dignity in Law v 
Canada [1999] 1 SCR 497 and Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney General) [2002] 4 SCR 429.  
44 M Jackman & B Porter “Canada: Socio-economic Rights under the Canadian Charter” in M 
Langford (ed) Social Rights Jurisprudence: Emerging Trends in International and Comparative 
Law (2008) 209 219.  
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In Columbia, the role of public reasoning to evaluate and rank diverse capabilities 
and rights calls for analysis, as does the structural measures employed by the 
Columbian Constitutional Court. For example, in decision T-025 of 2004 the Court 
issued wide-ranging structural orders in an attempt to remedy a systemic breach of 
human rights flowing from forced displacements on a massive scale coupled with State 
inaction that required structural reform and inter-governmental agency co-operation.45  
Furthermore, a capabilities approach to the enforcement of States’ resource-related 
obligations in terms of relevant international human rights treaties may yield significant 
results, and contribute further to the theoretical justification for enforceable obligations 
in the international sphere.46 In this regard, the body of existing scholarship regarding 
rights and resources at international law can be built on.47  
 
7 9 3 Beyond the judiciary  
 
Finally, this dissertation has focused on the role of the judiciary in adjudicating State 
resource allocation decisions impacting on socio-economic rights. The judiciary 
undoubtedly fulfils a critical role in realising the ideals of transformative 
constitutionalism, but its role is by no means exclusive or sufficient. If the capabilities-
based review paradigm espoused in this dissertation finds judicial acceptance, it is to 
be hoped that the same paradigm will be assimilated by the administration in its original 
decision-making processes. Scholarship should continue to focus on the role of various 
actors, including the need for State accountability measures and the contribution that 
Chapter 9 institutions and civil society organisations can and do make. A capabilities 
approach to the conceptualisation and refinement of a collaborative partnership 
between all branches of the State and other stakeholders, holds the potential to place 
                                            
45 See generally C Rodríguez-Garavito “Beyond the Courtroom: The Impact of Judicial Activism 
on Socioeconomic Rights in Latin America” (2011) 89 Texas L Rev 1669. 
46 For example, a capabilities approach may inform the reasonableness test incorporated in 
Art 8(4) of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights GA Res 63/117, 10 December 2008, A/RES/63/117 for the examination of 
State party communications. B Griffey “The ‘Reasonableness’ Test: Assessing Violations of 
State Obligations under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights” (2011) 11 HRLR 275. What, if any, effect South Africa’s recent 
ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) (on 
12 January 2015) will have on domestic socio-economic jurisprudence, remains to be seen. 
47 See, for example, R O’Connell, A Nolan, C Harvey, M Dutschke & E Rooney Applying an 
International Human Rights Framework to State Budget Allocations (2014).  
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competence-based issues of complexity into a perspective that resonates with the 
constitutional project of realising freedom, dignity and equality for all.  
 
7 10 Significance of dissertation 
 
This dissertation seeks to demonstrate that a capabilities approach to adjudication 
can advance the project of transformative constitutionalism. In particular, it develops a 
capabilities review paradigm to allow courts to review complex, polycentric State 
resource allocation decisions. It further shows that the proportionality doctrine can be 
adapted for the judicial review of resource allocation decisions that require the 
weighting and balancing of diverse rights and other considerations. However, it 
cautions that a capabilities-centred weighting exercise is only feasible where courts 
are willing to substantively interpret socio-economic rights. It contends that this 
challenge can be met by identifying the important capabilities that these rights seek to 
protect in the lived reality of litigants and other vulnerable members of society.  
Thus, courts can extract accountability, responsiveness and openness from the 
State by requiring it to justify its allocative choices in the light of the normative content 
and purposes of socio-economic rights. Where reasonable resource allocation 
decisions are required, courts can help ensure that the State directs its resources to 
socio-economic capability realisation at a systemic level. Where resources are 
allocated to realise capability needs, it becomes possible for the socio-economically 
disadvantaged members of our society to unlock their potential and choose to live 
meaningful lives. In this way, a society characterised by freedom, dignity and equality 
for all becomes a realistic prospect.  
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